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
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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST

by



Robert A. Melvin

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements For the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Edmonton, Alberta

July, 1968

Thesis
1968 (F)
54 D.

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies, for acceptance, a dissertation entitled The Concept of Interest, submitted by Robert A. Melvin in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge a long and lasting debt to Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie for the benefits of his vast knowledge and patience. I would like to thank Professor T. C. Pocklington for his encouragement, insights, and helpful criticisms. Professor R. E. Baird has contributed much through more informal conversations, understanding, and encouragement. I owe much to Professor G. R. Davy, for in his very presence there is greatness.

This study could never have been finished without the arduous labours and sacrifices of two outstanding typists, Mrs. Madeline Brooks and Mrs. Myrna Garanis. I would like to extend special thanks to Mr. Brian J. Collins for his long hours of thoughtful and time consuming work in correcting the final manuscript, footnotes and bibliography. Alice and Michelle have perhaps contributed the most through their patient understanding and encouragement.

ABSTRACT

This inquiry, an exercise in explication, turns primarily on the formulation and use of a major concept in the social sciences. The meaning analysis examines ordinary and technical language usages in order to identify and reduce the limitations, ambiguities, and inconsistencies of the term "interest". The reformulation attempts to improve the concept's ability to function in explanatory hypotheses and theories.

It is argued that the concept of interest plays a significant yet largely unexamined role in the discourse of political science and in the language of the social sciences in general. The difficulties encountered in formulating and using concepts in the complex and rapidly expanding activity of social science are illustrated by focusing on this concept. An investigation of the interdisciplinary usages of "interest" provides some insights into the problems confronted in constructing a general behavioural theory. The difficulties involved in relating technical usages to ordinary language meanings are also examined.

The greater part of this inquiry is concerned with meaning analysis. The concept of interest is examined and reviewed in selected literature from the disciplines of psychology, sociology, jurisprudence, and political science. The major usages are then summarized and synthesized on an interdisciplinary basis. Four tests of a concept's usefulness, that is, clarity, conduciveness to ambiguity, fruit-

fulness, and embodiment of ordinary language meaning, are formulated and applied. The usages are then evaluated in the light of this procedure. In the reformulation, it is argued that the term "interest" be retained in a more precisely specified dispositional sense along with the concept of interest as a feeling in relation to attention. It is recommended that the term be withdrawn from non-dispositional usages and that the phenomena involved be synthesized and denoted by other terms. Suggestions are then advanced in order to show how the term "interest" might be used in relation to other terms and expressions which have often occasioned much confusion. It is argued that the reformulated concept of interest might allow more sense to be made of such notions as the public interest, group interest, and class interest. It is generally concluded that a behavioural theory is possible but that its construction will depend on much greater care in concept formation and use.

The theme throughout is that social scientists must attend to the intricacies and shortcomings of their technical language in order to realize continuous and fruitful scientific advances. In short, there is a pressing need for constant conceptual evaluation and reformulation.

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INTRODUCTION

I. The Problem

The aim of this study, in Abraham Kaplan's terms, is methodological. It is an exercise in methodology where "methodology" is taken to mean the study, description, explanation, and justification of methods.¹ Methods include such procedures as forming concepts, formulating hypotheses, making observations, measurements, and experiments, and constructing models and theories. The function of methodology as a whole is to describe and analyze these methods. I propose only to deal with "concepts", assuming that well thought-out and carefully formulated concepts are crucial to the operation of the other methods.

More precisely, this study proceeds as an exercise in what Hempel calls explication (logical analysis, rational reconstruction). The outcome of this type of inquiry should be not simply a review of what a concept has been commonly taken to mean, but it should culminate in specified new and precise meanings. Assigning precise meaning to terms is a matter of "judicious synthesis", Hempel tells us, for it involves rational reconstruction as well as descriptive analysis. Hempel has this to say about the procedure called explication.

Explication is concerned with expressions whose meaning in conversational language or even in scientific discourse is more or less vague (such as "truth", "probability", "number", "cause", "law", "explanation") and aims at giving those expressions a new and precisely determined meaning, so as to render them more suitable for clear and rigorous discourse on the subject matter at hand.²

Two rather severe requirements must be met by any successful explicative reinterpretation. In the first place, the reinterpretation must allow the reformulation of "at least a large part of what is customarily expressed by means of the terms under consideration".³ Secondly, it should be possible to develop a comprehensive, rigorous theory in terms of the reconstructed concepts. The second condition will scarcely be fulfilled in the context of this study, although the groundwork ought to be laid for the incorporation of meaningful concepts into theories. What the whole investigation is trying to accomplish is best summed up in the following:

Taking its departure from the customary meanings of the terms, explication aims at reducing the limitations, ambiguities, and inconsistencies of their ordinary usage by propounding a reinterpretation intended to enhance the clarity and precision of their meaning as well as their ability to function in hypotheses and theories with explanatory and predictive force.⁴

This study is not overly sophisticated in any philosophical or linguistic sense. The question of concepts is unusually complex and frankly puzzling, but it does lie at the very vitals of the social science enterprise. Although this is not intended as a thorough-going contribution to the philosophy of science, it attempts to draw on that body of literature in order to better formulate, and come to grips with, the problems of conceptual vagueness and ambiguity.

This study attempts to delineate, analyze, and evaluate various usages of the concept of interest in the literature which bears on the study of politics. This literature today is almost without limits as the traditional voca-

bulary of politics has been enriched by the conceptual tools and usages of the entire social sciences. Concepts developed in the field and in the laboratories of psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists have been turned to the examination of the political aspects of behaviour. The idea of a behavioural science has become the objective of a number of scholars and research teams. But as the methodological arsenals develop and join, so too does the variety of different concepts and usages increase in complexity. The problem of translating between a variety of technical languages raises the task of conceptual analysis and clarification to a high priority level.

Agreement on basic concepts or units of analysis, the aim of H.D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan in Power and Society, may be too far to seek.⁵ It seems more reasonable to strive for a general awareness of the need for rigour in conceptualization and word usage. Thus other scholars in the field would at least be allowed to see and evaluate the meaning that a concept is given in each instance and to note what aspect of activity the author has claimed to have named and set apart. Research might not be so continuous or rush on with such co-ordinated vigor as would be the case if complete consensus prevailed on concept formation and word usage. But there could be more to lose in terms of imaginative approaches and new direction were this in fact the case. Judging from the experience of Marxists, Freudians, and Watsonian behaviourists, there are restrictive elements in most systems which do not meet well with the open-endedness of science. The short but dramatic record of concept formulation and reformulation in the social sciences of the

last twenty years suggests that the authoritative allocation of usage is not yet a value; clarity and understanding are. Communication is surely a primary condition in any public undertaking, especially science.

The contention that two distinct kinds of theoretical enterprise are possible in the study of politics, the normative and the empirical, is of quite recent origin. Those who suggest that there are a variety of useful and meaningful ways to talk about politics in a normative sense have often been concerned about being clear and concise in argument and in recommendation. There is a long tradition of thoughtful investigation of such terms as "rights", "democracy", "freedom", "power", and "obligation". Linguistic analysis and clarification are important steps, but the activity need not end there.⁶ It is not assumed here, as by some linguistic and analytic philosophers, that the clarification of meanings is about all that philosophers have to offer. It is rather that in getting on with the job of arguing carefully and theorizing clearly, basic terms should be unambiguously and consistently employed.

Although the focus of this study is on the use of concepts in empirical theory, it has a certain bearing on normative questions. In the first place, questions of concept formation and use are general to both kinds of inquiry. In the second place, substantive arguments will be advanced in the concluding chapter by way of elucidating and clarifying such concepts as interest and public interest, concepts which are frequently used in normative discourse.

The recognition of the important role that empirical theory could play in political science was in part a con-

comitant of the rise of the behavioural persuasion. It was also stimulated by the wedge that was driven between the methods of traditional political philosophy and those of scientific or empirical theory. The rasping voice and heavy cudgels of T.D. Weldon probably did much to crystallize the general trend which is best outlined by Arnold Brecht in his encyclopaedic Political Theory.⁷ Those working with empirical theory have been the most insistent in emphasizing the need for conceptual reformulation, clarification, and precision in usage. It appeared to David Easton some time ago that new orienting concepts had to be found, preferably those which could be related in an inclusive conceptual framework.⁸ In his most recent work, Easton argues that a general deductive theory cannot be taken very seriously until a good deal more ground work has gone on.

Each age in a science has its peculiar problems, and a major one in ours is the discovery and definition of stable units for understanding human behavior in its political, as well as in many of its other aspects. . . . Functions, decision-making, power, and interest groups are today central and broad concepts lying at the cross roads of political research and yet little success has been achieved in clarifying their meaning.⁹

The formulation of meaningful generalizations and their subsequent verification, Easton contends, cannot go forward without the prior step of rigorous conceptual analysis.

Where the concepts of which they are composed remain ambiguous there is little possibility of passing on to consider the interrelations among concepts. . . a great deal of what labels itself theory at this stage in the development of political science cannot help but be concerned centrally with the formation and evaluation of concepts. . . . It is just a preliminary, albeit an inescapable step towards the development of such theory.¹⁰

So it is assumed that the exercise of explication generally, and conceptual analysis in particular, is quite legitimate. There are limits, however, to which the activity can be pursued with profit at this stage of social science development. Some methodologists, notably Kaplan, caution against over-zealous campaigning for precision, rigour, and clarity.¹¹ But the case for explication is not that difficult to make in principle, albeit there should be restraints on the activity.

J. H. Masserman puts it as succinctly as any. His one wish is the following:

[T]hat we re-examine the conceptualization and terminology in our field. There is such confusion in terms that are uttered over and over again that our epistemology is uncertain, our heuristics obtuse, our labored investigations not always worth our elaborate investments, our results dubious and communications so ambiguous¹²

Robert K. Merton believes that much of what passes for theorizing "is taken up with the clarification of concepts -- and rightly so It is in this matter of clearly defined concepts that social science research is not infrequently defective." [F]or a basic requirement of research is that the concepts, the variables, be defined with sufficient clarity to enable the research to proceed¹³ It is Rollo Handy's contention that in large measure "the difficulty in behavioral inquiries stems from terminological problems. A major attempt to clarify that terminology is advocated here, on the grounds that existing terminology often hampers inquiry." Handy believes that the problem is more grave than social scientists have admitted. His concern is especially with "the extent to which present

terminology tends to hinder the development of warranted assertions about human action." That is, "semantic confusion seems inextricably bound to substantive problems."¹⁴

The need for careful scrutiny of scientific concepts which must be capable of precise measure, communication, and public test, is stated forcefully by Carl Hempel. It is imperative that "the vocabulary used in the interpretation of scientific terms have a high determinacy and uniformity of usage."¹⁵ That operationalized concepts are not free from the necessity of constant analysis is the argument of Melvin Marx. He suspects that "throwing the spotlight of critical inquiry upon many such concepts would certainly reveal an embarrassing lack of clarity. . . ."¹⁶ E. Meehan is firm in the belief that often unrecognized inadequacies in concepts seriously hinder scientific progress.

One of the major tasks in theory, whatever the discipline, is the clarification, modification, or invention of concepts, and some of the major headaches in theory stem from inadequacies, often unrecognized, in the conceptual armory.¹⁷

Herbert Feigl links the case for conceptual analysis with the larger concern for verifiability and scientific usefulness. He believes that there are a number of questions that should be foremost in any cognitive enterprise.

"What do we mean by the words or symbols we use?" and "How do we know that what we assert in these terms is true (or confirmed to some degree)?" "What do we do in order to find out whether a term is legitimately applicable?" and "What are the fruits by which we shall know whether the introduction of a term is scientifically useful?"¹⁸

Professor R.A. Dahl's persistent attempts to clarify the concept of power must stand as something of a model in this sort of analytical approach.¹⁹ His work appears to have led to much more useful research in politics and community studies than had previously been the case.²⁰ Equally important, he has established a criterion against which scholars can evaluate and direct their own use of the concept. It is probably fair to say that much less ambiguous talk has gone on about power since his efforts have become widely circulated. A case in point may be the lesser role which the concept has been given to play in the basic formulations of most systems approaches. After a thorough review of the literature, it may be possible later in this inquiry to set out the concept of interest in much the same fashion.

It should be mentioned that the primary concern is for caution, clarity, and rigour in theorizing, and not so much with the use of terms in ordinary language. It is John Plamenatz who draws this distinction most clearly.

It is only when, either as politicians or as economists, we theorize, that we must take precautions otherwise unnecessary, that we must not assume that we understand one another well enough for the purpose in hand, but must, on the contrary, always take heed lest we imagine we understand when in fact we do not.²¹

As Plamenatz reminds us, the notion of an interest is understood fairly well in ordinary language. It is indeed uncommon to hear people on a bus, in a pub, or at a ball game, challenging one another about what is meant by "interest". It is not the intention here to have everyone feeling guilty whenever he uses the concept of interest in ordinary discourse; only when he theorizes.

It should also be allowed that some rare genius who delights in inconsistent use of terms and vague concepts may lead us through mistake or flashing insight to knowledge of a most worthwhile nature. It can only be suggested that such genius appears to be rare, and that in such cases, little profit could be derived from this plodding and pedestrian undertaking. In any event, to be useful in general theory and practical research, such concepts would still have to be carefully defined for public consumption. The assumption here is that most scholars would do even more useful work by taking greater care in the concepts they formulate and in the choice of terms by which they are named.

II. Major areas of confusion.

What is it about concepts and the use of concepts that has been confusing? What kinds of problems ought to be remedied? A careful appraisal of what is said to be wrong with concepts in use should give some insights into what will be necessary in adequately explicating and reformulating concepts.

A. Vagueness, lack of determinacy.

For example, the term "hat" could be said to be vague. Various kinds of objects seem to fit the criterion and it would be a matter of some decision as to whether or not the term applied.²²

Vagueness is what Kaplan regards as "openness of meaning". All terms are said to be vague, partly by the process in which we learn language. Similarities must always

be perceived, and borderline cases almost inevitably occur. In Kaplan's view vagueness is of two kinds: (1) external and (2) internal.²³

1. External vagueness.

As in the above, this occurs when there is difficulty in deciding whether or not something belongs to the designated class. Here meaning is open at the edges, meaning is open in regard to what is comprised under the term.

2. Internal vagueness.

This turns on the "species" itself. Meaning is open "with respect to what should be taken as a typical, standard, or ideal instance."²⁴ Kaplan believes that it is the case that no one property or fixed set of properties will run through a whole class. The question seems to be partly that raised in the first sense of vagueness -- does it nearly enough satisfy the classification to stand as an instance of A? Yet Kaplan is suggesting that we are faced with family resemblances whereby a property B is very close to that exhibited by A yet has a great deal of A'ness about it. It is a question of setting up subclasses, in this case, of B's under the main class A.

Kaplan advances a necessary caution in regard to vagueness. He believes that some vagueness is inevitable in any language, whether ordinary or technical. He is also concerned that taking meanings as wholly fixed can have a pernicious effect on a developing science. The call for "exactness of meaning and for precise definition of terms" can lead, Kaplan contends, to "premature closure of our ideas."²⁵ Now it seems no great concession here to have it both ways. Surely Kaplan's point can be allowed, while

at the same time striving for sufficient precision for communication and the formation of testable hypotheses. Meehan believes that unlike ambiguity, vagueness "can be useful and even highly desirable." A term is vague to Meehan when it cannot be defined completely in terms of observations. His contention is that for theoretical terms, (Kaplan's systematic openness) and when new terms or concepts are being introduced in scientific inquiry (Kaplan's dynamic openness), "vagueness is to be expected and it may be advantageous." But this is only temporary Meehan suggests. It is not clear when vagueness moves from an unmitigated advantage to a positive evil. "In time," he tells us, "concepts should become more precisely defined if they are to be retained and used." ²⁶

B. Ambiguity

1. A term denotes different phenomena.

A term is ambiguous if it has several distinct meanings. ²⁷ As Madge has it, the "same word being used in a different sense by different social scientists." ²⁸ This raises a question to be examined in regard to concepts and terms. In the case of ambiguity, it is the term which has a number of different kinds of referents. The term has a number of meanings, that is, a number of quite different concepts are denoted by the same term.

Meehan takes this to be the worst sin in conceptualization. His case deserves some attention.

Since concepts are rules that organize or relate perception, ambiguity in the rules will produce a blurred, undependable communication. Concepts must define unambiguously a specified set of perceptions and exclude all others as rigorously as possible, particularly if they are used in description. Other-

wise, the concepts are not defeasible, leading to endless nonintersecting arguments -- as with terms like "democracy" or "equality".²⁹

The spirit of Meehan's account is laudable however unfortunate it is that "ambiguity" is not clearly set out. That a term may refer to quite different phenomena, that is, have different meanings, is noted by Goode and Hatt. They suspect that "the simultaneous existence of more than one meaning constitutes a trap for the unwary student."³⁰ Brecht contends that most words are ambiguous to some extent because they cover such a variety of facts or values, or of both. The force of his point, however, is that "this is especially so in the political field, where terms. . . power. . . democracy. . . (etc) carry many different meanings."³¹

There are quite clearly a variety of levels of ambiguity. The first case involves ordinary language alone; a term, for example, "interest", may have acquired a variety of common sense meanings. The second case involves technical language alone; a term, for example, "interest", may have acquired a variety of meanings in social science literature. The third case is more puzzling, and, in a way, more forgivable. It involves using terms in a technical vocabulary, that is, giving them stipulated meanings, whereas the terms retain one or more different meanings in the ordinary language vocabulary. Again the term "interest" could be used as an example, although very many words could qualify without difficulty. Goode and Hatt describe this problem simply as a case where a term used to denote scientific concepts may also have meanings in other frames of reference.³² Handy reminds us that

when terms with many connotations in ordinary language are more narrowly specified for scientific purposes, both layman and expert may be confused. Sometimes the technical term may be used as if it still denoted the old range of phenomena. In other cases, dispute turns on the lack of ordinary language meaning infused in the technical term. Some people may simply say "but that's not what we mean by the term." ³³

The existence of ambiguity poses serious problems too in the development of a social science. In fact, the formation of a social science hinges in large part on unambiguous concepts. As one illustration, Meehan advises that "propositions that include ambiguous concepts are untestable by observation, hence indeterminate." ³⁴ That the activity of science rests heavily on its basic foundation -- its concepts -- is the thesis of W. H. Werkmeister.

The scientist, however, must insist upon reducing to a minimum the vagueness and the shifts in meaning of his concepts; otherwise the clarity and the exactitude of thought necessary in science cannot be achieved. ³⁵

2. A concept is denoted by different terms.

This sense of ambiguity is fairly clearly set out by Madge: "different words being used to describe indistinguishable concepts." ³⁶ This kind of ambiguity is more difficult to detect and probably more painstaking to remedy. Goode and Hatt believe that this difficulty has serious implications for substantive research problems. When different terms refer to the same phenomenon, authors seem to be writing about different things, whereas in fact they are simply employing different terms. ³⁷

3. Inconsistency of usage.

Inconsistency of usage among different users or by the same user is a species of the first sense of ambiguity set out above. Hempel puts it very succinctly.

[I]nstances can be described or actually produced of such a kind that different users, or even the same user at different times, will pass different judgements as to whether the term applies to those instances.³⁸

It may well be the case that inconsistency of usage results most often from vague concepts and from concepts which are ambiguous in ordinary language. The chances of inconsistency in a young discipline are great, especially when so many users from so many backgrounds enter the field. More distressing, perhaps, is inconsistent usage by the same writer. Melvin Marx is especially troubled by "having to contend with the frequent variability that occurs within the usage of particular terms from time to time by the same author."³⁹ To at least limit this kind of confusion, Maslow's proposal may not be completely without merit.

[T]he appending of a subscript, consisting of the original author's name or initial, to indicate the specific meaning that is intended by the use of the particular symbols.⁴⁰

C. Concepts.

In outlining the form of nominal definitions, Hempel defines what he means by the term "concept".

A nominal definition singles out a certain concept i.e., a non-linguistic entity such as a property, a class, a relation, a function, or the like, and, for convenient reference lays down a special name for it.⁴¹

Meehan and Kaplan believe that a concept is best described as a rule. Kaplan also suggests that the kind of rule depends pretty much on the business at hand.

Since Kant, we have come to recognize every concept as a rule of judging or acting, a prescription for organizing the materials of experience so as to be able to go about our business. Everything depends, of course, on what our business is.⁴²

A fairly clear notion of a concept is set down by Goode and Hatt. They are especially concerned to distinguish a concept from phenomena or aspects of phenomena. Science is said to abstract from reality and deal only with certain aspects of phenomena. Now concepts are used as symbols of the phenomena under study. The concept is not the phenomena itself, but "logical constructs created from sense impressions, percepts, or even fairly complex experiences."⁴³ A concept is only an abstraction and takes its meaning from the thought framework in which it is placed. Van Dyke clearly expresses this attribute of a concept.

A concept is a mental construction, an abstract idea that refers either to a class of phenomena or to certain aspects or characteristics that a range of phenomena have in common Concepts . . . are abstractions from reality, designating types of movements, persons, behavior, or other classes of phenomena.⁴⁴

In Brodbeck's view, concepts are names or labels, and a concept "names what is the same in different individuals -- that is, a character they all exemplify."⁴⁵

So concepts are non-linguistic entities, sometimes conceived as rules or logical constructs. They serve a variety of functions.

Concepts serve to identify the entities we think about, classify entities into related sets, relate entities in time and space, define attributes, and perform all of the other functions implied in the term "organization of experience."⁴⁶

D. Concepts and terms.

One very puzzling question in the literature concerns the concepts of "term" and "concept" (or the terms "concept" and "term"?). Sometimes the words are used synonymously and at other times they are carefully distinguished. It is easy to see the source of the confusion. The language of science consists wholly of declarative sentences, Brodbeck asserts, and such sentences are composed of "descriptive terms or concepts" and "logical" words. So whenever a descriptive concept is found, which will be very often, a term will also be discovered.

A simplistic distinction could be that a term is used to denote a concept; a term labels a concept. In Hempel's usage, a term is a linguistic entity, whereas a concept is a non-linguistic entity. In fact Hempel does speak of the concepts of science "referred to by technical terms."⁴⁷ Goode and Hatt speak of the "terms used to denote scientific concepts" but detract from their case in arguing that "every science develops its own terms, or concepts, for communicating its findings."⁴⁸

A fairly clear statement distinguishing "concept" and "term", which comes close to what Hempel may have intended, is set down by Felix Kaufmann.

[I]n accordance with prevailing usage, I understand by "term" and "sentence" linguistic signs for meanings; by "concepts" and "proposition", meanings regardless of the type of linguistic signs by which they are represented. Accordingly, we may say that terms and sentences have meanings, whereas concepts and propositions are meanings.⁴⁹

Brodbeck appears to be arguing a similar position in using "concept" to refer only to "the contents of a thought", "the content of any mental act". A term, then, is used "to

refer either to concepts, that is, to someone's thoughts of something, or to non-mentalistic things and their character."⁵⁰

The problem is that it is impossible to speak of concepts except in terms of terms. In a sense they both "name" something, the concept names the phenomenon and the term names the concept. The terribly close association is spelled out in an example used by Brodbeck.

Concepts of clouds, thunder. . . [etc.] name differentiated slices of reality that impinge willy-nilly on all of us. Terms of common sense name these obtrusive daily experiences.⁵¹

Kaplan's terminology is quite clear. A set of utterances is grouped and identified as a term. The set of utterances is called "a usage for the term". An established usage serves as a norm in the light of which misuses of the term can be judged. Subsets of uses may be taken as marking off various "senses" of the term. Now what the meaning of a term is taken to be in a particular use, Kaplan calls the conception. "Associated with the usage of a term is a concept, which may be said correspondingly to be a family of conceptions."⁵²

A concept was earlier defined by Kaplan as "a rule of judging or acting, a prescription." Apparently terms have usages and concepts do not have usages. The concept is the "meaning" of a "usage".

II. The concept of interest.

A. The importance of the concept.

It is not difficult to make a case for the concept of interest as a worthwhile focus for a fairly wide ranging

and intensive conceptual analysis. The concept is widely used in the social sciences and especially in political science. The concept is ambiguous; it has acquired a number of different meanings. Scholars in various disciplines have voiced discomfort about the use of the concept, but no successful attempt has been made to rectify the situation. Finally, an easy equation of terms has resulted which ought to be recognized and carefully investigated. This sort of analysis lends itself to an excessive use of quotations, but for the objective of fairness to the authors concerned, and the portrayal of sufficient evidence, this seems unavoidable.

The concept of interest or interests, (and there is much confusion here as the latter is not always the plural of the former), is sometimes used as the essential element in political society, especially in explaining conflicts and diversities. J.B.D. Miller argues that in considering how politics is carried on, "the notion of interests is of prime importance. Interests are the embodiments of active diversities in any political system. Practical politics is a matter of continual tension, of unstable equilibrium, between interests."⁵³ He suggests that the individual is a universe of interests, and so "the business of the general inter-relationships of society is one of conflict and accommodation between interests."⁵⁴ Gabriel Almond emphasizes interest articulation and interest representation as two crucial functions performed by every political system.⁵⁵ It is Samuel Krislow who relates how the sociological conflict theorists found the clue to society in the conflict and resolution of interests.⁵⁶ David Hume regarded government as being founded on two kinds of opinion, opinion of

interest and opinion of right. Right would gain the upper hand although men "were much governed by interest."⁵⁷ R.M. MacIver has argued that the conflict of interests creates the problem of government,⁵⁸ and Sheldon S. Wolin has claimed that "the reduction of politics to interest has cast a powerful shadow on modern politics."⁵⁹ John C. Calhoun held that in any community where the suffrage was free "there will arise, as a matter of course, a rich variety of conflicting interests"⁶⁰ At the same time, Sigmund Neumann feels that the democratic process must "represent and integrate the numerous special interests within a live society."⁶¹ There are others who simply assert that conflict gives rise to politics, or that conflict is politics. The things in conflict are often not made explicit although interests would probably be among the leading candidates.

The emphasis on interest groups in recent political studies needs little elaboration. Samuel Krislov has pointed out that "no term has been so common in the 'new style' political science as 'interest group'".⁶² The study of political parties has been to a considerable extent based on some sort of often unarticulated interest theory. S.M. Lipset argues that the American primary system "permits the interests and values of different groups, which would give rise to separate parties elsewhere, to be expressed within the major parties."⁶³ In discussing two-party systems, he claims that parties aim for a majority, seek support from groups loyal to the opposition, "and avoid accentuating too heavily the interests of their customary supporters."⁶⁴ Throughout the literature on political parties, this theme is echoed with only minor alterations. R.T. McKenzie sees

parties integrating diverse and sometimes conflicting interests and opinions.⁶⁵ F.J. Sorauf views parties as agencies for representing interests, organizing individuals, interests, and groups, and mediating and compromising the clash of political interests and ideologies.⁶⁶ It is difficult to discover any author who does not assert some association between parties and interests. That parties represent and promote private interests at the expense of the public interest has been held by Bolingbroke, J.C. Calhoun, M. Ostrogorski, and legions of other critics of party government.⁶⁷ An extensive literature is developing on the question of the public or common interest, but as Krislov reminds us, discussion has turned more on the public than on the interest.

Students of voting behaviour have recognized the predictive value of incorporating a dimension of interest in the larger variable of political involvement. "Our measure of interest carries us further than the measure of partisan intensity in finding the conditions of nonvoting."⁶⁸ So claim the authors of The American Voter. In his Political Life, R.E. Lane advances the law of mediating interests. He argues that it is interest which mediates between sociological pressures and expressed behaviour.⁶⁹

The argument here is simply that the concept of interest has been used unsparingly in the study of politics. Its use suggests that it is a basic concept. That it has held this position for a considerable length of time is argued by Sheldon Wolin who records early usage of interest in Cicero, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke, and then more general usage by Marxists, Utilitarians, Social Darwinists, and pluralists ever since.⁷⁰

The concept of interest has been held to be of equal importance in other disciplines of the social sciences. The study of psychology is sometimes said to be grounded on interests. G.W. Allport argues that "the ego-process can be considered equivalent to interests. . . . There is something functionally irreducible about interest systems."⁷¹ R.B. Catell believes that interest appears as the result of the operation of any instinct, sentiment, or complex, and that "the expression 'interest' might be used as a generic term to cover all these dispositions."⁷² It is Roscoe Pound who most insists on the key role of the concept of interest in jurisprudence. "A legal system attains its end by recognizing certain interests, individual, public, and social. . . ."⁷³ Gustav Ratzenhofer's dictum, "in the beginning were interests", indicates his view of the importance of this concept in sociology.

The innate and acquired interest is the source of all human needs, and, in the changeable manifold forms, the guiding motive of all movements in the biological, psychical and social process of the individual and of humanity.⁷⁴

Albion Small has a no less exaggerated view of the basic role played by interests. "The clue to all social activity is in this fact of individual interests. Every act that every man performs is to be traced back to an interest."⁷⁵

A.F. Bentley contended that the study of politics is the study of interests; Albion Small argued that interests are the subject matter of sociology, while Pareto believed that economics was the science of interests. Homer Dubs maintained that interests are the basic factors in the study of psychology, and Roscoe Pound insisted that interests are the subject matter of jurisprudence. In the light of these

contentions, there seems some grounds for investigating the concept of interest in an interdisciplinary focus.

B. The ambiguity of the concept.

Because the concept of interest has been used so often and in such a variety of ways, it has acquired a diversity of meanings. It is Samuel Krislov's conclusion that in being a frequently used household term "the tool dulls, the more types of usage, the more all-purpose and adaptive to any utilization it becomes."⁷⁶ Only a random selection of usages is hinted at here, as a thorough examination of usages constitutes the major portion of subsequent chapters.

It is well known how A.F. Bentley regarded the interest, the group, and the activity as coterminous, equivalent terms with a slight variation in emphasis. But he did deny that an interest was either the asserted claim or the aspiration of a group. Professor Plamenatz is of a contrary view. Interests he regards as

[t]he settled and avowed aspirations of a man or group of men which he or they -- or other people interested in them -- believe to be more or less realizable. . . . The facts to be considered are the claims actually made, the disputes that arise, and the settlements that end them. We can have no idea of men's interests that we do not derive from these facts.⁷⁷

Lasswell and Kaplan have defined an interest as "a pattern of demands and its supporting expectations."⁷⁸ But David Easton, noting that interests might be confused with demands, has insisted that "it is important to recognize that, conceptually, they are quite separate."⁷⁹ Interests, he believes, can be narrowly defined as instrumental values. A similar usage appears in the analysis of Vernon Van Dyke who seems prepared

to use "motive", "goal", "need", "value", and "interest" synonymously.⁸⁰ R.A. Dahl was content to define "interest" as "how curious one is to know what is happening."⁸¹

A definition of interest which has had considerable influence is that advanced by D.B. Truman. "The shared attitudes, (moreover) constitute the interest."⁸² In the same breath, he rules out MacIver's distinction between the attitude and the object (interest) towards which it is directed. S.J. Eldersveld regards the shared attitude usage as having "questionable analytical utility."⁸³ This tension between subjective feeling and objective referent is nowhere resolved in the literature. A similar and related dispute concerns the notions of real or objective interests and real or subjective interests. Marx's notion of real or objective class interest is set against J.S. Mill's contention that

[w]hat it is the man's interest to do or refrain from, depends less on any outward circumstances, than upon what sort of man he is. If you wish to know what is practically a man's interest, you must know the cast of his habitual feelings and thoughts.⁸⁴

S.E. Finer distinguishes between groups which represent social or economic interests (in the eighteenth century sense) and groups which represent an attitude.⁸⁵ Harry Eckstein's British Pressure Groups makes a similar distinction.⁸⁶ Interests are taken to mean having a social or economic stake in society, not unlike the usage "vested interests" or even "the interests". It should be noted that one of the most common usages of the term has been that of economic or material advantage.⁸⁷

This is all confusing enough without turning to philosophy and to the related disciplines of the social sciences. But turn we must because students of politics have frequently

done so in an attempt to formulate and to support their views. That there has been little more agreement in these fields need come as no surprise. A few examples should suffice. The sociologist Albion Small defined an interest as, "an unsatisfied capacity corresponding to an unrealized condition."⁸⁸ A usage which is no less satisfactory appears in M. H. Moore's discussion of the interest theory of value. "We use interest as synonymous with wish, desire, need, and not just in the pedagogical sense of attention."⁸⁹ The psychologist E. K. Strong Jr. has argued that interest is an aspect of activity, it is called an interest when its feeling quality is emphasized."⁹⁰ Throughout this literature, interest is sometimes synonymous with value, sometimes with attitude, attention, aspiration, sentiment and so on.

It has been urged here to considerable length that the concept of interest has been widely and variously used. Some alarm has been voiced from time to time by scholars who have noticed certain confusion and ambiguity. But clarity has not been forthcoming, although useful distinctions have been drawn. There does seem to be room for another contribution.

The additive equation that could be made of all this talk about interests would look something like the following: interest = activity = group; attitude = interest; interest = claim; claim = demand; attitude = opinion = sentiment; interest = value = goal = need = motive; interest = attention; interest = trait = sentiment; wish = interest = desire. It is not unusual to see attitude = interest and attitude = opinion; therefore opinion = interest. But it would be unusual to speak of wish = groups, or trait = demand, or goal = attention. It would also be confusing. To reduce

all these to one term "interest" would clearly satisfy in large part the quest for basic concepts. But it would be alarming if the richness and variety of human activity and expression could be so easily compressed. It would be useful to consider whether there is not some kind of activity or aspect of behaviour which the term "interest" alone could serve to represent. Given the existing situation, it is tempting to alleviate confusion by translating "interest" in terms of more precise meaning. Consider the following statements:

X is not interested in taking an interest in interesting interest group interests although other interesting interested interests say it is in his interest and in the public interest that he be interested.⁹¹

Does the public have an interest in, or is it interested in, the public interest which the interests say is not only interesting but is in their interest and in the interest of world peace?⁹²

These may be interesting, but they come close to unadulterated nonsense.

III. Other considerations.

A. Behavioural theory.

Although this study is primarily concerned with the discipline of political science and with the concept of interest as it is utilized in this field, a secondary consideration also informs this investigation. This turns on interdisciplinary research in general, and the conditions necessary for a behavioural theory in particular. It is sometimes argued that a general behavioural theory is not only possible but is in fact greatly needed. It is thought to be

possible because the social sciences deal with the same basic subject matter -- man in his environment -- and that the quest for knowledge proceeds with essentially the same research tools. It is said to be necessary because facts are relevant only in a theoretical context, that is, only if they have theoretical import. With different theories there will be different facts, and this is sometimes believed to be an uncomfortable and confusing possibility. So if the behavioural sciences are dealing with the same facts about the same subject matter, it is believed that social scientists had best set out on the same general path with the same basic instructions. It is thought to be time to pull the social sciences together at the top to take stock of theoretical findings and to better organize the next integrated assault on the real world.

There is no doubt much merit in this approach. But it is certainly a gigantic undertaking with serious methodological difficulties. The most basic problem is perhaps the conceptual one. It is difficult to integrate existing theory and research, not to mention the yet undiscovered findings, without scholars being able to communicate with clear and precise terms and generally understood concepts. This study is a preliminary and exploratory attempt to discover how much agreement on concept formation and use in fact exists across disciplinary boundaries. The concept of interest is used as a case study in exploring interdisciplinary usage with an eye to the basic conditions for a behavioural theory.

B. Ordinary language and technical usage.

It is assumed that words are conventional symbols and that usage changes from time to time as the phenomenon denoted

is variously perceived and defined. The question turns on what is to be done in the relationship between common usage as defined lexically, and technical usage as defined more or less stipulatively in on-going social science research and theory construction. It is clear that common usage is not common in the sense that there exists one agreed upon meaning. Terms in common currency that are defined lexically frequently have a variety of meanings. As will appear in a moment, the term "interest" is no exception. A similar condition exists with stipulative definitions, although the term "technical usage" seems more appropriate. The procedure in question is that of defining a word for purposes of precision and clarity which is sometimes the case in on-going empirical research.

The social sciences are presently experiencing a situation in which many key terms such as "class", "attitude", and "decision" have been given a number of technical usages. This condition in large part results from the nature of the solution found to the essentialist problem. When correct or proper usage is not legislated by nearness to essence or ideal form, then scholars are more or less unrestrained in contributing to what the consensus on meaning ought to be. An emphasis on raw empirical productivity has tended to reduce the amount of interchange among scholars on concept formation and use. This kind of complaint was forcibly voiced not long ago by the authors of Opinions and Personality.

What we were most sure of was the underdevelopment of the theory of attitudes in contrast with increasing refinement in their measurement. . . . Until we have a clearer conception of the nature of attitudes and the manner in which they function, we shall not know what aspects of an attitude are worth mea-

suring. It is a deep question within any branch of psychology to decide what are the useful units of analysis.⁹³

It is at least plausible that in giving technical meaning to a term, some consideration should be given to the meaning or meanings that the term enjoys in common usage. After all, social scientists speak the common language at least occasionally, and a good many of their conceptualizations that give meaning to the world around them are informed by socialization in that language. There is no well-articulated rule governing this question. But the need for understanding among colleagues and between academics and the public ought to be one consideration. The desirability of intellectual insight and new concept formation and use is another consideration. So also is the business of constantly adjusting empirical concepts with research results and other technical problems in operationalizing and measuring.

To formulate a concept with clarity and precision is necessary in formulating propositions which can be meaningfully tested. To include within this formulation the substance of what is meant when the concept is used ordinarily is often desirable, so that if empirical theory emerges, it will bear a certain relationship to what others mean when they talk about that particular aspect of the world around them. Technical concepts are expected to bear a close relationship to some objective or external referents. Yet the objective referent is usually conceived in some common sense form and is known to the common language. The amount of overlap which is necessary for communication while at the same time facilitating scientific explanation, is by no means well understood. But when science makes so much of

its licence to call anything pretty much whatever it likes, there may be some grounds for arguing that if technical usage does not accord with that of ordinary language, scientists should be asked to create a new term rather than confounding ambiguity by adding yet another usage to an old one. After all, it is science which gives ordinary language terms technical (operational) meanings and constructs new concepts which are given old and familiar names. It is not ordinary language which tries to break into the domain of science.

The case of partial overlap is even more distressing. It is difficult to think in terms of three quarters of a meaning and one quarter of another, in a concept labelled by an ordinary language term. And probably one of the greatest obstacles is presented by a term which has a score of ordinary language meaning to begin with. It is hard to know which one (ones) is (are) intended in a technical transfer. It is difficult to ask of science that a term's meaning in ordinary language be respected when it is capable of a variety of confused meanings in that language to begin with. It may be possible to formulate some view about this question in the concluding chapter.

The case in point involves the term "interest" which has a number of common or lexical meanings and has been given a number of technical usages. One question to be asked throughout is how much the common has informed the technical. This is complicated when other technical terms are used to stand for, or encompass, the common sense meaning or meanings of a term. For example, the use of "attitude", a reasonably technical term, as a verbal equivalent for "interest" could be viewed as an attempt to replace common sense with technical usage. A difficulty emerges when "interest" has al-

ready acquired a number of technical usages in its own right, some of which diverge quite considerably from the technical use of "attitude". The difficulty becomes more complex when it is admitted that the term "attitude" also appears in a variety of technical usages. The further social scientists advance in discussing conceptual difficulties central to their empirical theorizing the more abruptly will they face this kind of dilemma which offers no ready answer. And there are grounds for thinking that this sort of question is no less significant than the difficulties involved in drawing a representative sample or in designing a meaningful questionnaire.

C. Ordinary language usages of "interest".

The word "interest" in the substantive sense appeared in the fifth century as "enterest", in the sixth century as "interest", in the sixth to seventh centuries as "intrest", and in the seventh century as "int'rest". It was an alternative to the earlier "interess", apparently after the Cognate French "interest" (or modern French intérêt) as a substantive use of the Latin "interesse", (it makes a difference, concerns, matters, is of importance). This was in the third person singular present indicative of the verb, of which the infinitive "interesse" was used as a substantive in medieval Latin. The Latin "interesse", to concern, meant literally to be between: inter-between; and esse, to be.⁹⁴

The various meanings of the term will be set out fairly thoroughly in order to illustrate the richness of our language in use and the sensitivity with which distinctions have been drawn.⁹⁵

1. Interest as used in the substantive sense, that is, noun usages.
 - (a) "The relation of being objectively concerned in something, by having a right or title, a claim upon, or a share in."
 - (i) The fact or relation of being objectively concerned in a thing, especially a right or title to property. This usage appeared in 1450 in the Rolls of Parliament and in 1593 by Shakespeare in Henry VI: "All your interest in these territories is utterly bereft you."
 - (ii) Interest as the right or title to spiritual privileges appeared in the fifteenth century.
 - (iii) The use involving a right or title to a share in something was used by Shakespeare in 1594 in Richard III. "[S]o much interest have I in thy sorrow, as I had title in thy noble husband."
 - (iv) A new obsolete usage was that of interest as a share in doing something or the production of some result. This appeared in Hawksbee in 1709, "a signal demonstration of the influence and interest of the air."
 - (v) A more important usage is that of interest as a pecuniary share or stake in or claim upon anything. This includes the relation of being a part owner of property or a shareholder or bondholder in a commercial or financial undertaking. An example is Marshall's constitutional opinion in 1824. "The Planter's Bank of Georgia is not the state of Georgia,

although the state holds an interest in it."

(b) "The relation of being concerned or affected in respect of advantage or detriment; especially an advantageous relation of this kind." This usage is seen in E. Blount in 1600. "There was none in Lisbone but had some interest in this warre."

(i) Interest as that which is to, or for, the advantage, good, benefit, or profit of anyone. An example is given by Morris in 1691. "Is not every thing almost reckoned profitable only so far as it conduces to some temporal interest?"

(ii) The sense here is that of being in the interest (interests) of someone or something, that is, on the side of what is advantageous or beneficial to one. Goldsmith employed this sense in 1771. "The party in the interests of Lewis began to lose ground."

(c) "A thing in which one has an interest or concern." D. Pell used this sense in 1659. "Many times your interests are seized on by storms, sometimes by pyrats."

(d) "A business, course, or principle, in which a number of persons are interested; the party interested in such a business or principle; a party having a common interest; a business or political party, business connexion, etc." This is the sense in which Pope used "interest" in 1714; "He said that I was enter'd into a cabal with Dean

Swift and others to write against the Whig interest" or by Disraeli in 1830. "The cabinet was divided by two opposite interests."

(e) "Regard to one's own profit or advantages, selfish pursuit of one's own welfare; self-interest."

(f) "Influence due to personal connexion; power of influencing the action of others; personal influence with a person or body of persons. To make interest, to bring personal influence to bear." Shakespeare employed this usage in 1596 in The Merchant of Venice, as did Strype in 1709. "Early interest was made with Elizabeth for the continuance of the old religion."

(g) "The feeling of one who is concerned or has a personal concern in anything; hence, the state of feeling proper to such a relation, or a particular form or instance of it; a feeling of concern for or curiosity about a person or thing." It is also used in this sense as a "feeling of personal concernment in an object such as to fix the attention upon it."⁹⁶ This is a very common usage as, "he regarded the debate with great interest", or "he is a man with wide interests."

(h) "The fact or quality of mattering or being of importance (as belonging to things); concernment, importance." McCullough used it in this sense in 1845. "However important, these, after all, are matters of subordinate interest."

(i) A now obsolete usage was interest as compensation or damages for injury.

(j) "Money paid for the use of money lent (the principal); or for forbearance of a debt, according to a fixed ratio (rate percent)."

(i) There is a figurative sense as in the phrase "with interest, with increase or augmentation." Goldsmith used this sense. "The latter. . . returned the blows with interest."

(k)

(i) "The persons effectively controlling an enterprise or dominating a field of activity."⁹⁷ This is the common use as "the landed interest", "the Protestant interest".

(ii) This is interest in the plural, as the interests. "The dominating group of owners in a field of business, industry, or finance, considered locally, regionally, nationally or internationally, sometimes big business."⁹⁸

(l)

(i) "A feeling that accompanies or arouses special attention to some object, curiosity, concern."

(ii) "Readiness to attend to and be stirred by a certain class of objects."

(iii) "Something that causes or arouses curiosity or concern."⁹⁹

2. Interest is also used as a transitive verb, apparently an alteration of the earlier "interest". This can be set down briefly, as the main instances of usages appear in the noun forms already outlined.

(a) "To involve the interest, or concern of; to have an effect upon."

- (b) "To cause to have an interest, or share in, as," "can I interest you in joining our club?"
- (c) "To excite the attention or curiosity of."¹⁰⁰

IV. The Procedure

An exercise in explication proceeds on two fronts -- meaning analysis and rational reconstruction. The meaning analysis is concerned with examining customary meanings in both ordinary and technical language. It is basically a descriptive analysis of the major usages of a term. It is an attempt to both identify and to reduce the limitations, ambiguities, and inconsistencies of usages.

The first eight chapters of this study are largely concerned with meaning analysis. Sometimes the account becomes laboriously descriptive, but in an honest attempt to follow Kaplan's dictum that we only recognize a usage by finding many uses, this has seemed inescapable. As a consequence, a large part of this study involves a detailed examination of major usages and more personalized uses (senses) of the term "interest". In an exploratory study of this kind, it was thought necessary to cast the net wide so that nothing of major importance would slip past. It is always possible to synthesize similar usages and group similar senses at the end, or discard them if they appear to fail the tests of useful concepts. The sensitivity to interdisciplinary fusion also entitles usages to remain in contention in the event that they have proved of major importance in other areas of the social sciences.

The question of ambiguity of usage is approached throughout by way of occasional critical examination of the work of a prominent author who relies heavily on the concept of interest. The great difficulties involved in using this vague but important concept are best exposed and elucidated by this type of case study. The writings of Small, MacIver, Weber, Pound, Bentley, Truman, Plamenatz, and Barry are treated in this fashion.

Rational reconstruction attempts to clarify meanings by advancing a reinterpretation or reformulation so that clarity and precision might improve the ability of the concept to function in hypotheses and theories. This aspect of the investigation is centralized in the concluding chapter but it will appear also in chapters III, V, VII, and VIII. In the concluding chapter, usages will be reviewed, synthesized, and tested against several criteria of significance. A reformulation of the concept of interest will then be attempted. Hopefully this chapter will have something constructive to say about the way in which the term "interest" could be usefully employed.

Chapters I and II deal with the concept of interest in selected writings of psychologists. Chapter III attempts to make distinctions among basic psychological concepts in an effort to discover whether or not the concept of interest can perform any useful function in that field. Chapter IV reviews major usages in sociology. The issue raised in chapter V is what notion of interest has informed the accounts of group interest and class interest in the sociological literature under review. Chapter VI reviews some

literature in jurisprudence and especially Roscoe Pound's theory of interests. Chapters VII and VIII examine major usages of the concept in political science. The concluding Chapter reviews the major usages discovered along the way and attempts a selective reformulation of the concept of interest.

As the investigation proceeds, major usages identified in psychology are used to order the quest for usages in sociology in an attempt to make more sense out of the interdisciplinary focus. This is not, of course, a design to force usages into pre-established patterns. It is rather an attempt to develop general patterns across disciplines for comparative purposes. At the same time, idiosyncratic usages of particular disciplines are more easily identified. Likewise, major usages discovered in psychology and in sociology are then used to initiate the classification of usages of "interest" in jurisprudence and in political science. Political science comes at the end not so much because it is the queen of the sciences, but because it is the discipline most under review. Political scientists have relied heavily on other disciplines in the formulation of their concepts and it therefore seems logical to begin at the beginning.

CHAPTER I

"INTEREST" IN PSYCHOLOGY: THE EARLY PERIOD

Introduction

A lengthy review of the usages of the term "interest" in psychological literature seems justifiable on two counts. In the first place, so many conceptualizations of interest advanced by political scientists, sociologists, and philosophers include, or relate to, concepts regularly discussed and employed by psychologists. Definitions of "interest" often rely on such concepts as attitude, value, motive, aspiration, activity or expectation. A thorough discussion of the usages of "interest" by psychologists should provide a useful background for later chapters. In the second place, political scientists have neglected the literature in psychology which is concerned directly with the concept of interest. In the last two decades, students of political science have frequently turned to psychology for assistance in the formulation and development of concepts. In their discussion of "interest", political scientists have sometimes examined certain psychological literature relating to motives, values, and attitudes, but never that which related directly to "interest".

A major difficulty that often confronts a political scientist who ventures into the domain of psychological discourse is the proliferation of conflicting theories, schools, technical languages, and conceptual tools. A fairly widespread view of the discipline is that voiced by Gordon W. Allport.

[P]sychology is not a unitary thing. Unlike mathematics, physics, or biology, it is not a cumulative science but rather an assortment of facts, presuppositions, and theories, whose relevance to human welfare depends upon the particular theories, presuppositions, and facts that we select for inspection. . . . Except for a common loyalty to their profession, psychologists seem to agree on little else.¹

Definitions of the subject matter of psychology illustrate an alarming lack of consensus. Some emphasize "behaviour", some "experience", others "consciousness", or "unconscious mental processes", "conscious mental processes" or "the totality of man's psychic experience".

The early experience of Graham Wallas is instructive. He ventured from "the Greats" at Oxford to the emerging schools of psychology in an attempt to base the study of man in political society on "human-type facts". Wallas's quest was soon tempered by the realization that he had to choose on his own initiative between conflicting assumptions, propositions, and evidence. He gradually tired of trying to discover who was closest to the facts he sought, James, Myers, McDougall, Wundt, Freud, Watson, Titchener or Trotter. He could play one against the other for only so long, and his later works relied as heavily on poets and on literary writers as they did on psychologists.

Probably at least two conditions are required if cross-disciplinary fertilization is to be productive. The visitor ought to assume an orientation of very critical wariness in accepting concepts, theories, or evidence. In a field as large and variegated as psychology, with so many looking on for advice and insights, practitioners ought to exercise unflinching integrity in reporting the significance of empirical findings and in explaining the moves in theoretical work.

With so much wool and with so many eyes, there is the danger that misunderstanding may affect the few as well as the many.

The rules governing borrowing privileges in the social sciences are nowhere clearly articulated. It is not clear how far a student ought to look before seizing upon a concept or research result to use in his own work. It could be asked why it was that Van Dyke, in formulating his conception of interest in 1962, should have relied so heavily on A.H. Maslow's discussion of needs in 1943; or why it was that D.B. Truman's notion of interest in 1951 should have leaned so strongly on G.W. Allport's 1935 formulation of attitudes. It may be useful to raise this kind of question. The case of borrowing conceptual devices seems very much a matter of developing an argument. Evidence should be sought to support or justify the selection of a particular concept and a specified use. Sometimes, in fact most often, this is not the case. It seems that the reader should be presented with evidence that would include the amount of usage the concept has received in its mother discipline, as well as the degree of consensus prevailing on its formulation and usage.

The major theme implicit in this enquiry is exceedingly simple. If a concept is variously and ambiguously used, caution ought to be exercised in accepting it and using it. The circumstances surrounding the nature and status of the concept ought to be disclosed. A concept which has failed to gain a vote of confidence in its native discipline will in all likelihood be confusing in another. The possibility of misinforming is as great a consideration as the possibility of confusing. The reward for inventing or populari-

zing new concepts ought to be no more than that given for clear and precise use of the old ones. Any student employing a concept about which there is any suspicion ought to set out clearly how it will be used in his own work. It is equally helpful if the defined meaning is consistently adhered to in the course of his discussion. And finally, if a term cannot be set out clearly, it ought to be discarded in favour of another term which is less ambiguous and which can denote the class of phenomena in question. In short, there is a pressing need for clarity and understanding, for much less razzle-dazzle and much more simplicity in expression.

One apology is offered. It is not intended that this study should take the form of a plodding descriptive-historical account of the development of a concept. Yet at times it comes dangerously close to being just that. It is intended to be a rather careful analysis of a particularly important concept in use. If a certain amount of depth and scope is necessary to give perspective, then the occasional use of the historical method may be justified. There is surely some danger in academics completely turning their backs on their discipline. Description is often a necessary context for analysis, especially if the reader is not to be left out of developments until it is too late for him to form an independent judgment.

The present chapter is divided into two rather unequal parts. In the first section some views of early psychologists are examined up to 1914. A similar treatment is contained in the second section which extends from 1914 to 1940. A summary of the usages of the term "interest" is brought forward at the end of each section along with other

conclusions and considerations.

The Early Period: Pre-1914

In many respects the early period of psychology, variously understood as "the elements of consciousness", "association of ideas" or simply as "introspective psychology", was more productive of theory and analysis than has been the case in any subsequent period. Psychology at that time was in the process of adapting innovations in method and subject matter. Broadly conceived, psychology as a branch of philosophy with some scientific trimmings was giving way to a scientific psychology with some philosophical overtones. More specifically, the period includes, from Herbart to J.B. Watson, strains of eighteenth century English associationism fused with psychological hedonism, the physiologically based experimental-introspective tradition of Helmholtz, Ebbinghaus, and Wundt, the environmental-instinct emphasis of the Darwinians, and the rigorous stimulus-response orientation of early twentieth-century behaviourism.

The notion of interest came under the surveillance of most of the great writers of the age with a consequence as confounding as it was stimulating. D.E. Berlyne's account of the various usages of the term in this period is much too simple. He has contended that analysis then turned on the subjective experiences involved in interest, especially with its relation to feeling and to attention.² That this was indeed part of the story, but by no means its entirety, may become clear as this Chapter unfolds. A great many of the writers and usages presented here have been outlined by Felix Arnold in his seminal article "The Psychology

of Interest".³

The most outstanding and influential early treatment of the concept of interest is that advanced by J.F. Herbart.⁴ Herbart argues that interest stands opposed to indifference and in this respect is similar to the concepts of desire, will, and aesthetic judgment. It is distinguished from them in that it neither controls nor disposes of its object but depends upon it. Interest is not psychological activity but a passive reflex or product of the interaction of ideas. While we are inwardly active because we are interested, we are externally passive until interest passes into desire or volition. It is not clear if Herbart intended to use the concepts of desire and volition synonymously nor did he ever set down under what conditions interest could pass into desire and hence lead to action.

The crux of his doctrine is the nature of the association of ideas in the apperceptive systems. Interest is said to be simply one case of feeling and all feeling depends on the mechanism of ideas. Interest as feeling results from the interaction of ideas and as such clings to the contemplated present. Under certain conditions, such as strength of impression, freshness of susceptibility, and degree of opposition present, the feeling of interest could arise in the so-called apperceptive masses.

Those who were to continue this kind of conceptualization, notably Volkman and Wundt, like Herbart, developed the theory of apperception to the almost total disregard of the theory of interest. After all, they contended, you must work from within outward to rouse interest. You present things which will excite the apperceiving masses to obtain interest. Volkman, Steinthal, and Ladd pursued

the thesis that interest as feeling emerges with the readiness of a group of ideas to assimilate a new idea.⁵

W. Ostermann, writing much later as a self-reputed Herbartian, attempted to clarify this notion of interest. He urges that the concept means "that we attach value to the thing", and he offers as the definition of interest; "consciousness of value, or recognition of value."⁶ Ostermann proceeds to distinguish two types of interest. Positive interest is present whenever we take pleasure in an object or feel attracted to it because of its positive value. Negative interest appears when an object displeases us or repels us on account of its want of value. Now in Ostermann's view, valuation is a matter of feeling. Echoes of a still more ancient psychology appear in his remark that "Feeling is the faculty of valuation in the mind."⁷ Impressions appear to the mind as valuable or worthless according as they afford pleasure or pain.

Ostermann suggests a classification of interests in terms of the objects which stimulate the feelings which in turn lead to the valuation and hence to the interest. It could be noticed that he detects no difficulties in asserting a direct relationship between positive or negative interest and effort to either reach or avoid the object in question. In Herbart's view, interest might pass into desire. Ostermann seems to imply that interest always leads to effort and activity. In any event, emphasis is removed from apperception and comes to rest on evaluation of objects in terms of pleasure-pain impressions.

Finally, Ostermann proposes something of a normative criterion for further classifying interests. The lower interests include the sensuous interests and interest in

money. The higher interests involve aesthetic, ethical, sympathetic, and religious interests. His distinction between direct and indirect interest, later conceived as the means-end problem, rests on a similar criterion. In this case, one might profess interest in music or art for purposes of status advancement.

We take direct interest in an object, if we esteem it for its own sake; we take indirect interest, if such interest depends on secondary ends that have nothing to do with the intrinsic value of the object.⁸

A more popular and basic concept of this period was that of attention. Interest was often treated in relation to it, most frequently as a section of a larger chapter on attention. Stumpf considers attention as identical with interest which is a feeling. Every feeling is said to be either pleasure or pain, positive or negative. Attention or interest apparently belongs to the positive class, but it is a turning-toward or participation-in something regardless of whether or not the content is agreeable or disagreeable. That Stumpf never quite succeeded in making himself understood seems to be one of the few points of consensus in the literature of that time. He continued to write new books in an attempt to clarify misunderstandings arising from his earlier work. Professor Arnold guides us through and around Stumpf's thesis and finally suggests that Stumpf regards interest "as a feeling of desire which may become an act of volition".⁹

Titchener regards interest as a different aspect of the attention process, that is, the feeling accompanying the mental state which the term attention denotes.¹⁰ To J.S. Mill, experiencing a pleasurable or painful sensation was in fact attending to it. Another name for the painful

or pleasurable quality of the sensation or idea was its interest. William James argues that "the things to which we attend are said to interest us. Our interest in them is supposed to be the cause of our attending."¹¹ Sully's position is similar to that of Stumpf and especially Mill.

G.F. Stout insists that "the coincidence of interest and attention is simply due to the fact that interest, as actually felt at any moment, is nothing but attention itself, considered in its hedonic aspect."¹² However, in a footnote on the same page, Stout mentions that interest in its most common usage denotes a permanent disposition or capability of being interested. Thus a person may be said to be interested in mathematics although he may not be thinking about mathematics at that moment. The significance of this common sense usage is not contained in the technical or psychological concept that Stout employs.¹³

J. Mark Baldwin of Toronto, although holding fast to certain tenets of the interest as attention position, is one of the first to attempt to incorporate a larger portion of common sense usage into his psychological conception of interest. He sets out two rather distinct uses of the concept.

A thing is interesting to me when, for any reason, it appeals to my attention -- when it is worth looking at -- when it is so related to me that I am led to investigate it, and the feeling of interest is this need of looking, investigating, finding out about.¹⁴

Here Baldwin sets out interest at what he takes to be the intellectual level. New relations are said to be interesting. This is the feeling of curiosity. This sort of interest is temporary, representing a tendency to want to know. Suggestion is the usual stimulus for this kind of

interest which "does not attach itself firmly enough to its object to cause the latter to become one of our interests or goods."¹⁵

Baldwin introduces his discussion of the permanent life interests by reporting in a footnote a common use of the concept not usually included in psychological discussions. This use usually takes the plural form and implies that "a person's interest or interests may mean his advantage. A man is not always interested in pursuing his best interests."¹⁶ His argument is long, but in the context of his time, rather extraordinary.

If the object of intellectual interest has an effect upon an individual, it provokes a tendency to feel and to act. Whatever causes pleasure or pain also excites the feeling of interest in the stimulating object. The interest in this case is said to exist because of the relation of the object to some outgoing impulse. As examples of this emotional interest, Baldwin lists aesthetic interest, moral interest, and sympathetic interest. He then outlines the kind of interest aroused by our volitional life. In ordinary circumstances we act in reference to something because we are impelled by intellectual or emotional interest. "But it is still true that, after acting, our interest is greater than before. Any effort expended on a thing makes it more worthwhile to us."¹⁷ He is clearly asserting not only that interest impells or motivates, but that interest becomes more permanent through activity. Indeed, he argues that "it is still often through habituation that real interests are formed, [As] we grow accustomed to them, we begin to find ourselves expecting to find them, relying upon them, appealing to

them. . . ."18

Pleasure and pain are the two great stimuli to activity, representing what Baldwin calls the constitutional and the permanent. They are ever recurrent. But more significantly, "the interests they arouse are the deep-seated life interests already examined. The ordinary distinction between interest and interests is accordingly just."19 It will be recalled that suggestion is seen as the passing stimulus which elicits temporary intellectual interest. Baldwin goes on to speak of interests as stimuli to voluntary attention and as leading to volition to pursue the object of attention.

This contribution is especially noteworthy because it is one of the first instances of the use of interest as a more or less permanent disposition with certain motivational implications. His conception is that of an enduring association between emotional and volitional tendencies and certain stimulating objects. This concept of interest differs rather markedly from other usages which regarded interest as a more or less temporary feeling, most often of pleasure, accompanying the attention process.

J.R. Angell reaffirmed the distinction made by Baldwin in an account which fairly bristles with the overtones of Dewey, his former teacher. He allows that interest should be treated as one of the intellectual feelings, especially applicable in the case of curiosity. But there is another and more important sense.

If we consider the type of interest which we feel in an absorbing pursuit, a game, an experiment, or a business venture, then we recognize that such interest, however truly it may display affective

characteristics, is a phenomenon which belongs conspicuously among the conative processes of mental life.²⁰

He emphasizes "the positively active, self-expressive, self-assertive nature of interest."²¹

Angell argues that interest always has some recognized object to which it refers, an object of which the organism has already had some experience. He suggests that while spontaneous attention initially differentiates our interests, our reflective abilities then coordinate them into an elaborated hierarchy of interests. He also regards specific natural talents as first "evinced as interests rather than as accomplishments."²² This anticipated a later tendency to regard interests as reflections of aptitudes. Angell was one of the last to employ the notion of the self before the advance of Watsonian behaviourism, an approach which McDougall denounced as a most "misshapen and beggarly dwarf". Angell was convinced that "the self is in a very true sense reflected in one's interest."²³ The use of the concept self or ego was not to become respectable again in the main stream of psychological thinking until 1943.²⁴ The defense was offered by G.W. Allport and the acceptance of the term was due probably as much to Allport's reputation as to his arguments. The case for interests as self or ego-involved was not long to follow.

The distinct usages of the concept of interest advanced by Baldwin and Angell were not widely accepted. W.B. Pillsbury's Attention is significant primarily because it denies the possibility of fixed interests directing attention. "Things are interesting because we attend to them, or because we are likely to attend to them, we do not attend because they are interesting."²⁵ W.H. Burnham en-

dorsed this position by elaborating the two senses in which the concept of interest had been used. Interest denotes (1) "a complex state of feeling" and (2) "it denotes a permanent mental possession - as when we say a man has an interest in art, or literature, or music; or the like."²⁶ His intention was to strike out the latter.

The second sense suggests that one has a store of associations relating to certain subjects, that one habitually attends to them, or has a permanent habit of preperception in such subjects. In the first sense, following the James - Lange theory of emotion, any organic adjustment, in this case attention, is followed by an affective state or feeling, in this case interest. In the second sense, interest as a permanent habit of preperception determines attention. Burnham urges that interest be conceived only as an affective state, and that the concept of a habit of preperception be retained to denote a distinct type of mental process.

A view which falls outside any of the various usages thus far presented is that offered by John Dewey. His contribution to the Herbart Yearbook in 1895, "Interest as Related to Will", can be examined alongside his similar statement in 1913, Interest and Effort in Education.²⁷

Dewey's premise discloses a good deal of the substance of his argument. "It is psychologically impossible to call forth any activity without some interest."²⁸ Interest, he argues, is active, projective, or propulsive, as in the sense of "taking interest". Interest is dynamic. "To be interested in any matter is to be actively concerned with it."²⁹ Secondly, interest is objective in the

sense of a person having many interests to look after, business interests, local interests, etc. Every interest attaches itself to an object. "We identify interests with concerns or affairs."³⁰ Thirdly, interest is personal or emotional, a recognition of something at stake, a direct concern for something. This is the sense of a feeling of worth, such that "wherever we have interest there we have internal realization of value."³¹ Now Dewey does not relate these senses of interest together such that one sense (for example number one) is a condition for another (for example, two or three). All three senses become lost in the activity (which is the interest).

Dewey has incorporated a number of common sense usages into his psychological concept, particularly the feeling of one who is concerned or has a personal concern in anything, and the thing in which one has a concern. Dewey's first aspect of interest, that is, its active, dynamic side, is not set down lexically. He does note other common uses which he does not include in this concept. These involve more or less disparaging implications as when interest is spoken of as opposed to principle, or when self-interest is used as a motive to action which regards only one's personal advantage. Dewey holds that the latter are neither the only, nor the controlling senses in which the term is used.

The great synthesizing concept for Dewey is the notion of self-expressive activity. Two examples are quoted, the last being somewhat more emphatic and suggesting that interest will give way to activity.

Genuine interest . . . is the accompaniment of the identification, through action, of the self

with some object or idea, because of the necessity of that object or idea for the maintenance of self-expression. . . .³²

An interest is primarily a form of self-expressive activity. . . . Any account of genuine interest must, therefore, grasp it as outgoing activity holding within its grasp an intellectual content, and reflecting itself in felt value.³³

It is hazardous but plausible to suspect that it was this sort of position which informed the thinking of A.F. Bentley.

Dewey offers a view of interest which fits easily with his distinction between means and ends. Direct interest includes cases of direct and immediate action in which the end is the present activity. More frequently there are cases of indirect, transferred, or mediated interest. In such cases anything indifferent or even repellent can become of interest when viewed as a means to an end already commanding attention. More surprisingly, anything can likewise become an interest when "seen as an end that will allow means already under control to secure further movement and outlet."³⁴

His position is that anything can become an interest when seen as a means or an end insofar as it can be related to on-going, self-involved activity. Dewey insists that the interest in the means is not tied externally to the interest in one end. The interest in the end saturates, transforms, re-evaluates the means. "Whatever interest or value attaches to the end attaches to each of these steps."³⁵ But it could not be otherwise insofar as the interest is the entire activity. Dewey is plainly ambiguous by having the term "interest" denote quite different phenomena.

The terms "means" and "end" had meaning for Dewey only in the sense in which they applied to the positions occupied by acts at stages of a single developing activity. Each mean was also an end to a particular process or phase of the whole. And with interest being in effect the activity as a whole, it was clear to Dewey at least, that the means and end participated in the same quantum of interest. Later writers such as Vernon Van Dyke and David Easton were to make a much sharper analytical distinction between means and ends such that ends could be labeled "intrinsic interests" and means "instrumental interests". In accomplishing this, they not only tore the idiom of activity which had been so crucial to Dewey, but they succeeded in leaving the concept of interest devoid of any independent meaning or fixed moorings.

D.E. Berlyne implies that because motivational concepts did not become popular until after 1914, interest as a motivational concept did not become common until that time.³⁶ Dewey's work stands as an unmistakable exception. It should also be noticed that although "interest" was seldom seen as a motive in this early period, it was nevertheless given the same job to perform as a motive (conative disposition). Felix Arnold's account is a case in point. In fact much of what Stout had to say suggested that interest and conation were the same thing. Interest then became a striving towards an end state. William James, whose work pointed in so many directions and forecast so many different schools, also gave interest this dynamic aspect.

My experience is what I agree to attend to.

Only those items which I notice shape my mind, -- without selective interest, experience is utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground -- intelligible perspective in a word.³⁷

In his discussion of "analysis", James argues that our practical or personal interests and our aesthetic interests determine which element we shall attend to first.³⁸ Interest in the sense of a disposition directing the organism to objects or other types of activity was used in spite of the absence of the notion of motivation.

Dewey's intimate relationship of means and end in mediated interest is nowhere more clearly seen than when he addresses himself to the question of motivation. Desire and effort both imply a state of tension and are both phases of mediated interest. This tension state is called effort when viewed from the side of the idea, that is, how the transformation of the actual state of things is to be carried out to make it conform to the ideal or end. It is called desire when seen from the side of the existing energies which push forward to secure this transformation, that is, from the side of the means at hand. Normal desire, or properly mediated interest, exists when interest in the end has been carried over into the means. Dewey sets this out in what seems to be a different definition of the term interest.

Interest marks the fact that the emotional force aroused is functioning. This is our definition of interest: it is impulse functioning with reference to an idea of self-expression.³⁹

The ideal is simply the projection of the active powers into intellectual terms. The ideal has the function of a motive when desire has passed into mediate interest.

"Motive is the interest in the ideal mediated into impulse and habit."⁴⁰ Or as he later argued, "the motive force of an end and the interest that the end possesses are equivalent expressions. . . ."⁴¹

Although Dewey spends much time in setting out concepts such as interest, desire, and effort, he does not give any independent definition to the concept of activity. It is rather an amorphous whole, much like a conceptual scheme or framework, involving interest, desire, effort, self, objects, self-object identification, and means-end fusion. Activity seems to be always going on and it is not easy to see how one activity is to be distinguished from another, that is, when one activity ends and another begins. In a sense, interest also loses out, because, being a part of activity and existing only in activity, it becomes redundant in its own right. This may be quite proper and meaningful. But, as will be argued in a later chapter, there seem to be cases in which the term "interest" can be used where the term "activity" is inappropriate. "Interest" as "self-expressive activity" is a cumbersome concept to wield. Possibly Dewey is being pushed too far. Conceivably he would have employed "interest" in any one of its three aspects to cover certain kinds of activity, without needing to involve everything included in his notion of activity. But this is not very clear. Nor is it certain that Dewey would have taken anything for "interest" except "self-expressive activity."

Dewey is most confusing when he sets out a number of distinct meanings for a concept and then never bothers to suggest which one he intends at any given time. It is sometimes implied that they are all really the same thing.

For example the term "means" in one place denotes the energies of the organism focused on the idea to be reached, and in another place, it denotes anything which could serve to realize an end, object, activity or idea. But more importantly, it is simply ambiguous to have the term "interest" denote phenomena as diverse as active concern, activity, a feeling of worth, concerns or affairs, and a motive.

The final view to be examined in this section is the synthetic attempt advanced by Felix Arnold.⁴² It is one of the most thoroughgoing analyses of the concept of interest that exists in the literature of psychology. Arnold offers a careful delineation of concepts and presents the term "attitude" in relation to "interest". He develops a well-rounded conception of interest which includes cognitive, motivational, and affective aspects not unlike the form that the notion of attitude was later to assume. Arnold presents a further contribution to the means-end problem which had been opened by Dewey.

Arnold begins with a lengthy discussion arguing that interest is not equivalent to pleasure-pain feelings or to attention. The burden of his article, however, is to set out the concept of interest.

"When I am interested in anything, I take a certain attitude toward it."⁴³ There is a tendency to realize a set of reactions which would give control of the situation and which would result in a certain state which is now in ideal form. If there is striving for the realization of the future state, interest is present. The attitude taken towards the object is due to the significance it has in connection with a future state of the self.

The feeling attitude involved is a resultant of past experience in knowing and reacting to an object. Other objects of the same class confronted in the future thus acquire a certain meaning. They are identified and located and the feelings and reactions associated with previous experience arise in the present as the feeling attitude or conative tendency. The striving may be to realize the object or to escape from it. "The meaning or felt worth of an object is simply consciousness of the attitude roused by such object."⁴⁴ The attitude is said to set up a tendency to realize reactions which will arise when the future condition is reached. This tendency is "felt as striving, appetite, conation, as interest."⁴⁵

The striving for direction or control bears with it a cognitive element. The future condition to be realized exists in some ideal form as a mental disposition or system of ideas. "Interest on its cognitive side is the special significance which an object or idea has with reference to some future condition of the self."⁴⁶ The notion of "reference to the self", Arnold explains, means that anything connected with one in any pleasure-pain relation has reference to me, and is connected with my future welfare. For example, a man's business means to him food, luxuries, home, ease, family welfare etc. It is related to the self and things so related largely determine my future attitude towards them. Interest to Arnold is an enduring thing. "Interest is a matter of interpreting and reacting."⁴⁷

In his psychological concept Arnold includes the common usages involving a feeling of concern in something and the things in which the concern is centered. He also

anticipates the usage to appear much later, that is, a readiness to attend to, and be stirred by, a certain class of objects.

Arnold argues that desire, expectation, and curiosity, are the most important forms that interest can take. The distinctions between them being based on the relative balance of the conative and cognitive elements. Of the degrees of development in interest, there are the stages of primary interest, secondary interest, and acquired interest.

The simplest form of interest, that is, primary interest, is that in which motor control of a situation has given the situation meaning in itself. The object or situation, without any other connection, leads to the future state idealized in awareness or thought. The interest in this case is the meaning the object has for one's future welfare plus the attitude aroused by the awareness of such welfare. The object or situation is the end, so to speak, as it leads directly and immediately to the realization of the interest.⁴⁸

The more usual case, Arnold contends, is that in which the object or situation to be reached, as well as the objects through which attainment is possible, are not directly amenable to the motor control necessary to realize the future condition ideally present. In this case the object or situation as an end exists only in mental construction. It becomes connected ideally with a series of means over which control is necessary before the terminal condition can be reached. Interest in the final object or situation lends interest to the means which are regarded as secondary interests. Arnold emphasizes the point

that the means may not afford pleasure but nevertheless have interest in the sense of being secondary to, or a means to, what is to come. This is a significant departure from Dewey's position.⁴⁹

A common occurrence in the pursuit of a series of means, Arnold argues, is the development of acquired interest. This is an attitude and determining cognitive content toward the mean which is a result of secondary interest. Reading psychology as a means to passing exams so that a teaching career could eventuate might give way to an acquired interest in psychology and hence to a career in testing the mental fitness of teachers.

In concluding this section, the various usages of the concept in this early pre-1914 period will be set out.

1. Interest as a feeling. This took various forms and to the exponents no doubt constituted distinct meanings.

a) Interest as one case of feeling; the passive outcome of the interaction of the apperceptive systems.

b) Interest as consciousness of value or worth based on the feeling of pleasure created by a stimulating object or idea.

c) Interest as a feeling of pleasure or pain which was identical with attention.

d) Interest as the feeling aspect only, or hedonic tone, of the attention process.

e) Interest as the intellectual feeling, most typically the feeling of curiosity.

2. Interest as a more or less permanent mental disposition with conative (motivational) and affective (feeling) connotations.

a) Interest as a mental process involving i) a conative aspect or feeling-attitude which gave meaning to objects and was felt as a striving or appetite, and ii) a cognitive aspect or awareness of the significance which objects or ideas held with reference to some future condition of the self.

b) Interest as a permanent mental possession such that an individual has a store of associations relating to certain objects to which he habitually gives attention.

3. Interest as activity.

a) Interest as self-expressive activity with a dynamic conative aspect, an objective referent to which the self is identified, and a subjective and emotional, or affective aspect.

Also significant in these early usages were: a) the notion of a hierarchy of interests within the mental processes of an individual which reflected the self; b) interest as the relationship of identification between the self and some external object or concern necessary for bringing about or continuing some aspect of self-expression; c) the naming of interests by identifying the objects, activities, or ideas to which the self was related; and d) the setting out of objects, ideas, or activities as interests in a means-end relationship as they were perceived by, and related to, the experiencing individual.

The main conclusion that appears from examining the concept in use in this period is that, as a concept, interest was sometimes vague and often ambiguously used. Little consensus emerged on the meaning of the term and it experienced much definition, redefinition, formulation

and reformulation. Almost every psychologist reviewed sought to outline interest so that it would fit in with his prevailing orientation, his own introspections, and his other major conceptual tools. It was an individualistic era of prolific theorizing filled with competing conceptual frameworks. Interest was only one of the major concepts which defied standardization and which had almost as many meanings as it had users.

The Interwar Period: 1914-1940

D.E. Berlyne has rightly argued that two main trends in this period were to bear on the discussion and analysis of interest as a psychological concept.⁵⁰ The first influence came in the form of an exaggerated emphasis on motivational questions. The second factor was more generally a flourishing experimental orientation which sometimes sought to define psychology as measurable behaviour. Concepts became defined much more in terms of what the available methods could measure. The extension of experimental methods in this period left less room for theoretical speculation about the nature of interest.

The period generally is characterized by a quest for new orienting concepts, tools which would mesh with the developing empirical machinery. This period saw the rise and decline of McDougallian instinct theory, the anti-instinct forces being summoned by Dunlop in 1919, joined by Floyd H. Allport and such cultural anthropologists as F. Boas, Malinowski, and the Meads. A more isolated and physiologically oriented tradition was forged by J.B. Watson, E.L. Thorndike, E.C. Tolmon, Skinner and Hull, with the simple formula of stimulus-response slowly giving way to stimulus-

organism-response. The systematic, all inclusive alternative offered by Freud became popular in the nineteen-twenties, and the Gestaltist influence joined the prevailing currents in the nineteen-thirties.

That which was considered quantitative flourished and was amassed in innumerable empirical studies of intelligence, aptitudes, motives, traits, needs, habits, interests, and of greater consequence, the new concept of attitude. It was an epoch when psychologists generally agreed only in turning their backs on their discipline, in disclaiming the past as a gigantic waste of time, and in proclaiming psychology as a new science of what ever subject matter they happened to favour. Some political scientists were to assume a very similar stance some two to three decades later.

R.S. Woodworth, the first to introduce the term "drive" to psychology, describes "interest" as having an objective side and a subjective side.⁵¹ From its subjective side interest "is similar to an emotion" and from its objective side it is "a drive towards activity."⁵² Woodworth advances a theory in which motivation and interest are seen as the driving forces in perception and in the development of skilled movements. There is no common usage of the concept that relates easily to Woodworth's position but he sits fairly in the tradition of James, Baldwin and Arnold.

William McDougall proffers the hormic theory, supposedly derived from Aristotle, Hartmann, and Schopenhauer, as an alternative to hedonism.⁵³ He believes that all mental activity has three aspects, the cognitive, the conative, and the affective. Conation is immediately determined by cognition, while the pleasure-pain feeling results from the striving or conation. Attention, McDougall argues, is

"conation or striving considered from the point of view of its effects on cognitive process."⁵⁴ He regards interest as being conative rather than cognitive, depending on the strength of the conative tendencies excited and not relying on existing present knowledge. It is not unusual to find McDougall arguing from animal findings.

An animal is interested in all those things that are capable of evoking any of its instinctive impulses. Like the animals, we are interested only in those things that evoke in us one or other (or several) of the instinctive impulses.⁵⁵

While animals are limited to their natural instincts, man can acquire many new interests by developing sentiments for a wide range of objects. An old question reappears. McDougall regards interest as latent attention, and attention as interest in action. The mind is said to be so organized that when it thinks of an object, such thinking evokes an impulse or desire which then leads to and maintains a train of activity relating to the object.

R.B. Cattell develops the concept of interest into one of "the stable features of the landscape of personality."⁵⁶ He employs McDougall's dictum as his guiding conceptualization of "interest" and incorporates F.C. Bartlett's thesis that "interest" is that "which determines perception and memory."⁵⁷ His final definition of "interest" is rather broad and difficult to place within the context of motivation.

We have agreed that interest appears as a result of the functioning of any instinct, sentiment, or complex and that the expression "interest" might be used as a generic term to cover all these dispositions.⁵⁸

Cattell uses the notion of interest to cover all expressions of libido regardless of whether the attachments

are of love or hate. Interests are conceived as a broad pattern of all the things which concern an individual and are seen as associations reflecting the basic dispositions in relation to particular objects. But interests are not motives. The measurement of interests is discussed as a procedure distinct from that of measuring attitudes which are seen as motives.

The measurement of interest is a purely quantitative survey which may need to be followed by the measurement of attitudes in which qualitative differences became all important.⁵⁹

The confusing thing in Cattell is the use of "interest" as a term to cover all the dispositions, especially the instincts, which McDougall regarded as the motivational forces of the personality. And yet Cattell can turn around and argue that interests are not motives. Either usage would be acceptable, but having both is simply too much.

Cyril Burt seems to set off in the same direction as Cattell and similarly blurs and scatters the force of his argument. He defines a "complex" as an emotional system which is built up unconsciously and which is apt to be illogical and irrational. The more rational and logical emotional systems he calls the "sentiments". "To cover both perhaps the best generic name would be interests."⁶⁰

In what he considers very common usage, E.L. Thorndike separates wants, interests, attitudes, and emotions, from sensations, percepts, images, and ideas, and in turn from movements or acts.⁶¹ Interest seems to be viewed, in a general way, as one type of motivational factor. He argues that the term "drive" "refers to wants, interests, attitudes, and emotions when these are considered as active forces", and that "thoughts and action occur largely in the service of

wants, interests, and attitudes and are stimulated and guided by them." Thorndike nowhere makes explicit differentiation among his concepts, and "interest" is simply left undefined.⁶² He was consistent by avoiding definitions in his earlier book, The Psychology of Learning, and by continuing this trend in his later work, Adult Interests.⁶³ E.C. Tolman contributes nothing by way of definitional clarification but he does emphasize that the main significance of wants, interests, and attitudes lies in the fact that "they in their turn control -- select and reject -- behaviors."⁶⁴

The usages so far reviewed have tended to see "interest" as a conative element, an emotional system, in general, as a basic motivational factor which is somehow a significant part of the personality system. Others would have "interest" as the general and most basic motivational factor. It is in this context of motivation that Gordon W. Allport develops his argument.⁶⁵

Allport outlines a difficulty which had troubled psychology in the past and which was to recur many times again. Some conception of a determining tendency or readiness for response is inferred in order to account for the manifest stability and consistency of behavior and experience. These hypothetical constructs have sometimes been labelled "acquired behavioral dispositions."⁶⁶ The problem is that of making conceptual distinctions between or among entities inferred from behavioral consistencies. Allport recognizes the difficulty but is prepared to differentiate conceptually even though the distinctions may not be quite as apparent in actual empirical procedures.⁶⁷

Allport regards all traits as directive tendencies but denies that all directive tendencies are traits. Some directive tendencies are too narrow and specific in their reference and are too fleeting or transient. Interests appear, along with traits, as one case in the large class of lasting mental structures.

Traits are more generalized and enduring, having less to do with fleeting mental sets than with lasting mental structures such as interests, tastes, complexes, sentiments, ideals and the like.⁶⁸

In distinguishing between traits and attitudes, Allport uses three criteria: (1) an attitude has a well-defined object of reference whereas traits have no definite reference to objects; (2) attitudes may be specific as well as general, whereas traits can only be general; and (3) "attitude" signifies the acceptance or rejection of the object or concept of value to which it is related, whereas traits have no such clear-cut direction and are often merely stylistic. In giving examples of psychological concepts which are equivalent to, or overlap with, the concept of trait, Allport notes, among others, "interest", "complex", and "general attitude". This is not at all clear. The distinction drawn above is less easy to see when Allport introduces the concept of attitudinal trait to denote modes of adjustments through which the person orients himself to some specifiable aspects of his life situation.

One major class of such traits are those which are directed toward values. These values or variables include the six directions of striving outlined by E. Spranger.⁶⁹ They include theoretical interest, economic interest, aesthetic interest, political (power) interest, and religious interest. The variable "social interest" is not

included, Spranger advises, because it could be neither defined nor adequately measured. These variables are clearly of motivational import and it is evident that Allport elects to use "interest" and "value" synonymously.

The last five variables on the psychograph relate distinctly to motivational traits or interests. No psychograph would be complete without some dimensions to represent subjective values which are the core of the dynamics of behavior, and play so large a part in unifying the personality.⁷⁰

Allport regards motives as constituting the personality system. He argues that in McDougall's hormic psychology only the instincts or sentiments are prime movers and they are counted on to explain the endless variety of human interests. He sees this as an error. Allport defends the thesis that adult motives are infinitely varied, self-sustaining, contemporary systems, growing out of antecedent systems but functionally independent of them. He sees interests as personal values which are in turn motives.

When an interest-system has once been formed, it not only creates a tensional condition that may be readily aroused -- leading to overt conduct in some way satisfying to the interest, but it also acts as a silent agent for selecting and directing any behavior related to it.⁷¹

The permanent interests of personality, like all motives, are a kind of striving for some form of completion or closure. Lasting interests are said to be recurrent sources of tension or discontent, deriving their forward impetus from their incompleteness. Although Allport allows that learning may bring new systems of interest into existence, the interests are always contemporary. "Whatever drives, drives now."

But conceptually we are no clearer. Allport regards traits, attitudes, interests, and sentiments as the ultimate and true dispositions of the mature personality. They are given equal status. In one place he suggests that at some point in life "an interest (sentiments, values, trait,) may become essentially fixed in its organization."⁷² The terms are used synonymously, with "attitude" being strangely absent. He notes the tremendous changes that occur when infancy is passed.

[P]rimitive segmental drive rapidly recedes in importance, being supplanted by the more sophisticated type of motives characteristic of the mature personality, and commonly represented by such terms as interest, sentiment, value, trait, ambition, attitude, taste, and inclination. . . . Thus it seems there are many terms available for expressing the dynamic unit we have in mind.⁷³

Allport suggests that this general class of structural units be named "traits". The principal properties of these elements are similar but there are distinctions that he feels should be made. Yet he does not make them except by way of noting that in certain contexts certain concepts fit better than others.⁷⁴

One trend which must be mentioned is the development of tests for measuring individual and group interests. D.E. Berlyne regards this experimental approach as being so devoid of conceptual import that he allows it only one small paragraph in his discussion.⁷⁵ Although many experimenters did not set out clearly what they were measuring, others did attempt some conceptual clarification.

Edward K. Strong Jr., a long time leader in the measurement field, came as close as anyone to avoiding serious discussion of the concept of interest. Yet there are traces of concern when he argues that "an interest is accompanied

by pleasant feeling and by a dynamic tendency to seek the object or do something with it."⁷⁶ Aversions are said to be the opposite -- unpleasant feeling and a tendency to escape from the object. Strong includes in the concept a great deal of the earlier tradition of interest as a feeling, and especially a feeling of pleasure. There is also the suggestion of future activity towards the object which is at least a part of what was intended by speaking of interest as a permanent mental disposition. However, in Strong's usage, it seems more reactive than it is proactive or dynamic. He does note that "a measurement of one's interests is also a measurement of what one will do, other things being equal."⁷⁷ In operational terms, interests are indicated by positive likes of certain statements of activities, occupations, hobbies etc. Dislikes are said to be expressions of aversion.

Douglas Fryer gives the most comprehensive account of the interest measurement school.⁷⁸ He explains that an interest profile or inventory gives an expression of three qualities of feeling; an interest or like, an indifference, an aversion or dislike. There is some confusion in regard to the aversions. Fryer speaks of the two kinds of subjective interest.

Subjective interests are likes which are estimated experiences characterized by feeling of pleasantness, and aversions are dislikes, which are estimated experiences characterized by feelings of unpleasantness. . . . Interests are the objects and activities that stimulate pleasant feelings in the individual. Interests and aversions, then, are material quantities.⁷⁹

Fryer is clear enough in stating that we know or name interests by the stimulating object, although his high step

to a "material quantity" is in some doubt. He is also unclear in regard to the nature of the feeling relationship toward the object. He clearly states that subjective interests are likes and aversions yet speaks also of "interests" and "aversions".

Objective interests to Fryer are reactions or expressions of interest which are directly observable. The two kinds of objective interest, positive and negative, (note "negative interest") are said to be determined by the two types of movement, either toward or away from the stimulus. He later separates objective interests: "Activity in the direction of the stimulus is an interest and away from the stimulus is an aversion."⁸⁰ It seems reasonable to expect that if his measure of subjective interest is valid, that there ought to be a high correlation between the subjective feeling and the objective interest or direction of movement. But Fryer must admit that "it is not clear. . . that the measure of subjective interest and of objective interest are measures of the same thing."⁸¹

A major contribution made by Fryer is his attempt to distinguish between interest and motivation. He does this at the expense of leaving motives as reactive agents which do not strive or drive on their own accord. His argument is brought forward in the context of his acceptance -- rejection theory of interest measurement.

Objective interests are acceptance reactions, and objective aversions are rejection reactions. . . . Subjective interests, or likes, would appear to be acceptance of stimulation and subjective aversions, or dislikes, would appear to be rejections of stimulation. . . . The persistence of stimulation, the driving strength of objects of interest and aversion to cause reactions, is this second aspect. This as-

pect of the reaction has been dealt with experimentally as motivation. . . . It is an energy aspect of experience or reaction which is present in degrees.⁸²

Fryer refuses to see the affective-emotional aspect of subjective interest as a factor in selecting stimuli and in predisposing the organism to certain types of activity. His view is the model of the utterly outer-directed man. There is little evidence that his theory was ever accepted or rejected. The absence of any evidence one way or another suggests that it could possibly have been neglected or even ignored.

The Kuder Preference Record employs much the same operational concept of interest as is contained in the tests devised by Strong and Fryer. Test construction differs, but interest is similarly regarded as a like or preference.⁸³ The Study of Values employs a broader conception of interest and differs from the other interest tests by stressing "non-vocational interests and need traits."⁸⁴ The authors of the test argue that broad functions of personality must be explored if the interests are to be uncovered.

Vernon and Allport conceive interests as values, arguing from Spranger that mental states are characteristically engaged in some form of evaluating. The categories of value (interest) are those set out by Spranger and are seen as important and pervasive dispositions of personality.⁸⁵ In a later report it is argued that "five of the values represent generalized, self-consistent, attitudinal traits of personality."⁸⁶ Results of test experience suggest that it is a fairly reliable instrument for tapping some motivational factors of a generalized dynamic nature. G.W. Hartmann's results indicated that the scale measured "fund-

amental and enduring attitudes of the sort represented by Shand's sentiments. . . . The experiments prove. . . that general evaluative attitudes enter into various common activities of everyday life."⁸⁷

The conception of interest here is that which has been examined in the work of G.W. Allport. It is a much broader concept than that employed in other interest inventories. The research results, as well as the conceptual formulations, illustrate the confusion that is emerging in the use of the concept of interest and the concept of attitude.

It remains now to set out the usages of the concept in this second period and to offer brief concluding remarks.

Usage in the Interwar Period, 1914-1940:

- I. Interest conceived as a motivational factor
 - A. Interest conceived simply as one motivational factor.
 - B. Interest conceived as one motivational factor which is an aspect of the personality system.
 - C. Interest formulated as a concept which covered all forms of motivation.
- II. Interest conceived as a generic concept denoting broad emotional patterns which were characterized by the feeling of general concernedness. In this sense it was not a motivating factor but an outcome of motivational dispositions.
- III. Interest as a feeling.
 - A. Subjective interest which is a like and leads to the acceptance of stimulation that is characterized by the feeling of pleasantness.
- IV. Interest as a reaction.

A. Objective interest as an acceptance reaction characterized by movement toward the stimulating object.

There are really no usages in this period which incorporate common sense meanings of the concept of interest. The closest is R.B. Cattell's notion of interest as "general concernedness". But his use of interest as a generic concept denoting the dispositions of instinct, sentiment, and complex is rather different and at best his meaning is not clear. In general, very little that was new in the way of usage appeared in this period. Even the empirically minded could find precedent for their conceptions in earlier writers. A tendency which is continuous is the difficulty of drawing clear distinctions between concepts. Although the concepts of attention and feeling appear much less often, the confusion moves to the field of motivational concepts or acquired behavioral disposition where "interest" was to struggle for independent status and even for survival.

CHAPTER II

"INTEREST" IN PSYCHOLOGY: THE MODERN PERIOD

This chapter continues the review of the usages of the term "interest" that was initiated in the first chapter of this inquiry. A survey is made of some of the contributions made by psychologists to this discussion between 1940 and 1965.

The major trends within the discipline outlined in the preceding chapter continue unabated to the present. The emphasis on motivational questions continues throughout this period and comes to form the basis for resurgent theorizing in the field of personality. An example of the confused variety of conflicting orientations in personality theory is set out by a recent writer in the field.

The simultaneous presence today of so many systematic and viable treatments of personality tells us that the science of personality is still at a somewhat early stage of development. . . . The presence of so many side by side suggests inadequacies in their present formulations and in the available evidence with which to evaluate them. . . . Each personality theory differs from the other in some of its tenets about the nature of the person. These differences have become intensely debated issues. . . .⁸⁸

A new trend appears in the wider discussion of mental acts as well as motor acts. Theory and empirical research in the area of cognition flourished, sometimes in conjunction with motivational inquiry and sometimes alone. There are few signs of a silencing of the rivalry between and within conflicting schools of thought.

The period reviewed in this chapter contains some of

the contributions to the discussion of "interest" as a psychological concept by psychologists since 1940. Critical conceptual analysis is not a general feature of this literature nor is the concept of interest viewed as being of special importance. Social psychology seems preoccupied with such concepts as interaction, role, group and attitude. In this field the concept of interest is given low priority. Theory and empirical research which stress cognitive phenomena rely much more on the concept of attitude than on the concept of interest. Personality theories and to some extent learning theories have used "interest" in varying degrees, the interest measurement school becoming largely an adjunct of personality assessment.

Psychology as a discipline has expanded enormously in recent years and psychologists have retained a marked individuality in concept formation and usage. To manage this diversity, a classification of usages is outlined here and employed throughout rather than simply being set down at the end as a consequence of tracing the period through in chronological order. This is done at the expense of some injustice to individual contributions.

I. Interest as a Motivational Concept which Relates to the Personality System

A. Interest as a motivational factor which is a vital aspect of the personality system.

1. Interests as key motivational and control factors which constitute the ego-structure.

The first sense of this general usage regards the system of interests as constituting the ego or "self" structure. Most theories of personality include motivational factors in some patterned or hierarchically structured arrangement as well as a distinct function, and usually a distinct structure, to account for integration and control of the system as a whole.⁸⁹ But sometimes motivational and control functions are included in the same concept. This is the case in the usage of interests as the ego-structure.

The most outstanding exponent of this position is Gordon W. Allport. Since at least 1931, Allport has regarded "interest" as a general determining tendency or readiness for response. Like the concepts of attitudes, sentiments, traits, and values, interests are seen as motives which are independent and functionally autonomous, selecting stimuli and directing behaviours relevant to them.⁹⁰ Allport often contends that "striving from within is a far more essential characteristic of motive than stimulation from without."⁹¹ He frequently speaks of the permanent interests of the personality as recurrent sources of discontent, strivings for completion, which characterize adult motivation in contrast to the primitive, segmental drives of infancy. In his early work, Allport makes no real attempt to distinguish between the terms which denote this dynamic unit. However he does conceive of interests and values as being synonymous and denoting the same aspect of motivation.⁹² His prime concern is to distinguish between the two classes or forms of motivation, "one ego involved and one not."⁹³ In regard to the first class, he argues that "normally the ego-structure is made up of the ordinary values that spell the significance of life to the individual."⁹⁴

Allport considered himself to be moving away from the main stream of American psychology which stressed action, that is, motor action, not mental action. He draws a distinction between activity which is task-involved and true personal participation which is ego-involved. As opposed to peripheral motor activity, he argues that participation "sinks a shaft into the inner subjective regions of the personality. It taps central values."⁹⁵ His usage of "values" in this context is synonymous with his usage of "interest", that is, it refers to Spranger's six directions of striving. He frequently employs the concepts of interests, intentions, values, in speaking of ego-functions, but seldom uses the concepts of trait or attitude.⁹⁶

Allport regards the mature interests as constituting the "present ego-structure",⁹⁷ or, more explicitly, the "ego-process can be considered equivalent to interests. . . there is something functionally irreducible about interest systems."⁹⁸ Because interests interlock and comprise the structure of a personal life, they often persist in the face of dissatisfaction and failure. It is important to appreciate the role that Allport allowed the ego to play in the personality.

The ego, in taking command, projects itself forward into the future and recasts its motives largely in terms of intentions and plans. . . functional autonomy marks a shift in emphasis in the theory of motivation from geneticism in its various forms to the present "go" of interests that contemporaneously initiate and sustain behaviour.⁹⁹

Allport regards drives or needs as a class of motivational elements peripheral to his ego-interests.¹⁰⁰ The most important learning follows the channels of acquired interests. In opposition to the formulation of the law of

effect which treats learning as a consequence of the affixing of a tension-reducing goal to a segmental drive or tension state, Allport proffers that "always the learning has some important relevance to an interest. . . an interest causes learning which somewhere fits into the interest structure."¹⁰¹ The ego, Allport maintains, has to be satisfied in order to maintain a course of conduct, and so it plays a special selective role in learning.

Rather than viewing personality as a peculiar set of reaction tendencies and deficit motives, Allport sees it as dominated by a peculiar set of growth motives, (subjective values), (intentions), (interests), which establish patterns of striving in terms of long range goals. An individual is said to organize his perceptions in terms of these interests (value-scheme), consult his conscience, inhibit irrelevant responses, and drop and form new habit systems as they are dissonant or harmonious with his commitments and intentions. Thus the interest system (ego-processes) selects and organizes perceptions, selects and inhibits particular behaviours, and acts as the framework in which new learned behaviours emerge.¹⁰²

It was Allport's contention that psychologists lacked the verbal or conceptual tools to build a science of growth, futurity, and potential. He feared that "our available technical lexicon tends to tie us to a science of response, reaction, and regression."¹⁰³ In terms of methodological practices, Allport continued to attack the genetic tradition.

At no point do these methods ask the subject what his interests are, what he wants to do, or what he is trying to do. . . . From adolescence onward. . . the surest clue to personality is the hierarchy of interests, including the loves and loyalties of adult life.¹⁰⁴

Martin Scheerer regards Allport's conception of "interest" as bridging the gap between motivational and cognitive theory. He sees in Allport's concept "a cognitive relationship of the person to the environment and a subjective relationship to his ego values."¹⁰⁵ Scheerer notes with approval Allport's learning theory which moves away from satisfaction in the sense of tension-reduction to a view in which new knowledge is added, items are differentiated within the system, and the range of equivalent stimuli are broadened because of their relevance to an interest system.

The authors of Opinions and Personality employ the concept of interest in much the same fashion as Allport although they seem less concerned to give "interest" a specific function not shared by other motivational concepts. But the selective, guiding role of "interest" is noted, as well as the relation of "interest" to the self.

Each through his needs, interests, and aversions defines what for him constitutes the effective environment. . . . It was necessary to consider. . . those other people in our subjects lives whose interests had become to some extent their interests, those extensions of the self.¹⁰⁶

The authors hint at a usage closer to Allport's when they explain how the holding of an attitude sizes up objects and events "from the point of view of one's major interests and going concern."¹⁰⁷ A methodological note discloses the sense of "interest" as a major aspect of the personality system.

It was by getting some sense of the person's major interests and enterprises that we were able to put his opinions into a context. One does not have to use highly unreliable "keyhole" methods to get at this broader context of values and general interests.¹⁰⁸

Philip B. Rice also contends that "the ego is a system of interests."¹⁰⁹ The interests which make up the ego cluster he regards as (1) those which supply continuity to the individual's life pattern; (2) those which have been most often reinforced in anticipation or in retrospect if not in actual achievement; (3) those which have constituted the area of his life conflicts, and (4) those to which he has given the most thought. Although interests constitute the ego processes, Rice formulates the concept of interest so differently that it merits special treatment in the context of a different usage.

2. Interests as secondary or acquired drives which constitute the ego-structure.

The second sense of this general usage depicts "interests" as secondary or acquired drives rather than as searching, guiding, autonomous motives. This sense is employed by O.H. Mowrer.¹¹⁰ He admits that it is acceptable to substitute the common term "interest" for "ego-involvement", but "interest" is regarded as equivalent to fixation of the goal-object, cathexis, expectation, or appetitive conditioning. In short, "interest" becomes a "covert emotional response" or an ordinary drive whose tension when reduced gives rise to the operation of the law of effect. By reducing interests and the ego-system to the level of ordinary emotional drives, Mowrer denies the existence of the generalized, autonomous interest systems postulated by Allport.¹¹¹

B. Interest as the basic or general motivational factor where interests constitute the entire personality system.

This usage appears primarily in Homer Dubs' quest for simple conceptual formulations which could overcome the confusion perpetuated by the vast number of variously used motivational concepts.¹¹² He argues that all forms of behaviour can be defined and explained in terms of two sets of functions labelled "mechanisms" and "interests". The psychological mechanisms or mechanical functions include all learned automatic functions and reflexes. Interest is the name for the type of psychological function which includes the notion of goal but not the notion of directional behaviour. He contends that the concept of drive, as ordinarily employed, implies directional behaviour towards a goal. In his view, the organism is typically goal-oriented but this does not imply a specific direction. Dubs sets out four characteristic features of the function termed interest.

(a) a stimulus; (b) the capacity for releasing psychological energy; (c) a goal, and (d) the capacity for producing satisfaction or dissatisfaction-feeling.¹¹³

His argument is that each interest includes an organization for distinguishing stimuli, a capacity for releasing psychological energy when appropriate, facilities for selecting particular mechanisms to operate on behalf of the interest, a distinctive goal-object, and means for producing a non-localized pleasant sensation or satisfaction-feeling when the goal is attained. This view lent itself to the formulation of personality as "a set of dominant and subordinate interests and associated mechanisms that activate a particular organism."¹¹⁴ Interest is not only the sole motivational concept but the systems of interests constitute the entire personality.

It seems, however, that Dubs would retain other beha-

vioural concepts defined as kinds or types of interest. For example, he defines "instinct" as an inherited interest, and "wish" as a latent interest without an energy supply. Dubs' extreme position does not seem to have been accepted by others. Apparently most psychologists did not despair quite as much in making conceptual distinctions in the motivational area whereas Dubs recommended that everything be reduced to the generic concept of interest.

C. Interest as simply one case or type of general motivational factor.

This is a rather general usage which would include the views of Allport, Rice, and others who considered "interest" as a motivational concept which was synonymous with the ego-structure. However, many psychologists did not assert the latter while they accepted the former.

Gardner Murphy regards interests as dispositions defined in terms of objects to which one easily and willingly attends.¹¹⁵ The concept of interest formulated by N.G. Morozavo implies directedness of activity, emotional involvement, and activity which is self-motivated.¹¹⁶ A similar statement which appears in the educational psychology field defines interest as "the motivating force which impels us to attend to a person, a thing, or an activity. . . . Interests are closely related to drives, motives, and emotional responses."¹¹⁷ S. Larcebeau suggests that "interest arouses attention, is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure or aversion, and is dynamic."¹¹⁸ It is reasonably clear that this class of authors would regard interest as an aspect of the personality system, a status which was generally accorded all motivational elements.

D. Interest as a special form of motivation.

D.E. Berlyne sets out three senses in which interest is used as a special class of drive, namely, that involving a striving for novelty.

1. The first sense is that of "variation" and "satiation-resistance". It appears that various forms of satiation reveal a state of boredom and a need for varied "interesting" activities to relieve it. Berlyne reports findings of various psychologists which support the notion of a tendency for the organism to vary its reactions within the limits imposed on it by the situation.¹¹⁹

2. The second sense involves the notion of curiosity and Berlyne's account here is similar to that advanced much earlier by J. Mark Baldwin and J.S. Angell. This sense involves an active impulse to seek out new sensations, new experiences, and new knowledge. It differs from the first sense in which the cessation of the monotonous response is the factor responsible rather than the nature of the new activity replacing it. Berlyne contends that "the urge to enlarge our store of experiences is permanently with us and is directed to stimuli and responses that are new to us, often to the satisfaction of specific curiosities."¹²⁰

3. The third sense of the striving for novelty is that which pertains to "formal beauty", the visual, auditory, or verbal patterns which are sometimes said to be "interesting in themselves" regardless of their representational content. Berlyne speculates that the principles underlying an interest in art may be the same principles underlying other intellectual interests.¹²¹

II. Interest conceived as a motivational factor related to activity in which the activity or some aspect of the activity is emphasized.

A. Interest as the feeling or affective aspect of an activity.

The most explicit expression of this position is given by E.K. Strong, Jr.

Psychologists are prone to call activities by many names depending upon the aspect that is emphasized. Thus the activity of skating is called a habit or a skill when its motor co-ordination acquired by repetition is emphasized; it is called an interest when its feeling quality is emphasized.¹²²

Strong lists the five characteristics of interests:

(a) they are acquired by experience in the sense that feeling becomes associated with the activity; (b) interests are persistent; (c) interests vary in intensity; (d) interests as preferences imply a readiness to accept or reject in terms of the associated value or feeling quality, and (e) the same feeling quality determines whether the organism will act by going toward or away from the stimulus.¹²³ L.W. Ferguson regards the concept of interest as including an individual's likes, dislikes, preferences and aversions. He argues that "an interest is an expression of feeling whereas an attitude is an expression of belief."¹²⁴ If attention is viewed as an activity, then Gardner Murphy's use of interest is an instance of this type of usage. He defines interest as "the attitude with which one attends to anything; the feeling accompanying attention."¹²⁵ Crow and Crow regard the affective experience that has been stimulated by an activity as one usage of "interest".¹²⁶

B. Interest as the aspect of an activity which is symbolized and reinforced.

After urging that the ego be viewed as a system of interests, Philip B. Rice proceeds to analyze the vague concept more carefully. Although Rice sets out the "activity" as crucial in defining the "interest", it is clear that he intends to include an ego-involvement in a particular aspect of an activity.

That core of the act which constitutes the "interest" is the feature of it most likely to be symbolized and repeatedly confirmed through approval of its symbol.¹²⁷

He contends that it is impossible to define interest generally, as the features of an act which are symbolized may vary from the goal-object to the terminal consummatory reaction to the preliminary response sequence. He argues that in economic activities interest centers on the goal-object, money and the things that money can buy. In amatory activities interest seems to center on preparatory features as well as on the consummatory aspect. In musical activities interest hinges on the pattern of sounds and on the affective responses to them. But there is one characteristic common to all interest involvement.

In these cases the interest is defined by the various features of the act, but always by those to which satisfaction chiefly attaches, and it is consequently those several phases of the act that are reinforced.¹²⁸

Rice comes close to saying that the interest consists of the interesting part of an activity which is symbolized, that is, the aspect which gives pleasure or satisfaction.

C. Interest as a certain class of activities.

In this case as in the last two senses, "interest" is seen as a motivational factor which is related to specific activities. J.P. Guilford sets out the best example of this usage. It is in distinguishing among the three kinds of motivational traits that he emphasizes "activity" as the characteristic defining "interest". He argues that the three kinds of traits, needs, interests, and attitudes, all pertain to things we strive to do or to obtain. Needs are "perennial desires for certain conditions", such as being noticed or being comfortable. Interests are defined as "long-standing desires to indulge in certain kinds of activities", such as handiwork, thinking, debating, and reading. Attitudes are distinguished from these two kinds of traits by the fact that "some social object or policies are involved."¹²⁹

Guilford later offers a more explicit account of interests, again using the condition-activity distinction to set "interests" apart from "needs".

An interest may be defined as an individual's generalized behaviour tendency to be attracted to a certain class of activities. . . . [B]eing attracted to certain activities implies that interests are most likely to determine what a person does rather than how he does it or how well. . . . Unlike an interest . . . a need pertains to the individual's attraction toward a certain condition or status rather than toward certain activities. . . classes of valued activities, which means interests, avocational as well as vocational.¹³⁰

It was a position very similar to Guilford's which informed a large number of the profession engaged in interest-measurement activities. The conception was easily operationalized in the investigation of vocational and avocational interests.

The emphasis is on classes of activities, which are

liked or not liked in fairly reasonable groupings under the different factors.¹³¹

The interest-measurement literature in this period diverges very little from the operational criteria and areas of investigation outlined in the last chapter. The most common operational definition employed "like", "dislike", "preference" or "aversion" as an indication of the subject's interest in people, things, ideals, or occupations.¹³² A slight but not significant variation appears in an empirical study of children's interests. The authors argue that their intention is "to make a general survey of children's interests as revealed by their wishes, likes and dislikes".¹³³ In the actual operation, "interest" becomes simply "what children report when they describe what they like."¹³⁴

On other occasions, the criterion of "interest" has been "knowledge, opinions, wisdom, etc.",¹³⁵ or simply "what things are you interested in", or "just think of your greatest interests or desires at this time."¹³⁶ In one particular study, the authors suggested that by "interest" they meant "not dull, not monotonous, fascinating, appealing."¹³⁷ In one instance, the student's selection of courses and achievement in those courses were used as the two criteria of "interest". Selection and achievement were thought to give "a strong indication of his desires and needs."¹³⁸ Some critical articles appeared but they seemed to have little effect in bringing consensus on operational definitions.¹³⁹

The study of vocational and avocational interests proved to be the most common areas of examination. However J. Marks did attempt to discover the effects of the similarity of interests in group formation.¹⁴⁰ D.E. Super and E.S. Bordin investigated the phenomenon of interest change as a re-

flection of changes in self-image,¹⁴¹ and R.E. Lana examined the influence of "interest" in determining order effects in opinion change.¹⁴² The investigation of the relation between interests and abilities which had been long pursued in the measurement field received much less attention. Guilford contends that this particular area of study was largely unsatisfactory because there were "no well defined variables of either interest or aptitudes."¹⁴³ His review of this literature is concise and pointed.

There is nothing known to support the idea that interests determine development of abilities to any significant degree. In fact, where correlations have been estimated between corresponding interests and abilities, they have been found to be generally low.¹⁴⁴

A summary of the psychological usages of the concept of interest in this period would include the following:

- I. Interest as a motivational concept which relates to the personality structure.
 - A. Interest as a motivational factor which is a vital aspect of the personality system.
 1. Interests as key motivational and control factors which constitute the ego-structure.
 2. Interests as secondary or acquired drives which constitute the ego-structure.
 - B. Interest as the basic or general motivational factor where interest systems constitute the entire personality structure.
 - C. Interest as simply one case or type of general motivational factor.
 - D. Interest as a special form of motivation.
 1. Variation and satiation resistance.

2. Curiosity.

3. Formal beauty.

II. Interest conceived as a motivational factor related to activity in which the activity or some aspect of the activity is emphasized.

A. Interest as the feeling or affective quality of an activity.

B. Interest as the aspect of an activity which is symbolized and reinforced.

C. Interests as a certain class of activities.

D.E. Berlyne concluded his 1949 review of "interest" as a psychological concept by setting out the various usages of the concept and the general areas of psychology to which they pertained. He decided that the time had not yet come when the various threads of meaning could be drawn together so that the concept could appear in a much more rigorous form.

A considerable amount is now known about some of these fields, but others have scarcely been explored. When some advance has been made in all of them, we shall be in a better position to give a clear, precise, operational definition of "interest" in one or several senses.¹⁴⁵

Berlyne's contribution has never been brought up to date, in fact seldom if ever has his work been referred to by other psychologists who have occasionally employed the term. Sustained analytical discussion of conceptual problems appears to be running a slow second to piece-meal empirical enquiries. It takes thirty years of Allport's reflections on the concept to equal in scope or intensity a single contribution by John Dewey or Felix Arnold in the earlier period.

There are no common sense usages included in the specifically motivational formulations of "interest" in this period,

although the work by G.W. Allport was pointing in that direction. The more he emphasized purposes, plans, intentions, or "one's going concerns", the nearer he came to incorporating the common usage of "being generally concerned about something." It may be that this common usage implies the notion of self or ego-involvement, and it was along these lines that Allport was working. In fact, the only feature that is new in this period is the use of "interest" as constituting the ego-structure. The notion of "interests" as reflecting the ego or self was of long standing, going back to John Dewey, Felix Arnold, and J.R. Angell. But the conception of "interest" as a highly generalized over-all planning, directing and selecting force in personality had never been specifically considered. Those who preferred to see "interests" on a more pedestrian level as "likes" or "preferences" defined in terms of pleasant or satisfaction feeling, stood in a very long technical, though not a common sense tradition.

In the general area of acquired behavioural dispositions, it is not easy to escape the conclusion that the concept of attitude was carrying the day. As long as the concept of interest remained vague and variously employed, psychologists seemed much more inclined to accept a concept which was more popular if not less ambiguous.

In terms of the amount of discussion in psychology relating to the concept of interest, and in view of the wide usage that the concept has received in political science, there seems no justification for the neglect that political scientists have shown this literature. That they may not have been greatly helped by this exercise in terms of enormous

theoretical or empirical gains is entirely possible. But a firmer commitment to clarity and precision may have resulted, or at least recognition of the fact that ambiguity does not breed fruitful and continuous academic advances.

CHAPTER III

"INTEREST" IN PSYCHOLOGY: SOME AREAS OF CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION

The enterprise of drawing out distinctions among concepts in a foreign literature such as psychology is probably both naive and presumptuous. That some would regard the undertaking as naive even if attempted by a scholar in his native discipline comes as a greater caution. But if there is a trend towards inter-disciplinary research, then clearly the conceptual job becomes one shared by all those who attempt to develop this kind of approach.

The psychologist W.H.R. Rivers once modestly argued that the study of politics could contribute more to psychology than any psychological knowledge then possessed could contribute to the understanding of social and political problems.¹⁴⁶ This is an unusual statement and it is probably more generous today than it was in the context of Rivers' time. But it is helpful to bear in mind, as it does suggest that political scientists have more to offer than the polite acceptance or immediate rejection of new streamlined methods and promising conceptual formulations. A good beginning would be to critically nag as well as to borrow.

It is not so much that political scientists should share the alarm of Walter Berns who was struck by the notion that the political was being psychologized out of existence by scholars who had little or no training in political science. He suggested that those who lacked the proper credentials in political science had little if any business working in the field at all.¹⁴⁷ It seems rather that political scientists can go a long way towards placing their own scholarly work on

a firmer foundation by pressing psychologists and others for greater attention to major conceptual difficulties. Rather than discrediting the joint enterprise out of hand, it would appear more reasonable to demand a more precisely packaged and clearly labelled article from the manufacturer before it hits the inter-disciplinary market. Scholars would be in a better position to judge whether the concept could be fruitfully used or better ignored.

When a political scientist does enter the realm of psychological distinctions as in the present attempt, even with much trepidation and humility, there is some uncomfortable resemblance to the sort of thing that Pope must have had in mind when he spoke about fools rushing and angels fearing.

1. Motivational Concepts

Motivational questions have received particular attention from psychologists throughout the most part of the twentieth century. The basic motivational unit or concept has never been agreed upon. A recent psychologist puts the problem rather succinctly.

Motive is a hypothetical construct denoting certain forces that impel behaviour. Every theory of personality makes use of some version of the concept of motive, even though the precise details vary. Diverse terms such as motive, drive, need, impulse, wish, want, or valence indicate these conceptual differences. But in spite of variation in precise meaning, the large concept is common. . . the idea that some identifiable force activates and directs behaviour.¹⁴⁸

Since most psychologists do contend that some kinds of distinctions can be drawn, and as "interest" has often been included somewhere in the realm of such concepts, it seems worthwhile to at least trace the outlines of available differentiations among concepts.

A fair statement would be that such concepts as motive, drive, need, valence, and want are used inconsistently and often interchangeably by many psychologists. Sometimes a distinction is drawn between need and drive such that tissue needs are seen as the source of drives. This usage is employed by Murphy and is explained by Lazarus.¹⁴⁹ He notes that the tension-reduction model usually employed in the stimulus-response associative learning school assumes that man is born with certain tissue needs which must be satisfied to permit survival and freedom from tension and pain. Writers who hold this position assert that "primary drives arise directly from these tissue needs. We learn the behaviour that enables us to gratify these needs and reduce their related drive."¹⁵⁰

Their position includes a second form or type of drive, usually termed secondary or acquired, or as Murphy remarks, derived or sociogenic. The secondary drives do not arise directly from tissue needs but are learned through social experience. Such drives are learned by connecting certain behaviours associated with them to the reduction or satisfaction of primary drives.

But the term "drive" is not always used in the sense of a learned response operating to reduce needs or lower order drives. A leading exponent of this general orientation, H.A. Murray, regards "needs" as the basic concept. Murray uses the concept of need to denote the psychological force which organizes action, perception, and other cognitive processes toward its own satisfaction. He classifies needs into primary and secondary, that is, viscerogenic and psychogenic.¹⁵¹

A rather different use of terms is employed by the authors of Social Psychology in drawing the same general distinction between basic and acquired motivational factors. They use the term "drive" to refer to the state of tension or restlessness which initiates tendencies to general activity. Through learning, the energy associated with a drive becomes linked with a specific goal and is given direction. They argue that "the individual no longer has just an unlearned drive; through learning he has also acquired a motive."¹⁵²

David Kretch and Richard Crutchfield employ the tension-reduction model, but by holding fast to a Gestaltist position, they distinguish between the immediate dynamic problem and the genetic problem. The authors contend that the basic unit in motivational analysis is molar behaviour which includes needs and goals.¹⁵³ The dynamics of molar behaviour are said to result from properties of the immediate psychological field. Thus the emphasis is on the immediate physical environment, the internal physiological states, and neutral traces of past experience rather than on how the needs and goals of a given situation have come into being in the course of an individual's development.

Kretch and Crutchfield argue that instabilities or tensions in the immediate psychological field create disharmony. The conscious correlates of tension are either (a) vague feelings of restlessness or anxiety, (b) feelings of desires, wishes, wants or needs directed toward explicit features of the field, or as (c) demands perceived as emerging from certain features of the field which are perceived as requiring something of the individual.¹⁵⁴ The authors suggest no conceptual distinctions except the

general division between tensions and desires (wishes, wants, needs).

The points to be made here are the following: (a) exponents of the associative learning school usually distinguish primary and secondary drives (motives, needs) in which the primary factor is the outcome of a more basic tensional condition and in which the secondary factor is learned only by its association with behaviour that reduces tensions associated with the primary factor; and (b) it seems an arbitrary matter of individual choice as to which particular concept is used to represent which particular aspect of the motivational process. Within the theoretical framework of the associative-learning model, two classes of motivational unit are postulated. The nature of the motivational unit in each class is basically the same and it is common to find a variety of terms employed with no real distinctions being intended. Concepts within each class are usually labelled in accordance with either the physiological base, the goal-object, or some behaviour instrumental in attaining the goal.¹⁵⁵

The second major model in motivational theory is that called the "force for growth" and is represented by such psychologists as Carl Rogers and A.H. Maslow.¹⁵⁶ In this view the central motive in man is said to be a need for self-actualization, an innate urge to grow. The variations on this theme and the concepts employed seem as divergent as in the stimulus-response associative-learning school. The "force for growth" model generally refuses to draw the primary-secondary distinction between motivational units and usually relies on one major motivational concept.

A.H. Maslow rejects physiological drives as the centering point in motivational theory and elects the criterion of basic goals or ends. The concept of need represents the basic motivational unit and needs are said to be organized in a hierarchical pattern of prepotency. The more basic classes of needs have to be satisfied before the individual can proceed to satisfy others. The needs in order of prepotency are (a) the physiological needs, (b) safety needs, (c) love needs, (d) esteem needs and (e) need for self actualization. In the course of his discussion, Maslow succeeds in using "need", "desire", "goal", "want", "value", and "end" synonymously. The term "drive" does not appear. It is significant that he regards the motivational factor to which these concepts refer as being largely unconscious.¹⁵⁷ Only in self-actualization, when all lower needs have been satisfied, could the individual become fully conscious and live in a state of "being" rather than in a state of "striving". Maslow believes that less than one percent of the population has risen to this condition.¹⁵⁸

It has been suggested in the previous chapter that Gordon W. Allport holds a rather divergent position on motivational theory and concept usage. Allport's combined contribution to this question over the years suggests two major distinctions. In the first place, he denies the primary-secondary dichotomy of the associative-learning school which he generally regarded as geneticism.

Geneticism regards a man's motives, say, at the age of fifty, as elaborated, conditioned, sublimated or otherwise modified editions of a primary material, that is, instincts, drives, or id.¹⁵⁹

As an alternative, Allport advances the view of functional autonomy which is intimately related to the ego-processes.¹⁶⁰ He holds that adult motives are infinitely varied, self-sustaining, contemporary systems growing out of antecedent systems, but functionally independent of them.

In the second place, Allport argues that there are two distinct types of motives. In developing this position he moves away from the widely held tension-reduction thesis. The first class of motives includes those peculiar to the associative-learning school in which drives are viewed as peripherally instigated activities and in which responses are simply reactive, persisting until the instigation is removed and the tension reduced. This class of motivational factors he regards as "deficit motives", applicable only to low levels of behaviour, to segmental and opportunistic adjustments. The second class of motive he feels is applicable to normal adult behaviour when personality enters the stage of ego-extension, when self-images are developed, and when visions of self-perfection and guiding value-schema emerge.¹⁶¹

Allport contends that "unfortunately we fail to distinguish between propiariate and peripheral motives" and we are forced "to postulate motives of a different order, motives that reflect propiariate striving."¹⁶² Propiariate striving includes ego-involved conduct, intentions (plans, interests) which sustain and direct tension rather than escaping from it. Allport was not particularly concerned about which concept was used to denote this type of motive. Most often he employs "interest", "value", or "intention".

The point however, is to discover where "interest" as

a motivational concept fits into these various frameworks. In the first view mentioned, that is, the associative-learning model, it is rather hopeless to attempt to set out concepts as specifically and finally representing a particular aspect or unit of motivation. The practice of psychologists in this area suggests that it makes little difference what the distinguished phenomena are called as long as the phenomena are distinguished and clearly named. It is fairly easy to see what is pointed to when "acquired motive" or "acquired need" or "acquired drive" or "acquired interest" is used. Psychologists of this persuasion have not usually employed the term "interest" in their theories at all. In the one case where "interest" has been used, it was set out as a species of covert emotional response or secondary drive.¹⁶³

In Mowrer's discussion, "interest" seem to share the privilege of constituting the ego-processes with other similar secondary drives termed "cathexis", "emotional arousal", or "emotions". In this particular theory the term "interest" denotes a type of secondary drive which could be given a number of different names without implying distinctions of any significance in the phenomena denoted.

The second view under consideration is the so-called "force for growth" model. There is little demand for specific concepts to denote specific phenomena in this position as long as (a) no distinction is intended as between primary and acquired factors, and (b) the need (desire) for self-actualization is included in the basic equipment of man. One basic type of motivational unit is involved, and if various terms are employed to describe it,

there seems to be no distinction implied in the phenomena denoted. On the other hand, there is no very compelling reason for using a variety of terms except perhaps by way of adding colour, variety and vigour to an otherwise monotonous story. And if this occasions confusion, it is not a very compelling reason.

If a writer chose to be rigorous and systematic about all this, then presumably the general class of motivational factors could be given one name. There are no requirements built into the theory which would make this impossible. In other words, A.H. Maslow was not required by his theoretical assumptions to employ such terms as "wants", "goals", "desires", "values". The single term "need" would have done well enough for his purpose, whereas in fact, he used all the terms mentioned synonymously. No gains were purchased as a consequence and the possibility of confusion was given every advantage.

Homer Dubs attempts to eliminate erstwhile confusing concepts by electing "interest" as the sole concept to denote the entire class of motivational factors.¹⁶⁴ He then constructs a hierarchy of interest systems much as Maslow does in erecting his hierarchy of needs. The hierarchy suggests, at least in Maslow, that certain needs are more or less basic insofar as the objects, persons, or conditions to which they are related are more or less crucial to the welfare and to the ongoing pursuits of the individual.

There seems to be little reason why "interest" could not have been added to Maslow's equation of terms. That he did not choose to do so may have reflected the variety of technical and common sense meanings that the concept enjoyed.

Much later, a political scientist did include interest as being synonymous with want, need, goal, motive, and value, as employed by Maslow.¹⁶⁵ But Van Dyke neglects an important consideration that had never been especially stressed by Maslow. This is best seen by tracing Maslow's moves in more detail.

Maslow begins by using needs synonymously with desires and wants. He postulates five basic sets of basic needs which are also called basic goals or purposes. Now conscious desires are only partial and incomplete goals, mere indications of basic needs. The conscious desires are logically distinguished from the basic needs which are said to be largely unconscious. The conscious desires are therefore not basic but instrumental in the satisfaction of the basic needs. The basic needs are said to be ends in themselves and so the conscious desires or needs are means to the realization of these needs. Maslow insists that when the unconscious needs (goals, ends) are ungratified, they are in fact the determining factors in directing behaviour. This he later suggests is the situation with ninety-nine percent of the population. There is no other conclusion to draw from this than that the basic needs (goals, purposes, ends) are unconscious. He was firmly convinced that "to know what one really wants is a considerable psychological achievement."¹⁶⁶

The only point in this long digression is that Van Dyke seems committed to the view that the interests which he regards as intrinsic ends (goals, values) are in fact unconsciously held by most individuals. They by no means measure up to the role that they were to assume in the

highly rational postulation of interests as ends and derivation of instrumental interests as means which Van Dyke goes on to argue. In making safe the kind of conscious rational process which he recommends, Van Dyke would have done well to have relied on a motivational theory which recognized the existence of two motivational levels. Allport's theory would have partially supported his position. In selecting Maslow's formulation he was simply in error.

The third view is that of Gordon Allport and he has made the necessary distinction himself. He often uses "interests" to denote the ego-structure and, consequently, to denote the propi-ate striving, planning, general directing, and selecting functions. As long as it is recognized that Allport allowed the concept of interest to represent this type of motivational unit, confusion is minimized when he introduces terms such as intention and value schema to denote the same phenomena. The reader can only conclude that whatever distinctions, if any, exist in Allport's mind, they must not be especially significant. Conceptual confusions emerge particularly when (a) different psychologists of the same basic view employ different terms to denote the same phenomena, and when (b) different theoretical systems using the same term to denote different phenomena are seen together in the literature.

J.P. Guilford advances a theory which does not fit well with any of the major motivational systems reviewed.¹⁶⁷ He contends that personality is a unique pattern of traits, a trait being any distinguishable enduring way in which one individual differs from another. Any personality system is said to include four general classes of traits; som-

atic, motivational, aptitudinal, and temperamental. The motivational traits are subdivided into three classes: the needs, the interests, and the attitudes. The distinguishing feature lies not in the nature of the basic motivational entity, but in the object to which the motivational unit is related.

Guilford argues that needs are perennial desires for certain valued conditions such as freedom, achievement, being noticed, being respected, and being comfortable. He devises five categories within the general motivational trait called needs. These include (a) organic need dimensions, (b) environmental need factors, (c) achievement need factors, (d) self-determination needs, and (e) social needs. The distinctions among these categories seem to be drawn in terms of the type of valued condition to which any set of needs is directed. But the more important question is what distinguishes needs from interests within the general class of motivational traits.

Guilford defines "interest" as "an individual's generalized behaviour tendency to be attracted to a certain class of activities."¹⁶⁸ The emphasis is on giving attention to, seeking out, or striving to attain something, some activity that has potential value for him. Needs and interests are both more or less permanent motivating conditions. The distinction offered is that needs pertain to an individual's attraction toward a certain condition or status, whereas interests pertain to an individual's attraction toward certain activities. The crucial distinction rests on differentiating conditions from activities. But it is not at all clear that this distinction can be upheld.

Guilford seems forced to posit certain classes of activities as values or ends in themselves. As soon as he admits that the pursuit of some activity is by way of satisfying some condition such as comfort, security, adventure, sex, achievement or even satisfaction, then it would appear that a need is operative and not an interest. If he does admit this, then it becomes virtually impossible to distinguish between needs and interests. Guilford comes close to articulating this central difficulty.

There is certainly some uncertainty about whether meticulousness should be classified among the needs or among the interests, since valued kinds of activities are also involved. The emphasis is upon the end product of the activities, which justifies the grouping of the factor here among the environmental needs, the end product being in the form of environmental conditions.¹⁶⁹

If this holds for something like meticulousness, how much greater will be the problem of making similar distinctions in the more complex forms of need-activity relationships. It could be added that Guilford's theory does not seem to allow for multiple motivating conditions, a situation which Murphy reminds us is usually present.

The point urged in this section is that distinctions among motivational concepts are not easy to draw and in fact have not usually been a concern of psychologists in this area. The only useful way that "interest" can be set apart from other motivational concepts is by (a) recognizing the type of motivational theory involved, and (b) by recognizing the limitations placed on concept usage by the theoretical assumptions of the particular system in question. It is futile to attempt to distinguish "interest" from "need", "want", "motive", "drive" if "interest" is postulated as a

similar type of motivational unit and if no distinction is intended among the concepts in terms of the phenomena which they denote.

2. The Question of "Goals"

The concept of interest has sometimes been used in the context of means and ends. The means and ends relationship often takes the form of a discussion of goals. This is especially the case in theories of motivation. The question that is raised here is simply how have the concepts of interest and goal been employed by psychologists in the context of the positions on motivation already examined.

R.S. Lazarus informs us that the notion of motivation implies direction, "goals toward which our behaviour is directed."¹⁷⁰ The term motivation is said to denote that which excites action and impels it toward some goal. In the stimulus-response associative learning school, a goal is usually seen as the object or condition towards which the tension or need within the organism is pointing. Learning consists in the development of responses by which basic needs and primary and secondary drives are satisfied; that is, by which tension is reduced. In this tradition, the law of effect is said to be operative when satisfaction (tension-reduction) enhances the tendency for (a) a specific response sequence to be repeated, and for (b) a particular goal-object to be chosen again. Individuals are said to learn those activities that are immediately followed by tension-reduction.¹⁷¹

D.T. Campbell argues that some scholars have wrongly drawn a dividing line among acquired behavioural dispositions in respect to the presence or absence of "motivational or

goal attributes."¹⁷² That all constructs referring to responses or to mediational dispositions also have goal or motive quality is the position advocated. He contends that by viewing all learned behavioural dispositions as object-consistent responses, the gap can be bridged between concepts previously regarded as depicting means and those depicting ends. The means and ends concepts which Campbell hopes to unite are the following:

[T]he means concepts referring to acquired behavioural routines, to programs or sequences of response, to schedules of behaviour and the ends concepts stated in terms of acquired drives, motives, goals, purposes, needs, need-dispositions, cathectic orientations, and the like. . . .¹⁷³

The significant point is that Campbell regards goals as motives and motives as ends such that any need, acquired drive, or motive, is characterized by its goal or end. The end or goal is viewed as the condition which initiates and later terminates the drive much along the lines of a thermostat. O.H. Mowrer employs this argument when he regards interests as covert emotional responses learned by past satisfaction just as any other response is learned.¹⁷⁴ Satisfying activity leads to the fixation of the goal-object. The goal-object is also said to be the stimulus which trips off or arouses the interest response.

A goal or end in this view is characteristic of any motive (need, drive) whether primary or acquired. The theoretical assumptions of this system also dictate that any goal or end which brings to consummation an acquired drive must do so by virtue of the satisfaction that it affords to a primary drive and hence a more basic goal. Goals emerge from the bottom upwards and are said to be

characteristic of the lowest forms of peripheral or deficit motives. If "interest" is a motive in this sense, it must include a goal-object which turns it on and shuts it off.

A.H. Maslow's view, which Lazarus classifies in the "force for growth" model, differs only in that self-actualization needs are said to be basic and in no sense acquired or derived from more basic drives. Otherwise his position partakes of a good many of the tenets of the tension-reduction model. His dynamic theory of motivation stresses the notion of goals. Needs or wants are used synonymously with goals. As soon as a need is felt, a goal is also present. Apparently needs or goals disappear with equal rapidity, as he notes that ". . . a want that is satisfied is no longer a want. The organism is dominated and its behaviour organized only by unsatisfied needs."¹⁷⁵

Maslow argues that the condition of self-actualization involves the transcending of deficiency needs and launches the individual into a meta-motivated or un-motivated state. If there is no motivation there are likewise no goals. "Being" is said to involve "expressing" rather than "coping" or "striving".¹⁷⁶ But the crux of this doctrine is the repeated suggestion that "conscious, specific, local-cultural desires are not as fundamental in motivation theory as the more basic, unconscious goals."¹⁷⁷ How the individual copes at all when so much is unknown remains a mystery. And how interests can be seen as goals or ends or even as means in the context of this theory, remains a question that should constantly be asked of Professor Van Dyke.

Homer Dubs likewise posits that each interest (motive) is characterized by a specific goal object. A goal is regarded as "any condition of the organism upon the occurrence

of which the supply of energy furnished by an interest is cut off."¹⁷⁸ The procedure is in agreement with the tension-reduction model with the basic motivational unit bearing the label "interest".

R.B. Rice draws a distinction between "goal" and "interest" which is rather fine but never firm. He argues that although adults may alter the particular behaviour sequences involving goals, something about an activity is learned and repeated. This "something" is the interest. Success in any activity reinforces the interest in it. The particular goal and the specific response may vary, but the interest, once stimulated, tends to be repeated. The stimulus-response associative learning school holds that the goal is in effect the consummatory aspect of a tension-reduction sequence. Rice does not see it quite this way.

Rice contends that the interest is the aspect of an activity that is symbolized and reinforced. The aspect which is reinforced is that to which satisfaction is attached. In Rice's view, interest may accrue to any feature of an act, the goal-object, the consummatory reaction, or the preliminary response sequence. The distinction between goal and interest in this view relies on the distinction between goal and satisfaction. In most tension-reduction theories the goal is by definition the consummatory phase of an act which gives satisfaction. Rice seems to be saying that the goal may not always be the end, but the interest is always the end.

He is much clearer in respect to rational or reflective activity. This kind of activity is said to involve a singling out, by responding to symbols, of certain general

characteristics of an act in advance of its performance. These crucial features constitute the purpose of an act. In setting out the purpose, Rice distinguishes it from the intention and from the means and the end.

What is most reinforced by success is the purpose rather than the intention or the specific response sequence as a whole or even any particular temporal slice of the latter. The purpose is that aspect of an act for the sake of which it is done, that to which satisfaction has attached in the past or to which it attaches by way of anticipation; the intention includes the projected means as well as the end. . . . So it is the purpose, or interest, that is reinforced more strongly than the details of the response.¹⁷⁹

In this sense, the purpose or interest is a preliminary and overriding aspect of activity and is distinct from the goal and end and means. It is here that Rice's notion of interests as constituting the ego processes is very close to Allport's position. Rice attempts to broaden the law of effect from simple responses to segmental ends or goals and have it pertain to more general features of activity such as purposes or interests. He regards interest as an enduring disposition or general tendency of the organism which lasts much longer than particular goals and response sequences.

Gordon W. Allport advances a view of interest and goals which is an outcome of his distinction between deficiency motives of a peripheral and segmental nature, and adult motives characterized by ego-involvement, self-image, and intentions or value-schema. Interest is often a name for this latter class of motives. In his view, the psychogenic interests which characterize adults are very conscious modes of sustaining and directing tension rather than reducing

it or escaping from it. Such interests are said to lead us to complicate and strain our lives indefinitely. And so he regards such notions as "striving for equilibrium" and "tension reduction" as trivial and erroneous representations of normal adult motivation. ¹⁸⁰

Allport contends that individuals usually adopt a conception of what they want to be and what they want to do. Specific goals are always subsidiary to such long-range intentions. Self-image and interests therefore antedate and define more specific goal-reactions. The processes involving an active ego in striving to fulfill preferred patterns is said to be very conscious. The point persistently maintained by Allport is that high-order motivational patterns are enduring and surprisingly well focussed.

These intentions (interests, directions of striving) are seen as very general modes of maintaining tension. He vigorously contends that only in animals, small children, mental defectives, and in some peripheral phases of adult human conduct, is there a tendency for rewarded acts to be constantly repeated.

The difficulty with "anticipatory goal reaction", as with "expectancy", is that men often have values without having any specific goal in mind. They may have a consistent direction of striving but their goals are either transient or else undefinable. All of a rat's, but only a small bit of human, behaviour can be characterized in terms of concrete goals, whose attainment will de-tension specific drives. For the most part the course of a man's behaviour runs according to certain schemata, or in prolonged channels. Only now and then are these channels marked by lights or buoys that represent specific goals. ¹⁸¹

Allport's interests (intentions) are ends toward which the individual strives. They are goals in the sense of giving a certain direction to behaviour, but not in the sense of offering specific way-stations for the regular reduction of tension. The more specific and peripheral behavioural responses are said to be directed toward goals, but these goals are largely chosen in the light of ego-involved interests. The impression that Allport gives is that of organized patterns of purposive behaviour, not always clearly detailed, which cannot be explained in terms of specific moves from tension to goal or consummation. A similar view is argued by Helen Barshay who notes that "all behaviour is purposeful, but not always goal-directed".¹⁸²

The purpose in discussing this question is merely to illustrate that a number of positions are offered in the literature. In selecting a view of interests and goals, as in so many other things, entanglements are often encountered which go to the heart of theoretical assumptions and intimate variable-system relationships. A political scientist who offers his readers one view could do well to identify the theoretical system of which it is a part and to suggest along what lines an alternative formulation might be shown to be less tenable.

3. The Question of Interests and Attitudes

That the concepts of interest and attitude have sometimes been employed to denote the same class of phenomena was noticed by D.E. Berlyne in 1949.¹⁸³ Philip E. Vernon's more recent observation that "interests are very much the same as attitudes", suggests that the overlap still prevails.¹⁸⁴

Judging from the manner in which many motivational concepts are sometimes used synonymously and sometimes not, the situation was probably to be expected as soon as interest and attitude were commonly thought to refer to motivational factors.

A more general trend could be noted. The concept of interest appeared in the psychological literature much earlier than the concept of attitude. Interest received widespread but never consensual usage in a variety of senses of "feeling" and "motivational disposition". In more recent trends in psychology, the concept of interest has declined in importance, while the concept of attitude has gained full-time employment. There is at least the suggestion that attitude may have assumed the role previously played by interest.

It remains to gather together several usages of both terms to see if the concept of attitude adequately covers the phenomena denoted by the concept of interest and to inquire further if any meaningful distinctions can be drawn between these concepts.

An important part of the argument will be to illustrate that the ambiguous career of "interest" has been more than equalled by confusion surrounding the meaning of "attitude". If this is the case, it might be tentatively concluded that a researcher is no less confused by electing one term rather than the other, except in so far as by using the terms synonymously one class of concepts may be eliminated. In the midst of such a lack of agreement in usage it is difficult to be certain that one concept can be employed to replace another. It is a distinct possibility that several usages of both "interest" and "attitude" might be meaningfully and independently maintained.

In his early pioneering work, L.L. Thurstone admits that the notion of attitude is a complex affair which cannot be adequately described by any single numerical index.¹⁸⁵ Gordon W. Allport reviewed the attitude literature several years later and discovered that little if any agreement prevailed on concept usage.¹⁸⁶ In 1939 E. Nelson notes "the wide variety of meanings which are ascribed to this term",¹⁸⁷ and cites twenty-three fairly distinct characterizations given the concept of attitude. By 1945 there was more to be said about conceptual confusion and diversity of usage. Sherif and Cantril explain that "in fact the problem of attitudes is in a very confused state. . . . The variety of phenomena covered by the concept 'attitude' vary to a large degree in their specificity and range. . . . There is yet no recognized psychology of attitudes with basic concepts applicable to all cases of attitudes."¹⁸⁸

At the same time, a more stringent complaint was voiced by A. Strauss who was alarmed that the concept of attitude was marked by such confusion while at the same time it occupied such a key position in social psychology.

Examination of the various definitions and discussions of attitude offered by social psychologists . . . reveals that there is an amazing diversity of conceptions of what the term denotes. . . . This sprawling concept of attitude serves to focus inquiry upon various forms of "inner" psychological behaviour without the necessity of psychologists having to make clear what particular activity they are dealing with at any specific time.¹⁸⁹

L.W. Doob's attempt to clarify the concept in terms of more rigorous Hullian behaviour theory was prompted by a similar realization that conceptual ambiguity did not sit

well with theoretically useful research. Apparently earlier critical reviews had failed to clarify the status of attitudes. Doob laments that "the problem of what an attitude is and how it functions, nevertheless persists. . . little explicit agreement is apparent in the published literature."¹⁹⁰ He concludes by almost proposing that the concept of attitude be removed from the vocabulary of the social sciences.

D.T. Campbell opened the next decade with another critical review of the concept in which he attempted to draw together conflicting theoretical and empirical approaches. He admits that research on social attitudes has been justly criticized for a lack of common definition and for a failure to integrate definition and measurement procedures. Smith, Bruner, and White hoped that their contribution would clarify "the implicit psychological status of this oddly disembodied concept of attitude."¹⁹¹ They were struck by the underdevelopment of attitude theory in contrast to the pulsating business of attitude measurement.

[U]ntil we have a clearer conception of the nature of attitudes and the manner in which they function, we shall not know what aspects of an attitude are worth measuring.¹⁹²

The situation has not been appreciably altered in recent years. Philip E. Vernon notes that the concept is variously used and has no agreed definition.¹⁹³ H.J. Eysenck asserts that "both definition and usage are often confused."¹⁹⁴ Writing in 1963, D.T. Campbell could do no more than reaffirm the existence of the confusion that he had noted in 1950.¹⁹⁵ Helen Barshay illustrates the need for clarification by setting out a wide and highly diversified array of conflicting definitions that exist in the literature.¹⁹⁶

In the light of this situation there seems to be some grounds for exploring available and possible attitude-interest distinctions before giving up the concept of interest. Something tangible might be rescued from all this. Formulations of "attitude" will be examined and compared with certain major usages of the term "interest".

The major characteristics included in the concept of attitude appear to have developed out of the earlier models of L.L. Thurstone and G.W. Allport. Thurstone argues that an "attitude is the affect for or against a psychological object."¹⁹⁷ The two aspects of affect include appetition and aversion. The positive form, appetition, involves liking the object, defending it or favouring it in various ways. The negative form, aversion, includes disliking the psychological object, destroying it or otherwise reacting against it. He decides that "attitude" "describes potential action toward the object with regard only to the question whether the potential action will be favourable or unfavourable toward the object."¹⁹⁸ Thurstone emphasizes the affective or feeling component which takes the form of favourable or unfavourable feeling and predisposes a similar type of reaction either toward or away from the object.

Gordon W. Allport stresses the characteristic of preparedness or readiness for response.

An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness organized through experience, exerting a directive and dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related.¹⁹⁹

The affective component is not stressed in this definition which gives predominance to the motivational component. Allport later made it clear that "attitude" represents a

definite feeling of attraction or repulsion toward relevant stimuli.²⁰⁰

Sherif and Cantril elaborate more explicitly the cognitive component of an attitude but otherwise employ Allport's formulation. However, they do emphasize that although "attitude" denotes a functional state of readiness, every state of readiness of the organism is not an attitude. The difficulty which they readily realize is that of distinguishing attitudes from other cases of "readiness" states.²⁰¹ In explicating the concept, the authors set out five characteristics of attitudes: (1) Attitudes imply a subject-object relationship such that attitudes always relate to specific stimuli or stimulus situations; (2) attitudes are formed in relation to objects, persons, and values which may or may not have had motivational appeal at the outset; (3) attitudes have affective or value characteristics in varying degrees; (4) attitudes are more or less enduring states of readiness largely owing to the cognitive component; and (5) attitudes vary in number and variety of stimuli to which they are referred.²⁰²

The affective or value characteristic is said to include feelings "either positive or negative and in different degrees for that individual."²⁰³ This factor becomes especially significant in distinguishing attitudes from other readiness states. The authors contend that we know that an attitude is being inferred from behaviour "when an individual reacts repeatedly in a characteristic way (positive or negative) in relation to a certain stimulus object".²⁰⁴

Some psychologists chose to place emphasis on certain of these aspects of components which had come to be associated with the concept of attitude. Norman Cameron views an atti-

tude as "the relatively widespread, diffuse aspect of a reaction which functions as a behavioural background, preparing for, supporting and prolonging certain responses and not others."²⁰⁵ L.E. Doob contends that an attitude is an implicit drive-producing response which is anticipatory and mediating in reference to patterns of overt response. Attitudes can be evoked by a variety of stimulus patterns as a result of previous learning or of gradients of generalization and discrimination. An attitude is itself drive or cue producing and is considered to be socially significant by that particular society. As with Cameron, the burden of Doob's argument rests on the reaction tendency of "readiness to respond" component.²⁰⁶ H.J. Eysenck employs Allport's earlier formulation of attitude where the "readiness" aspect is predominant.²⁰⁷ Freeman likewise defines attitude as a "dispositional readiness to respond to certain situations, persons, objects, or interests in a consistent manner which has been learned and has become one's typical mode of response."²⁰⁸

The affective or feeling or emotional component of the attitude concept sometimes stands as the primary distinguishing characteristic. Thurstone continues his earlier formulation by arguing that "attitude" be used "in the sense of affective dispositions about a controversial object."²⁰⁹ Hillgard contends that "simple preferences become organized into patterns of emotionalized preferences called attitudes".²¹⁰ A.L. Edwards employs a variation of Thurstone's definition in his conception of attitude as "the degree of positive or negative affect associated with some psychological object."²¹¹

The cognitive component which has been ascribed to the concept of attitude, as in Sherif and Cantril, has some-

times been viewed as the characteristic which sets attitudes apart from other concepts. L.W. Ferguson regards the concept of interest as denoting a feeling and as covering such things as likes, dislikes, preferences, and aversions. "In contrast", he argues, "the concept attitude. . . covers our beliefs. . . . We favour this and object to that. We accept this position and reject that position. This believing or disbelieving, this favouring or not favouring, this accepting or rejecting, constitute expressions of attitude."²¹² A similar distinction is drawn by Guilford in his contention that an attitude is a disposition to favour or not to favour some type or class of social object or action. "Interest" is said to denote a feeling, whereas "psychologically, an attitude involves beliefs as well as feelings, a characteristic that distinguishes attitudes from interests."²¹³

Kretch and Crutchfield advance a notion of attitude in which belief is a constant and vital component. They consider a belief to be an enduring organization of perceptions and cognitions, a pattern of meaning, about some feature of an individual's world. Beliefs are said to be the cognitive embodiment of attitudes but are themselves motivationally and emotionally neutral. Thus attitudes include beliefs as the cognitive component. An attitude is broadly defined as "an enduring organization of motivational, emotional, perceptual, and cognitive processes with respect to some aspect of the individual's world."²¹⁴

Before outlining what was to become the major trend in attitude formulation, it is as well to identify other more disparate treatments. R. Bain conceives an attitude as the more or less stable behaviour which affects an individual's

status.²¹⁵ Helen Barshay notes that some psychologists define attitude as simply an evaluation. Perhaps one of the most general definitions of a concept to appear in any social science literature was Thurstone's earliest formulation of attitude.

[A]ttitude. . . to denote the sum total of a man's inclinations and feelings, prejudice or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, and convictions about any specific topic.²¹⁶

In a very similar vein, H.H. Remmers defines an attitude pattern as a combination of values, mores, loyalties and ideals.²¹⁷

The most common recent conceptualization of attitude is that which follows in the tradition of Sherif and Cantril and Kretch and Crutchfield. "Attitude" is often defined as a readiness to respond which includes cognitive, affective, and motivational components. Sometimes one of another of the components is not given explicit formulation. For example, the definition of attitude offered by Smith, Bruner and White is that of "a predisposition to experience, to be motivated by, and to act toward, a class of objects in a predictable manner."²¹⁸ Here the affective component is withheld. Sofer and Menzies regard attitudes as a combination of beliefs, valuations and feelings. The motivational component is not explicitly included.²¹⁹ Lambert and Lambert advance a definition which includes all the above mentioned components.

An attitude is an organized and consistent manner of thinking, feeling, and reacting with people, groups, social issues, or, more generally, any event in one's environment. Its essential components are thoughts and beliefs, feelings (or emotions), and tendencies to react.²²⁰

Newcomb, Turner and Converse hold the same basic position but incorporate the affective aspect in the cognitive component. Thus valenced cognitions are those involving objects surrounded by positive or negative feeling associations. These authors suggest that from "a cognitive point of view, an attitude represents an organization of valenced cognitions. From a motivational point of view, an attitude represents a state of readiness for motive arousal. An individual's attitude toward something is his predisposition to be motivated in relation to it."²²¹

One of the main usages of the term "interest" in the earlier psychological literature related to a feeling. Variations on this theme were many, including interest as simply a feeling, interest as pleasure or pain feeling, interest as the hedonic aspect of the attention process, interest as the feeling of curiosity, and often interest as the feeling of value or worthwhileness. There is no formulation of the term "attitude" which could be said to incorporate this class of meanings of the term "interest". This constitutes the first instance of a general usage where the concepts of interest and attitude can be distinguished. Even when the affective component was emphasized in some definitions of attitude the feeling was one of a favourable or non-favourable, pro or con, accepting or rejecting nature, rather than one of worthwhileness, curiosity, or attention. It does not do justice to those senses of interest to say that they could be incorporated as the affective component of the attitude concept.

There was another usage of "interest" in this early period which denoted a more or less permanent mental dispo-

sition with motivational, cognitive, and affective characteristics. This was the thesis advanced by J. Mark Baldwin, J.R. Angell, and Felix Arnold, and it constitutes the core without the complexity of Dewey's position. When interest is conceived this broadly in the absence of specific conditions relating to the generality or specificity of referents or stimuli, and when distinctions are not drawn among other concepts denoting inner psychological processes, it is extremely difficult to distinguish the concept in this sense from the later formulations of "attitude". In the last part of this section, it will be argued that a distinction can be drawn between more recent formulations of "interest" and "attitude" in the dispositional sense.

In the interest-measurement school the concept of interest is frequently defined as a feeling of pleasure or preference or of liking. This usage is difficult to distinguish from certain formulations of attitude, for example Thurstone's or Edwards, in which the affective components of positive or negative feeling toward an object is taken as the definition of attitude. However, in the interest-measurement literature, it is never very clear whether aversions are also interests. The feeling of liking is said to indicate an interest, the feeling of indifference suggests no interest, or disinterest, and the feeling of dislike or aversion is sometimes regarded as a low degree of interest and at other times as the opposite of interest. The attitude measurement school sometimes treats likes as being favourably disposed to an object and dislike as being unfavourably disposed to an object. On the attitude continuum this is regarded as evidence of a positive or negative attitude. The

notion of a positive or negative interest has seldom been used.

Measurement procedures usually implicitly distinguish attitudes from interests in terms of the content of the index statements. Thus interests pertain to preference statements involving occupations, hobbies, and sometimes vague wishes and desires. Attitude statements usually pertain to favouring or not favouring fairly explicit statements concerning social issues, social objects, and social conditions. But the subjective side of the subject-object relationship in this case seems to be much the same. There is little doubt that in measuring procedures of this nature there has been a certain amount of overlap in the phenomena being measured. This literature is further confused by the absence of definitions in many of the interest-measurement studies. Practitioners often appeared little concerned about what was being measured as long as the findings proved of some practical value in student guidance work and in occupational counseling.

In the later period, "interest" is usually regarded as a motivational factor of some sort and most often as an organized aspect of the personality system. "Interest" in the sense of the general or basic motivational factor is not especially common, but it does appear. It has been argued in an earlier chapter that interest in this sense, usually employed in the context of the tension-reduction and "force for growth" models, may be acceptable but it is not very defensible. In other words, terms such as "drive", "need" and "motive" are similarly used, and it seems merely a matter of the personal preference of the author as to which

term is accepted. Such theories employ only one basic motivational unit, and "interest" is not usually the term selected. The term "attitude" has seldom if ever been employed in this extreme sense as denoting the basic motivational factor.

"Attitude" is usually regarded as a motivational factor of a higher and more general nature. In the context of the associative-learning school, which draws a distinction between basic needs and primary drives and secondary drives, attitudes appear as one case in the class of secondary drives. It is usually in this sense that the concepts of attitude and interest can be and have been confused. It is in this context that Doob argues that implicit responses can be called attitudes, or attitudes can be regarded as one instance of implicit responses. As he contends that distinctions among implicit responses are extremely difficult to draw, the special concept of attitude is not regarded as being especially meaningful. D.T. Campbell places attitudes as well as interests in the category of acquired drives or acquired behavioural dispositions. He then argues that unless it can be demonstrated empirically that one term denotes a different kind of phenomenon, then they ought to be given the same name. Strauss urges the same point although the concept of interest is not included in his discussion.

O.H. Mowrer does treat "interest" as an acquired drive, or, as he prefers, as a covert emotional response, and he fails to distinguish "interest" from other cases within that class of motivational factors. It appears that if "interest" and "attitude" are used to denote this type of motivational factor, the overriding theoretical requirements allow no

real opportunity for distinctions. If the theory respects only a generally undifferentiated class of motivational factors at this level, the use of "interest" and "attitude" is simply giving the same phenomena two different labels.

"Interest" has also been regarded as a special type of motivational factor, usually as a drive for novelty which includes curiosity. There is no problem about distinctions here as attitude has not usually been employed in this sense. But given the definition of attitude which includes cognitive, affective, and motivational components, there seems to be no reason why an attitude of curiosity could not be formulated. The point, however, is that this has not been common.

The last major usage of "interest" is that of a higher order ego-involved motivational factor denoting autonomous intentions or plans or value-schema. In this sense the term "interest" denotes a disposition to respond which includes cognitive, motivational, and affective qualities. Although a similar phenomenon has been labelled "attitude", it is in this context that a major distinction has been suggested by certain psychologists. The distinction rests on viewing an interest as a more basic type of personality factor than an attitude. It could be roughly expressed by the statement that people usually form attitudes, positive or negative, towards the things in which they are interested. The argument is not that this distinction is usually drawn. It is rather that academic communication and research would be greatly clarified if the distinction were more commonly drawn.

F.C. Bartlett outlines this distinction although he uses "attitude" as an affective reaction tendency and not in the composite sense which has recently become more popular.²²²

He argues that mental life, including past experience and reactions, is organized in various patterns of schema. Appetite, instinct, interests, and ideals are said to be the active factors which organize or create these schema. At the human level, interests and ideals predominate. Interest is never explicitly defined but the usage suggests that it is a development of individual mental life as a fairly permanent, wide-ranging motivational disposition with a relatively specific direction.

Bartlett argues that in the process of perceiving, the stimuli presented are ordered in terms of the various schema which have been organized and reshuffled in the light of the various interests. The attitude taken towards the stimuli results from a combination of factors including interest.

For what is presented at once stirs up in the subject some preformed bias, interest, or some persistent temperamental factors, and he at once adopts towards the situation some fairly specific attitude. . . . For the more complex the material, or its setting, the more varied is the play of interests and consequent attitudes which can be evoked.²²³

Bartlett regards the possibility of remote stimuli determining conduct to be a function of specialized and widely ranging interests. The process of remembering largely involves the weighing which interests give to certain elements of the mass of past experiences. Images are said to be determined by interests in the context of the larger schema. As soon as images are evoked by certain stimuli, a particular attitude reaction is triggered.

Attitudes (are). . . best described as an orientation of the agent towards the image and its less articulated "schematic" surroundings.²²⁴

Although Bartlett is by no means precise in concept usage, the impression given is that of interests as basic organizing dispositions which largely construct and reshuffle schema and images towards which attitudes are subsequently taken.

Gordon W. Allport initially distinguishes attitudes from interests by regarding interests as of the same generalized and enduring nature as traits. To Allport, attitudes have well defined objects of reference whereas traits have no definite reference to objects; attitudes can be specific as well as general, whereas traits can only be general; and attitudes signify the acceptance or rejection of the object, whereas traits have no such clear cut direction.²²⁵ In his later work he regards interests as high level motivational factors which make up the ego, constitute directions of striving, (value-schema, basic intentions) and which guide subsequent learning and select appropriate behaviours. The concept of attitude remains in its earlier formulation and apparently denotes certain reaction tendencies organized by and around the ego-structure or interest-systems.

Philip B. Rice suggests a similar distinction in his view of the ego-structure as a system of interests. Like Allport, Rice gives the ego processes a commanding and controlling role in personality. He contends that unity is supplied by the hierarchy of dominant and subordinate interests, the level of aspiration, the style of life, and "attendant attitudes such as self-respect, shame and the like, evoked by satisfaction or frustration of the interest cluster in question".²²⁶

The most explicit distinction of this nature is that outlined by Smith, Bruner, and White. These authors argue that it is through an individual's needs, interests, and aversions that his effective environment is defined. Attitudes are said to function in relation to personality which is basically a striving, self-involved, hierarchically organized and unified structure. The function of object appraisal that attitudes serve is the one crucial to the distinction argued here.

The holding of an attitude provides a ready aid in "sizing" up objects and events in the environment from the point of view of one's major interests and going concerns. . . . Each person is constantly trying to size up the world around him and to place it in relation to his major interests, on going concerns, and cherished aspirations. An opinion on any given topic represents a person's way of defining a relationship between the demands of the outside object and the requirements of his own interests. . . . And so we see the concrete effects of interest in the selection of events and issues and in their transformation into the texture of a man's opinion.²²⁷

In setting out a coherent schema for describing these interests, the authors include the pattern of personal goals, the areas of significant frustrations, the areas of success, the vested interests acquired in satisfying modes of activity, the extended interests in other people and groups, and moral values and ethical purposes. It is their contention that all of these are important in the process of adjusting events in the world to an individual's ongoing interests.²²⁸ The authors insist that a clearer understanding of opinion was reached by analyzing their subjects' highly personal patterns of interest. In terms of the social adjustment function served by attitudes, they speak of attitudes (opinions)

serving "the interests of conformity or identification" as if conformity and identification were basic interests to some people.²²⁹

The conception of attitude employed by Newcomb, Turner, and Converse has been noted earlier. It is their claim that highly generalized attitudes form around the core of highly generalized objects. Attitude objects are said to be characterized by (a) the dimensionality of the cognized object, (b) the inclusiveness of the object, and (c) the psychological centrality of the object for the individual. Psychological centrality refers to the frequency with which an object occurs to a person, that is, its generalized and durable salience. The psychological centrality of an object is said to be the durable interest which an individual has in an object or class of objects.

[S]alience is a short-term phenomenon that is a function of the immediate situation; centrality refers to a much more durable interest on the part of the individual in certain objects or kinds of objects, with these objects remaining important for him through many differing specific situations.²³⁰

There is little suggestion of what a durable interest in an object entails, but it is clear that objects related to interests become the objects towards which highly generalized attitudes are formed. Goal objects of motivated behaviour, objects associated with goal objects, and objects, properties, or states associated with the self are said to be of high centrality. The authors show that the more central the object the greater the probability that large amounts of information relating to it will be stored.

Far more typically. . . interest and information are intertwined. . . we are far more likely to form

attitudes toward objects that have some centrality for us, and are less likely to form attitudes toward objects that are peripheral or psychologically remote.²³¹

The contention is that the more central the object, that is, the greater the interest in an object, the more information is stored and the more cross-referencing there will be with other attitude objects of equal centrality. Thus the authors argue that attitudes towards objects viewed as belonging together tend to become congruent and center around focal objects.

[A] fairly limited number of objects become so central as to figure in a great many of a person's attitude systems, and these systems tend to become integrated around such objects. . . we might label these few objects of greatest centrality to the individual as focal objects.²³²

Most focal objects are regarded as belonging to one of three categories: (a) the self, (b) other groups or persons, or (c) inclusive values. In discussing objects vital to the self, the argument closely parallels Allport's view of interests as constituting ego-involvements. Other persons and groups become focal objects when they become involved in an individual's major goal-seeking behaviours. The kinds of inclusive values which the authors outline are explicitly said to be those which Edward Spranger sets out and which are included in the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values. There is thus a further convergence with Allport's formulation of "interest".

The distinction between the concepts of interest and attitude in the enduring dispositional sense which seems to be contained in these views can be set out as follows: Interest and attitude are both concepts involving cognitive,

motivational, and affective characteristics. The concept of interest denotes a very generalized high level disposition in the personality system which involves the self in some enduring relationship with an object or class of objects. The emphasis is not so much on reaction tendency or readiness to respond as it is on propiagate striving, organizing, and planning. The concept of attitude denotes a disposition or readiness to respond which may be very general or rather specific. The more general and enduring attitudes relate to the objects which are central to an individual's ongoing interests, and they function in such a manner as to express, enhance, protect and develop these interests.

The key role of the direction of the feeling or the belief or of the reaction tendency in definitions and descriptions of attitudes, lends some credence to this distinction. Thurstone's early formulation and Edward's more recent conception of attitude center on the direction of affect, that is, whether the feeling is favourable or unfavourable towards the object. Harding and associates regard an attitude as being characterized by a reaction tendency either positive, negative or neutral, by a cognitive element which consists of beliefs either favourable or unfavourable, and by an affective component which includes either friendly or unfriendly feelings.²³³ Sherif and Cantril regard an attitude as a functional state of readiness which is either positive or negative in relation to its object.

Guilford and Ferguson emphasize the cognitive component of an attitude as consisting of either a favourable or unfavourable belief about an object. Kretch and Crutchfield stress the pro or anti direction which attitudes always take.

Murphy and Murphy regard an attitude as "primarily a way of being 'set' toward or against certain things."²³⁴ Norman Squirrell stresses the positive or negative, favourable or unfavourable judgement of the object in the attitude relationship.²³⁵ To Newcomb, Turner, and Converse, the objects towards which attitudes are formed are said to be valenced objects, that is, objects accompanied by negative or positive associations. This informs their definition of attitudes as "stored cognitions that have some positive or negative associations."²³⁶

The point argued here is that unless a readiness to respond includes this direction toward or away from an object, whether accounted for by feelings or beliefs or by a combination of these, it does not merit the label "attitude". The most common formulations of "interest" which include cognitive, motivational and affective components, denote only an involvement, usually an ego-involvement and a general direction of striving toward an object or class of objects. The feeling is usually said to be one of "concernment" and "worthwhileness". Interest is not usually described as a negative feeling or reaction away from, or an unfavourable belief about, some object. Presumably having an interest in some things need not prejudice the presence or absence of interests in other things.

In these formulations, it is difficult to conceive of an individual not holding favourable or positive attitudes towards his objects of interest, whereas it is conceivable that he may have interests in objects towards which he holds negative attitudes. The central point is that an interest is one way. The opposite is a dislike or an aversion toward

an object or class of objects. This is not an interest. Indifference or disinterest is the mid-way point. Attitudes can be in either direction and can vary in intensity along the way. An interest is a disposition which involves one general direction and denotes a rather different kind of feeling.

The distinctions outlined here are by no means clear. However, they do suggest that there exists in certain of the psychological literature meaningful ways of using the concept of interest and the concept of attitude to denote fairly distinct classes of phenomena. If there is any general conclusion at all in this chapter it is by way of stressing the conceptual and empirical difficulties in psychology. It is sometimes thought by certain academics that psychology is the most rigorous and scientific of the social sciences. This may well be the case. But unfortunately, this does not suggest the existence of a reliable body of sound and tested generalizations that mark the termination of man's quest for knowledge about himself and his behaviour. It is in this discipline that conceptual difficulties abound, that the nature and limits of scientific method are often in dispute, and the basic units of analysis are in considerable competition.

Political scientists ought to be somewhat cautious in selecting disparate bits of research findings and using them as evidence, as well as in borrowing concepts for empirical and theoretical purposes. Political scientists might do well to fully face up to the conceptual difficulties that surround their work and urge their inter-disciplinary colleagues to do the same.

CHAPTER IV

"INTEREST" IN SOCIOLOGY

Introduction

The discipline of sociology closely resembles that of psychology in its troubled quest for a subject matter and for appropriate and fundamental concepts by which it could be captured, delimited, and defined. From the historical and philosophical roots of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, sociology has turned and twisted through a rich and variegated congeries of philosophical foundations, conceptual orientations, and methodological devices. The threads are too fine and too completely tangled to be drawn out and identified in a brief introduction. Professor Martindale describes the halting advance from positivistic organicism to conflict theory, the parallel movement of sociological formalism, the development of social behaviourism with its pluralistic, symbolic interactionist and social action branches, until sociological functionalism partially turns the orientation full circle.²³⁷ These conflicting intellectual orientations and methodological approaches have conspired to leave the discipline in a somewhat untidy and dislocated condition. Sociology, like psychology, has been a far from unitary thing.

Some sociologists have courageously stepped outside the practical tradition of stock-piling disparate empirical studies (a variety of extreme behaviourism which Znaniecki, like Sorokin, regard as a kind of scientific superstition), to compile a brief but thoughtful literature on the nature of their conceptual difficulties. Political scientists

would do well to preface their safaris for new conceptual tools with an informed review of these excellent investigations.

Albion W. Small presents what is probably the first inclusive compilation of sociological terminology by defining and elaborating forty-eight terms which he takes to be crucial to the discipline.²³⁸ F.N. House, in his model examination of the key concept of social forces, emphasizes particularly the importance to sociological method of precisely formulated fundamental concepts "with corresponding terms of general acceptance as tools of research and explanation."²³⁹ He believes that at the time of writing there were not above one-half dozen concepts which were accepted in about the same sense by American sociologists. The strictures which E.E. Eubank levels against his colleagues are even more pointed. He maintains that the lack of agreement on terminology and the resulting confusion are occasioned primarily by indefiniteness in concept formation and by carelessness in usage. Not only do different writers use the same term in different senses but the same idea is often labelled differently by different writers.²⁴⁰ He suggests that some terms have no general acceptance at all, that various terms overlap, and that unless some agreement is reached on major orienting concepts the discipline will be erected without any foundation or ground work. Eubank sets out four admirable criteria to be employed in determining whether or not a term is of scientific stature. Failure to conform to any one of these standards will cast suspicion on its scientific character.

- (1) Is the term reasonably precise? Does it convey an exact and clearcut meaning?
- (2) Does the term contain only one final idea?
- (3) Is the term per-

fectly general, that is, always employed in the same sense wherever it is used? (4) Is the idea fundamental to its particular field; that is, essential for its inclusive interpretation?²⁴¹

The attempt to define terms in such a manner that more or less similar usages can be brought together is continued in the writings of E.S. Bogardus.²⁴² N.S. Timasheff emphasizes the importance of a set of commonly accepted and well-defined concepts as the only solid foundation for the construction of theory. It is his view that terminological confusion results from (a) the same concept being designated by different terms, (b) the same term being used to designate many concepts, and (c) the inconsistent definitions of the same concept given the same author in the course of a discussion.²⁴³ A basic requirement in the construction of sociological theory, Timasheff contends, is that "propositions must be couched in terms of exactly defined concepts."²⁴⁴ That insufficient attention has been directed to these basic problems is his concern, as it is the concern of this enquiry.

This chapter will include an investigation of the various usages of the concept of interest which have appeared in what is thought to be a cross-section of the relevant sociological literature. The argument and analysis in this chapter are a further attempt to illustrate the key role which the term "interest" has been called upon to play in the social sciences and to point out the various senses in which it has been employed. More evidence of disparate usage is presented and more grounds are set down for a later re-examination and reformulation of the concept of interest.

Basic Usages

The concept of interest is no stranger to any of the competing sociological schools. Usage, however, is by no means uniform throughout. Representatives of conflict theory have a decided edge in usage over the analytical school, the social action proponents, and the macro-functionalists. The point argued here is simply that the concept is not peculiar to any particular orientation or methodological approach. It should also be argued that few sociologists have regarded the concept of interest as a fundamental one in their discipline. Only in those early stages of sociology when a key unit such as the atom of physics was considered necessary for scientific regularity and underpinning, did the concept of interest rise like a Goliath in the field of contending conceptual devices. But it was soon passed over, firstly by those who fell prey to the spell of Freudian and McDougallian instinct theories; secondly, by the trend toward operationalism which had settled on the concepts of attitude and group; and thirdly, by the general acceptance of the possibility of a social level of explanation which required no reliance on more basic psychological or biological laws.

Rather than treating instances of usage in terms of schools of thought, it will be the objective of this chapter to set out fairly distinct meanings which appear across the entire spectrum. A schema of usage is set out in advance so that the complexity might be reduced by some small measure.

- I. Interest as a more or less permanent disposition which acts as some kind of motivational factor.
 - A. Interest as the general and basic motivational factor.
 1. Interest as the general and basic motivational

disposition

2. Interest as a subjective-objective relationship

B. Interest as one type of class of motivational factor.

1. Interest as the primary motivational factor

2. Interest as the secondary or derived motivational factor

II. Interest as the relation of being concerned or affected in respect of advantage.

A. Interest as that which is to or for the advantage, good, benefit, or profit of a person or group.

1. The not explicitly motivational sense -- advantage alone is implied

2. The more explicitly motivational sense -- perception of advantage motivates conduct

B. Self-interest.

C. Interest, usually in the plural, to denote a group which is united for the defense, maintenance, or enhancement of any more or less enduring position or advantage possessed in common.

D. Interest as on the side of what is advantageous, aids in the realization of that which is advantageous.

III. Interest as the feeling of curiosity or concern which stimulates, accompanies, or is the effect of the attention process.

IV. Interest as the object of an attitude.

The first general usage of "interest" as a motivational factor has been discussed at considerable length in the preceding chapters on psychology. However, as this has constituted the major usage in sociology, it seems in order

to indicate the scope and general treatment of the concept in this sense.

A. Interest as the general and basic motivational factor.

1. Interests as the general and basic motivational dispositions.

The founder of the notion of interest as the key to sociology was the Austrian field-marshal Gustav Ratzenhofer.²⁴⁵ According to the gospel of Ratzenhofer, "in the beginning were interests." It is somewhat difficult to be clear on exactly what phenomena he intends to include under this term. To begin with, he contends, the organism evolves from the germ in accordance with its innate or inherent interest. Psychological life is said to be pre-patterned by the innate interest of the germ. In Ratzenhofer's schema there are five basic interests: (a) the race or sex interest, (b) physiological interest; and with the rise of consciousness, the (c) egotic or individual interest develops from the race interest, and (d) the social interest arises from the physiological interest. In proportion as these lower interests are satiated, the impetus of thought awakens a feeling of dependence upon the infinite which gives rise to (e) the transcendental interest, the creator of religion and philosophy.²⁴⁶

To Ratzenhofer, the race and physiological interests are of the nature of necessities, which, when perceived in the human mind and understood, can give rise under life conditions to the acquired interests. Every individual is said to be endowed with these inner forces of vital and psychic energy. The units of the social process are

neither individuals nor groups, but interests. Ratzenhofer holds that all action arises from interests, that social life is a bundle of interests, and that social dynamics consists of the conflict, adaptation, and interplay of the interests of the members of a society.

The innate and acquired interest is the source of all human needs, and, in its changeable manifold forms, the guiding motive of all movements in the biological, psychical and social process of the individual and of humanity.²⁴⁷

Once Ratzenhofer established the foundation of inherent and acquired interests, he goes off to spend most of his time discussing the formation of groups around interests and views the social process as conflict and co-operation among groups.²⁴⁸ The point to note here, however, is that to Ratzenhofer the term "interest" denotes the general and basic innate and acquired motivational factors without which no human action can be forthcoming.²⁴⁹

Albion Woodbury Small was the main popularizer and translator of Ratzenhofer's position to American sociologists. Small leaves no doubt that it is Ratzenhofer to whom he is indebted for the concept of interest which he unparingly utilizes as the foundation of his own sociological system. It is the view of H.E. Barnes that "Small has excelled any other sociologist writing in the English language in the thoroughness of his elaboration of the interest concept and the group notion as sociological clues and formulas."²⁵⁰ In Small's view, the concept of interest serves the same purpose in sociology as the concept of atom has served in the physical sciences. Interests are seen as the "stuff that men are made of", and they are

the last elements to which human action can be reduced.

Like Ratzenhofer, Small sets interests initially in the context of biological phenomena, regressing finally to the species and the germ cell. Human beings contain groups of interests, which, in the form of motion or energy, involve themselves in the construction of tissues. He then argues that although we eat because we desire food, the desire itself is set in motion by a "bodily interest in replacing exhausted force."²⁵¹ It is in this context that Small believes that he is defining interest not in a psychological sense but in a teleological sense. He maintains that his formula expresses a conception of something back of consciousness, something operating more generally than in facts of consciousness.

In general, an interest is an unsatisfied capacity, corresponding to an unrealized condition and it is predisposition to such rearrangements as would tend to realize the indicated condition.²⁵²

Small classifies the elementary interests in a sixfold schema: Health, Wealth, Sociability, Knowledge, Beauty and Rightness.²⁵³ It is not that these are the only interests which man can experience, but that they are the groups into which all other interests will fall. The individual is said to be a resultant of the different interests that wrestle with each other in his personality. The primacy of interest as a motivational factor is apparent.

The clue to all social activity is in this fact of individual interests. Every act that every man performs is to be traced back to an interest.²⁵⁴

These interests are always implicit or latent in the nature of man although at any given time they may function beneath the level of awareness. In fact, Small makes it

abundantly clear that individuals may not even usually be conscious of the six interests, and so may satisfy these motives without recognizing them at all.

The human individual does not and cannot get himself into motion except under the conscious or unconscious impulse of one or more of these interests.²⁵⁵

This vague, general concept of interest as the ultimate and basic motivational factor, the necessary condition for every action, is only one of the concepts which bore that label in Small's work. But it is in terms of this general sense that other usages must be compared.

Lester Frank Ward fathered the notion of "social forces" as the true natural forces which obey the Newtonian laws of motion and which account for all human and societal phenomena. In his earlier work, Ward regards "desire" as this all pervading, world animating principle, the main-spring and master motive of action.²⁵⁶ In his more mature Pure Sociology, Ward recognizes some merit in Ratzenhofer's view and accepts "interest" as an equivalent of "desire". He notes how Ratzenhofer has enriched social science terminology with the term "interest" "as the precise equivalent of the social forces, as I have used that expression."²⁵⁷ Thus to Ward, the social forces as desires are in fact interests.

Interest is almost a synonym of desire in the sense here employed. . . . [H]uman interests thus constitute the equivalents of the social forces. They are coextensive with the dynamic agents in society.²⁵⁸

R.M. MacIver develops a more confusing position on the nature of "interests" but it is fairly clear that his meaning falls within this general category of usage. He proposes "interest" as the term to denote the objects or objectives of the will, that is, the mind as active. It is MacIver's

view that such objects always determine activity. Interests are the spurs of life.

I propose to follow Ratzenhofer in consistently calling these motive forces interests. . . . The interests of men, so understood, are the source of all social activity, and the changes in their interests are the source of all social evolution.²⁵⁹

L.T. Hobhouse's evolutionary theory relies on the term "interest" to denote almost every motivational factor. Only the innate impulses and the feelings stand in a class apart. Even an instinct is defined as an "innate interest" which serves the more basic needs called "root-interests".²⁶⁰ It is his view that interests (instincts) determine a particular course of action without foresight of the end and in accordance with hereditary modes of response. The root-interests determine the general trend of thought, feeling and behaviour whether acting with clear consciousness of direction or not."²⁶¹ To Hobhouse, "there are interests and interests." Interest (attention) is said to be a temporary outcome of a more general interest (instinct) which in turn can be traced back to a particular root-interest (need). The root-interests themselves are four in number; (a) interest in self (egotic interest); (b) interest in others (social interest); (c) interest in understanding the order and structure of things (cognitive interest); and (d) interest in making or remaking things (constructive interest). How much less confusing it would have been had Hobhouse denoted different motivational levels with the terms need, instinct, and attention.

II. Interest as a Subjective-Objective Relationship

This general usage is most clearly set out by H.P.

Fairchild in his Dictionary of Sociology.

Interest (1) the relation between a person and anything which he believes will satisfy one of his desires. An objectified desire. . . . The purposeful and voluntary acts of human beings are always in pursuit of interest.²⁶²

In Fairchild's definition the relation is between the whole conscious person and an object which the individual believes to be a potentially satisfying condition. It is not merely the relation between a desire and a potential or trusted satisfier.²⁶³ This is reasonably distinct from Small's sense in which an interest is an unsatisfied capacity which corresponds to an unrealized condition with the built-in predisposition to realize the unsatisfied condition. Interests in an unconscious state may still seek and obtain satisfaction without arousing any awareness of what they are about. But Small is much more confusing than that. The term "interest" is apparently intended to denote not the innate interest (capacity) alone, but the relationship with the desired state of affairs.

Both something in men that makes them have wants, and something outside of men that promises to gratify the wants, is implied by the word interest. We need not now enter into these details, but may frankly speak as we do when we refer to the farming interests, or the banking interests, or the labour interests, or the interests of the "machine".²⁶⁴

This is a truly extraordinary statement.²⁶⁵ Small explains his position in a very folksy manner. The owner of a flour mill is a man before he is a miller, in fact, he becomes a miller because he is a man; that is, "because he has interests -- in a deeper sense than that of the popular expression -- which impel him to act in order to gain

satisfaction."²⁶⁶ Now to make sense at all, this must relate to Small's teleological view of innate interests as "indicated spheres of activity which persons enter into and occupy in the course of realizing their personality."²⁶⁷ Interests in the subjective sense as unsatisfied capacities seem to come ready made with a blue-print which designates appropriate objective conditions as modes of satisfaction. This would mean that the man who becomes a miller has a milling interest deep in the inner reaches of his psyche which impels him to enter the activity of milling which is the objective side of the self-same inner interest. The capacity to mill and the milling together constitute an interest. Needless confusion is built into Small's definition. In the first usage examined, Small speaks of interests as the subjective motivating factors which arrive with the organism and which motivate all behaviour. At the same time he can speak of the objective satisfiers as interests, and thirdly, he often implies that neither alone are interests, but only the subjective-objective relationship constitutes an interest. But even granting this confusion, there are absolutely no grounds to support the next step which is to regard the "milling interest" as something like the same phenomena which he has already denoted by the term "interest". This is simply asking too much.

Interest in this latter sense denotes a number of people who unite for the defense, maintenance, or enhancement of any position or advantage possessed alike or in common. This common usage is rather ambiguous as the term "interest" is said to denote either (a) the course or advantage pursued, or (b) the group so united.²⁶⁸ This is not to deny that,

given Small's argument thus far, a miller may join with other millers to promote milling. Nor is it to deny that the millers so united may be regarded in a different sense as an "interest". But it is a different sense. The millers united are not a motive (as subjective-objective relationship), nor are they alone the satisfying condition, nor are they an innate unconscious unsatisfied capacity. They constitute a group, and members of the group will probably be motivated by a desire to protect milling. Small resorts to another innate device to vouchsafe his position. He suggests that "persons form groups, because inborn interests push them towards association. . . ." ²⁶⁹ Thus the milling interest (unsatisfied capacity) creates millers who mill (objective condition) and pushes them into an association (the "milling interest"), which is in fact the final realization of the initial interest. The term is said to be used throughout in the same sense. This is too much to allow on any logical grounds, and, in view of what reputable literature there is on motives, instincts, and group formation, his position, however ingenious, is factually quite false. ²⁷⁰

It would be unfair to imply that Small was entirely unaware of this host of difficulties. He proposes that it would be troublesome to bother about such "nice metaphysical distinctions between the aspects of interest", but that if the trouble were taken, some formula could be worked out.

We might reserve the term "interest" strictly speaking for the use defined above, [i.e., his definition], applying the term "desire" to the subjective aspect of choice, and "want" to the objective aspect, i.e., the thing desired. Precisely because the term "interest" is in current use for all these aspects of the case, we prefer to retain it. ²⁷¹

In Chapter III it was argued that the psychological school known as the "force for growth" model usually relies on only one basic motivational unit. As there is no distinction implied among motivational phenomena, one term can denote this general class of motivational factors. It is argued earlier that Homer Dubs employs the term "interest" to label all motives which are said to be of the same order of importance. There seems to be no reason why this term cannot be used in this fashion, other than the general preference which psychologists and sociologists have shown for alternative terms such as "drive", "motive", or "need". The writers examined under this category of usage in the present chapter preceded much of the work on motivation carried out by psychologists.²⁷²

B. Interest as one type or class of motivational factor.

1. Interest as the primary motivational factor.

This usage has already been pointed out in the writing of Albion W. Small at such times as he flirted with the idea of calling the subjective aspect of interest "desire". In Small's comments on Ward's notion of desires as the "social forces", he not only postulates the existence of interests beneath desires, but he also succeeds in establishing the independence of desires. Thus he argues, interests have to desires, the relation of substance to attribute, genus to species. Interests are more basic and may be beneath our awareness while desires are specific and concrete and real. It is suggested that desires may in fact take their own course.

Our implicit interests move us to desires which may correspond well or ill with the real content of the interests. . . . It is these desires which make up the active social forces.²⁷³

In this particular section of his work, Small suggests that the shifting concrete desires arise from more general and stable interests. But the interests themselves are not the immediate motives of behaviour. Interests are the underlying needs which must achieve some measure of satisfaction if life is to go on in a bearable condition.

2. Interest as the derived or secondary motivational factor.

The best example of this usage is set down by E.A. Ross. He believes that it is useful to arrange the springs of human action in two planes. Desires are the primary motivational forces which well up in consciousness and which can be catalogued in two classes, the natural and the cultural. The interests are the secondary or derived motivational factors which are woven complexes of "multi-colored strands of desire". Ross maintains that there are certain huge complexes of goods, wealth, government, religion, and knowledge which focus or bring together various desires and so serve as means to the satisfaction of a number of desires.

In respect to these [complexes of goods] the various elementary social forces therefore give off impulses which run together and form the economic, political, religious and intellectual interests, which constitute in effect the chief history-making forces.²⁷⁴

Ross hopes to distinguish between original and derivative social forces so that a method can be worked out, as he puts it, to aid in interpreting interpretations of history. It is his contention that shifts in interest such as the nineteenth century concentration on wealth, have been mistakenly attributed to the evolution of new desires. In fact, Ross insists, shifts in interest are due primarily to a disturbance in the relation of means to ends, that is, in

the capacity of the secondary goods to promote the satisfaction of existing desires.²⁷⁵

William Graham Sumner sets out hunger, sex passion, vanity, and fear (of ghosts and spirits) as the four great motives of human action. But under each of these motives are secondary motivational factors termed interests. Life consists in satisfying interests. Interests seem to be relations of action and reaction between the individual's basic motives and the prevailing life conditions. It is in such a fashion that folkways are created.

The relation of the needs to the conditions are interests under the heads of hunger, love, vanity, and fear; efforts of numbers at the same time to satisfy interests produce phenomena which are folkways. . . . The immediate motive is interest.²⁷⁶

II. Interest as the relation of being concerned or affected in respect of advantage.

A. Interest as that which is to or for the advantage, good, benefit, or profit of a person or group.²⁷⁷

This common usage is as vague as are the attendant terms in the definition, that is, "advantage", "good", "benefit", "profit", and "welfare", which frequently becomes part of this equation. J. Mark Baldwin outlined this sense of "interest" in 1901 and declared that "this meaning is not sufficiently exact to be technically useful."²⁷⁸ The point, however, is that it has been used by sociologists in theoretical work. Rarely has the term been given a more special stipulative meaning when it has been employed in this sense. Most often the common (lexical) usage is simply assumed and the sense is taken to be plain enough. The notion of "interest" in this general sense is devoid of any specific

content or specific referent. The term "interest" does not denote any general class of specific phenomena but only particular phenomena in any given case. It could conceivably denote almost anything.

This sense of "interest" most frequently depicts some kind of motivational relationship involving an actor in pursuit of that which he perceives to be to his advantage (profit, good, benefit, welfare).²⁷⁹ In this sense, the term "interest" as advantage is often difficult to distinguish from the usage of "interest" as a more or less permanent disposition which motivates conduct. This is especially the case in the general class of conduct which focuses on economic activity. Thus it is often said that an individual's interest is that which promotes his material advantage and enhances his economic position. The individual is said to be motivated by this perceived advantage. There is little doubt that concern about material advantage and economic position motivates a good deal of conduct and that it is often as permanent and enduring as Small's basic interests or Ross's secondary economic interests.

It is in the context of Small's position that a possible area of distinction emerges. To Small, interests as the basic innate motives are said to continue throughout an individual's lifetime and often in an unconscious and unrecognized state. A person is thought to be impelled to certain types of conduct by the interest which seeks satisfaction. Now interest in the sense of advantage seems to work only as long as the production of wealth, for example, is thought to be to the actor's advantage. Upon retirement an individual may be quite able to cease money-making activities, that is, no wealth-making interest continues to urge him

to the mill, office or stable. And it is often observed that certain sections of any population and indeed entire societies, do not perceive wealth-making activities as altogether essential. This would be the case, presumably, if the desire were implanted by nature as a permanent motivating factor. This distinction between interest as a basic motivational factor and interest as that which is to an individual's personal advantage, is forcibly illustrated in the writing of L.T. Hobhouse. His notion of interest as the root-needs of personality is held to be quite different from the notion of interest as that which is to a person's advantage. This is implied in his most extraordinary statement that the aesthetic, intellectual, ethical, and religious interests are the "disinterested interests". He also maintains that groups, whether classes or nations, are led by impulses such as pride and self-assertion to results "which may be very much opposed to their interests in the sense in which the term generally suggests."²⁸⁰

A more realistic distinction is argued by those who see interest as entirely of the character of means. Professor Plamenatz contends that interest, in this sense of advantage, is "whatever is profitable to a person or group, because it gives him or them what he or they want or will find satisfactory."²⁸¹ Plamenatz is then able to draw a distinction between basic motives called wants and means which bring satisfaction to these wants called interests. It also opens the possibility that a man may not know his interests, that is, he may not know what will satisfy his wants.

A man's interest is whatever is profitable to him, whatever helps him get what he wants or what will satisfy him. In this sense a man may not know his own interest or others may know it better than he does. . . . It can be our interest not to get what we want, if our getting it prevents our getting other things we want more or makes us want things we cannot get.²⁸²

Plamenatz does not seem to recognize, or at least he does not explicitly recognize, the motivational relationship that may be set up between the want and the thing which is thought to be to an individual's advantage. In other words, the sense of advantage which is entailed in the wanting guides the quest for things which will satisfy the wanting. Such things, called interests, may then become aspects of specific motivational relationships and become wanted in their own right as well as to satisfy more basic wants. Plamenatz does not suggest that whatever helps an individual get what he wants may turn into what he wants. In Plamenatz's language it would then cease to be an interest. This question probably has much to do with the notion of means becoming ends. Thus if money or property is thought to be to an individual's advantage because it satisfies wants (prestige, feelings of worth, sex needs, food, good drink), there are to that extent motives set in operation which involve wanting money or wanting property. This motive, including want and goal objects (interest), will probably be enduring insofar as the more basic wants require money or property to bring them to culmination.

This sense of interest as advantage need not point to an enduring relationship between a specific want and a specific satisfying state of affairs. Wants are presumably many and shift in strength. Old satisfiers are not always present, and new and more satisfying states of affairs are

constantly canvassed. Therefore, a thing may be to an individual's advantage if it satisfies any want for any length of time, or even if it brings any want closer to satisfaction. The thing, as an interest, could be anything which circumstances provide.

The sense of "interest" which does not necessarily denote a permanent motivational disposition, but suggests a means of promoting a particular desire or want, is set out in an example given by Albion Small. He speaks of an individual having "an interest in catching a train". The individual in question is concerned about catching the train. To catch the train is an interest. It is to his advantage to do so because he wants to do so to satisfy some desire or to avoid some unpleasant consequence. Failure to catch the train may make him late for a crucial business appointment, or it may mean that he will miss his supper, or be caught by pursuers bent on his capture. To say that he has an interest in catching the train does not usually imply that he has a train-catching motive in the permanent dispositional sense which leads him to catch every train in sight. He may usually take a bus or drive his own car. It may mean, however, that he does have a permanent interest in this sense, more commonly known as a compulsive obsession. But it need not and usually does not imply that.

The notion of advantage may not be taken in the context of a particular want or of any want consciously felt. In fact, "advantage" is sometimes used to refer to an individual's general position and welfare, that which he is trying to do or trying to be in a larger sense. Thus a thing may be to his interest, as advantage insofar as it

promotes this general welfare. It is in this context that it is most often said that an individual "does not know his own interest."²⁸³ This expression does not usually imply that he does not know his own want (although it could mean that), nor that he does not know what will satisfy his own wanting (although it could mean that as well.) It usually implies that certain things which he is consciously doing are not in keeping with his general welfare or position in terms of his conception of them in the general train of events and circumstances in which he is acting. Thus a businessman may want to make money for any number of reasons and may be engaging in transactions which actually enhance his business at the moment. But in the process he may employ tactics which will gradually alienate key sectors of his potential customers. Or it may be that the type of business he is promoting is quickly becoming obsolete in terms of new technological advances and consumer fads. By purchasing more loans on the strength of his business in order to develop larger facilities he may be said to be acting against his own interests or that he does not know his own interest. An example of interest in this wider sense as anything which enhances the advantage or general welfare of a person or group is set out by Talcott Parsons in the language of institutions.

Power we may define as the realistic capacity of a system unit to actualize its "interest" (attain goals, prevent undesired interference, command respect, control possessions, etc.) within the context of system-interaction.²⁸⁴

Parsons' definition, and especially the "etc.," indicates the vague, almost infinite regression incumbent on the use of "interest" as advantage in this general sense.

It is exceedingly difficult to be exhaustive in pointing to the interests of a system, group, or individual. The conditions of clear definition and easily identifiable referents demanded in empirical theory, make this sense of "interest" a troublesome one, and virtually rule it out in its present form. To become more precise in usage and yet retain this very common sense of "interest" is a challenging problem.

The sense of interest as that which is to the advantage of an individual or group usually implies that awareness of the advantage, and selection of conditions whereby it may be achieved, actually motivates conduct. Sometimes motivation is not implied as in those cases in which it is said that an individual does not know his own interest. In many cases in which something is said to be to someone's advantage, it is not clear whether or not the actors are aware of this or whether or not they actually act on this basis. In the remainder of this section examples of these kinds of vague and often indistinguishable usages will be presented from the works of several sociologists.

1. The not explicitly motivational sense -- advantage alone is implied.

Vilfredo Pareto contends that derivations, that is, ideas, ideologies, verbalizations of any kind, can be used to influence conduct. Derivations are often employed in "inducing A to do something X which is said to be advantageous", whereas in reality it may not be. Such derivations are of great importance in society, Pareto maintains, because they "aim primarily at obviating possible conflicts between individual interest and the collective interest." The ploy is to "confuse the two interests by derivations,

asserting that the interests are identical."²⁸⁵ Pareto advises that speculators have been winning favours from governments for years "by asking for them in the interests of the labouring classes or even in the 'public interest'". In fact, he continues, all ruling classes strive to show "that their interest is the interest of public and country."²⁸⁶ In speaking of the "present interests" and the "future interests" of every community, Pareto seems to mean the conceptions of material advantage held by two different generations. The young generation may not be aware of its interests. Thus, Pareto argues, "material interests. . . stand in conflict with interests of another kind -- the future prosperity of the country."²⁸⁷ Pareto is of the opinion that the rentier class "may be so blinded by sentiment as to act against their own interests", whereas "the ruling class has a clearer view of its own interests because its vision is less obscured by sentiments."²⁸⁸

Karl Mannheim holds that there are two senses of ideology, the particular and the general. Although the total ideology is the primary focus of his investigation, he does comment on the particular. By a particular ideology, he means those ideas which are regarded as more or less conscious disguises of a situation, "the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests."²⁸⁹ It is one of Mannheim's recommendations that it would be "in the true interest of the whole" to establish centers for the critical analysis of "political interests."²⁹⁰ R.M. MacIver notes the manner in which the various forms of government "have sustained systems of property congenial to their nature and conformable to the interests of those who ruled the state."²⁹¹ He also warns that by treating people as mere

means to an end a person may be deceived concerning the conditions of his own welfare. That is, "he may be acting in opposition to his own 'best interests' or 'real interests', as it is sometimes put."²⁹² Ludwig Gumplowicz was one of the first to notice that an individual may be bound to one group by one set of interests and to other groups by other sets of interests. His example is that of a government official who owns a large estate, professes adherence to a zealous religious sect, and owns a sugar factory. Apparently what he sees to be to his greatest advantage at any given time determines his conduct in the on-going social struggle, that is, "his position will be finally determined by his relative interests."²⁹³

Max Weber employs the term "interest" in a wide variety of senses but the one most commonly used seems to refer to that which is to an individual's advantage. In commenting on the "interests of agriculture", Weber notes the variety of conflicting interests which are observable if we take "the interests of agriculture as the empirically determinable, subjective ideas of economically active individuals about their own interests." As an example, he mentions "the interests of farmers who wish to see their property and who are interested in a rapid rise in the price of land."²⁹⁴ This is in opposition to the interests of farmers who wish to buy land. Weber implies that when farmers decide what their interests are at any given time and in any given circumstances, they consider what is to their advantage in the context of material and ideal values. Thus he speaks of "those material and ideal values to which the farmers themselves at a given time relate their interests."²⁹⁵

In drawing a distinction between those who "live for" and those who "live off" politics, Weber is led to believe that in those cases in which politicians "live for" politics, a plutocratic recruitment system must be in effect. He adds that such politicians may also "live off" politics, that is, "exploit their political domination in their own economic interest."²⁹⁶ This sense of interest as advantage incorporates much more than economic advantage in Weber's usage. He maintains that to the Calvinist follower, the doctrine of predestination became of greater importance than all the interests of this world. The question "am I one of the elect?", "forced all other interests into the background."²⁹⁷ Concern about salvation and the benefits to be derived therefrom were said to be more salient than concerns about other sorts of advantages. However, a reconciliation with the material world was discovered whereby the bourgeois businessman could pursue his pecuniary interests and still feel that he was fulfilling a duty.

2. The more explicitly motivational sense -- perception of advantage motivating conduct.

A very explicit usage which involves material advantage as an aspect of a motivational relationship is set out by Pareto.

Interests: Individuals and communities are spurred by instinct and reason to acquire possession of material goods that are useful -- or merely pleasureable -- for purposes of living, as well as to seek consideration and honours. Such impulses, which may be called "interests", play in the mass a very important part in determining the social equilibrium.²⁹⁸

Interests appear to be a class of impulses distinguished from others by virtue of their focus on the acquisition of

material goods. That the economic character of the goods sought is important in the interest relationship is quite clear to Pareto.

The mass of interests falls in very considerable part within the purview of the science of economics . . . [a] general science of interests, the science of economics.²⁹⁹

The motivational sense of interest as advantage is contained in Max Weber's discussion of the support which demagogic leaders often receive from party officials in a democratic system. Apparently "the material and ideal interests of the officials" are secured because the leader frequently wins elections and because officials find it "inwardly more satisfying to work for a leader."³⁰⁰ The end toward which party activity is said to be devoted is "to secure power within a corporate group for its leaders in order to attain ideal or material advantages for its active members."³⁰¹ Politics always becomes a matter of "the play of interests", Weber contends, whenever legal parties exist on the basis of voluntary membership. But interest, he advises, need not mean an economic category.

In the first instance, it is a matter of political interests which rest either on the ideological basis or on an interest in power as such. . . . [T]he interests both ideal and material, which both the party leaders themselves and the members of the party organization have, in power, office, and remuneration always play an important part.³⁰²

The sense of advantage with clear motivational-dispositional connotations is explicit in Weber's discussion of ideas and interests. Weber warns that he is not arguing that the nature of religious doctrines is a simple function of "a stratum's material and ideal interest situation." It

is rather that ideas have an autonomous role.

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the "world images" that have been created by "ideas" have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.³⁰³

Weber frequently employs the term "interested" to denote those individuals affected in respect to advantage. He suggests that lawyers became prominent in occidental politics at the time when the management of politics through parties meant management through interest groups. The training in the law became valuable in terms of parliamentary bargaining as "the craft of the lawyer is to plead effectively the cause of interested clients."³⁰⁴ He notes that in modern democratic systems the members of advisory bodies are selected from among "private and interested circles."³⁰⁵ The establishment of caucus parties, Weber maintains, is primarily the work of the local circles, "composed of those interested in municipal politics from which the fattest material opportunities always spring."³⁰⁶

Karl Mannheim advances the proposition that ideas merely reflect individuals' situations in life, they are "anticipations of their unconscious interests."³⁰⁷ One of his most common assertions is the profound degree to which conduct is determined by individual interests. It has been noted that Mannheim appears to mean by "interest" the perception of advantage associated with power, status, and wealth. In the analysis of ideology at the particular level, Mannheim explains that the enquiry focuses on ideas at the psychological plane. A "psychology of interests" is employed, and the investigator assumes that "this or that interest is the cause of a given lie or deception."³⁰⁸ The class of in-

tellectuals is said to be recruited from every class and group in society and thus subsumes within itself "all those interests with which social life is permeated."³⁰⁹ This fusion of class origins is expected to perform a balancing act with distorted perspectives and thus render a more purified view of social life as a whole. Some intellectuals are said to turn their now unbiased attention toward the field of political sociology. It is this discipline which attempts to illuminate the nature of "socially bound interests" by clarifying relationships of a causal nature.

Given such and such interests, in a given juncture of events, there will follow such and such a type of thinking and such and such a view of the total social process. . . . What these specific sets of interests will be depends on the structural determinants of the social situation.³¹⁰

B. Self-Interest

This is the same sense of interest as advantage but relates more specifically to the personal or self-advantage of the actor. Self-interest is frequently, if not entirely, used to describe a motivational relationship -- the motive to acquire something perceived by the individual to be to his own profit or advantage. There is probably some need or desire or want which is said to be more basic and in terms of which the thing thought to be to the actor's advantage is evaluated.³¹¹ In other words, something is to his advantage, that is, in his self-interest, if it satisfies some basic disposition. It should be emphasized that "self-interest" is very close to the notion of "interest" as outlined above, and may be implied in many cases where the term "interest" rather than "self-interest" has been

selected. The notion of self-interest is one of ancient lineage and it is as vague as the concepts of self and interest. The basic motives involved in self-seeking can include almost the whole gamut of motives known to mankind. It is in terms of these conceptions of the self that "advantage" is perceived. The common usage of self-interest is sometimes set down as simply "selfish pursuit of one's own welfare" and is held to be the opposite of an altruistic motive. Others contend that in the final analysis, everything comes back to the self. In a word, this is a very elusive and confusing term.

Weber remarks that the administrative staff in a bureaucracy is bound by obedience to the office holders by factors other than the concept of legitimacy. He notes two other means, "both of which appeal to personal interests: material reward and social honor."³¹² A major mode of orientation of social action is, in Weber's view, self-interest.

[A] uniformity of action may be said to be "determined" by the exploitation of the opportunities of his situation in the self-interest of the actor. . . . This is above all true of economic action. . . but it is by no means confined to such cases. The dealers in a market thus treat their own actions as means for obtaining the satisfaction of the ends defined by what they realize to be their own typical economic interests. . . .³¹³

Weber holds that the stability of action in terms of "self-interest" rests on the fact that the individual who does not take account of the "interests of others" will arouse their antagonism and possibly damage "his own interests". In Weber's view, the market, and the competitive economy resting on it, constitute the most important example

of "the reciprocal determination of action in terms of pure self-interest."³¹⁴

The concept of self-interest is also introduced in Weber's discussion of the two principal ways in which the legitimacy of an order may be guaranteed or upheld. The first includes purely "disinterested motives" which may be (a) purely affectual, or (b) derived from rational beliefs concerning the validity of the order as an expression of absolute values, or (c) religious attitudes. The second involves interested motives. The order may be upheld "also or entirely by self-interest, that is, through expectations of specific ulterior consequences."³¹⁵

There is the suggestion in Weber that self-interest denotes "rational action", that is, the calculation of means to achieve given ends. An instance of this has already been pointed out in connection with economic conduct. Weber contends that one of the most important aspects of the process of rationalization of action is the "substitution of the unthinking acceptance of ancient custom" by "deliberate adaptation to situations in terms of self-interest."³¹⁶ This is further evidenced in Weber's definition of an associative type of social relationship as one in which the orientation of social action within it rests on "a rationally motivated adjustment of interests."³¹⁷ Examples of associative relationships include the rational free market and the pure voluntary association which is based on self-interest, that is, an agreement on a long-run course of action oriented purely to the promotion of "specific ulterior interests, economic or others. . . ."³¹⁸

Talcott Parsons regards Weber's entire notion of interest as the category in which uniformities are understandable in terms of the rational orientation of the actors to similar expectations. He then suggests that in Weber's view, only action based on interest can be rational. In so doing, Parsons must imply that interest (self-interest) is a purely "means" concept and does not denote basic motivating factors, unless he holds that all motives yield rational conduct.

[A]ction is determined by interest only insofar as it involves adaptation of means to given ends, according to objective standards. It may be said that this is what orientation to efficiency norms is.³¹⁹

Pareto's position is much the same although he prefers the notion of logical conduct.

If the interest is real and the individual acts logically to favour it, there is no derivation; it is a case of plain logical conduct designed to attain an end desired by an individual.³²⁰

Pareto goes on to argue that logico-experimental reasoning plays a major role in conduct when the objective is known and the search is for appropriate means of reaching it. Such reasoning, he believes, is used in the arts and crafts, agriculture, industry, and commerce. But in addition to the many technical sciences,

it has been possible to constitute a general science of interests, the science of economics, which assumes that logico-experimental reasonings exclusively are used in certain branches of human activity.³²¹

Karl Mannheim sets out the notion of "rational interest" as a motivational factor which is opposed to unconscious and emotional factors which also guide conduct. He distinguishes rational interest from what he calls the psychological sense

of the term, that is, interest in MacIver's sense as the counterpart of attitude. The non-psychological use of interest is said to imply personal advantage which is sometimes called self-interest.

As an instance of this I may want to get the greatest amount possible in the fields of power, prestige or economic gain. It is principally the wish for advantage which urges me to purposive activities.³²²

It is thus a wish or desire for personal advantage which makes up self-interest which is then said to urge the individual to purposive activity to realize this perceived advantage. There is so far no built-in demand that self-interest need be rational in any ends, calculation of means, sense. But he goes on to argue that any conduct which is interest-impelled is in fact rational. Calculation plus self-interest yield the notion of rational interest.

This means that interest compels me to organize my behaviour to attain this given end of calculation, and in this case we can speak about. . . rational interest.³²³

C. Interest, usually in the plural, to denote a group which is united for the defense, maintenance, or enhancement of any more or less enduring position or advantage possessed alike or in common.³²⁴

This common (lexical) notion of interest as a group rests on the usage of interest outlined in the present chapter under II A. . . . Plamenatz sets this out as follows:

(d) whatever is profitable to a person or group, because it gives him or them what he or they want or will find satisfactory, (e) a group who have an interest in common in the sense defined under (d).³²⁵

A somewhat stronger statement of the interest as group usage is that which employs interest to denote those groups which actually control and dominate a particular enterprise.

(a) The persons effectively controlling an enterprise or dominating a field of activity, the landed interest, the banking interest; the Protestant interest; (b) interests, plural; the dominating group of owners in a field of business, industry, or finance, considered locally, regionally, nationally, or internationally, sometimes "big Business".³²⁶

It appears that a distinction might be justified between these two senses, that is, between a group united on the basis of a common cause or advantage or position for the defense and promotion of the uniting cause, and the notion of a group effectively controlling a particular enterprise and dominating a field of activity. For example, the farmers of Outback, Alberta, may unite to defend the cause of higher loans for desert weed production and may thus constitute an interest in the first sense. The farmers of Backout, Saskatchewan, may be the most influential members of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and may be regarded as the interests in the agricultural industry in the second sense.³²⁷ This notion of "the interest" is not an easy one to pin down. The farmers of Outback may join with the farmers of Backout in the contention that "the interests" in the field of agriculture are in fact the people in commerce and finance who control agricultural prices, the Winnipeg Wheat Board, and the export-import trade. It may be, however, that the large wheat farmers of the prairie provinces exercise more voting power in the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, control the content of briefs and deputations to federal and provincial governments, and dominate the membership on advisory committees. They are, therefore, in a

position to protect the wheat industry against the various other types of farm enterprise and thus may be regarded as "the interests" of agriculture.

The second sense of interest (as group) more clearly implies "the interests" or the "vested interests."³²⁸ This sense contains certain derogatory overtones with which no particular group operating in a democratic atmosphere wants to be burdened. It is vague but still widely employed. In utilizing this sense it is probably wise to set down quite specifically at what level "the interests" operate and what particular aspect of life is thought to be controlled. There are many investigators examining power and/or influence at the community and national levels who seem to be trying to track down groups of much the same character. The group sense of "vested interests" should also be distinguished from the sense in which an individual may be said to have a vested interest in something.³²⁹

The sociological literature generally under review in this chapter is replete with statements concerning interests as groups. Nowhere is the distinction outlined above clearly utilized by the authors. The term is employed in the ordinary language sense and never seems to warrant a definition and subsequent stipulative or technical usage in actual practical work. That the term does warrant a more technical sense has been realized and outlined by Fairchild.

Interest (2) A group which is bound together by the identity or similarity of the interests of its individual components. For example, the banking interests, the racing interests, the metal trade interests.³³⁰

Albion W. Small makes frequent use of the term "in-

terest" to denote a group of people promoting some cause or shared advantage. It will be recalled how Small argued that his notion of interest in the sense of unsatisfied capacity corresponding to an unrealized condition could be illustrated by talking of interests as do the men of affairs. There then follows a discussion of the "sugar interest" and "labour interest" and how the legislation of a given session could be explained "as the final balance between the conflicting pecuniary interests."³³¹

He does hint at a distinction which remains unpursued in his work in his comment that all the interests struggling for recognition in business and politics are highly composite.³³² Small frequently urges students of society to examine such questions as the tariff, currency, monopolies, and "the demands of the numberless 'interests' that seek legislation."³³³ In a wide ranging account of "special interests", Small notes that "certain types of interests did not want the government to perform certain types of actions."³³⁴ It is quite apparent that Ratzenhofer employs this usage as it is in the section on Ratzenhofer that Small makes most frequent reference to "the interests". The groups labelled "capital", "massed agriculture", "trade", "massed industry", "corporate interests", and "manufacture", appear in Small's outline of Ratzenhofer's schema of typical interests within the state. A representative instance of usage is contained in the observation that "the law administered by the government is always the expression of the will of those interests which are for the time being dominant."³³⁵

Examples of this usage abound in almost all Weber's works. He speaks frequently of the "trading interests", the "capitalistic interests", and how control over managerial

positions may be "in the hands of other business interests, such as banks and others."³³⁶ He notes the various interests engaged in determining monetary policy, and how formalism in bureaucracies is promoted by all "the interests which are concerned with security of their own personal situations."³³⁷ He contends that advisory bodies are usually composed of "delegated representatives of conflicting interests" whether their basis be in "ideal causes, in power, or in economic advantage."³³⁸ R.M. MacIver mentions the "economic interest complexes", "the political role of property interests", and usually refers to the "interests" as "interest groups."³³⁹ In The Web of Government, MacIver presents a colourful exhibit of this type of usage. He argues that "industrial and technical advances created many foci of opposing interests, competing or bargaining for advantage one against the other", and that frequently exploited groups or classes perceive the state as "the mere agency of dominant interests." Almost invariably, MacIver maintains, "strong interests interpret the welfare of the nation in terms of their own immediate profits."³⁴⁰

It is argued earlier that the term "vested interests" seems to imply some notion of a group or groups effectively controlling some enterprise or sphere of activity. This, of course, is almost as much a recommendation as it is a statement of actual usage.³⁴¹ A distinction between the two senses of interest as "group" seems to be more clearly drawn in lexical definitions than in either the definitions or practical work of sociologists. But some sociologists do imply that a vested interest means something more than an interest. Fairchild's definition of vested interest suggests

that the term applies more nearly to privileged groups.

"Vested interest: an economic interest of a privileged group in maintaining the status quo."³⁴²

It is also clear from this definition that the common usage of the "vested interests" as "groups" rests on the notion of groups having interests vested in something which is to their profit or advantage or welfare. This is presumably what Karl Mannheim means when he speaks of ruling groups becoming so intensively "interest bound" to a situation that they are unable to see facts which would undermine their position. Groups in power, he notes, participate in, and share responsibility for, the existing order, and so become "wedded to things as they are."³⁴³

Weber points out how pecuniary and capitalistic interests are "anchored in the maintenance and cultivation of the popular language", and how others have "vested interests in the political structure."³⁴⁴ Talcott Parsons advances the view that all institutional systems create, and are supported by, a complex system of vested-interests. In proportion to the institutionalization of any pattern, a self-interest is said to develop in conformity with it. By "vested-interest" Parsons means "an interest in defending higher statuses and its perquisites against challenge from less privileged elements. . . . [t]he status and situations and their perquisites to which such interests are attached involve some element of legitimacy or claim to it."³⁴⁵

Possibly the best definition of "vested interests" is that set down by Max Lerner.

When an activity has been pursued so long that the individuals concerned in it have a prescriptive claim

to its exercise and its profits, they are considered to have a vested interest in it.³⁴⁶

Lerner goes on to argue that when an interest of this nature is given legal sanction, it becomes a "vested right" and may be enforced against other individuals and even against the state. His discussion then turns on an examination of the cyclical alternation of periods of defense and aggression, protecting existing vested rights against rising and assertive vested interests. It is his view that this sort of process is vital to an understanding of the history of capitalism, and that even the history of American constitutional law is most intelligible as "a record of the varying legal sanctity of the vested interests."³⁴⁷

D. Interest as on the side of what is advantageous, aids in the realization of that which is advantageous.³⁴⁸

This is a very minor sense and it appears most frequently in the works of Max Weber. When Weber employs this sense he seems to imply that something which is in the interest of something else actually furthers or assists in realizing the latter. For example, he argues that there is a need for both materialistic and spiritualistic interpretations of events "in the interest of historical truth."³⁴⁹ He maintains that modern bureaucracy, "in the interest of integrity", has developed a high sense of status honour, and that modes of division and organization of human services are "in the interest of production."³⁵⁰ The best example of the sense in which the thing to be realized, the object, is to the advantage of someone, is contained in the following. Weber argues that the small peasant tends to devote more intensive

labour to his non-specialized function and to restrict his standard of living "in the interest of maintaining his formal independence."³⁵¹

III. Interest as the feeling of curiosity or concern which stimulates, accompanies, or is the effect of the attention process.

This general usage is outlined in the first chapter on "interest" as a psychological concept. A variety of senses are included under this general usage, ranging from interest as simply a feeling, to interest as a feeling of pleasure identical to the attention process, interest as the hedonic tone of the attention process, and interest as the intellectual feeling. These technical senses are rather difficult to distinguish from the use of the term in ordinary language as the feeling of one who is concerned, has a personal concern in something such as to fix attention on an object.³⁵² Generally, sociologists have attempted to incorporate this sense of "interest" in either the motivational-dispositional usage or in the usage of interest as that which is to one's profit or advantage or welfare.

It has been argued that Albion Small incorporates what he calls the pedagogic sense into his own loose formulation of "interest" very soon after he has laboured to draw a distinction between them. His notion of the subjective aspect of interest (sometimes called desire) becomes "interest in the derived, secondary sense involving attention and choice."³⁵³ Frank Lester Ward employs interest in this sense in conjunction with Ratzenhofer's notion of interest as an innate biologically based motivational factor.

When any question agitates the public mind there is a great central mass of men who take an ordinary enlightened interest in it. Below these there is a body of persons experiencing an interest diminishing in degree until it practically vanishes. Above the mean there is a certain number with whom the interest is greater, and this rises with diminishing numbers until there is reached a point at which a very few persons are wholly engrossed in the question. [A]ttention cannot be attracted unless an interest can be aroused.³⁵⁴

L.T. Hobhouse is far from mistaken in his observation that there are "interests and interests". It has been noticed how he uses interests as the basic needs, the secondary instincts, and as that which is to the advantage or profit of a class or nation. The sense of interest as the accompaniment of attention is also included. Hobhouse remarks that in simple forms of action, impulse and feeling appear as two closely related elements. The factor common to them is "the interest in the situation . . . the attention to or (at lowest) the awareness of something with which we are dealing."³⁵⁵ There is the suggestion later in his argument that interest as attention is merely the temporary flickering of a more general and basic interest, presumably one of the instinct variety.

Karl Mannheim struggles to set out a definition of interest in the psychological sense which can be contrasted with his use of interest as "rational self-interest."³⁵⁶ He utilizes MacIver's definition of attitude as the subjective state of mind involving a tendency to act in a characteristic way when a stimulus is presented. All attitudes imply objects, and it is these objects of attitudes which the term "interest" denotes. Interest is said to be the counterpart of an attitude. But rather than adhering to this usage, Mannheim immediately speaks of "the object of interest" which suggests that interest is not only an "object of an attitude",

but that it is a subjective state which relates to its own objects.

Once my interest has focused on the object, however, the objective relationship between the object and me becomes more and more important. In this broader sense we can speak about interest in cultural objects, like a philosophy.³⁵⁷

But Mannheim is not even content with this position. In the very next sentence he argues that "in this case interest means objects which enlist our attention." Notice that he does not say that interests are objects towards which attitudes are focused. It is rather attention which relates to such objects. In the course of a few brief paragraphs on conceptual clarification, Mannheim succeeds in using interest in four rather distinct ways under the guise of a single usage. Interest is set out as the object of an attitude, the object of an interest, a subjective state which relates to its own object, and as the object which calls out attention.

The common usage of interest as the feeling of concern appears to include some of the characteristics of interest as related to attention. For example, Weber notes that "[a] relatively small number of men are primarily interested in political life and hence interested in sharing political power."³⁵⁸ He argues that the question of whether or not an actor's intentions will be carried through or not, is determined "either by a strong interest in the outcome on his own part, or by direct or indirect compulsion."³⁵⁹ Weber contends that employers often increase piece-rates at harvesting time to interest them [the workmen] in increasing their own efficiency."³⁶⁰ The somewhat sharper sense of concern is present in such statements as "the pure interest

of the bureaucracy in power."³⁶¹ Mosca holds that once an individual has achieved a level of culture which relieves him of the pressures of material needs, he will sometimes rise above ordinary preoccupations and "interest himself in something higher than himself, something that concerns the interests of the society to which he belongs."³⁶²

IV. Interest as the object of an attitude.

This rather unusual and little-used sense is found in the work of R.M. MacIver and Karl Mannheim. In MacIver's case, the notion of interest as the object of an attitude seems to develop out of his earlier attempt to relate interest as object to the will as subjective acting agent. He contends that there are two polar factors in all human activity.

[O]n the objective side the interest, that for the sake of which we will the relations of community, on the subjective side, the will, the active mind for which the interest exists.³⁶³

In his following argument, MacIver quickly confuses the subjective-objective relationship which he has set down. Presumably, he believes that by concentrating on interests rather than on will, his study will warrant greater scientific claim by being, to that extent, more objective. But he maintains that interests as the object (or objectives) of our will are not to be confused with material or other objects by means of which interests are satisfied. That is to say, "no material object can constitute an interest, but only the satisfaction of its possession or use."³⁶⁴ It seems, then, that interests are the objectives of the will and that they are largely subjective in nature. It is this sense which MacIver must have in mind when he contends that "by interest

we shall always mean some object which determines activity; and "the interests of men. . . are the source of all social activity."³⁶⁵

MacIver's use of interest as the object of an attitude is contained in his article, "Interests", and is specifically elaborated to make clear his departure from the school which treats subjective interests as motives.³⁶⁶ He notes that Ratzenhofer, Small, Ross, Ellwood, and Hayes have given essentially psychological definitions of the term and have drawn up lists, the crudity of which is obvious. Not only is the attempt to explain social phenomena as expressions or embodiments of specific interests unsuccessful, but a greater difficulty is said to lie in the use of the term "interest" to denote at once the subjective phenomena of motivation and the objective phenomena.

For this reason MacIver has proposed that a clear distinction should be drawn between attitudes or states of consciousness, on the one hand and interests, or the objects toward which these states are directed on the other. . . . If the term interests is used with this objective significance as the correlative of attitudes, the concept becomes particularly useful in the explanation of the growth and change of social organization.³⁶⁷

It is apparent that MacIver intends the term "interest" to be objective in nature and to denote only the object of an attitude. He is thus in some difficulty if attitudes, as many maintain, can be held about concepts, ideas, or anything immaterial which is subjectively entertained. Most motivational theories seem to imply that the concrete object (goal) which constitutes the desired and direction giving state of affairs, is external to the individual, and hence objective. But it is also implied that a subjective image

of the object exists and is included as an aspect of the motive itself. Thus the image of the satisfying state of affairs which will relieve (or in some cases perpetuate) tension, is necessary before general and specific energies can be channelled into a disposition known as a motive. MacIver's failure to allow for this subjective aspect makes more confusing an already ambiguous literature on motivation.

MacIver's use of the interest concept in the paragraphs which immediately follow his definition occasions some alarm. His position requires that whenever "interest" appears there also is an attitude. But there is absolutely nothing more said about the kinds and direction and intensity of the attitudes supposed to accompany the references to the mere objects of such attitudes. Statements such as the following are rather meaningless if the interests (objects of attitudes) are not specified and if the nature of the accompanying attitude is not indicated. Little is gained, especially in the second example, by attributing "objects of attitudes" to particular localities without saying something about the supporting attitudes.

With the advance of civilization interests are organized in particular associations, and in this way become more specialized, defined and limited. . . . The attribution of interests to localities, the principle on which the system of representative government has been built, has diminishing significance.³⁶⁸

In the statement quoted above, "the attribution of interests. . .," more than an object of an attitude seems to be implied. The usage suggests "concerns" or "advantages". In fact interest often appears to be used in the rather distinct sense as a group pursuing some common cause or advantage.

In an industrialized society with its division of labor and its opportunity for widened contacts every interest of any proportions establishes an organization for its promotion. Many quite limited and selective interests are enabled to draw their scattered adherents into personal and impersonal relations over greater areas. . . .³⁶⁹

In his succeeding books on sociology, MacIver continues to employ interests and attitudes as correlative. He illustrates his position by listing such terms as "fear", "love", and "surprise" in one list, and terms such as "enemy", "friend", and "discovery" in another.

Terms in the first group connote attitudes; those of the second, interests. The former signify subjective reactions, states of consciousness relative to objects; the latter signify the objects relative to the subjective reaction. . . . Until we relate interest to attitude or attitude to interest the situation itself remains undefined.³⁷⁰

In this statement, MacIver makes it clear that the term "interest" as the correlative of attitude cannot be employed without implying some sort of attitude. An actual behaviour situation is known only when we know both the attitude, "the mode of consciousness" and the interest, "the object of consciousness". But the object does not have to be "objective". The object (interest) is not merely a material or external fact: "It is anything, material or immaterial, factual or conceptual, to which we devote our attention."³⁷¹

There are various implications involved in this position. In the first place, he has forsaken the attitude-as-subjective, interest as objective, distinction which he clearly intended in his earlier statement. He therefore falls into the same confusion which he earlier attributes to Small and others who employ the same term "interest" to

denote both objective and subjective phenomena. In the second place, if interest is used in his sense as the object of an attitude alone, interests are only objects and can exist only upon the demonstration that an attitude exists. This means that MacIver cannot employ interest in the sense of being subjectively interested in something, or having an interest in something. All relationships involving interest in a subjective, dispositional sense, and as attention, and as a feeling, are excluded by the nature of his definition. There is simply no interest relationship in its own right. Interest exists only as an object, and only as an object of an attitude.

The only consistency in MacIver is the manner in which he consistently neglects to abide by the conditions which he has built into his definition.³⁷² In the quotation above, MacIver uses interest as an object to which attention is devoted. This can be the case if attention is attracted or drawn out only in the process of exhibiting an attitude.³⁷³ In illustrating the interdependence of attitudes and interests in the paragraph immediately following his definition, MacIver succeeds in violating his definition.

[I]f we say that a person is interested in law or in religion or in the stock market we do not reveal the attitude that attends the interest. . . . [A]ll have an interest in the law.³⁷⁴

Of course we do not reveal the attitude by mentioning its object. But far more serious is the fact that by definition, we could not say that a person is interested in any of these things. It is strange to speak of people having an object in the law, and rather unjust to common and technical usage, without good argument, to rule out the possibility of people having an interest in the law or in any-

thing else. Examples of this variety of inconsistency abound in MacIver's book. His definition of a self-limited interest is a case in point.

His interest in you was a self-limited interest, the kind of interest a man has in any object from which he derives a private gain.³⁷⁵

Furthermore, his illustrations of self-limited interest are used in the sense in which Weber, Mosca, Pareto, and Mannheim employ self-interest. He implies personal gain or advantage or profit. MacIver's example is that of trade relationships in which both parties are animated alike by self-limited interest.³⁷⁶ When people bargain, the self-limited interest of each is said to be so related that each reaps some advantage from the transaction.

Throughout his book, MacIver makes good sense only when the interest concept involved in any given case is not questioned. Interests as mere objects of attitudes are called upon to perform truly remarkable feats. There is seldom any mention of what kinds of attitudes are intended in any given case where interest is used. And he has made it clear that to speak of the interest without the attitude is to leave the situation undefined. To speak as he does of the common interests of groups being potent spurs to conflict is only so if the attitudes are in conflict, and there is no point in speaking of the objects of attitudes being in conflict without saying something about the attitudes themselves. In most cases he seems to employ the term "interest" as if it were the attitude. Sometimes it appears that interest is the generic term of which the subjective attitude is only an element. On other occasions he draws the distinction but leaves the object to perform a stupendous

role.

[I]t is in terms of interests rather than of attitudes that we can explain the formation and maintenance of associations. Attitudes encourage or discourage but they do not create organizations.³⁷⁷

There are at least two things to be said about this statement. Firstly, the divorce between interests and attitudes is untenable. The attitudes must be there if the interests are present and the interests can be nothing other than the objects of those particular attitudes. Secondly, it is simply inconceivable that the mere object of an attitude can perform a role so much in excess of that which an attitude can perform. Interests as objects of attitudes can do very little without attitudes performing the major function. If MacIver's distinction were actually implemented, it might have some merit. But it is a difficult distinction to follow, and MacIver has nowhere proved equal to the task.³⁷⁸ In fact, as this sense does not seem to be able to stand alone without working in other undisclosed subjective senses of interest, it is probably as well to forget about it.

In the Web of Government, MacIver refuses to define the term "interest" and it is therefore difficult to know whether he intends any continuity between usage here and that set down in earlier works. For the most part, the term "interest" is employed to denote a group united to promote and defend some common advantage or profit or benefit. He speaks of the state being perceived by some as "the mere agency of the dominant interests". He notes the struggle between "power-possessing interests", and he maintains that "the white collar class is squeezed between the demands of other interests." He also makes reference to "the interest

in the common welfare," and observes that "the sum of the desires of particular interests is something quite different from the general interest."³⁷⁹ There is even the suggestion that he is turning full circle to Community, and employing the term "interest" as a basic motivational factor.

[M]en have many different kinds of interest, . . . some of these are universal, in the sense that they are pursued by all men everywhere -- all seek alike the satisfaction of certain elementary needs -- while others are particular, making appeal to some men and not to others.³⁸⁰

The reasons which prompted MacIver to draw the attitude-interest distinction seem to have disappeared. In any event, MacIver does not appear to regard it as a usage worth employing in a discussion of government and politics. Although The Web of Government contains at least four different (and unrecognized) usages of the term "interest", as a group, as that which is to a person's advantage or profit, as attention or the feeling of concern accompanying the attention process, and as a need or basic motive, it is a marked improvement over his earlier works.³⁸¹

CHAPTER V

"INTEREST" IN SOCIOLOGY:

NOTES ON GROUP INTEREST AND CLASS INTEREST

I. The movement from interest to group interest.

One of the most intriguing questions raised by this segment of sociological literature is how any particular author advances from the concept of interest at the individual level to the notion of group interest at the group level. Whether the same phenomenon is denoted at both levels by the term "interest" is the question raised here. In some cases there is more than a suspicion that various senses of "interest" are being employed. This is a serious, though not a completely devastating criticism. Different senses of interest are used at all levels by an alarming number of writers. But in all cases, it is essential to distinguish between senses if there is any importance in discovering what a writer is trying to say and what he is actually saying. If the same term is used to describe different phenomena, there are good grounds for a reformulation of the concept for the purpose of meaningful theorizing. There are good reasons for suggesting alternative terms if ambiguity and inconsistency can be avoided.

In an age when it is fashionable in political science circles to speak of groups having interests, and interest groups pursuing interests, and groups uniting on the basis of common interests, and individuals having interests which can be shared, pursued, and represented, it is not quite as

fashionable, but, I hope, not unimportant, to examine what is thought to be happening in these processes. The sociologist whose investigations raised this problem most directly, Albion Woodbury Small, has been awarded no lasting place in that political science and sociological literature which relates to interests and to groups. A.F. Bentley dismisses Small after a careful but unsympathetic examination. Bentley's conception of the interest as the activity which constitutes the group leaves no room for individual interests of a dispositional and motivational character. It is apparent that D.B. Truman takes Bentley at his word, for he dismisses Small without any examination. Truman's notion of the interest as the shared attitude likewise seems to foreclose any discussion of individual interests. There can be no such thing as individual's having interests. They can only have attitudes which can be shared in a group or potentially shared in the absence of a group. The possibility of groups having interests is also uncertain. It is the shared attitude which itself constitutes the group. It may be that there can be neither individual nor group interests but only interest groups. It is in Small's work that the uneasy relationship between individual and group interest is most forcibly illustrated. Part of the argument in the following section will be to show that in spite of everything else, there is much in Small's writing worth saving.

A. Individual interests as basic motivational factors.

It was argued at considerable length in the last chapter that Small outlines a number of different notions of interest. The problem of selecting a conception of interest in order to follow Small through from the individual

to the group is a necessarily hit-and-miss enterprise. In his view, interest is the term used to denote an unsatisfied capacity corresponding to an unrealized condition plus a predisposition to realize the potentially satisfying condition. He then argues that interest can denote this general relationship or it can denote the subjective desire or it can denote the objective want. He also proposes a scale whereby interest denotes only the basic innate unsatisfied capacity, with the terms "desire" and "want" depicting independent and distinct phenomena.

It is reasonably clear that in a large number of cases Small allows interest as a basic innate motivating factor to stand alone. It is this usage which is relied upon to enable interest in the teleological sense to underpin Baldwin's psychological conception of "interest", Ward's "desire" as the basic motive in all human activity, and Dewey's notion of interest in the pedagogic sense. Interest, to Small, represents something far more deeply ingrained in human nature than any of these things, something beneath and beyond the facts of consciousness. It is interest which impels, which motivates all behaviour, whether the actor is aware of its presence or not. Yet this notion of interest is expected to square with the view of the "interest", whether business, agriculture, labour, or whatever. How is it possible for Small to speak of a "group interest" using this sense of interest? A very simple device seems to be relied upon to vouchsafe this transformation.

Persons form groups, because inborn interests push them towards association in place of individual isolation, and also stimulate antagonisms to other associations. . . . [T]he social process is a con-

tinual formation of groups around interests, and a continual exertion of reciprocal influence by means of group action.³⁸²

In this unlikely kind of circumstance, the group interest might be said to be the inborn interests of members who find themselves compelled to join a particular group. Thus the group interest would be the unsatisfied capacity of the individual writ large, the motivational factor which would then impel the group in a quest for the other side of the coin, the unrealized condition. It is difficult to believe that Small actually thinks that this is the way things happen. But he does speak in places as if the sense of interest as an individual motive is in fact the same kind of thing which operates in, and activates a group. He maintains that "rigorous analysis of interests traces out the kind of aggressive impulse that activates the group. . . ." ³⁸³ He also contends that individuals and groups have interests which are quite distinct from the interests of others. It is also pointed out that "each has some degree of impulse to assert these interests in spite of others." ³⁸⁴ Thus he can argue that the whole life process, whether viewed in its individual or social phase, "is at last the process of developing, adjusting, and satisfying interests."

The point is that it is possible to find evidence that Small moves directly from the individual to the group level with the concept of interest as a basic unsatisfied capacity which impels all conduct. It is equally clear that this position is at best extremely doubtful in the light of known empirical evidence on instinct theory and on the process of group formation. The dynamic and purposive nature of group conflict which Small himself forthrightly advances, scarcely

leaves room for the presence of largely unconscious unsatisfied capacities.

That the concept of interest may be a peculiarly individual phenomenon Small emphasizes time and again. The human individual is said to be a variation of the sixfold interests. The social process is spoken of as a resultant of reactions between the six interests primarily in their permutations within the individual and secondarily in their permutations between individuals. There is thus the faint suggestion that interest may not be a term applicable at the group level at all.

In a word, the whole social process is a perpetual reaction between interests which have their lodgement in the individuals who are in contact.³⁸⁵

The only real evidence that Small may have seriously held this position is given in his comment on Spencer's view that "there is not a representation of individuals, but a representation of interests." This, Small exclaims, is a tautology; interests are essentially individual.

All human interests are primarily individual interests. . . . Interests that are more than individual get that plus character, not by differing in kind from individual interests, but by being permutations of individual interests.³⁸⁶

And so it is, Small continues, that there is no way to represent interests without representing or misrepresenting the individuals in whom the interests are found. This position is nowhere consistently urged by Small, but it does indicate his reluctance to speak of a group interest as anything more than a number of individual interests. It also opens the possibility that a group interest may be something quite different from the innate unsatisfied capacity of the individual unit.³⁸⁷

In Small's major writings, the group concept is almost as widely employed as the interest concept and it is scarcely less ambiguous. The term "group", Small informs the reader, is a social designation "for any number of people, larger or smaller, between whom such relations are discovered that they may be thought of together." The term "group" is said to be merely a handle to grasp "the innumerable varieties of arrangements into which people are drawn by their variations of interest."³⁸⁸ It seems clear that individual interests provide the basis upon which groups are formed and that there is such a thing as a group interest.

The conflict of interests between individuals, combined with community of interests in the same individuals, results in the grouping of individuals between whom there is relatively more in common, and then the continuance of struggle between group and group.³⁸⁹

The most commonly used sense of interest in Small's work is the notion of the unsatisfied capacity (desire) in conjunction with the unrealized and potentially satisfying condition (want).³⁹⁰ Apparently individuals who experience the same interests (desires plus wants) are drawn together by the realization that they share these desires and potentially satisfying states of affairs.³⁹¹ They form a group. The group membership is then characterized by a common unsatisfied capacity and by the prospect of a common satisfying condition. But the group as a group is neither an unsatisfied capacity nor a satisfying state of affairs. It is a group, that is, a number of individuals. People do not simply join groups and by that process alone obtain satisfaction for unsatisfied capacities. Rather the group

engages in some activities the pursuance of which ideally brings satisfaction to the individuals so united. In other words, the group attempts to realize the unsatisfied conditions which Small believes constitutes the objective aspect of the interest relationship. If the integrity of the relationship of correspondence between unsatisfied capacity and unrealized condition can be upheld, then there are grounds for speaking of the unrealized conditions which the group promotes as the interest in the same sense in which Small sometimes calls the unrealized condition corresponding to the individual's unsatisfied capacity the interest. That is to say, if the group is based on common unsatisfied capacities and struggles to realize conditions which explicitly correspond to these capacities, then the group occupies the same function as the individual as the container of capacities and the realizer of conditions. If the group seals the relationship between capacities and conditions, thus maintaining the integrity of the correspondence between these aspects of the same thing, then the group interest is of the same character as the individual interest only at a different level.

This seems to be the best that can be made of Small's position utilizing this particular sense of interest. The use of group interest, however, hinges on the tenability of Small's correspondence between inner capacity and outer condition on the individual level. That Small does intend some kind of correspondence or even identity between the subjective and objective elements seems clear.

First, the human individual is a variation of the sixfold interests, i.e., desires (subjective) and second, the conditions of human satisfaction consist of variations of the sixfold interests, i.e., wants (objective).³⁹²

It has been argued earlier that this asserted identity is simply not tenable.³⁹³ To be able to speak sensibly of the subjective aspect and the objective aspect constituting a relationship called an interest, the subjective aspect would not only have to imply a specific condition (state of affairs), but would need to be in an existing and enduring relationship with a specific condition. Small's subjective and objective categories are much too broad, general, and unspecified for that to be possible. The health capacity may desire health, but many things go to make up health just as many kinds of unhealthy unsatisfied capacities may arise. There is a vague sense in which a toothache implies a dentist's drill, a pregnancy implies a midwife or an abortionist, and a heart attack implies heart attack pills. It might be very generously allowed that the interest may be the unsatisfied capacity plus the specific thing which regularly satisfied it. But to speak loosely of health (capacity) equals health (condition) is to talk nonsense. The world is just too complicated to be related in this fashion. The case of the wealth (capacity) desiring wealth (conditions) is no more permissible. People exhibit many differing kinds of wealth desires and presumably there are an equal number of kinds of wealth available. But there are many more ways or activities which are wealth producing. How do individuals with wealth capacities decide whether they will engage in milling, labouring, agriculture, banking, sugar manufacturing, or whatever? Unless each individual has a capacity plus a built-in predisposition to engage in a specified activity, and Small really never says quite that much, there seems to be no way of discovering the kind of activity to be engaged in on the basis of a wealth capacity alone.

What then does Small mean when he speaks of a group interest? He notes that individuals have various desires (capacities) in varying quantity and intensity and that groups emerge when individuals with similar desires come together. Individuals are said to have more in common with other group members than they have with individuals outside their group. In certain portions of his work, Small seems capable of extricating himself from any suggestion of crude determinism. He argues that members of a dairy association may be divided in health programmes between Christian Science and Mormonism. In respect to social impulses, they may divide between Republican, Democratic, Populist, Prohibitionist, and Socialist Labour parties. They may likewise divide in respect to knowledge on a variety of publications and extension facilities, and in respect to Rightness among scores of religious connections, lodges, and fraternal organizations. This is all that is meant by multiple-group membership, but if there is no necessary relation between unsatisfied capacity (desire) and unrealized condition (want), the group interest must be thought to lie somewhere outside the confines of this relationship.

The unrealized condition, that is, the satisfying state of affairs, must hold the key. Individual's perceptions of similar desires (unsatisfied capacities) leads to group formation. The group is the means to be employed in the quest for satisfying states of affairs. But as these states of affairs are not explicitly implied in the nature of the similar desires, they must be canvassed and sought out. The individuals in a group must make up their minds not only on what the state of affairs should be, but also on how likely it is that it can be realized given the existing and

potential resources of group members. It is unlikely that there will be one final state of affairs. Small's group conflict notion is too fierce and prolonged for that. It is probable that many different kinds of states of affairs will be required from time to time in any of the different groups which Small mentions. If any given state of affairs of any given group at any given time is the condition to be realized, it is a variable, changing, and uncertain thing which must be decided upon, discussed, and pursued in existing circumstances through the best use of available means. What the group does, therefore, is engage in various kinds of activity in an attempt to realize states of affairs which in some fashion satisfy the desires of individual group members. The notion of purpose, or common purpose, is the term most often used by Small to describe what the group pursues once united, that is, the interest of the group. There is a considerable amount of evidence in Small's work to support this interpretation of his position.

The interests that lodge in the individuals who compose a state sooner or later prompt those individuals to form groups within the state, in promotion of common purposes, by offense and defense against opposing or retarding interests. [T]he purpose of party (group) policy is accordingly given by the fact that the group came into existence. This purpose can be no other than practical assertion of the idea which forms the rallying point of the group. . . .; [a] cardinal sociological factor is the group idea, purpose, selfishness, interest, or animus.³⁹⁴

The group interest in this sense is neither an innate unsatisfied capacity nor a derived disposition in the sense which Small uses the term on the individual level. Nor is the group interest an unrealized condition which directly

corresponds to, that is to say, is specifically implied in, the unsatisfied capacities of group members. The group interest seems to be a desired state of affairs which is visualized by group members, decided upon, and formulated in terms of a common purpose. It is expected that the state of affairs pursued in common will in some measure satisfy the various unsatisfied desires of group members.³⁹⁵

It is Small's view that people pursuing "identical or similar purposes" usually recognize themselves as constituting a body in society, "distinguished by their interest" from the rest of society. He argues that such people will likely keep this interest in mind and stimulate in one another attention to it. What the interest as a common purpose becomes in Small's way of thinking is to be contrasted with his naive statement of the "agricultural interest" being the same thing as an innate unsatisfied capacity. It is his contention that people in the same vocation join together "with the common purpose of procuring modifications or additions to the formal law of the state, which will be favourable to their vocation", and "to procure administrative action which will place them on a more favourable level as compared with other occupations."³⁹⁶ The common purpose is to seek through legislation and administrative action certain changes which will be advantageous or profitable to the occupations of group members, and which will presumably safeguard the conditions upon which these occupations are based.

The desired state of affairs which group members seek is sometimes spoken of in terms of a claim which the group makes on the larger society. Small maintains that the first step which a faction must take in allying itself with other factions is the

more or less explicit concession of some portion of its claims to the counter claims of the other factions. By thus sacrificing a less important margin of its interest, the faction is able to make common cause with other factions equally bent with itself upon gaining some important remainder of interest.³⁹⁷

To Small, the social problem par excellence is to instill in each group a genuinely judicial attitude toward the basis of its own claims in order to replace the existing partisan attitude. Otherwise unresolved conflict prevails, "an interest is urging its claims, and everywhere a competing interest refuses to listen."³⁹⁸

There is another side of Albion W. Small which sits fairly well with this interpretation of the group interest as the state of affairs pursued as a common purpose and in terms of which claims are made on society. This is his view that conduct is basically self-interested, that is, conduct is guided by the individual's sense of what is to his advantage (profit, welfare, good). A statement was quoted earlier in which "selfishness" is used as a synonym for "idea", "purpose" and "interest". One basic difficulty in society, Small urges, is that all men are stimulated "by each one's appraisal of his own good."³⁹⁹ Each group is said to seek to have its group selfishness appear in the guise of public spirit. Besides "the impulse in the special interest of the group", Small notes that every group activity has some bearings on other more general interests. A group is led to proclaim "that its aim is essential to the general good, if not identical with the general good." Group programmes are often ambiguous and confusing. It is such ambiguity, he contends, which is the ambush "from which special interests assail common interests."⁴⁰⁰

In this view, group members attempt in combination to realize certain states of affairs which they could not achieve individually and which are advantageous to them in terms of maintaining or enhancing the positions in society which they enjoy, and which, in turn, serve to satisfy one or a number of more or less basic desires. If the desired state of affairs, that is, the purpose (interest), is the same thing as that which is advantageous to group members, then Small's view is basically the same as those to be examined in the next section.

Small's view of an interest as an unsatisfied capacity (desire) at the individual level bears no direct relation to his notion of a group interest. His statement that interest includes a correspondence between an unsatisfied capacity and an unrealized condition is too vague and general to be useful at all. But there is a kind of correspondence between the unsatisfied capacities of individuals and the kinds of states of affairs hoped for through group action. There is also a kind of correspondence between the unrealized condition which is said to be an aspect of an interest at the individual level and the notion of an interest at the group level. It is this unrealized condition which each group member formulates from his own perspective and which is argued by each group member as the state of affairs which ought to be attained by collective action, and which the group purpose or aim ought to embody. The notion of a group interest is a variable thing which grows out of individual interaction and argument in circumstances which are never uniformly perceived and never completely predictable. A group interest is a purpose or objective which is formulated in the pers-

pective of advantageous states of affairs and in terms of which claims are made on society.

In the theoretical work of Albion Small and others of the so-called psychological school, it appears that different phenomena are denoted by the term "interest" at the individual and at the group level. There are some grounds for considering the use of the term "interest" at the individual level to denote either a desire or a state of affairs or a specified relationship between a desire and a satisfying state of affairs. It would then be possible to speak of a group of individuals having a group purpose or objective in the sense of a commonly sought state of affairs without using the notion of a group interest at all.⁴⁰¹

B. Interest as that which is to a person or group's advantage.

Those who speak primarily of interest in the common language usage as that which is to the advantage (profit, welfare) of a person or a group, seldom discuss "group interest" in any systematic fashion, and rarely outline the steps involved in advancing from individual interest to group interest. As interest is expressed as that which is to the advantage of a "person or a group", presumably there are no difficulties involved.

Max Weber frequently mentions instances of individual interest. He notes that material reward and social honour both appeal to personal interests. His most common references are to individual economic interests, as when the leaders of a state "exploit their political domination in their own economic interest."⁴⁰² Weber holds that interests of self-esteem and prestige, along with material and ideal interests,

are basic in explaining the conduct of men. In moving to the group level, as when he speaks of the special interests, property interests, and agricultural interests, the implication is that individuals are united to more effectively pursue certain states of affairs which are perceived to be to their individual advantage and profit. In other words, this ordinary language use of interest lends itself to an easy and straightforward transfer from the individual to the group level. The group interest is not some indivisible thing which belongs to a group as a reified entity or sentient being. The interest is rather that satisfying state of affairs which organized individuals can promote and which will prove advantageous to them. Weber argues that attaining political office, power, and remuneration are interests or conditions which are materially and spiritually satisfying to party leaders and to members of the party organization.⁴⁰³ Such conditions satisfy individuals, and they can be pursued more effectively in an organized collective manner.

The notion of the "vested interests" held by Karl Mannheim and Talcott Parsons is that of a group privileged in respect to position, power, wealth, and status in a social system. This usage provides an example of the uncomplicated movement from individual to group. Individuals who have vested interests in position, status, and wealth, insofar as advantage and profit derive from these factors, may join together to defend and promote conditions or states of affairs upon which their privileges depend. There is a suspicion that the term "vested interests" is more commonly a device for classifying the privileged by outsiders, and so may not involve any co-ordinated action or organization

by those thought to be privileged.

R.M. MacIver's definition of a group interest does not touch on the question of an individual interest, but it seems to imply that the same sense may also be employed at the individual level.

When a number of men unite for the defense, maintenance or enhancement of any more or less enduring position or advantage which they all possess alike or in common, the term interest is applied to the groups so united and to the cause which unites them.⁴⁰⁴

It is clear from this statement that the interest at the group level is the cause pursued by all members so united. The cause seems to be those states of affairs which defend, maintain, or enhance an enduring position or advantage. MacIver does not specify the individual element but presumably the desire to defend and maintain a position or advantage is held by each individual as his own interest. But as MacIver does not treat individual interests in the body of his article in this sense of personal advantage, it may be that "interest" applies only to the group and to the cause which unites the members. If this is his position, and it is doubtful in view of his definition, it would provide another instance of the usage initiated by Gumplowicz and followed by Bentley and Truman.

C. Interest as the object of an attitude.

MacIver's general position seems to be that an attitude signified a subjective reaction or state of consciousness which always exists in relation to an object which is called an interest.⁴⁰⁵ It is emphasized that an actual behaviour situation is revealed only when the attitude as made of consciousness and the interest as object of consciousness are both

known and accounted for. It is said to be impossible to speak of an interest without implying some kind of attitude. Every fact of experience involves a relationship between experiencing subject and experienced object or, what amounts to the same thing, a relation of attitude and interests."⁴⁰⁶

MacIver's distinctions between exclusive and inclusive interests and between like and common interests are apparently relevant at the group level. Interests which are exclusive to one individual as against others are said to be dividing or self-limited. When viewed in the group context, they are exclusive to one group as against others and are group-limited. Harmonious interests and common interests are the types which characterize the uniting or inclusive interests. Now it is MacIver's contention that attitudes can be harmonious but never common. People can experience like pains and like attitudes but they can never have a common attitude any more than they can have a common pain. The subjective element is always individualized. On the other hand, people can have common interests in the same sense as they can have common possessions.

The like is what we have distributively, privately, each to himself; the common is what we have collectively, what we share without dividing up. . . . [w]e shall speak of like interests when two or more persons severally or distributively pursue a like object, each for himself, and of common interests when two or more persons seek a goal or objective which is one and indivisible for them all, which unites them with one another in a quest that cannot be resolved merely into an aggregate of individual quests.⁴⁰⁷

MacIver sees the primary group as the simplest and most universal of all forms of association. Most pursuits, he emphasizes, are more keenly appreciated, enhanced, and more ardently followed when they are shared by a congenial

group. It is apparent that in MacIver's writing the interest as the object of an attitude can be denoted by such terms as "goal", "objective" and "pursuit". It is the interest as object which may bring members into a group and which is presumably the state of affairs pursued by the group. The interest as mere object is the same at the individual and group levels. But to say this is really to say very little. An interest is set down as an object and is devoid of any subjective aspects. It is always merely the end product, the focus of subjective components called attitudes. It is only the kind and character of attitudes which focus on various objects, which may be dissociative or associative, which may be lightly or keenly held, that can tell us very much worth knowing about a group and what it pursues. MacIver's notion of interest as the object of an attitude allows a relatively uncomplicated transfer from individual to individual within a group context, but it does so at the expense of being virtually without significance.

A prime example of this difficulty appears in his discussion of interests and associations. Individuals are said to become members of an association by virtue of particular attributes or qualifications corresponding to the particular object for which it is organized. That is, we profess some faith or cultivate an art or pursue some kind of knowledge, or run some kind of business, "and find it desirable or advantageous to join with others in so doing."⁴⁰⁸ In the first place, it is these attributes and qualifications which are of primary importance. The object of an association will be contingent on the kinds of attitudes held by the kinds of members uniting. To allow the object the focal role

is to miss the point. Surely the object as interest could range widely both within a religious faith and between religious faiths. In MacIver's own words, the behaviour is unknown until the character of the attitude supporting the object is fully disclosed. In the second place, there is the suggestion that it is a concern for personal advantage, and an attempt to realize conditions through association which will enhance this advantage, which provides the incentive for association. And this is a rather different sense of interest.

Interests alone, in MacIver's account, explain little about what groups do. He does not rely on attitudes which appear to be the key to his position. It is this weakness which leads him to make incredible statements concerning the role that interests can perform.

[I]t is in terms of interests rather than of attitudes that we can explain the formation and maintenance of associations. Attitudes encourage or discourage but they do not create organizations.⁴⁰⁹

II. The movement from interest to class interest.

The concept of class interest has remained vague primarily because of the ambiguity of its constituent elements. Two unknowns have seldom been known to yield a known. It is a concept which most commonly appears in a taken-for-granted sense. It is argued in this section that for the most part, class interest is used primarily to refer to anything which is to the advantage, profit, or welfare of a class of people, whatever the criterion of class employed. But it is extremely difficult in most cases to be confident that the author's intentions are being fairly presented. In some cases, as with Mannheim, the author leaves both terms ambiguous and

undefined. At other times, as with Weber, the notion of class is clearly set out but the concept of interest is vague and variously used. In the case of Albion Small the interest concept is set out with rare frequency, but it remains ambiguous, as does the undefined notion of class.

A. Individual interests as basic motivational factors.

In Small's frequent use of class interest, the previous argument relating to his movement from interest to group interest is decidedly relevant. In his terminology, "class" differs little if at all from his notion of group, with the exception that class implies a more specifically occupational basis.⁴¹⁰ It is reasonably certain that the interest mentioned in the context of class refers to the unrealized conditions which certain individuals hope to realize through collective action. "Class interest" does not refer to a basic unsatisfied capacity which is somehow the property of a class, but rather to states of affairs which are thought to be to the advantage or profit of individuals because their realization will satisfy basic desires.

In following Ratzenhofer's guideline of typical interests in the state, Small combines a discussion of class interests with his comments on pecuniary interests.⁴¹¹ The very broadly conceived pecuniary interest is said to be that which each man has in adding to his possessions. Thus individuals who make gains from the same occupation are naturally hostile as "their interests invade the same fields of satisfaction." In order to bring together such scattered and hostile persons "to form class groups, with group interests that will organize the primarily individual interests", some political diversion is required.⁴¹² Individuals so

situated must be stimulated by some common interest, national, creedal, local, or whatever, to group them into clusters with similar group reactions to other clusters. In this view, class is a more or less artificial grouping based on the incessant antagonism of the pecuniary interests of the members. It is Small's contention that class groups are not easily formed, and that once formed, are not easily held together. Classes are based quite simply on the eight gainful occupations. Antagonism within classes easily leads to further subdivisions within each occupational category.⁴¹³

Small sometimes implies that "class interest" relates primarily to economic position and material advantage. As an example of an attack on a class interest, Small notes the threat to the landowning class if importation supplies raw materials to such an extent that rents fall. He speaks of "economic self-interest" in the context of classes, and the expression "economic class interest" is frequently used. It is Small's view that government interference in the management of economic affairs in wartime unsettles the mind of each economic class about the "permanent relations of government to its peculiar interests." In such cases where economic considerations become involved in politics "there is the danger of turning parties, and the administration that is the government for the time being, into tools of conflicting class interests."⁴¹⁴

Apparently the interests of a class may not be straightforward and obvious to those concerned. Small places himself in basic agreement with Adam Smith in the contention that "while the interests of the order that lives by wages are also intimately dependent upon the interests of society

in general," the members of that order seldom know how "to represent their own interests." Small believes that under the liberating and educating conditions provided by democracy, wage-earners will exert a greater influence in molding social institutions "according to the dictates of their interests. In future litigation of class interests, labor is bound to be better represented than in the past."⁴¹⁵

B. Interest as that which is to a person or group's advantage.

In Weber's well-known definition of class, it is the individual's economic interest, that is, the individual's perception of his own material advantage, which is the basic determinant of his class position. Weber contends that we may speak of "class" or "class situation", when three conditions are satisfied.

(1) A number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, insofar as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets. . . . According to our terminology, the factor that creates "class" is unambiguously economic interest, and indeed, only those interests involved in the existence of the market.⁴¹⁶

He goes on to argue that class situation is actually determined by the kind of property usable for returns and by the kind of skills which can be offered in the market. Interest retains the loose sense of concern about economic advantage or profit which is contingent on the bargaining of different kinds of property or skills in a market situation. "Class situation" roughly corresponds to position in the "market situation."⁴¹⁷ For economic interest to create class, it is implied that individuals in the same

relation in respect to property or skills will act in the market place on the basis of economic self-interest in order to maximize opportunities and income.⁴¹⁸ By so acting, predictable regularities of behaviour are forthcoming which are characteristic of economic action.

A uniformity of acting may be said to be "determined" by the exploitation of the opportunities of his situation in the self-interest of the actor. . . . The dealers in a market thus treat their own actions as means for obtaining the satisfaction of the ends defined by what they realize to be their own typical economic interests. . . .⁴¹⁹

Therefore a person's economic position and a liberal dosage of self-interest in maximizing his opportunities in the market, sets the individual in a class. But the notion of class-interest Weber sees as particularly ambiguous.

[E]ven as an empirical concept it is ambiguous as soon as one understands by it something other than the factual direction of interests following with a certain probability from the class situation for a certain "average" of those people subjected to the class situation.⁴²⁰

By "the factual direction of interests", Weber seems to mean the kinds of activities in which an individual will engage in an attempt to realize his maximum economic advantage given his particular market position and the kinds of goods or skills which he has at his disposal. Weber thinks that the direction in which an individual worker is likely to pursue his economic advantage will vary according to his constitutional capacities, according to whether or not a communal action grows out of the class situation, and depending on whether he believes the communal action (for example, a trade union movement) promises beneficial results. There is no

determinism here. He seems to be saying that class interest is produced by individuals' perceptions of their own economic advantage; that this sense of what constitutes economic advantage may not be uniformly perceived; and that there may be a wide variation in the kinds of action arising from an individual's perception of personal economic advantage.

In Weber's view, "societal action" may result from a class situation, that is, action "oriented to a rational adjustment of interests." On the other hand, the action generated may be "mass action", that is, similar reactions by members of the same class. The sense of economic self-interest may, however, lead individuals in the same class situation into "communal action", that is, "action which is oriented to the feeling of the actors that they belong together." Communal action by the members of a class is said to be "class action". Weber makes it particularly clear that neither communal action nor societal action necessarily arise from any given class situation.

Weber's resort to different types of action blurs the notion of class interest which seems to mean the kinds of things that individuals in a given class situation will actually do in order to realize their economic advantage. As this action may not be uniform, there is to that extent no such thing as "the class interest".⁴²¹ The distinctions drawn among variations of this behaviour, that is, societal action, communal action, and mass action, seem designed to contest the Marxian assertion that classes are never in error concerning the things they ought to be doing and that if all individuals within classes were clear on this, communal action could be predicted.⁴²²

Weber appears to be saying that this is not necessarily the case. Individuals in a given class situation will likely be fairly clear about where their own economic advantage lies, but this may not lead to communal, that is, class action.⁴²³

C. Interest as the object of an attitude.

MacIver does not appear to use the notion of interest as the object of an attitude in his conception of class interest.⁴²⁴ Social classes are rather spontaneous groupings which express social attitudes and which are based primarily on status distinctions.

A social class. . . is any portion of a community marked off from the rest by social status. A system or structure of social classes involves, first, a hierarchy of status groups, second, the recognition of the superior - inferior stratification, and, finally, some degree of permanency of the structure.⁴²⁵

Occasionally the notion of class interest appears, but it seems to be of little consequence for a general understanding of class behaviour. He does note two kinds of class sentiment, competitive class feeling and corporate class feeling. The former is said to express in greater measure "the individual or self-limited interest", while the latter is an expression of "the common interest of the class."⁴²⁶ This conception of competitive class sentiment as a feeling which expresses self-limited interest does not sit well with his notion of interest as a mere object of an attitude. Presumably it is the attitude and not its object which encompasses the feeling and hence directs action. It is no easier to make sense out of corporate class feeling as the expression of the common object (interest) of a class. As it is difficult to conceive of objects being expressed in the sense in which feelings or attitudes may be expressed, it is apparent that class in-

terest as a class sentiment is simply incompatible with his definition of interest. Beyond this, little mention is made of class interest and the discussion turns on attitudes without any comment on the objects towards which they are directed.

It is in the Web of Government that frequent references to class interests are to be found, but the notion of interest relates little if at all to the sense of "object of attitude". The usage of "interest" in this book generally is that which is to the advantage (profit, welfare) of an individual or group. For example, he speaks of group interests as "the jockeying of organized groups for relative advantage." The focus throughout is primarily on the emergence of the multi-group society. When the term "class interest" is used, the conception of interest seems to be that which is to the advantage of the members of a class. It is in terms of class interests that an explanation is sought to account for political parties.

[T]he right is always the party sector associated with the interests of the upper or dominant classes, the left the sector expressive of the lower economic and social classes, and the center that of the middle classes. . . . The opposing principles have broadly corresponded to the interests of the different classes.⁴²⁷

The party system, in MacIver's view, is the democratic translation of the class struggle.

It postulates the rationalization of class interests so that these can make appeals on the grounds of their service to or compatibility with the national interest.⁴²⁸

It is this undefined notion of class interest which informs S.M. Lipset's discussion of elections as the expression of the democratic class struggle. It is Lipset's contention that although parties renounce suggestions of class conflict

and class loyalty, "an analysis of their appeals and their support suggests that they do represent the interests of different classes."⁴²⁹ Lipset admits that MacIver's formulations have set the framework for his schema of left and right voting. The stage is set with the assertion that parties take stands on such left-right issues as political democracy, equality, and social change. Evidence is then presented to demonstrate that in most economically-developed democracies, lower income groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while higher income groups vote mainly for parties of the right. But in the process, the concept of class becomes a rather sterile objective criterion of classification. It is really the individual's sense of economic self-interest, prompted to be sure by primary group associations, which determines voting behaviour.

The simplest explanation for this widespread pattern is simple economic self-interest. The leftist parties represent themselves as "instruments of social change in the direction of equality, the lower-income groups support them in order to become economically better off, while the higher income groups oppose them in order to maintain their economic advantages."⁴³⁰

A classical example of undisclosed and seemingly unrecognized assumptions concerning class interest is provided in the thesis of Robert R. Alford.⁴³¹ He owes much to the general view of voting and class which has been traced in the works of MacIver and Lipset. Alford sets out a series of propositions concerning political parties in the Anglo-American democracies: (1) Political parties in these countries fall along the classic left-right continuum to a greater extent than is the case in most other countries; (2) basic left-right issues such as welfare, the regulation of business and trade unions, arise from "the basic divisions of

class interests in these societies;" (3) in these countries, religious bias gives way to a secular norm in politics, and "secular politics, almost by definition is 'interest' politics. The parties represent loose coalitions of diverse interest groups rather than clearly defined sets of ultimate values."⁴³² It is then assumed that because of a number of specific factors, an association between class and voting is "natural and expected."

[T]he existence of class interests, the representation of these interests by political parties, the regular association of certain parties with certain interests, and the tendency of voters to choose the party historically associated with social groups to which they belong.⁴³³

Alford may be quite correct in what he says. Unfortunately it is difficult to demonstrate error when the basic concepts of interest and class interest are vague and undefined. It is even doubtful if the general notion of class interest as that which is to the advantage of members of a given socio-economic group is a formulation precise enough to support these kinds of propositions.

CHAPTER VI

"INTEREST" IN JURISPRUDENCE

Introduction

In recent years, and especially since the rise of the behavioural movement in the late 1940's, political science has retained only part-time contact with the field of jurisprudence. A reliance on psychology and sociology has largely replaced the grounding in the law which was so evident in the prevailing formalistic and institutional emphasis of a generation ago. The splendid tradition forged by Bodin, Montesquieu, Bentham, Bryce and Jennings, although still active in some measure, has tended to give way to social science oriented approaches. Jurisprudence is not usually regarded as a member of the social science fraternity. Nevertheless, one of the leading and most stimulating movements within this discipline in the present century has been the sociological school of jurisprudence instigated by Rudolf von Jhering and pioneered by Roscoe Pound. It is with this approach that the present chapter deals.

Roscoe Pound resurrected the concept of interest from the earlier work of Bentham and Jhering and gave it a pivotal role in his systematic theory of justice in a sense not unlike Freud's use of the unconscious or Marx's reliance on class. Pound's long insistence that human interests constitute the subject matter of law has won for "interest" a lasting place in jurisprudence literature. It is reasonably safe to say that almost any use of "interest" in jurisprudence is coloured to a great extent by the formula-

tions of Pound.

The major part of this chapter relates to Pound's theory and classification of interests. The more recent focus on group interests by scholars within the Poundian framework is briefly noted. Some emphasis is placed on the "jurisprudence of Interests", the continental movement which found its source also in von Jhering, and which parallels Pound's contribution in the United States.

I. Interest as the general and basic motivational factor: Roscoe Pound.

For almost six decades a persistent but contentious lead was given to American jurisprudence by the learned and formidable figure of Roscoe Pound. Some argue that his university training and doctorate in botany provided him with the flare for classification, a useful though not always precise aspect of his sociological emphasis. After entering the University of Nebraska at the age of thirteen, Pound was to amass a gigantic storehouse of legal knowledge and theoretical insight, kept ever nurtured by a keen and lucid memory. Justice Holmes once confessed that "the number of things that chap knows drives me silly",⁴³⁴ and that it made him tired "to try to remember the titles of what Pound knows."⁴³⁵ Although vastly well-informed, Roscoe Pound was often less than clear and precise in his written formulations. In this respect he was decidedly unlike Justice Holmes whose clarity has been confirmed by Professor Hart. Holmes was sometimes clearly wrong, Hart observes, "but again like Austin, when this was so he was always wrong clearly."⁴³⁶

With Pound it is not only difficult to tell when he is wrong, but it is often difficult to be even vaguely clear on what he is trying to say. Pound never seems to have shared Kant's concern that being in error was nowhere nearly so dangerous as being misunderstood. To the very end of his legal and sociological pronouncements, Pound refused to clarify contentious and ambiguous portions of his doctrine just as he refused to answer the often conflicting interpretations of his work advanced by critics and disciples alike. The basis of Pound's legal contribution is his theory of interests. It is this aspect of his work which perhaps remains most vague and perplexing.

A. The context of Pound's theory of interests.

Pound's sociological jurisprudence is said to be the most comprehensive, coherent, and original philosophy of law produced in the United States.⁴³⁷ It is strongly flavoured with pragmatism of the Jamesian variety and deeply coloured by the social utilitarianism of Rudolf von Jhering.⁴³⁸ It is Pound's opinion that a striking change in jurisprudence was instigated by Jhering when he turned his attention from the nature of law to the purpose of law. Legal doctrines and legal institutions were viewed as creations of the human will to meet human needs. A jurisprudence of realities which worked out legal precepts by testing their practical application was advocated as a replacement for the jurisprudence of concepts which derived legal precepts by logical deduction from principles discovered by historical enquiries.⁴³⁹ Jhering insisted upon an examination of "the interests which the legal system secures rather than upon

the rights by which it secures them."⁴⁴⁰ This notion of a legal right as a legally protected interest provoked Pound into peering behind the shadow of legal rights and precepts in an attempt to come to grips with the significant subject matter of law, the concrete human claims or interests.

Law begins by granting actions. In time we generalize from these actions and perceive rights behind them. But, as the actions are means for vindicating rights, so the rights are means conferred by law for securing interests which it recognizes.⁴⁴¹

In Pound's view, law is merely formal and instrumental. It provides the means whereby human interests can be secured. He strives to perfect an approach which will not, like the earlier conception, divorce jurists from actual life. The focus of sociological jurisprudence is an attempt to enable law-making and the interpretation and application of legal rules to take more intelligent account of the social facts upon which law must proceed and to which it is applied.⁴⁴² Pound continually advocates a move to a higher and more civilized phase of social life which he calls the "socialization of law." He believes that insofar as law is made consciously, it ought to be made intelligently. In Pound's view, previous conceptions of the legal system were predominantly individualistic and emphasized primarily the securing of individual interests (called natural rights). The law at that time was designed to prevent interference with individual self-development and self-assertion insofar as this was consistent with like self-development and self-assertion by others. Pound advocates that individual interests are on no higher plane than social interests and that in fact they derive their significance from a social interest in securing them. The juristic thinking of the past knew of social interests only as the individual in-

terests of the state or sovereign. Pound recommends that emphasis be placed on clarifying the nature and extent of social interests.

[T]he juristic thinking of the present must start from the proposition that individual interests are to be secured by law because and to the extent that they are social interests. There is a social interest in securing individual interests so far as securing them conduces to general security, security of institutions, and the general moral and social life of individuals. Hence while individual interests are one thing and social interests another, the law, which is a social institution, really secures individual interests because of a social interest in so doing.⁴⁴³

Pound insists that the law does not create interests but that they arise outside the law through the competition of individuals with each other, the competition of groups and societies, and the competition of individuals with groups and societies. The task of the law is one of social engineering, of recognizing, securing, and adjusting conflicts between competing interests.

A legal system attains its end by recognizing certain interests, individual, public and social; by defining the limits within which these interests shall be recognized legally and be given effect through rules of law, and by endeavouring to secure the interests so recognized within the defined limits.⁴⁴⁴

B. The concept of interest defined.

Pound's definition of "interest" remains basically unchanged in essentials over the long course of his writing.⁴⁴⁵ However, it is constantly being broadened as he goes on by the addition of new synonymous terms. His definition becomes more expansive and vague as it is stretched to become more complete and all-inclusive. Pound initially sets out interest to mean "a claim which a human being or group of

human beings may make. . . ." ⁴⁴⁶ Very soon interests are defined as "demands of the individual", and it is one of the first tasks of jurisprudence to "ascertain which demands the individual conceivably may make as incident to personality." ⁴⁴⁷ The earlier statement of interest as claim appears in the same article. In his investigation of the interests in the domestic relations, the terms "demand" and "claim" are used interchangeably. ⁴⁴⁸ With the publication of "A Theory of Social Interests", the equation is broadened as interest becomes "a claim, a want, a demand, of a human being or group of human beings which the human being or group of human beings seek to satisfy and of which social engineering in civilized society must therefore take account." ⁴⁴⁹ Two decades later Pound argues that each person has a multitude of desires and demands which he seeks to satisfy. The demands and desires of each are said to be in constant conflict with those of others. Hence the task of social engineering becomes one of making the goods of existence, the means of satisfying demands and desires, go around as far as possible. Interests are said to be "claims or demands or desires", "a demand or desire", and he also speaks of "human claims and wants and desires." ⁴⁵⁰ Pound's reformulation of social interests in 1943 relies on the same terms with the exception of "want". ⁴⁵¹ "Expectation" joins the growing list in a later discussion, and interests appear as "the claims or demands or expectations" which are asserted by individual human beings. ⁴⁵² Pound's final formulation brings together almost all the terms which have stood to define interest at some time or another over the years.

[T]he subject matter of law is those manifestations of internal nature which, in the form of assertion of or seeking to realize individual expectations or claims or wants, require social control. . . . [t]he claims or wants or desires (or, I like to say, expectations) which men assert de facto, and about which the law must do something if organized societies are to endure. . . . [a]n interest may be defined as a demand or desire or expectation which human beings, either individually or in groups or associations or relations, seek to satisfy. . . .⁴⁵³

Pound advances a very broad psychological definition of "interest". Although Pound refuses to have his doctrine linked with any particular psychological theory, Julius Stone rightly believes that interests are nonetheless psychological facts.⁴⁵⁴ Stone goes on to explain that the interest concept in Pound's formulation includes the "double aspect of the subjective feeling of interest and participation, and the objects to which these feelings are directed."⁴⁵⁵ This is probably a fairly accurate rendering of a position which Pound presumably thought required no elaboration. In his final statement quoted above, Pound speaks of interests as the "manifestations of internal nature" which appear in the form of "assertions of or seeking to realize" expectations, etc., and which "affect their relations or determine their conduct." It seems clear from Pound's usage throughout that the internal motivational conditions of seeking and striving are directly related to specific things desired and claimed. Thus Pound's definition can be classified as an instance of those formulations which (a) regard interest as the basic and general motivational factor, and (b) view the motive (interest) as including an explicit subject-object relationship. His definition is therefore exceedingly broad, encompassing all tension states which culminate in

a striving to achieve a particular object or class of objects.⁴⁵⁶ Thus anything wanted or desired or expected as well as the wanting, desiring, and expectation is to be described, in Pound's view, by the term "interest". The subject matter of law is to that extent so broad, changeable, and diversified, as to almost defy limitation.

C. The concept of interest examined: Pound and the critics.

A number of difficulties arise from Pound's grand equation of supposedly synonymous terms; interest = claim = demand = want = desire = expectation. It seems quite in order to ask whether these terms are commonly used interchangeably. On the face of it, there appears to be some difference between expectations and desires (wants).⁴⁵⁷ Desires (wants) usually relate to states of affairs which are associated with physical, mental, and emotional desiring and wanting and towards which a person strives. An individual may desire a great many things which he has no reason to expect and which he may not in fact expect. Expectations usually relate to desired states of affairs which, if realistically informed, the individual has some grounds for expecting. An outcome may be expected because of empirically observed regularities or because of certain logical conclusions derived from the normative standards shared in his society. On the other hand, an individual may have expectations concerning states of affairs which are not desired. A reasonable expectation of a fighting soldier in Asia is that he and some of his friends may perish at the hands of the enemy. In most cases this is not desired.

The term "expectation" is sometimes used in a rather different sense as a goal or purpose. It is said that a student has expectations of becoming a doctor or a prosperous manager of a fertilizer outlet. This sense of "expectation" appears to include a great deal of what is meant when "desire" is used, except that it seems to depict something more long-range and enduring. The first sense of "expectation" relates more nearly to what a person expects will happen under certain conditions and not to that which he desires to happen.

The assertion that "expectations" are the same as "claims" and "demands" is more difficult to maintain. Julius Stone draws the fairly obvious conclusion that the use of "claim" and "demand" as unarticulated, seems self-contradictory, whereas the use of "desire", "expectation", "interest", as unarticulated is not self-contradictory.⁴⁵⁸ On the basis of articulation alone, this seems a valid criticism. It is not to say, however, that desires or expectations may not be articulated. Pound may have meant that all subjective desires (wants, expectations) are expressed as claims (demands). On the other hand, he may have believed that his concern, and the concern of the law, is only with desires which are in fact claimed. In view of Pound's theme that all desires (claims) ought to be heard and evaluated, it is easier to believe that he saw all desires as being in fact claimed. But the belief that all expectations or desires are actually claimed or demanded of others in society assumes a very aggressive, extroverted, and individualistic populace. It is difficult to conceive of every expectation entertained by every person being claimed even most of the time. There is

no doubt that some expectations concerning desired states of affairs are claimed in terms of accepted standards of justice and fair play. Some people probably make claims without feeling the need for any justificatory standards. But many expectations relate to behaviour of the self and others which it makes little sense to claim at all. An expectation that this chapter be completed on schedule can hardly be claimed of anyone, just as an expectation that a son will hit ninety home runs a season in the sand-lot league can scarcely be claimed.

Pound does not appear to be aware that his terms may not be entirely synonymous. He does not allow for the possibility of unclaimed desires, and it is extremely difficult to decide whether or not he would regard such cases as interests. Pound is quite silent on the question of articulation. His theory treats de facto claims (desires) which actually exist in society and which are asserted. It could be presumed that anything not articulated is not asserted, and is by that measure not an interest.⁴⁵⁹ In view of his assumed synonymy of terms, he apparently did not feel that anything was being excluded. On the other hand, if his terms are not synonymous, he may be excluding more than he would have desired (wanted? expected? demanded? claimed? interested?). That the synonyms were as vague as the term "interest" which was being defined never seems to have occurred to Pound.

It is Pierre Lepaulle's contention that Pound meant to include as interests all desires (claims) existing in a given society. His criticism is that a certain class of desires differs from claims; that a claim in Pound's usage is something necessarily conscious, deliberate, and formulated.

In Lepaulle's view, this excludes the unconscious forces or desires of men in society, the class of factors which he believes "play by far the greatest role."⁴⁶⁰

Pound is reasonably clear that interests are those things which people actually desire or expect or claim, and that interests are not what people ought to want in the opinion of outsiders, whether legislators, judges, or philosophers.⁴⁶¹ Stone's warning that the legislator should not confuse his own desires and views of what should be the desires of the subjects with the actual desires of the subjects is well taken in Pound's formulation. But Stone goes further and points to the difficulty of distinguishing articulations by the subjects which express their own desires from those which are the result of manipulations by operators of various sorts.⁴⁶² By de facto desires, Stone means real, genuine, individual desires formulated without external pressure of a nefarious nature. Phoney desires are those which individuals are persuaded to accept and make their own. It is Stone's view that "any degree and kind of conscious legislative stimulation, suppression, diversion or manipulation, strikes at the vitals of Pound's whole theory of justice."⁴⁶³ This is a difficult sort of proposition to meet. It could be said that Stone's conception of man as having real, genuine, desires expressive of his basic nature if environmentally unaffected, is naive and in want of supporting evidence. In the light of certain sociological and psychological theories which stress environmental stimulation, modification, and motivational direction, Stone is probably quite wrong. There is no doubt that Pound fails to consider this kind of question. In the

Poundian position, desires are desires however informed and wherever they originate, insofar as they exist and are asserted. In his view, all interests are valid by the fact that they exist and are pressed. There is nothing in the nature of the thing claimed or in the intensity of the claim which provides a standard whereby its goodness or badness can be measured. All claims are deserving of consideration and will be ruled upon insofar as they can be satisfied with the least friction and sacrifice to the scheme of interests as a whole.

Stone's point is not easily dismissed, however, as it does express a view about the important issue of persuasion and propaganda in mass society. But it does not, as he believes, strike at the vitals of Pound's theory, except insofar as this theory is at heart democratic, whereas Stone's contention tends to deny the unlimited expression of, and attention to, popular opinion however derived and however well-informed. There is simply no evaluative standard built into Pound's notion of interests which could serve to earmark persuaded desires as of questionable pedigree. To provide this sort of criteria, as Stone suggests, is to advance a very different kind of theory of justice.

One persistent theme in Pound's work is that law does not create interests. He feels that there is that much truth in the doctrine of natural rights. The number and variety of interests pressing in society is said to increase with increasing civilization and with general societal progress.⁴⁶⁴ It is Herbert Morris who asks why interests must always be the cause and never the consequence of the legal system. He believes that on the face of it there is a very good case to

be made for the view that the legal system, insofar as it balances the limitless desires and claims pressed by individuals in society, stands a very good chance of creating certain desires in certain individuals. He believes that Pound simply does not consider this possibility.⁴⁶⁵ Morris' point is well taken. Pound is led to his position by his assumption that interests are the kernel of legal rights, and that until interests are pressed, no rights can be forthcoming. He simply does not see the need to discuss the source of desires. In a sense the law creating interests as genuine desires is a rather different thing than the law creating rights which individuals may not desire. It is the latter which Pound wants to discredit. It may also be the case, as Stone implies, that Pound holds a conception of natural man expressing himself only in the absence of all external pressures and guidance.

At various points throughout his work, Pound cautions that "we must not confuse interest as claim, as jurists use the term, with interest as advantage, as economists use it."⁴⁶⁶ He feels that social utilitarians exemplify this confusion insofar as they weigh interests in relation to the end of law conceived as social advantage. Pound is not very convincing in his refutation. In fact, he never really succeeds in drawing out the distinction which he implies.⁴⁶⁷ He seems to believe that the claim itself ought to be examined without consideration of the individual advantage which it is intended to secure. It may be that he does not regard desires or demands or claims as embodying or representing something which is either to the advantage of individual's or society. But the general force and purpose of his theory

seems to belie this interpretation. His most severe stricture is that social utilitarians erroneously assume that social advantage is something taken as given, that it is well understood. Pound rightly insists that this is not the case. Jurisprudence cannot wait, Pound warns, until all are agreed on one philosophy or doctrine of social advantage.⁴⁶⁸ He points to the ambiguous tendencies created by this doctrine in that each individual identifies his individual claim with the public welfare and asserts it in title of social advantage.

It is somewhat surprising that few legal scholars seriously challenge the definition of "interest" which Pound advances.⁴⁶⁹ They choose instead to critically analyze Pound's classification of interests and especially his notion of social interests.

D. The classification of interests.

Pound's method of classifying interests is possibly the least clear and consistent aspect of his entire theory. It is never really apparent upon what basis the classification proceeds. The concern of this section is to investigate in what respects Pound's classification affects his notion of interests, and not with the intricacies of the scheme itself nor with the multiplicity of problems surrounding the weighing and balancing process.

In his earliest statement, Pound outlines three major classes of interests, individual, public and social. By public interests he means "interests of the state as a juristic person", and by social interests he refers to "interests of the community at large."⁴⁷⁰ His "Theory of Social Interests" contains a more complete statement of his position.

So defined, the interests which the legal order secures may be claims or wants or demands of individual human beings immediately as such (individual interests) of the political organization of a society as such, conceived as a person (public interests) or of the whole social group as such (social interests).⁴⁷¹

In these statements, the basis of classification rests solely on the claimant, that is, whether the claims are asserted by individuals or by the political organization of society or by the whole social group. A second criterion, and one which Pound utilizes in his later work, is inserted in his reformulation of social interests. Individual interests are claims or demands or desires "involved immediately in the individual life and asserted in title of that life." Public interests are likewise claims or demands or desires "involved in life in a politically organized society and asserted in title of that organization." Pound believes that they are commonly treated as "the claims of a politically organized society thought of as a legal entity." Social interests are viewed as the claims or demands or desires "involved in social life in civilized society and asserted in title of that life." He suggests that they are usually treated as "the claims of the whole social group as such."⁴⁷²

This formulation suggests that it is not only who makes the claim or entertains the desire which acts as the criterion of classification, but equally important is on whose behalf the claim is made. Pound seems to believe that these two criteria are closely related. That is, claims arising in social life will be asserted by the whole social group and will also be asserted on behalf of (in title of) social life. But strictly within the terms of Pound's criteria, it is entirely possible that individuals as well as politically organized society, may assert claims on behalf of social

life. If this is allowed, there is no easy means of classifying such claims. Pound does not seem to give the nature or content of the claim any importance in this respect. Presumably the claim can relate to almost anything and still find its way into one of the three classes of interests. Pound may be suggesting a third criterion in this latter statement. He may be saying that certain types of claims called individual, social, or public are peculiar to certain vaguely delimited spheres of life, that is, individual life or social life or life in a politically organized society. The extreme difficulty of setting meaningful boundaries on the life space of an individual in a society which is politically organized, makes this a questionable means of classifying interests, if, in fact, it is being advanced as a criterion.

The final version of his classification includes the points previously noticed and adds an additional criterion. This statement is at best exceedingly unclear.

Individual interests are claims or demands or desires involved in and looked at from the standpoint of the individual life immediately as such -- asserted in title of the individual life. Public interests are the claims or demands or desires asserted by individuals involved in or looked at from the standpoint of political life -- life in a politically organized society. It is convenient to treat them as the claims of a politically organized society thought of as a legal entity. Social interests are claims or demands or desires, even some of the foregoing in other aspects, thought of in terms of social life and generalized as claims of the social group. They are claims which are involved in the maintenance, the activity and the functioning of society; the wider demands or desires asserted in title of social life and looked at from the standpoint of social life in civilized society.⁴⁷⁵

The new criterion which is presented in this statement concerns the standpoint from which a particular claim is "looked at" or "thought of". It may be that Pound has decided upon a scheme which is flexible enough to be utilized by an observer as his purposes fluctuate. Thus any given claim could be looked at from the standpoint of the individual life or political life or social life and could be inserted in any one of these classes for the time being. If this is the case, it is not very obvious what it means to look at an expectation or desire or demand or claim from the standpoint of a certain kind of life. Nor is it immediately apparent what an observer uses to delimit social life from political life, or individual life from social and political life. In fact, it is not even clear why this should be done at all.

Some faint light is cast on the dilemma by Pound's statement that his classification is really "no more than a convenient teaching device."⁴⁷⁴ Pound seems to feel that the whole business is not worth bothering about in any precise scholarly way. He casually remarks that it has proved of some explanatory value in dealing with systems of law in which private, public, and criminal law are distinguished by the kinds of interests secured. Pound then proceeds to virtually eliminate the need for a classification at all. He argues that it is quite possible to call all interests "individual", "because all are asserted by individuals in some capacity or other." It is equally legitimate, he continues, to call them all "social", "because they are all recognized and secured ultimately to secure the social order."⁴⁷⁵ Pound clearly implies that (a) there is nothing in the nature of any claim which by virtue of content or sphere of life

in which it is involved, sets it apart as falling in one class or another and (b) that there are two distinct ways of looking at claims which really involve no classification at all. Interests are not either individual or social, but they are individual and social at any given time. But Pound goes on to say that interests can also be classified as individual, social, or political insofar as "we may look at them also from the standpoint of the capacity in which they are asserted -- whether in title of individual, political, or social life." Thus, if interests are to be classified, it is to be carried out in terms of "on whose behalf" they are asserted, "for whose benefit" they are claimed.⁴⁷⁶ But the classification is never really a viable concern because the answer to this question is a foregone conclusion. All interests will be regarded as "social" because they are all "recognized and secured ultimately to secure the social order."

This confusing problem of classification will be raised again in the context of certain strictures which legal scholars have levelled against the system. In the meantime, it is appropriate to briefly examine Pound's method of classifying interests and to quickly review the actual kinds of interests included in his scheme.

E. The survey method: individual, social, and public interests.

In arriving at a method whereby interests may be identified and classified in the three-fold scheme outlined above, Pound rejects not only the older deductive method (for example, that used in deriving lists of natural rights), but also more empirically based social-psychological formulations

of instincts and basic tendencies. He decides upon a survey technique. Legal phenomena are viewed as social phenomena. The lawyer can survey legal systems "to ascertain just what claims or wants or demands have pressed or are now pressing for recognition and satisfaction and how far they have been or are recognized or secured."⁴⁷⁷ The survey, however, does not proceed by setting out rigorously tested and logically integrated questions which respondents are then invited to answer. The survey consists in Pound spending countless laborious hours examining various facets of the positive law in Anglo-American systems. With the three main classes of interests vaguely formulated, Pound classifies such interests as he finds in sustained case law, unrepealed legislation, proposed case law, proposed legislation, judicial hearings and decisions, and general proposals for legal change.⁴⁷⁸ In the course of this examination, he no doubt encountered decisions and proposals which expressed valuations about what the legal system ought to be providing, as well as numerous specific instances of justifications provided for actual legislative and judicial decisions. Out of this mass of detail, Pound extrapolates the interests which he thinks people in the society under examination have pressed for and are currently pressing for. He nowhere sets out the criteria used in the infinite number of judgments which he was surely called upon to reach in deciding what kinds of interests are involved in any given case. Because the basis of his three-fold classification is so ambiguous at the outset, and because the procedure of classifying interests is so infinitely subjective, a great many of the difficulties encountered in discussing the completed system

of interests can be regarded as the outcome of his crude methodological approach.

The uneasy and indeterminate relation between individual, social, and public interests appears in Pound's detailed practical studies. But few clues are provided whereby Pound's methodological considerations can be more easily understood.

1. Individual interests.

His classification of individual interests includes:

A) Interests of personality, with the sub-headings, (1) physical person, (2) honour (reputation) and (3) belief and opinion; B) Individual interests in the domestic relations, which incorporates, (1) interests of parents, (2) interests of children, (3) interests of husbands, and (4) interests of wives; C) Interests of substance, which include property, freedom of industry and contract, promised advantage, advantageous relations with others, freedom of association, and continuity of employment.⁴⁷⁹ The criterion used in distinguishing individual interests is not easy to locate. The categories are so broad that it is difficult to see how any particular claim has been sorted into the proper place. The interests are clearly asserted by individuals, but this is said to characterize social and public interests as well. It is more probable that the criterion used is that these are the very general kinds of things which individuals have desired and demanded on behalf of, and in order to maintain, individual privacy and relatively unfettered determination of their personal lives. The types of claims, in a very general way, relate to individualistic concerns growing out of the so-called private sphere of life.

2. Social interests.

Pound's classification of social interests is much more detailed and elaborate. There is some evidence that the vague criterion for recognizing social interests gives way to the more practical criterion of public policy. The term "public policy" refers to "social interests which we feel the law ought to, or which in fact the law does, secure in delimiting individual interests and establishing legal rights."⁴⁸⁰ In Pound's opinion the whole body of the common law is made up of compromises of conflicting individual interests in which social interests have been turned to, frequently under the name of "public policy", to determine the limits of a reasonable adjustment. Now because social interests have been conceived as public policies and not as interests, Pound believes that they have been rarely resorted to and only apologetically recognized. In the more individualistic days of jurisprudence, Pound argues, individual interests (as individual rights) were the prime concern in the making and adjudication of law. The need for an explicit detailed theory of social interests is premised on the belief that the vague notion of public policy which existed in the past was too ill-defined and mistrusted to properly safeguard the realization of most of the social interests. In his final statement on social interests, Pound reiterates his view that (a) social interests in the common law have usually gone by the name of public policies, and that (b) it is important to recognize social interests as such instead of thinking of them in terms of policies.⁴⁸¹

Pound's scheme of social interests includes, in the first place, the social interest in general security. There are

five forms of this claim or demand of the social group to be secure against forms of action and courses of conduct that threaten its existence: (1) interest in the general safety, (2) interest in general health, (3) interest in peace and public order, (4) interest in the security of acquisitions, and (5) interest in the security of transactions. In the second place stands the social interest in the security of social institutions, the claim or demand of civilized society that its fundamental institutions be secure. The three forms of this interest include: (1) an interest in the security of the domestic institutions, (2) religious institutions, and (3) political institutions.⁴⁸² Pound sets out as the third category, the social interest in the general morals, the claim or want of society to be secured against acts offensive to the moral sentiments of the individuals in a given society at a given place and time. In the fourth place, there is the social interest in the conservation of social resources. This involves the use and conservation of natural resources as well as the protection and training of dependents and defectives. The fifth category is headed by the social interest in general progress, the claim or want of society that the development of human powers and of human control over nature for the satisfaction of human wants go forward. The three forms of this interest include (1) an interest in economic progress, (2) in political progress, and (3) in cultural progress. Closely related to the latter is a social interest in aesthetic surroundings. In the sixth place stands the very important social interest in the individual life. This is the claim or demand of society that each individual be allowed to live a life according to the standards of the society and that if all individual wants cannot be

satisfied, at least a minimum standard should be provided for all. Of the many forms of this interest, Pound emphasizes two: (1) the claim that the individual will shall not be subjected arbitrarily to the will of another, and (2) the claim that all legal restraint and enforcement of the claims of others leave secured to the individual the possibility of a human existence.⁴⁸³

These are the interests which Pound calls social, perhaps because they are (a) claimed by society or the social group as a whole, and/or (b) asserted in title of social life, and/or (c) are thought of, or looked at, in terms of social life, and generalized as claims of the social group. On the other hand, he has specifically stated that they are asserted by individuals and are social because they are recognized and secured ultimately to secure the social order. But from the earlier glimpse at Pound's method, and in view of the sorts of claims outlined above, social interests seem to be nothing more than general societal concerns which Pound has found expressed in various facets of the legal system. The claimant in any particular case is lost sight of in the generalized categories which he advances. When Pound speaks of social interests being asserted by individuals, he seems to cleanse himself of the danger of reifying the notion of society.⁴⁸⁴ Apparently something called "society" does not directly assert these claims. The claims are asserted by individuals, very probably not by all individuals in society, but at least by enough individuals that the principle embodied in a claim or demand has found its way into legislation, judicial decisions, proposals for legislative change, etc. Pound has brought together, on the basis of his ex-

amination of the legal system, certain rather general demands which he believes relate to the maintenance and functioning of the social order.

3. Public interests.

Pound is unusually equivocal in his statement on public interests. These interests are claims asserted in title of a politically organized society by individuals involved in or looked at from the standpoint of political life. He argues that they may be treated as the claims of a politically organized society thought of as a legal entity. In one sense, Pound contends, "ultimately these come down to a social interest in the security of social institutions, of which political institutions in the world today have taken the first place."⁴⁸⁵ On the other hand, he continues, the existence of a politically organized society involves claims or demands which can be thought of as those of the political organization as such, "certain demands involved in its existence and efficient functioning and de facto asserted by those who wield political power under the organization."⁴⁸⁶ Pound seems to sense that he is grappling with a troublesome issue. He admits that public interests can ultimately be subsumed under social interests insofar as political institutions are social in character.⁴⁸⁷ Yet he sets public interests apart from social interests by virtue of the fact that (a) they are peculiar to the politically organized aspects of society although affecting and involved in social life, and (b) in that they are asserted by agents of the political organization and not usually by general demands of individuals in society. Pound may be relying again on the results turned up by his method. There is every reason to believe that

Pound may have discovered judicial decisions and statutes which proposed means of securing the governmental apparatus in its widest sense, and which seemed to emanate primarily from governmental officials. It is simply impossible to know what kinds of criteria Pound uses in distinguishing between social and public interests.

Public interests include, firstly, the interests of the state as a juristic person. Under A) Personality, are included the integrity, freedom of action, honour, and dignity of the state personality. The integrity of personality is said to encompass the security of the political organization, the efficient functioning of the machinery of government, and the dignity of the political organization of society. Closely related to these are a series of interests usually recognized in international law. They number: (1) the rights of self-preservation and independence, (2) the rights of exclusive legislation and jurisdiction within its territory, (3) the rights of equality and dignity, and the right of legation, and (4) the rights of property. This means that the territory and persons and material objects within it are subject to the supremacy of the state. The interests of the state as a juristic person also include B) Interests of substance, claims of the politically organized society as a corporation to property acquired and held for corporate purposes. This claim is characterized by powers of regulating the use, rather than ownership, of property.

In the second place stand the interests of the state as the guardian of social interests. Pound confesses that "interests of the state as the guardian of social interests strictly are not public interests. The significant interests

are the social interests looked at directly as such."⁴⁸⁸

Pound's quandary is not entirely without precedent. It is no easy matter to distinguish with any precision between society and politically organized society. The vagueness of his formulation of public and social interests deepens the dilemma, especially when he speaks of public policies as social interests. Pound does not want to appear to be the champion of the public interests because politically organized society intertwines with society and touches on the all important social interests. But he perceives that politically organized society, as the state acting through government and courts of law and administrative agencies, is the recognized arbiter in the event of conflicting social interests and is the agency authorized to wield coercive power in safeguarding all individual and social interests. Although the claim or demand that social interests be secured is no doubt made by individuals in society, Pound believes that it is the political organization which is held responsible and which must on occasion act in the absence of explicit and detailed social demand. He therefore believes that it is quite in order to speak of claims which the political organization and agents thereof may make in their own right, especially insofar as safeguarding social interests also secures the political organization of society itself. What Pound does not want to be taken to be saying is that the social interests to be guarded are in fact public interests. He wants to say that there is a public (political) interest in safeguarding social interests and that there is to that extent an interest or claim which can be directly asserted by politically organized society.⁴⁸⁹

F. Pound's classification reviewed.

It is time to raise again the dispute centering on the nature and classification of interests. The difficulty in discovering exactly what Pound means by social and individual interests has occasioned much confusion among his critics and disciples. This has given rise to vastly differing interpretations of the Poundian position. This is especially evident in those areas in which the nature and kinds of interests are intimately involved in the weighing and balancing of interests. The difficulty springs not only from the fact that Pound is not clear, but equally from the fact that Pound clearly makes contradictory statements.

It is as well to set out the principles which Pound enunciates for the weighing and balancing of interests. Pound insists that in weighing or valuing claims or demands with respect to other claims or demands, the arbiter must be careful to compare them on the same plane. Pound believes that if one interest is regarded as individual and another as social, the manner in which the proposition is stated may leave nothing to decide. He argues that claims or demands should be put in their most generalized form as social interests and that they ought to be compared at that level.⁴⁹⁰ He believes that no absolute formula can be derived whereby the intrinsic value of various interests may be determined. To Pound's way of thinking, the problem is an infinitely practical and pragmatic one. To carry it off, Pound suggests two further principles.

[W]e must look at the individual demand in its larger aspect, as subsumed under some social interest in order to compare it with other individual demands treated in the same way. . . . Secure all interests so far as possible with the least sacrifice to the totality of interests or the scheme of interests as a whole.⁴⁹¹

The contentious points here include the notion of the same plane, the idea that claims or demands in their most generalized form are social interests, and the assertion that individual interests are to be subsumed under social interests. In earlier writings, Pound makes the same statements. These are no innovations of his later years. As an example of "subsuming", he notes that the "individual interests of personality may be asserted in title of, or subsumed under, the social interest in the general security, or the social interest in the general security, or the social interest in the individual life."⁴⁹² In the eyes of the critics it is simply not clear what goes on in this subsuming process. In large part, the issue turns on whether social and individual interests are all entirely interchangeable, as being the same claim viewed from a different perspective and spoken of in different terms, or whether there is some difference between them which is based on other criteria.

Edwin Patterson takes social interests as claims involved in social life, asserted in title of (on behalf of) social life, and in some vague sense asserted by the social group. He often prefers to speak of them as public policies. Patterson believes that there are three requirements to which a social interest must conform in Pound's formulation: (1) it must be a measuring or testing device for individual interests; (2) it must be inferred from the positive law and legal processes of a society; (3) it must conform to a widespread set of demands or convictions of members of that society; and sometimes Pound suggests (4) that it must be a means to the attainment of a civilized society. He interprets Pound as saying that each individual interest must be tested by, that is, subsumed under, two or more (or in fact all six)

social interests. He maintains that the quality of an individual interest which is tested is "one which bears a causal relation to consequences which the social interest designates as significant, and as good or bad."⁴⁹³ In other words, Patterson believes that individual interests are not the same as, or identical to, social interests, but that individual interests bear some relation to, or affect, or sustain certain social interests. He believes that by "generalizing claims as social interests", Pound means that it is important to see claims in all their implications, in their larger aspect, in order to discover whether they are conducive to, or are detrimental to, the various social interests.

There are certainly a good many fairly straightforward statements in Pound's work which support this interpretation. Passages recently quoted seem to sustain this kind of view. Pound's earlier work in particular appears to be directed to a clarification and systematic outline of social interests because he feels they have been neglected and because he believes that they must be used in the balancing process.

[I]ndividual interests are to be secured by law because and to the extent that they are social interests. There is a social interest in securing individual interests, insofar as securing them conduces to general security, security of institutions, and the general moral and social life of individuals. Hence, while individual interests are one thing and social interests another, the law, which is a social institution really secures individual interests because of a social interest in so doing. Hence it would seem that no individual may claim to be secured in an interest that conflicts with any social interest unless he can show some countervailing social interest in so securing it -- some social interest to outweigh that with which his individual interest conflicts.⁴⁹⁴

The general sense of this statement is clear enough. If individual interests are conducive to the maintenance and realization of social interests, they are to be protected. If individual interests conflict with a social interest, they are to be passed over unless a more important social interest is in fact served by the individual interest in question. In the same article, Pound sets out as one task of sociological jurisprudence the study of means of securing social interests by different methods than those worked out to secure individual interests. It is clear that the content or general effect of the interests must differ, because if identical, ways of securing individual interests would surely suffice to secure social interests.

Pound reiterates this stand in his discussion of the individual interests of personality. He makes mention of the social interest in the individual moral and social life and argues that "in securing individual interests to this end, the law is securing a social interest."⁴⁹⁵ He maintains that although there are social interests served by securing all the individual interests of personality, social interests also limit the legal protection accorded to each individual interest. The law does not secure individuals in the free exercise of their faculties for purposes of injuring others because "obvious social interests are opposed to such a claim."⁴⁹⁶ In another place, Pound suggests that social interests give effect to individual interests "to the extent that they coincide with or may be identified with a social interest."⁴⁹⁷

That the evidence is not all on one side is indicated by the fierce and sometimes indignant argument of Julius Stone. In a somewhat rankling tone, Stone proffers that

"after years of treasured associations with Pound at Harvard. . . the only view which makes sense of Pound's main exposition is the one which this reviewer has always understood him to hold."⁴⁹⁸ Stone believes that Patterson's interpretation is totally unfounded. He (Stone) has always understood Pound to mean that all de facto interests can be stated as either social interests or individual interests, that interests are entirely interchangeable.⁴⁹⁹ Now Pound has clearly implied something like this in several of the passages quoted earlier. Pound argues that it is possible to call all interests individual and all interests social. He suggests that social interests are claims or demands, "even some of the foregoing in other aspects,"⁵⁰⁰ and that social interests are capable of statement in terms of individual interests, while "individual interests are capable of statement in terms of social interests and get their significance for the science from this fact."⁵⁰¹

Stone maintains that Pound's social interests are not a measuring device at all, but simply a way of referring to de facto human claims, just as the term "individual interest" is another way of referring to the same claim. Because the terms "individual interest" and "social interest" are merely different ways of referring to the same subject matter, he fails to see how social interests can be a measure for valuing individual interests. Stone goes on to argue that if Patterson sees social interests as a measuring device, they can no longer be a part of the phenomena to be measured. They must consist of different stuff from his individual interests.⁵⁰²

The major difficulty with Stone's position is his failure to clarify what he means by a different way of looking at, or referring to, the same claim. He does not seem to realize that looking at a claim in different ways is what in fact happens when claims are examined on the basis of certain criteria in the process of classification.⁵⁰³ But he does not set out upon what basis claims are viewed or classified. He appears to believe that statement in social or individual terms makes the difference. It is difficult to know what he means. As an example, he argues that "my claim to my watch" may be stated both as an individual interest of substance and as a social interest in the security of acquisitions. But it seems that more is involved here than individual or social terms. In a second example, Stone maintains that the claim to security of the physical person, an individual interest, can be stated in terms of the social interest in the general security. This suggests that "social terms" really means "in terms of social interests", a rather different thing from the distinction which Stone was pressing. In the example last mentioned, an individual claims that he be secured in his physical person. To Stone, this is an individual interest because it is stated in individual terms. He has presumably classified the claim on some undisclosed basis which he takes to be of little concern. This same substantive claim to be secure in the physical person can also be stated, Stone holds, in terms of the social interest in the general security. The point is that this is not the same thing as saying that the claim in question is a social interest. It is rather to ask for one of the things which goes to make up or support general security. To ask for

security of one's person is not to ask for general security. Stone does not elaborate on how general security came to be regarded as a social interest in the first place. Stone also suggests that the claim to free individual self-assertion can be expressed as a social interest in a minimum individual life. The claim is said to be the same. This is perilously difficult to follow.

Patterson does not deny that any given claim is initially only a claim. What he does suggest is that any given claim is examined in terms of the properties of a scheme of classification. It is then placed in one or another class because it agrees with the properties characterizing that category. Now the basis of Pound's classification is unclear, but not to such an extent that it can be said that Pound implies no classification at all. Stone's error lies in his failure to recognize a scheme of classification and to make explicit the method of looking at or referring to things which his argument implies.

Stone's assertion that social interests are not used, and cannot be used, in measuring or weighing individual interests is simply not correct in view of Pound's written works. There seems no apparent reason why social interest as one kind of claim could not be used in weighing individual interests seen as another kind of claim. It almost seems from Stone's interpretation that Pound's written works bear little relation to what was gained from long years of intimate and treasured associations with Pound at Harvard. But it is, unfortunately, upon the written word that judgement must be based. Stone is led to this contention by his view that social interests and individual interests are the same thing, distinguished only by the terms in which they are ex-

pressed. If this were the case, which it does not appear to be, Stone could have found some basis for his confidently held position.

It is futile to go further into the complexities of the Patterson-Stone controversy. The skirmish for Pound's cloak of many colours does little to clarify the basic ambiguity of Pound's theory of interests.⁵⁰⁴ That Pound's theory has not proved particularly useful in the practical field of balancing interests to which it is primarily directed, is the decided opinion of Jerome Hall.⁵⁰⁵ Pound raises but does not solve the almost impossible task of identifying and classifying every desire or want or demand or expectation or claim which emanates from individuals in politically organized society. The categories which emerge from Pound's classification (on whatever grounds it is based) proved much too broad and all-inclusive to be of much practical use.⁵⁰⁶ Pound has not provided principles or standards in terms of which interests, once recognized and classified, could be balanced and weighed.⁵⁰⁷ He has only pointed out and accentuated the scope and difficulties of the enterprise so that those immediately involved might recognize more clearly the infinite complexity of the practical task that has been set for them.

II. Group interests and the law.

From within the Poundian school there has only recently emerged a recognition of the existence and importance of group interests. This insight has apparently been gained without any conscious or deliberate reference to the now somewhat bulky literature which political scientists have

been accumulating on this subject since at least the time of Arthur F. Bentley. It may be that years of conditioning in the Poundian trinity of individual, public, and social interests had dulled the senses to any consideration that something of importance might lie outside the established system. On the other hand, the political science emphasis on working from the ground upwards may have seemed strange and improper to those who had been confidently nurtured in the interpretive art of peeking downward at social phenomena from the reaches of the finished law. In this particular area, for whatever reasons, the disciplinary door between jurisprudence and political science has been carefully guarded. It was not until 1958 that legal scholars noticed that within their bailiwick lay the unrecognized and neglected phenomenon called group interests. Thomas A. Cowan has rallied the students of the law into this seemingly uncharted frontier, and it is by his pen that the Poundian shroud has been pierced so that the hinterland might be plotted.

The time has come for legal scholars to study more intensively the nature of group interests. By "group interests" I mean interests urged, not in the name of individuals nor of society as a whole, but in the name of what sociologists call "secondary groups" -- associations, unions, societies, clubs, boards, councils, professions. Even looser than these, but still having a group character, are taxpayers, consumers, "interested parties", and other amorphous collectivities.⁵⁰⁸

Although Cowan does not define an interest in his own right, it is apparent from his writing that Pound's definition is utilized. Interests are therefore claims or demands or desires. It is with the group concept that Cowan experiences the most difficulty. Group interests are said to be those

claims which are neither wholly individual nor wholly social although they partake of the characteristics of both.⁵⁰⁹ The distinguishing criterion offered is that the claims are urged not on behalf of society nor of individuals but in the name of secondary groups such as unions, councils, and professions. Cowan is not saying that groups urge claims but only that claims are asserted in the name of, or on behalf of, a group. In the course of his argument however, a new criterion is added, that is, it is the group itself which asserts group interests. It is not clear at this point how a claim asserted by a group on behalf of an individual or society is to be classified. Nothing more precise is said about the nature of groups or the sorts of interaction and behavioural relations which he has in mind. Such widespread clusters are consumers, taxpayers and other "amorphous groups" are included alongside secondary groups without any apparent distress. It seems obvious that the differences between a union or a council and consumers is worthy of some consideration. It is not easy to understand why Cowan has rejected primary groups and why it is that such groups can assert no claims on their own behalf.

Apparently the question of a "group" is of little importance to Cowan, as the fact that claims are asserted in the name of something other than individuals or society seems to be his only major contention. He respectfully mentions that a vast literature on human groups exists but he does not feel that acquaintance with it is required for the kind of analysis he has in mind. He proclaims that "it is not to our interest (claim? desire?) to examine that body of learning here."⁵¹⁰

On the other hand, Cowan does seem to be saying that there is something in the nature of a group which bears on the question of a group interest.

Groups make demands for themselves and resist the demands of individuals, other groups, and the whole of society. . . . But the interests are not those of single individuals nor of a mere aggregate of individuals. Their claims are collective: The members of the union, association, whatnot, make the demands in a collective capacity.⁵¹¹

It is reasonably clear that the notion of a "collective capacity", of a belongingness developed through interaction, is required to set groups in his sense apart from mere aggregates of individuals. Yet this does not appear to apply in the examples of groups given earlier.

In the remainder of his enquiry, Cowan examines administrative law, labour law, insurance law, procedure, the law of torts, and legislation in an attempt to bring to light the extent and role of group interests in the law. His method is strictly Poundian. He begins with general areas of the law and discovers group interests through an examination of statutes and cases. Armed with his ambiguous conception of group, it is not surprising to learn that the law is found to be replete with groups. By assuming that groups have interests, there is little more to be said than that the groups present have asserted numerous interests. His general conclusion is that group interests have not been well recognized in the law, and that largely individualistic legal procedure and legal orientation have been basically responsible.

Not long after his pioneering efforts, Cowan stimulated a general symposium on group interests and the law.⁵¹² This lengthy compilation of individual examinations of various aspects of the law constitutes the most thorough-going appli-

cation of the Poundian method outside of Roscoe Pound's own work. Each scholar utilizes Pound's definition of interest and Cowan's notions of group and group interest.⁵¹³ The various aspects of the law are then recast in terms of these unifying conceptual devices. Little gain seems to have been purchased. In most of the studies the term "group interest" is used unsparingly to designate any demand or group that is turned up in the various cases and statutes under review. For example, A.W. Blumrosen's investigation of labour law is largely a reinterpretation utilizing "group interest" to replace the terms union, workers, employees demands, labour, management, and the numerous demands asserted. Rather than saying that the union became the spokesman for the workers, Blumrosen remarks that the union became the spokesman for the "group interest."⁵¹⁴ Samuel Krislov regards the result of this attempt as simply a general review of modern private law.

[T]he interest concept was reduced to its final point here, emerging as a case-by-case judgment and description of each decision, with a new "interest" for virtually every case.⁵¹⁵

III. The "Jurisprudence of Interests".

The "Jurisprudence of Interests" or Interessenjurisprudenz, is a movement in legal theory in Germany and France which grew out of the sociological jurisprudence of Rudolf von Jhering and basically parallels the work of Roscoe Pound in the United States. The movement gained ascendancy in the first decade of the twentieth century, apparently springing up shortly after the introduction of the new German Civil Code of 1900.⁵¹⁶ The objective of this group of legal

scholars is to find a theory of judicial interpretation of statutes and code provisions which will free the judge from the prevailing demands of "technical construction". The older conceptual jurisprudence held that general legal concepts were the basic causal concepts of law, and that legal precepts and legal notions caused legal rules. It is the opinion of Philipp Heck that legal commands precede the formation of general concepts and that such commands result from the practical needs of life and from their evaluation and adjustment and not from notions of legal concepts.

The struggle is not for accuracy of definitions of concepts or consistent application of definitions agreed upon; it is a struggle for the protection of interests. . . . Law is, from the point of view of history, the product of interests. . . . Law is not created by concepts but by interests, by the ends pursued. . . ,[e]ach command of the law determines a conflict of interests; it originates from a struggle between opposing interests, and represents as it were the resultant of these opposing forces.⁵¹⁷

The "Jurisprudence of Interests" is said to be a method to serve the practical ends of law, the securing of human interests, and it is not thought to be a general philosophy which provides judges with a complete scale of values.⁵¹⁸ It aims merely at discovering those principles which judges should follow in deciding cases. Under the earlier doctrine of cognition, the judge was not expected to evaluate or establish legal rules of his own making. He was rather to cognize rules of law and subsume pertinent facts under these rules by a logical operation. If gaps appeared in the law, the judge was to construct new concepts from which new legal rules could be deduced. In Heck's view, the judge was no more than "a legal slot-machine functioning according to the laws of logical mechanics."⁵¹⁹ The "Jurisprudence of

Interests" advocates a method whereby the judge, although constitutionally bound to obey the law, is expected to adjust interests by ruling on conflicts of interests in the same way as has the legislator. The evaluation of interests advanced by the legislator has precedence over the individual evaluation of the judge. But because the law is viewed as inadequate, incomplete, and sometimes contradictory, the judge is expected to go beyond a literal translation and seek out the interests which may be involved. Although a judge must apply the same evaluation of interests which he finds embodied in statute law, on certain occasions he must decide conflicts of interests on the basis of his own evaluation. The judge is to do so (a) when instructed by statute, and (b) when statutory evaluations are contradictory or entirely absent.

The procedure and instructions outlined above depend entirely on the nature and usefulness of the concept of interest. The extreme scope and generality of the concept employed by this school presents the method with most unreasonable and ill-defined prospects.⁵²⁰ Interest is not used to denote any specific or even general class of phenomena. Rather, it points to virtually everything. The term is employed, Heck insists, in its widest connotation "as embracing all things that man holds dear, and all ideals which guide man's life."⁵²¹ This expansive definition is partially designed to include much more than what is commonly known as economic or material interests.

In everyday usage "interest" connotes the significance which life values have for man, and therefore their desires for life values. It means not only the actual desiring, but also latent desiring, which is hidden

in the subconscious mind but ready to step forward when stimulated; hence not desiring alone, but the disposition to desire as well. Finally, the term includes those conditions which normally cause such desire (interest in the objective sense).⁵²²

Heck explains that the definition imposes no limitations on the holders of these values or on the kind of values held. Therefore, the definition is said to encompass the interest of an individual as well as those of groups, of the community, of the public, and of humanity. Ideal and material interests are both designated in the formulation. This usage takes the first place in that general category which regards interest as the basic and general motivational factor. The notion of interest used here is most closely related to the all-embracing concept advanced by Small. By "interest", Heck means actual and latent desiring plus the disposition to desire, regardless of, and in the absence of, specific states of affairs desired. On the other hand, any objective condition which stimulates desire of any kind is included in the concept. It is indeed difficult to visualize legislators or judges ever exhausting the interests expressed in, and secured by, statute law. As no scheme of classification is offered by the "Jurisprudence of Interests", the task of identifying, weighing, and balancing interests is complicated almost beyond comprehension.

CHAPTER VII

"INTEREST" IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: ACTIVITY, ATTITUDE, AND MOTIVATION

Introduction

It is the verdict of many political scientists that their discipline shares, if it does not excell, in conceptual difficulties. This situation seems to be partly due to the sibling role of political science in the social science family. By the time students of politics became serious about the "science" in political science, older sister disciplines had created fairly impressive concepts, research tools and developing theory. Political scientists became regular borrowers, but sometimes they proved to be reckless, overanxious, and indiscriminate in their hurried quest for status, recognition, and the blurred seal of social science approval. On the other hand, many fringe scholars in the social sciences have used political science as the field for interdisciplinary cross fertilization. This is partly the circumstance which led Charles Hagan to speak of "the polyglot army that marches under the banner of 'political science'."⁵²³ At the same time, political science has stayed reasonably close to the language of the street (which some attribute to the hangers-on in political philosophy), and to the language of the assembly (which is sometimes attributed to the institutional members of the profession). The vocabulary of political science is still largely informed by ordinary language usages.

The state of conceptual uncertainty in political science has recently drawn some useful comments and attempted clarifications. Frank J. Sorauf believes that the "vocabulary of politics very likely has more than its share of words and phrases whose definition lies obscured in a half-light of confusion and disagreement."⁵²⁴ His efforts are expended in an attempt to reach some consensus on the concept of the public interest. His grounds for concern are fairly compelling.

Whereas imprecision, vagueness, and mythology may serve some strategic purpose in the world of affairs, they contribute nothing to the formulation of valuable generalizations and theories about politics and the evolution of public policy.⁵²⁵

The presence of so many "vague, ill-defined concepts" in political science caused David Easton to speak of it as a very immature discipline.⁵²⁶ The fact that "political and social terms are vague and formless" prompted J. Szrednicki's investigation of basic political concepts.⁵²⁷ The problem is said to be so bad that communication itself is in danger. In Hagan's view, "the inability of any of us to communicate with all of us stems from our lack of an agreed-upon set of categories for description."⁵²⁸ Samuel J. Eldersveld is of the same considered opinion; "we have not yet satisfactorily solved the problem of conceptualization, and we have not met the need to develop proper categories for analysis."⁵²⁹

The concept of interest has undoubtedly received its most widespread use at the hands of political scientists. Its use has, unfortunately, contributed greatly to the general ambiguity and confusion suggested above. Myron Q. Hale at least puts the dilemma in perspective. "But, as Socrates demonstrated to Thrasymachus, interest is an

ambiguous term."⁵³⁰ More recently, S.I. Benn has attempted to untangle the "ambiguity of 'interests',"⁵³¹ and J.P. Plamenatz's efforts at clarification are based partly on his view that "the notion of interest. . . is extremely vague. . . . [M]uch vaguer than the notions of right and duty."⁵³² R.E. Flathman notes the "gradual development of a wide variety of uses of 'interest' each of which carried quite different political consequences." He believes, in fact, that "there are few terms in political discourse used in a more diverse and shifting manner."⁵³³ That great confusion about the meaning of the concepts of interest and value has grave practical implications, is the warning of Vernon Van Dyke.

Rather than serve as effective tools for incisive analysis, they frequently lead to intellectual traps, and rather than serve as clear symbols for communication, they frequently lead to misunderstanding.⁵³⁴

J.R. Lucas argues that the concept of interest "can be expanded until it becomes vacuous." In fact, the concept is "indeterminate, and liable to expand in unexpected directions."⁵³⁵

Samuel Krislov believes that part of the problem is that "the basic term 'interest' is accepted as self-defined and ineluctable." That this is not the case is the burden of his explicatory essay.

"Interest", in short, is to students of society of various kinds a household word, and household words, like most terms, tend to have the precision requisite for the use at hand. The use being frequent, the tool dulls; the more types of usage, the more all-purpose and adaptive to any utilization it becomes.⁵³⁶

In the realm of pressure group research, Roy C. Macridis believes that conceptual failures have proved disastrous in terms of integrated and consistent work. The definitional shortcomings include the fact that "there is no clear meaning attached either to the term 'interest' or to

that of 'group'. . . . [T]he study of 'interest groups' therefore has a questionable analytical utility unless these terms are clarified and used in a consistent manner."⁵³⁷

The practical import of a vague concept of interest for group studies is noticed in a somewhat vague statement by D.C. Blaisdell. "Even in the United States, we still lack an accepted theory of interests."⁵³⁸ Perhaps the most frank statement about the term "interest" and its bearing on pressure group research is that offered by Henry W. Ehrmann.

It is quite true that many of the terms such as "access", "claims", and "interests", used by us when we discuss pressure groups, are usually loosely defined even if they are carefully exemplified. This may have much to do with the inarticulateness of our conceptual scheme of the political process in general.⁵³⁹

The ambiguous use of the term "interest" has had unfortunate consequences in discussions of the public interest. It is F.J. Sorauf's contention that "some widely held misconceptions about the nature of interests contribute to the potency of the public interest."⁵⁴⁰ Schubert holds that in trying to make sense out of the public interest, "the problem lies rather with the definition of 'interest'".⁵⁴¹

That recent attempts to clarify the concept of interest in political science have not been entirely satisfactory, will be argued by way of critical comments on that literature in the course of the following chapters. The major undertaking, as in the past, will be to set out fairly consistent usages of the term "interest" as they have appeared in a sample of writings in the discipline. The two chapters on political science are basically organized on the basis of major usages which have appeared in other disciplines. It

is hoped that this will provide evidence of interdisciplinary fusion as well as marking disciplinary peculiarities.

I. Interest as activity.

A. Activity and group in A.F. Bentley.

The use of interest as "activity" is one which has appeared only fleetingly in this extensive compendium of common and technical uses of the term "interest". In Chapter I it was argued that John Dewey, after having identified the three aspects of interest as a disposition, the conative, objective and affective, proceeded to define an interest as self-expressive activity.

An interest is primarily a form of self-expressive activity. . . . Any account of genuine interest must, therefore, grasp it as outgoing activity holding within its grasp an intellectual content, and reflecting itself in felt value.⁵⁴²

Dewey held that somehow an individual could identify the self, through action, with some object or idea. The whole process, self-expressive activity, could be denoted by the term "interest".

Albion W. Small employed interest as "a sphere of activity" as one of the numerous senses of the term that appeared in his voluminous writings.

Interests. . . are indicated spheres of activity which persons enter into and occupy in the course of realizing their personalities. . . .⁵⁴³

It was Arthur F. Bentley who stipulated that this was the only sense in which the term could be used if brain spooks and soul stuff were to give way to a scientific approach to the study of society. Most critics and friends of Arthur F. Bentley hold that he, almost alone, championed

the notion that the interest is the activity and the group.⁵⁴⁴

That Bentley says that he is going to use the terms "interest", "activity", and "group" synonymously cannot be denied. This was no doubt the manner in which he wanted to use the terms as well as the sense in which he wanted to commend them to other scholars. When critical critics, critical friends, and uncritical adherents of Bentley discuss the great man's notion of interest, it is clearly approached in this fashion.⁵⁴⁵ But there is much more to be said about interests in Bentley than this.

In this section I want to argue that the critics have been much too superficial in their examination of what Bentley meant by an "interest". Had they taken Bentley less at his definition, (which he warned was only an overrated convenience) and concerned themselves more with the term in use, they would have discovered a wide variety of usages of "interest" none of which was consistent with his statements of intended use. In short, Bentley pooh-poohed definitions and distinctions as violating the seamless idiom of activity, yet at the same time he utilized distinctions in his practical writing in order to make sense out of the world around him.

That Bentley had no time for fine distinctions or definitions is regrettable, but at least it is well known.⁵⁴⁶ The process, the manifest activity and tendencies of activity of groups of thinking, feeling actors could not be reduced to a level of conceptualization or explanation below that of activity. Distinctions are useless "between wants, and the men who want, and the external acts of these men, and the institutions or things done by them, and the external world in which these things are supposed to exist." These

are all merely "different phases of a process."⁵⁴⁷

In attempting to establish the integrity of a social level of description and explanation, a task he saw taken up by Simmel, Durkheim and Ratzenhofer, Bentley was led to deny, at least for purposes of studying politics, the integrity of ideas, feelings, motives, desires, and ideals as independent causal factors.⁵⁴⁸ Now in so doing, Bentley was attacking the notion of an interest as a motive, either acquired or inherent, a notion current in the sociological writings of Ratzenhofer, Small, Ross and Ward. It was part of Bentley's methodological mission to deny the existence of interests in the psychological sense.⁵⁴⁹ Having purged the reader of ghostly and metaphysical inclinations to speak of interests as motives (desires, goals) at the individual or group levels, Bentley thunders on to proffer his case for interest as activity.

Not only is the raw material of politics always action, the activity of thinking feeling men, but it is always "the doings of wanting-knowing men in masses."⁵⁵⁰ It is the purposive activity of men in groups, not the actions of men as individuals.⁵⁵¹ So Bentley is concerned solely with group activity, and the "groups" and "group activity" are equivalent terms. Now the "interest" is also the same thing as the "group" and the "activity".

There is no group without its interest. An interest, as the term will be used in this work, is the equivalent of a group. We may speak also of an interest group or of a group interest, again merely for the sake of clearness in expression.⁵⁵²

Much later in his account Bentley presses the view that discussion and organization groups are "themselves activities, themselves interests, and that they are themselves pressures

in the moving society."⁵⁵³ Bentley would have us believe that interest=interest group = group interest=pressure.

It is apparent that little gain has been made in understanding what kind of phenomenon is denoted by the term "interest". "Activity" is presumably "something doing", a process involving men in motion; in short, a group which is not standing still. What constitutes a group is nowhere clearly set out in Bentley. Sometimes "group" seems to be used in a technical sense to denote a certain portion of men as mass activity. A group seems to be also an analytical concept, classifications of men being determined by the purposes and practical considerations of the investigator. And, thirdly, there is the concrete sense where group refers to a number of individuals sharing certain characteristics and aware of the sharing.⁵⁵⁴ Groups do include members, techniques, and intensity of activity, but these variables presumably run together to help make up an interest.

The key terms which could explicate "interest" are ambiguous, and vague. If interest is the equivalent of group and activity, Bentley has left us with little which can be operationalized, if indeed, it can even be comprehended or understood.

The strictures against Bentley's equation of interest as group and as activity are many, varied and detailed. There is no point in going into them here in anything other than a brief and cursory fashion. It should be noted that the above usage, whether employed in practice by Bentley or not, has not met with the approval of a critical audience of political scientists.

Bentley's emphasis on groups and group interests, and

activity as the activity of groups, leaves no room for individuals as such, or for individual interests. After all, the interest is the group. It has been the view of most political scientists that there is some merit in considering individuals as actors for some purposes at least in the study of politics. It seems also widely agreed that it is useful to be able to speak in terms of individuals having interests, being interested, acting in their interests, being squashed by the interests, or mistaking their interests.⁵⁵⁵

Some political scientists believe that a strict rendering of Bentley on "interests" allows no opportunity for the scholar or detached person to say that a group has mistaken its interests or has gone against its own interests, or should pursue other interests.⁵⁵⁶ There is no doubt at all that a strict rendering of Bentley supports this view. It ought to follow that if the interest is the activity which the group is engaged in, it cannot mistake it or be acting against it.⁵⁵⁷ I believe that the observer can always say that he thinks that the group ought to be acting in a different way, but this would be the case if interest were defined as goal, advantage, motive, or shared attitude. The earlier stricture, however accurate in terms of Bentley's usage, is unfortunately not denied by Bentley. That members of a potential group may be in error concerning their "best interests" is affirmed by Bentley in violation of his definition. This will be explored later by way of illustrating Bentley's open-mindedness when it came to using terms without settled meanings.

It seems that "activity" is too broad and too ill-defined to offer much by way of a clear and precise orienting concept. It is not easy or straightforward to tell when

activity begins or ends, or where activities run together, or how they are to be distinguished or labelled. On the other hand, everything seems reducible to activity; physical and geographical environments, individuals, groups, thoughts, feelings, and purposes come to be encompassed in the term "activity".⁵⁵⁸ Activity becomes the whole of personal and social life moving forward in a continuously progressive stream. There is nothing which is understandable by itself, nothing makes sense unless seen in the context of the whole. Bentley sets down no formula for trapping activity, for separating various aspects into meaningful and manageable pieces. There is nothing, as Crick remarks, besides patternless empiricism, "activity without pattern or plan. . . ."⁵⁵⁹ And, of course, as Bentley reminds us. . . . "the interest is nothing other than the group activity itself."⁵⁶⁰

There is good reason to believe that Hale is correct in his opinion that the term "interest" used as activity is deprived of any explanatory value.⁵⁶¹ The point is simply that interest has no subjective content. It is not something which causes behaviour as it is the behaviour itself. Hence Hale concludes:

We are left with the picture of multifold processes which can be described only in terms of the contemporaneous system of which they are a part.⁵⁶²

But Weinstein assures us that we are to expect no explanation from Bentley in any event, and that it should come as no surprise that interest (activity, group) enjoys no explanatory power. In this view, Bentley fashioned a tool which was designed to seek out "hows" not "whys"; that by reducing "hows" to activity, explanation was to give way to the complete empirical description of the social process. Once the

groups are described, the science of politics is complete and there is nothing more to be said.⁵⁶³

A more devastating stricture is that it is impossible to locate interests on Bentley's guidelines. It is impossible to know when an interest has been found. Quite simply, Bentley relies on interests to classify groups whereas the interest is the group to begin with.

If we take the group without the interest we have nothing at all. We cannot take the first step to define it. . . . We have a group fairly well defined in terms of its interest. . . .⁵⁶⁴

Now the import of this is clear. Somehow a knowledge of interests is said to exist prior to a classification of activity into groups. But this is impossible as the interest is the activity (group) itself. "The group and the interest are not separate. . . ." "The interest is nothing other than the group activity itself."⁵⁶⁵ There is simply no way to define groups in terms of interests, especially if, as Bentley tells us, we only know when we are on the track of an interest group when we can watch its progress.⁵⁶⁶

Bentley sometimes speaks of "interest" as the value of a certain quantum of group activity, that is "the valuation of the activity not as distinct from it, but as the valued activity itself."⁵⁶⁷ Now apparently the activity is the clue to its own value in a sense other than its expression of its own value. For the latter is ruled out by Bentley as one of the difficulties about interests. You simply cannot take the group's verbal expression, or "talk activity", as correctly reflecting the interest (activity). Nor is the observer allowed to impute a meaning or value (that is, an interest) to the activity because he can be so easily misled, and not

being a part of the activity, is in no position to know the activity (that is, the interest).⁵⁶⁸ Weinstein concludes that interest emerges, in Bentley's view, as "a manner of stating the value of the group activity" but that "the value meaning is assigned to the activity by Bentley; the interest is not the activity itself."⁵⁶⁹ (In fact it is almost enough to question whether Bentley seriously intended to be taken at his word when he announced his unique usage.)

In turning from the usual criticisms of Bentley to an examination of the actual usages of the term "interest" in his work, two general arguments will be advanced. In the first place, Bentley's actual use of the term "interest" is inconsistent with his statement that "group", "activity", and "interest" are equivalent terms. The terms are sometimes used interchangeably, but on other occasions it is clear that different phenomena are being denoted. The terms often cannot be used interchangeably if any sense is to be made of what he is saying. In fact, the terms retain their common meaning in Bentley's usage as well as occasionally taking on his stipulative meanings. In the second place, Bentley wanders through a variety of usages of the term "interest" in the process of drawing the kinds of distinctions which he has advised us were impossible and indefensible. In particular, Bentley often speaks as though interests were the purposes (goals, objectives) of groups which serve to give direction to the groups' activity, and in terms of which one group could be distinguished from another. Leo Weinstein has noticed this use of interest in Bentley and believes him to be inadvertently or unconsciously using it to avoid the difficulties involved in the use of interest as activity.⁵⁷⁰

It is the contention here that Bentley's terms "interest", "group", "activity", cannot be used synonymously, i.e., they are not, for the most part, interchangeable.

1. Bentley's use belies his definition.

It is important to be clear on Bentley's point of departure: "Groups and group activity are equivalent terms. . . ." "[A]n 'interest' is the equivalent of a group. . . ." ⁵⁷¹

Consider Bentley's statement: "All cattle-raisers had interests both as producers and consumers. . . ." ⁵⁷² Cattle-raisers are clearly a group, an activity, an interest. Yet this Bentley believes is not sufficient; it is still necessary to say that this group had interests. He must mean something other than the group had groups. He may be saying merely that the group had activities as producers and as consumers; but it is more likely that he has resorted to common usage and is saying that the group has interests in the sense of goals or a stake in, or some advantage to be gained in, their roles as producers and consumers.

The early statement asserting the equivalence of terms is itself strangely ambivalent. Bentley urges that "there is no group without its interest. . . ." ⁵⁷³ In short, groups have interests. He may mean that groups have activities, but this carries him only a short distance as the group is already said to be the activity.

To resort to an earlier example, Bentley argues that we can have "a group fairly well defined in terms of its interest." ⁵⁷⁴ Again, it seems very clear that the interest denotes some phenomenon distinct from the group. Bentley goes on to say that "the interest is merely a manner of stating the value of the group activity." ⁵⁷⁵ The interest is a

manner of stating the value, it is not the group activity as such. When Bentley speaks of "interest groupings" either the "interest" or "grouping" is redundant, but he does not use the one or the other. Likewise, it is puzzling to discover what Bentley means when he argues that "Taft's proclamation sets forth the whole truth about the interest activities involved."⁵⁷⁶ Again, Bentley seems to be meaning something beyond that which would be normally conveyed by either "interest" or "activities".

In a statement of classification, Bentley illustrates how the terms "interest", "group" and "activity" cannot logically substitute one for another.

[T]here is nothing in the interests purely because of themselves. . .; we can depend on them only as they stand for the groups which are acting, or tending toward activity, or pressing themselves along in their activity with other groups.⁵⁷⁷

None of the terms alone could give the kind of meaning Bentley wants to convey in this statement. Each term retains its common, rather than its stipulated meaning.

Very often interest and activity can be substituted in Bentley's work, especially in such cases where Bentley speaks of the "group's interest". But even then, to say "the group's activity", where "the group" is "the activity", is to talk nonsense. On occasion, Bentley is in difficulties in equating "interest" and "activity". For example, in defining "intensity" as a word "to denote the concentration of interest which gives a group effectiveness in its activity in the face of the opposition of other groups. . .",⁵⁷⁸ Bentley clearly does not intend a "concentration of interest" to mean a concentration of activity", nor would it make sense to say that. (Of course, it makes less sense to substitute "interest"

or "group" for every case where the term "group" "interest" or "activity" is used.) In at least one instance, "interest" and "activity" are distinguished by Bentley.

We shall always find that the political interests and activities of any given group. . . are directed against other activities of men, who appear in other groups.⁵⁷⁹

It is fairly evident that, although, Bentley says that the terms "group" "activity" and "interest" are synonymous, in actual use each term is employed separately to denote specific aspects of activity.

One final example of the shortcomings in Bentley's equation of terms remains to be noted. This involves such cases where Bentley refuses to recognize that the activity is everything, whereas he wants to go well beyond this in drawing distinctions not permitted by his definition. Consider the following:

[T]he electorate. . . represents the interests of those other elements of the population who do not directly participate in it.⁵⁸⁰

Now by definition, the electorate, the group, is the activity and it is the interest. It is only as an activity, as a group activity, that it can be said to have an interest or, more precisely, be an interest. It is simply impossible by definition to have an activity represent the (interest) activity of those not in the activity. In Bentley's use of terms, it cannot represent the interest of those not part of the activity. It is very possible that Bentley means by interests here the concerns, stakes, or advantage of the disenfranchised.

In speaking of disenfranchised males, Bentley contends that they are "represented by the male voters in very fact, whether they are found in large numbers with somewhat

varying interests, or in smaller numbers with group interests in general identical with the various group interests of the voter."⁵⁸¹

Now the electorate we know to be "a differentiated activity",⁵⁸² hence a group and an interest. The electorate is a particular activity in Bentley's sense, whereas the disenfranchised are not part of that activity and hence cannot be in the group or share the interest. It seems fair to Bentley's stipulated usage to say that those not part of an activity (interest) cannot have identical interests with those in the activity, or else they would be in that same group activity. There seems no doubt but that Bentley does not intend to be taken as using the terms synonymously.

2. Usages of interest in Bentley's work.

The second argument turns on the contention that Bentley employs a variety of usages of interest, the most important of which is the notion of interest as a goal or purpose. It appears that Bentley wanted to involve this usage in his notion of activity, so that it could be seen to be inseparable from the activity. But at the same time, he wished to use "interest" to stand for a part of activity, a phase of the whole process. This Bentley says quite explicitly:

The group and the interest are not separate. There exists only one thing, that is, so many men bound together in or along the path of a certain activity. Sometimes we may be emphasizing the interest phase, sometimes the group phase, but if ever we push them too far apart we soon land in the barren wilderness.⁵⁸³

So the terms are not strictly synonymous. There is an "interest phase" of an activity as well as a "group phase". The "interest phase" can be verbally and analytically distinguished from the whole activity, as Bentley has done,

and it is not the same as the whole activity. In other words, the "interest phase" is a part or an aspect of the activity, though a part of the activity itself and not separate from it. Unfortunately Bentley does not even hint here as to what the "interest phase" of an activity involves. Presumably, it is one or more of the many traditional usages of the term "interest". Likewise, Bentley suggests that the raw materials are "the group activities of men, activities that always embody an interest, that never define themselves except in terms of other group activities of the existing society. . . ." ⁵⁸⁴

The clearest statement of what Bentley means by interest is the following:

The interest I put forward is a specific group interest in some definite course of conduct or activity, [w]hen we have a group fairly well defined in terms of its interests." ⁵⁸⁵

The group has an interest in some definite course of conduct or activity. In short, the group has a dispositional goal orientation, a purpose, an objective. This seems clear in his usage regarding the groups involved in the 1906 Statehood Bill. Bentley speaks of the "Republican Party interests", where it seems clear that the Republican Party is already an interest (as group) and that its interest is its concern, goal, objective. More explicitly he speaks of "the Republican Party's interest in preventing double statehood with double sets of senators. . . ." ⁵⁸⁶ This may be simply interest as a stake in, concern in respect to advantage, but it is clearly a sense of interest other than the one stipulated.

The following statement contains the use of interest first as purpose (goal), and later as "a stake in."

The seaboard will have separate, though rarely conflicting interests, as compared with the inland regions. Perhaps the cities may have interests in the federal government process which conflict with the interests of rural districts.⁵⁸⁷

The meaning of interest as goal (purpose) seems to be intended when Bentley concedes that certain groups may have interests of their own, that is, they neither merely reflect underlying group pressures, nor are they totally passive in the play of group forces. Bentley notes that both discussion and organization groups "have a certain residual group aspect which we may call their own interest."⁵⁸⁸ He believes that "a legislature might have its own interest", and the "judiciary might be looked on from one point of view of having an interest of its own."⁵⁸⁹ In treating this issue of a group having its "own interests", Bentley explains that it may be understood in two ways.

Either it may indicate a specialized underlying interest of the individuals who compose the group in question -- so, for instance, the "selfish" personal interests of a despot or of a boss and his henchmen -- or it may mean the tendency of the representative group to persist, i.e., its inertia whether the case is of a belief or of a governmental form.⁵⁹⁰

It should be noted that in the above, Bentley does allow that individuals may have interests; personal, selfish goals or concerns.⁵⁹¹

That Bentley's use of interest as activity as group does not allow that a group might mistake its interests has occasioned deep criticism in certain quarters. S.I. Benn and Brian Barry, especially, hold that this is one of the things that we need to be able to say, and that if the usage of interest does not facilitate a group or individual mistaking its own interests, then the usage is logically inadmissible.

In fact, Benn's most telling stricture against what he calls the Bentlian "naturalistic" view of interest, is that one can never say that a group has mistaken its interests.⁵⁹²

Bentley does outline a circumstance wherein people can be said not to know their own interest. A proposal to prescribe the width of wagon wheel tires proportionate to the load is launched. A movement for it begins; some taxpayers organize and try to lead the others who are indifferent and even ignorant of this movement. But the movement will win over time Bentley claims.

It will win because the organization that leads it genuinely represents the mass of indifferent taxpayers. It will win because it will be clear that those indifferent taxpayers are potentially comprised in the group activity. There is a tendency to action amongst them. If sufficiently goaded they will certainly come to "know" their own interest.⁵⁹³

The upshot of this is the following: the indifferents are not part of the activity represented as "the movement", which is a group, and is an interest. So the indifferents are not part of this interest. Yet they are said to be potentially comprised in the group activity. This can be so, Bentley implies, because in fact they share the same interest, that is, that the pavement can be saved by restricting wheel load. This is a common objective (goal, purpose) which they all share, although some have not come to see it as such.⁵⁹⁴

Several other senses of interest are used in the course of the Process of Government. Bentley frequently speaks of an interest as concern, relating to the attention process, almost as "curiosity". For example, he admits that "my interest in politics is not primary, but derived from my interest in the economic life."⁵⁹⁵ "I may add here that

'sovereignty' is of no more interest to us than the State."⁵⁹⁶
 Marx's political economy reflected the group process,
 Bentley admits, "but we are not interested in it here."⁵⁹⁷
 A stronger sense of interest as attention seems to be implied in his definition of intensity quoted earlier: a word "to denote the concentration of interest which gives a group effectiveness in its activity in the face of the opposition of other groups."⁵⁹⁸

A stronger sense of "an interest in" often denotes "a state in", a concern in respect to advantage, material or otherwise. This seems to be the burden of his remark that "what we actually find in this world, what we can observe and study, is interested men, nothing more and nothing less."⁵⁹⁹
 In discussing levels of groups and especially leadership groups, Bentley asserts that "this leadership group attains a very intense interest in self-maintenance."⁶⁰⁰

The sense of interest as material stake in (material advantage) appears in Bentley's discussion of the origin of constitutions.⁶⁰¹

So far as the large landholders feel that they can preserve their interests better through a constitution, just so far they are for it. . . .⁶⁰²

A peculiar usage involving the judiciary leaves no question that interest as activity is non-applicable. But it does not vividly suggest a clear sense of the term. Perhaps either goal (objective) or "stake" would suffice. The judiciary is a group, it is activity, it is an interest, but yet it is said to be "disinterested", as though it had no stake in the process, no advantage to secure or no goal to promote. The judiciary relates between contestants, and so it is that "a relatively disinterested agency of government appears."⁶⁰³

Bentley uses interest as group in a sense that is different from his suggested equation. He informs us that "it is convenient most of the time in studying government to talk of these groups as interests. . . ." ⁶⁰⁴ Now he also implies that these interests are sometimes the "vested interests" much feared by progressive reformers like himself. The executive, Bentley holds, represents "the great interest grouping. . . ." ⁶⁰⁵ He speaks variously of "the great mercantile and industrial interests", the "individual and commercial interests", and "the transportation interests".

B. Conclusions on Bentley.

Bentley was to exert little effective influence on subsequent scholarship in political science in respect to the notion of interest as activity. He gained more recognition in the 1950's and 1960's as the acclaimed fountain head for empirical theory, and champion of "the group" as a useful device in political research. Few if any have followed his framework. Few if any have employed his sense of interest as activity in on-going research. ⁶⁰⁶ Bentley felt his unpopularity very acutely, and in regard to his outcast position, B.M. Gross, reports that even in 1950 "public mention of his name was like having intercourse in public with the devil." ⁶⁰⁷

It has been argued that interest as activity (group) is not clearly and precisely defined by Bentley. He offers only a rough intention of usage and eschews the value of fine definitions or distinction. It is evident that Bentley does not clearly define or describe "activity" or "group" so that, as a consequence, the equivalent, "interest", is ambiguous.

It was contended that Bentley is unable to abide by his recommendation that interest=group=activity. That much of Bentley's work is senseless when such a substitution of terms is carried out seems clear. The logic of language holds grave problems for communication if Bentley's recommendation were followed.

It was argued that Bentley utilizes a wide variety of senses of "interest", primarily using the term to represent a certain phase of activity, the goal-orienting phase, the directing aspect of activity. But he goes well beyond this and dips frequently into common sense uses of the term when it suits his purposes. So "interest" appears as a goal (purpose, objective); as concern in regard to attention; as a stake in; as that which is to one's advantage; and as "vested interests".

Bentley had some small success in pressing his view of interest as activity on successive generations. Most often it was praised, and sometimes it was worked into a theoretical framework only to be forgotten when research was undertaken. D.B. Truman's work stands as the outstanding example of this.

C. Interest as activity: the post Bentley tradition.

Of the few political scientists who have striven faithfully to replicate Bentley's usage of interest as activity, I want to examine only P.R. Monypenny and C.B. Hagan.⁶⁰⁸ The point to be argued is that the logical difficulties of the Bentlyan equation continued, and more importantly, the tension in Bentley between interest as activity and interest as a phase of activity, the goal-orienting, purposive phase, become even more explicit in the work of Bentley's supporters.

While this is fidelity to Bentley in actual usage, it is infidelity in terms of his statement of intended usage.

Hagan proposes a framework based on what he calls the Dewey-Bentley tradition: activity is the data, and Hagan relates activity to specific political proposals. The interest is said to be the activity and at the same time it appears to denote the direction of activity.

[T]he organization is representative of the activity and is itself an activity. The activity is the interest. The interest is a shorthand way of saying that there is a mass of activity operating in a given direction.⁶⁰⁹

The problem of interest as purpose rather than interest as activity is not very explicit here. Yet it seems that if interest denotes a mass of activity operating in a given direction, it is not the equivalent of activity.⁶¹⁰ If it denoted the same phenomena that activity stands for, it would have no independent place in his framework. Rather, interest serves to denote an aspect of activity, the direction-giving, orienting aspect of activity. To maintain at the same time that the activity as a whole is the interest is to be indifferent to the value of clear and precise concepts.

When Hagan attempts to maintain the strict equivalence of interest as activity, the following kind of problematic statement occurs.

The present assignment of meaning to interest is to find the activity and to call that the interest which the activity connotes.⁶¹¹

It is difficult to see what distinct phenomenon or aspect of phenomenon interest denotes here. Clearly, interest overlaps entirely with interest, so that to try to assign meaning to "interest" at all is absurd, since it is merely the activity

itself all along. The above statement is really quite extraordinary. In assigning meaning to interest we are advised to find the activity first of all and then to call that (the activity) the interest which the activity connotes. Not much sense can be made of this. We don't know how to find an activity to begin with and we are certainly not well briefed in regard to what the activity connotes. As an example, we may consider finding a "group marching" to be the activity. We may call the "marching group" the interest which the "marching group" connotes. Even on the most generous interpretation, very little headway has been gained. Hagan is caught in the Bentlian paradox. Everything is to be reduced to activity; there is no phenomenon of importance that has an existence apart from activity. But it is impossible to make much sense talking this way, and distinctions just have to be made within activity.

Philip Monypenny retains the emphasis on activity while at the same time recognizing the importance of identifying phases of activity. His framework, he professes, is Bentlian.

Groups which are shaping policy as they act also have directions, and the groups and the policy implicit in their activity are two abstractions from the same series of events. To use Bentley's terminology, these are interests.⁶¹²

Now Monypenny allows that groups have objectives which direct and orient their actions. Governmental organs, he relates, if effective, are representative "of those groups whose objectives or interests are embodied in their action."⁶¹³ Monypenny then proceeds to label both the objective and the activity as the interest. The group now assumes a more concrete and identifiable mold than it had enjoyed in

Bentley's usage.

It is difficult to avoid study of the group as a group, in addition to determining its objective or interests. Studying the group as such necessitates asking where in the total population is found the activity which is its interest.⁶¹⁴

The use of "interest" as "activity" has not been widespread nor has it appeared to have been successful in terms of stimulating and orientating fruitful research projects. "Activity" has apparently proved too broad and variegated to act as the main operational tool, and finer distinctions have usually been drawn within the activity itself.

II. Interest as a shared attitude.

A. Interest as attitude in D.B. Truman.

A usage which purports to be well within the Bentlian tradition is that advanced by David B. Truman -- interest as a shared attitude. In most respects this is just about all that can be said of Truman's use of the term "interest" although his book bears the subtitle, Political Interests and Public Opinion.⁶¹⁵ In this section it will be argued that Truman never does offer a clear definition of "interest"; that the term is of little importance in his theoretical work and has almost no role in his practical research undertakings; and that, in view of these strictures, protracted speculation about what he really means by an interest (or shared attitude) ought to be quietly discontinued.

In Truman's usage, the interest is not to be equated with the group. The important characteristic of a group

is the interaction or relationship which give the group its molding and guiding powers. "In fact", Truman insists, "they are the group. . . ." The interaction, therefore, is the group. So even though a categoric group is "any collection of individuals who have some characteristic in common", "[i]t is the interaction that is crucial, not the shared characteristic."⁶¹⁶

An interest group is a species of the general class of phenomena called "group". However, it is important to notice that Truman uses two senses of "interest", so that all groups are interest groups in one sense, and only certain groups are interest groups in the second and more important sense. This distinction does not seem to be very crucial, in Truman's view, to the balance of his argument, but it may account, in part, for his terrible ambivalence in regard to the temporal priority of interaction or attitudes, and it is for that very reason that it ought to be investigated.⁶¹⁷

Truman offers his very often quoted definition of interest group before he proceeds to discuss the notion of an interest.

As used here "interest group" refers to any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes.⁶¹⁸

It is not at all clear how "interest" is involved in this definition at all. It is not until a casual remark is made later -- "the shared attitudes, moreover, constitute the 'interest'"⁶¹⁹ -- that the distinguishing feature of the interest is divulged. Much later he **repeats** this with

little elaboration in the body of his work. We are invited to "recall the definition of an interest as a shared attitude."⁶²⁰

It is now time to examine what seems to be Truman's more or less carefully thought out distinction between the two kinds of shared attitude which give rise to two kinds of interest group. In the first place, "from interaction in groups arise certain common habits of response, which may be called norms or shared attitudes."⁶²¹ These shared attitudes (norms) act as frames of reference for interpreting and evaluating events and behaviour. So the interest (shared attitude, norm) here seems to be a very generalized tendency to respond to classes of objects in a certain way. All groups are shared attitude groups in this sense and all groups are therefore interest groups.

The second kind of shared attitude, or common response, emerges only "in some groups at various points in time. . . ."
 "[T]hese are shared attitudes toward what is needed or wanted in a given situation, observable as demands or claims upon other groups in the society."⁶²² This second shared attitude seems not to vary in kind but rather varies only in regard to its object. It is, however, observable not as a norm or frame of reference, but as a claim or demand. Now apparently shared attitudes are also demands or claims; that this is the form shared attitudes take when their objects are the things the group wants or needs.

Truman wants to reserve the term "interest group" for groups that exhibit "both aspects of the shared attitudes", by which he probably means the two varieties of shared attitudes distinguished by their objects.⁶²³

In the first sense, an interest is a "common habit of response", a "norm" or "shared attitude" and it is said to arise from interaction in groups. It is a feature of the group and the interaction which is the group. But at the same time, surely the individual must internalize the shared attitude, the norm, so that it is his, i.e. it must be individualized. It must become his private, individual attitude before it can be shared, although the general tendency to respond to certain objects in a certain way is shared by all members of the group. Truman does not necessarily rule out individuals having interests in the sense of holding attitudes which are held by others, at least in the first sense of "interest as shared attitude."⁶²⁴

In fact, there are numerous references in Truman to individuals holding interests. For example, as situations and experiences shift, there will be shifts in "individual's attitudes and interests".⁶²⁵ Truman argues that "an individual's group affiliations largely determine his attitudes, values, and the frames of reference in terms of which he interprets his experiences."⁶²⁶ He speaks of how groups enjoy a certain power of conformity, in terms of both present and past group affiliations. Conformity is also inspired "from groups to which the individual aspires to belong and whose characteristic shared attitudes he also holds."⁶²⁷ It seems clear that an individual may hold shared attitudes, that is, interests.

In the second sense of shared attitude as a claim or demand, a common response is made on behalf of the group in terms of what the group needs or wants in the circumstances. It is presumably not a claim or demand that individual group members would make in a non-group context, whereas they

might make use of a frame of reference or norm in a non-group context and on their own behalf. In this sense, the interest as shared attitude, claim, or demand is a group interest although asserted by and held by individuals in the group. It is a group interest insofar as the claims are based on what the group needs and are made on behalf of the group by individuals acting as group members, that is, by individuals conscious of group membership and identifications.

This entire question is nowhere clear in Truman. It is never really raised by Truman. We are simply left with the assertion that the shared attitudes constitute the interests and that an interest group, properly so called, consists of two varieties of shared attitudes. Truman never defines or explains what he means by a shared attitude and whether it is the same, or in what respects it differs from, an attitude plain and simple. He defines an attitude by quoting G. W. Allport's position in 1935, a view which emphasizes "mental and neural state of readiness." This view fits well with Truman's attempt to make potential activity ("tendencies of activity"), a stage of activity, and thus somehow observable activity which qualifies as social science data. This sleight of hand is performed by "the readiness", which is the attitude, which is really "potential activity" and which is, of course, measurable. So the potential is already actual.

The point which Truman casually makes concerning when an interest group is really an interest group should be re-examined. The interest as shared attitude (as frame of reference, norm) results from interaction, and occurs in all groups. So all groups are interest groups in this sense whether or not they have interests in the sense of making claims or demands. The interest as claim or demand results

from interaction in a group, but is a seemingly more ingrained shared attitude as it concerns the very life of a particular group. It is this kind of interest which is a feature of a specific kind of group, the kind of group which must fight for its life, which must be on guard to defend and attack. It is a group which is involved in the allocation of scarce resources, that is, a political interest group.

It is interest as claim or demand, as shared attitudes toward what the group needs or wants which characterizes groups as interest groups in Truman's practical work. All groups have shared attitudes in the first sense and Truman is not concerned with all groups. Now presumably the interests (shared attitudes) as claims or demands rest on the first level of shared attitudes as frames of reference (norms). For the claims (as interests) are based, Truman tells us, on one or more shared attitudes. In any event, throughout the balance of his book Truman talks only infrequently about the shared attitudes in the first sense, and speaks most often of interests as claims. His focus is on groups making claims on other groups and attempting to gain purchase for more effective pressure by gaining access to governmental organs.

The kind of casual distinction that Truman appears to be drawing between the two kinds of interests (shared attitudes) may be relevant to the problem of which comes first, the interaction or the shared attitude.⁶²⁸ It may well be the case that the confusions are unrelated, but the most generous thing to Truman is to at least try to find some theoretical justification for them.

In short, the contradiction in Truman is as follows.

The interaction of individuals (the group) is said to be the prime source of individual attitude formation.

[F]rom interaction in groups arise certain common habits of response, which may be called norms, or shared attitudes.

These group affiliations, with varying degrees of completeness and finality, form and guide the attitudes and therefore the behavior of their participants.

The group exerts power over its members; an individual's group affiliations largely determine his attitudes, values, and the frame of reference in terms of which he interprets his experience.⁶²⁹

These statements seem to suggest that the interaction (the group) functions so as to produce shared attitudes (interests) in the individual members. Truman occasionally argues that the group wields this power by virtue of common thought patterns which they produce and by virtue of the individuals need to be accepted, his quest for "security in conformity."

On the other hand, Truman can argue that the formation of attitudes precedes the formation of groups.

[I]t is possible to examine interests that are not at a particular point in time the basis of interactions among individuals, but that may become such.

[O]n the basis of widely held attitudes that are not expressed in interaction, therefore, it is possible to talk of potential interest groups.

[T]he characteristics of any interest group. . . are governed by the attitudes and the circumstances that give rise to the interactions of which it consists.

An interest group. . . . [C]ollections of individuals interacting on the basis of shared attitudes and exerting claims upon other groups in the society.

In any society. . . there exist interests that may not at a given moment form the basis of group interaction.⁶³⁰

The burden of these statements is that interests (shared attitudes) can exist without being the basis of interactions (groups); that interaction (group) is often on the basis of shared attitudes, (interests), and that the shared attitudes are not an outcome of the current interaction of which the individual may be a part.

This kind of position seems crucial to Truman's entire account of potential groups and the so-called "majority interests" and rules of the game. When Truman speaks of ideals or traditions such as the belief in democracy and constitutionalism as interests it is in the sense of general shared attitudes, frames of reference, norms and not in his second sense of interest as a claim or demand.⁶³¹ Interests in the first sense are not necessarily the outcome of specific or current group affiliations, but may generally prevail in a society, having been generated by a variety of interaction patterns from childhood onwards. Truman contends that unorganized interests, "wide, weak interests" such as the "unorganized attitude" that democracy is good or that corruption should be confined, can exist without serving as the basis of interaction. However, interaction may occur on the basis of such "democratic interests"; "the potential group may become actual and operative."⁶³² So while interaction is needed to constitute a group (the interaction is the group) interaction is not needed at a given moment in order that interests might exist. These interests may be the basis for interaction, that is to say, the emergence of a group, and presumably for the second

kind of interests, claims or demands for the things needed or wanted by the group.

What seems a mild conceptual fog is probably just that. It may be however, that Truman is trying to say that any and all attitudes held by individuals are the result of group affiliations, that is, interactions at some point in their lives. These shared attitudes (interests) as norms, frames of reference, (his first sense of shared attitudes) then exist in individuals' cognitive and affective frameworks long after the disappearance of the specific group contexts in which they arose. Truman can argue that two individuals belonging to the same group or having a number of common group memberships may not necessarily "hold identical attitudes on all issues or exhibit the same behaviors."⁶³³ He goes on to suggest that variations in the attitudes of individuals in the same groups are due partly to differences in biological functioning and endowment, and partly to different past group experiences of the individuals. His point is broad but understandable.

Their behavior and attitude are not simply the product of their current affiliations, but are the result of a genetic process that includes in some measure the whole of their life experiences.⁶³⁴

Similarly, in accounting for the power of groups in enforcing conformity to group norms, he argues that such power "is exerted not only by an individual's present group relationships; it also may derive from past affiliations such as the childhood family as well as from groups to which the individual aspires to belong and whose characteristic shared attitudes he also holds."⁶³⁵

The key may be in the last sentence quoted above. An individual is pressured by groups of which he is not a member, that is, by interactions of which he is not a part. Yet he is said to hold the group's "characteristic shared attitudes." Now if this is to be taken seriously, it is clear that an individual can hold an interest (shared attitude) without its being the basis of any interaction of which he is a participant. And likewise, he argues, "any mutual interests, however, any shared attitude, is a potential group."⁶³⁶ The interest may be prior to the group.

So in all this very general talk of Truman's about interaction and attitudes, it seems that all interactions give rise to shared attitudes which somehow persist, and which may become the common characteristics which act as a basis for further interaction and hence the generation of more and perhaps different shared attitudes. Groups do not interact initially on the basis of interests (shared attitudes) in Truman's second sense of interest as a claim or demand. They interact on the basis of this first kind of shared attitude as a frame of reference, a norm. All groups have shared attitude in this sense, either as the basis, or as an emerging bond for members. Nevertheless, the really significant groups are those with shared attitudes of a different kind; shared attitudes toward what is needed or wanted by the group i.e. claims or demands. This kind of shared attitude presumably, emerges only in groups which are organized to some extent and have as a basis one or more shared attitudes of the first sort. These interests are a feature of the current group context; they are not carried into the group, but develop with interaction in that particular pattern of interaction.

The drawback with this interpretation is that if Truman does intend that it be drawn, he has covered and obscured it pretty thoroughly. It has been suggested that he may be using his "two interest" distinction in a covert way throughout, but this is by no means clear. It is as plausible to contend that he is simply confused, for he never sets the senses out clearly and distinctly to begin with. Yet if the issue is clarified in this way, it seems to make more sense out of his theoretical work than the critics allow. However, this is not to deny the equally plausible contention that Truman is simply ambiguous and contradictory.

I have been trying to argue that there may be an alternative to the best argued point of recent critics of Truman; namely that he is simply contradictory about interests and interactions and is to that extent not worth bothering about. The alternative is that Truman is not contradictory at all but is basing his theoretical work on two notions of interest which are never clearly distinguished and to which he pays little overt heed thereafter. However, the alternative offered here, if sound, is still confusing: (1) it is ambiguous, as two distinct concepts of interest are employed, and (2) there is no easy way to know which usage is being used.

Truman offers a number of alternative uses of "interest" in the course of his book, but with nowhere near the richness nor importance that Bentley attributed to them. Interest in the sense of being concerned in respect to position, advantage, or having a stake in something, appears in Truman's account of "a group interested in the protection

of certain moralities. . . ." ⁶³⁷ Interest is also seen as a selfish, self-seeking, motive. Truman questions whether interest groups are inherently selfish, and argues that many are highly altruistic, that is, "disinterested and altruistic." ⁶³⁸ Truman follows Bentley in sometimes using interest to stand for a group. This occurs in Truman's view that assertions of a totally inclusive interest, as a national interest, are devices of groups "to reduce or eliminate opposing interests." ⁶³⁹ And finally, in speaking of the majority interests, Truman calls them "those interests or expectations" that are so widely held that they are often taken for granted in a society. ⁶⁴⁰ Truman's notion of interest as shared attitude expands to include as an interest, ideals and traditions such as constitutionalism, belief in democratic and civil liberties, ⁶⁴¹ and the "rules of the game."

Truman's notion of "interest" has been variously interpreted by the critics even from the standard use as "shared attitude". Roy Macridis takes him to be defining interest as "human activity or purpose", ⁶⁴² whereas Van Dyke believes that the shared attitude is really a goal. ⁶⁴³

B. Conclusions on Truman.

The contribution of Professor Truman to the "interest" literature in political science is difficult to evaluate. In the first place, his interest concept is so vague and indefinite that it is impossible to readily discover which of several things he may be trying to say. The possibilities are vast. Just as an example, consider the following. An interest is said to be a shared attitude, although a shared

attitude is never explained. An interest may or may not be the same as an attitude plain and simple. A shared attitude may mean an interest as a frame of reference, or a norm. A shared attitude may also mean an interest as a claim or demand. Individuals may be able to hold shared attitudes, thus allowing Truman to speak of individual interests. On the other hand, it may be that groups alone have shared attitudes because such shared attitudes have to do only with interaction and the interaction is the group. So on this basis, interest is a group phenomenon. Group interaction is said to yield shared attitudes. But shared attitudes are said to exist free-floating as it were, in the absence of specific interaction, and in fact may come to form the basis of such interaction. Claims are made on the basis of shared attitudes and turn on, reflect, or embody, forms of behavior implied by the shared attitudes. But claims or demands are also said to be the observable form of shared attitudes.

Secondly, Truman has gained little by way of clarification, precision, and hence theoretical, empirical utility, in defining interest by the term "attitude", which is as vague and imprecise as the term "interest". It is argued at great length in Chapter III of this discussion that from the 1920's to the present, great dispute about the nature and function of attitudes has raged in the literature of psychology. In fact the most strenuous critical analysis and the most bitter exchanges raged in the late 1940's to the early 1950's, the very period in which Truman, almost without taking thought or questioning, accepted Allport's 1935 version of an "attitude". Truman gives no impression that the attitude concept is in doubt, nor does he hesitate to allow the term "attitude" (or "shared attitude") to stand

for the class of phenomena denoted by the term "interest". And all this without any mention of what "interest" was taken to mean either in the literature of psychology or political science.⁶⁴⁴

That a useful distinction can be drawn between an interest and an attitude was the burden of much of Chapter III, above. It was argued that "interest" could denote a very generalized high level disposition in the personality system which involves the self in some enduring relationship with an object or class of objects. The emphasis being not so much on reaction tendency or readiness to respond as on propiarte striving, organizing and planning. An attitude could then denote a disposition or readiness to respond which might be very general or highly specific. The more general and enduring attitudes usually relate to the objects which are central to an individual's on-going interests, and such attitudes function in such a manner as to express, enhance, protect and develop these interests. Attitudes are either positive or negative in the affecting and/or cognitive dimension, and thus take a direction either toward, or away from, an object. An interest denotes an involvement, usually an ego-involvement, and a general striving toward an object or class of objects. The feeling or affective quality of an attitude is pro or conness, whereas that of an interest is concernment, worthwhileness.

Finally, Truman has not shown how interest as shared attitude can be used as a basis, or even as a useful tool, in the empirical analysis of the group process. In fact, Truman speaks of interests (shared attitudes) only infrequently, and almost exclusively in his somewhat confused theoretical chapters.⁶⁴⁵ He goes about studying groups

in a pretty pragmatic and traditional fashion. Agricultural, business, and labour pressure groups are emphasized and discussion focuses on their internal structure. Leadership function, techniques, and relations with the informal and formal processes of government. Almost nothing is said about shared attitudes, while much is said about "access". As W.J.M. Mackenzie has argued, Truman's theoretical framework, his appeal to Bentley, is virtually redundant in terms of his actual research.⁶⁴⁶ In short, Truman begins with concrete groups and assumes the existence of interests (shared attitudes). He makes no attempt to determine interests by going about measuring the shared attitudes of group members. He considers the group's claims, and in this sense may be examining interests in his second use of the term. But they are always "claims" and are never called "interests"; and the relation of claims to supposed underlying shared attitudes is never tested or brought to light.

Interest as shared attitude has almost no actual role in Truman's research orientation or in his account of research findings. So the empirical content and operational role of "interest" in this sense was never put to the test by Truman at all.⁶⁴⁷ He offers a thought provoking but confused piece of theoretical justification for an otherwise quite traditional and very useful account of pressure groups in American politics.

For the most part, the term "interest" is quite redundant in Truman's analysis. It does not denote any specific phenomenon which is not labelled by another term. The phenomenon which Truman denotes by the term "interest" is also, and much more legitimately, denoted by the term "attitude". The concept of interest scarcely appears in its most usual technical and ordinary language senses. It sometimes

seems that the only reason he uses the term "interest" at all is because he wants to talk about something which had commonly gone by the name "interest group". Had he elected to call these groups "pressure groups" (and there are plenty of precedents in Bentley for that), he might have avoided the problem of "interests" altogether. In any event, his key terms are "claim", "group", "access", and "shared attitude". That the term "interest" is not widely employed in his analysis may reflect the fact that it was not really needed in the first place.

C. Other uses of interest as an attitude.

Few political scientists have used interest in the sense of an attitude or in the sense of a shared attitude. But of those who have, two general trends are worth noting. First, there is the tendency to approximate Truman's definition. An example of this is found in Oliver Garceau. He argues that "there are common sentiments, attitudes, values, or interests that may if put under stress serve as the basis for organized political activity. . . ." ⁶⁴⁸ This expanded interpretation of Truman's position is used interchangeably by Garceau with the notion of interest as advantage. Group leaders usually develop indispensable skills, Garceau relates, "for negotiating in the group's interest." ⁶⁴⁹

A view which seems to owe much to Truman's definition is that advanced by Jean Meynaud in his definition of a pressure group.

Associations of various judicial forms which upon the basis of common goals or attitudes endeavour to impose a certain number of positions and demands by all means at their disposal, but especially by pressure on the public authorities. ⁶⁵⁰

The second tendency, seen to some extent in Garceau, is to advance a number of synonyms for "interest", one of which happens to be an "attitude". The most outstanding example of this very vacuous kind of definition is that offered by Jovan Djordjevic in his definition of political groups: "organisations for the realization of economic, political, ideological and other interests (conceptions, attitudes, aspirations and the like). . . ." ⁶⁵¹ In a similar vein, John Dickinson views an interest as "any fairly persistent attitude towards the environment, expressing itself variously as a purpose, claim, or expectation, whose satisfaction the possessor regards as a 'good' or utility. . . ." ⁶⁵²

A critique of these positions would parallel the general complaints put down in the review of Truman's usage, with the additional dimension here of increased vagueness and ambiguity.

III. Interest as a more or less permanent disposition which acts as a motivational factor.

A. Interest as the general and basic motivational factor.

This sense of "interest" has been explored at considerable length in the earlier chapters on psychology and sociology. It is this use which was fashioned by Ratzenhofer and Albion Small and which declined in favour from the 1920's onward. It is treated here only to illustrate the disciplinary overlap which has occurred, and how similar usages have prevailed across disciplinary borders even when little communication has gone on. Political scientists, however, unlike psychologists and sociologists, have been rather re-

luctant to label the basic motivational factor on "interest". When they have done so, the usage has often been combined with other senses of "interest", a procedure which suggests less than carefully thought out distinctions.

Carl J. Friedrich provides a clear illustration of this general usage. His framework is said to be that of R.B. Perry, and indeed, a value is defined as any object of any interest. Interest is the subjective dimension, "that which links the person, group or community with the value."⁶⁵³ That interest is the subjective side of any motivational relationship is clear in the following statement: "Interest arises when a valuer develops a disposition to act toward an object possessing a value dimension".⁶⁵⁴

The best example of this usage in the entire field of political science is that forcibly argued by Samuel H. Beer. Beer is not dissuaded by the fact that interest is "a slippery term". He exposes it with unusual vigour.

By interest we mean here simply a disposition to act to achieve some goal. Such a disposition has two sides. One is emotional -- the felt need that gives the push or drive leading to action. But rarely is such a need entirely blind and undirected: associated with it is a cognitive aspect -- some notion of the object or state of affair that answers to the felt need."⁶⁵⁵

Now Beer has virtually swept clean all conceptual entanglements in motivational theory, at least his definition purports to have done so. An interest is a disposition to achieve some goal through action. The basic motives, felt needs, and cognitive aspects, that is conceptions of goals or satisfying states of affairs, together constitute an interest. In this view, an interest is simply the most general and basic thing to be discovered and watched in the explanation of human behaviour. It assumes the gigantic proportions

that it had not enjoyed since the early days of Albion Small.

But Beer cannot in practice follow his own lead. If the value of his stipulated sense of "interest" is to be gauged by his ability to use it consistently in providing a coherent and reliable account of behaviour, then it fares rather badly.

Beer also uses "interest" to denote the ends or goals being pursued by individual or group action. So not only are subjective notions of the objects (goal) part of the interest, but the goal object itself is said to be the interest. "The ends at which he aims constitute his interests. They are the goals for whose achievement he exercises his power."⁶⁵⁶

In drawing the distinction between "selfish" and "unselfish" interests, Beer incorporates in "interest" the notion of benefit (advantage).

One interest aims at a benefit to the actor. Another aims at a benefit to others. . . . Yet each kind of motive is called an interest as we have defined the term here.⁶⁵⁷

Beer sets this out later in his account of special and general interest groups. "The goal of the special-interest group is primarily a benefit to itself, that of the general interest group primarily a benefit to others."⁶⁵⁸

After having defined an interest as the end or goal pursued in activity, Beer proceeds to distinguish the interest from the goal. He contends that the situation plays a great part in "directing his interests to one set of goals rather than another", and "interests are directed toward certain goals. . . ."⁶⁵⁹ In fact, Beer almost leads us to believe that he is discarding the use of the goal as the interest. It seems that the goal is a part of the interest, much like his initial contention that the "notion of the goal"

is the cognitive aspect of an interest. He discloses this in relating how "our beliefs about the relationships of goals will affect what goals we embody in our interests."⁶⁶⁰

Beer then uses the concept of interest as attention and concern. He does this in his discussion of the profit motive, which has been, he contends, "a goal of intense interest for many people."⁶⁶¹ To round out his discussion of interests, Beer provides us with "demand" as the embodiment of, or the key to discovering, interests at work in politics. ". . . interests are normally asserted as demands for policy only when they are felt to be justified by some conception of common purpose."⁶⁶²

B. Interest as one type or class of motivational factor.

1. Interest as the primary motivational factor.

This usage has never been employed to any extent in psychology, in sociology, or in political science. It does appear, if only briefly, in Emmett S. Redford's discussion of the public interest. The tone is surprisingly like that of A.W. Small who used this sense as well.

The essence of the public interest is a public need, and this need is intrinsic rather than derived. The public interest has an original primary and inherent quality.⁶⁶³

2. Interest as the secondary or derived motivational factor.

This, like the sister use above, has been seen very rarely in political science literature. Samuel Beer seems to have stumbled upon it in the work of Talcott Parsons. He explains in a long footnote fully three-quarters of the way through his discussion of British Pressure groups, how it has acted as his theoretical guideline throughout. His point of departure is an account of how values modify interests and

how he came to employ Parsons' conception of values. It turns out that he has based his notion of "interest" on Parsons' conception of "need-disposition."⁶⁶⁴ "Like a need-disposition, an interest is not simply 'appetite', a genetically given need, but is appetite conditioned by social experience."⁶⁶⁵ Like Plamenatz, Beer goes on to tell us that people are unlikely to assert demands for the satisfaction of needs which they feel unjustifiable. So an interest remains "a claim for a satisfaction of the individual."⁶⁶⁶ The odd thing about Beer's article is that the usage throughout does not seem to have been informed by his stipulated usage. For example, he speaks of the M.P. who represents "a particular interest in the legislature", of "interested organizations", "interested M.P.'s", and "outside interests."

C. Interest as one aspect of the motivational relationship: the goal.

The enormous difficulty in categorizing this sense of "interest" as a goal is that the notion of a goal is never clearly thought out or carefully defined in political science literature. The assumption seems to be widespread that the notion of a goal is plain and precise enough. That this is not the case was argued at prolonged length in Chapter III. It was noted there that the most common use of the term "goal" in psychology is to denote the consummatory or end stage of a tension-reduction sequence. The goal is taken as part of the motivational relationship; temporally, the idea of the goal is part of the motive and assists in instigating behaviour and in directing the course of behaviour; spatially, the goal itself comes at the end of the motivational sequence and bears satisfaction in its wake. This is the usual

interpretation of "goal" in the associative learning school.

A variation of this is provided by A.H. Maslow who uses goal as the motive, and equates "goal", "need", "end", "want", and "purpose". The goal motivates, that is, instigates action, and it is the terminal, consummatory state in the sequence.

As a distinction between these two senses of goal is not especially crucial, a very crude scheme can be utilized.

1. Interest as "goal", where the goal is taken to be the "objective" aspect of the motivational relationship, that is, as "goal-object".

2. Interest as "goal" where the goal is taken to be the motive, that is, where the goal is the subjective and objective aspects of the motivational relationship.

1. The sense of "interest" as a "goal" has been unusually popular in political science, and especially in a rather loosely employed sense of "goal". However, it seems that in most cases the goal is used to denote the "goal object", the "end" toward which action is directed. It is often called the "objective" or "political purpose".

The most distinctive example is that of Stanley Rothman who employs a strict MacIverian position. Interests are simply "the ends or goals about which people have attitudes."⁶⁶⁷ Leo Weinstein speaks of an interest as "a goal toward which other activities are directed" and he presses this in opposition to Bentley's stipulated definition of "interest" as the activity.⁶⁶⁸ This usage is quite frequent in discussions of the "public", "common", "general" interest. Harmon Zeigler speaks of the common interests as "overriding goals,"⁶⁶⁹ and C.W. Cassinelli views it as the "highest ethical goal of

political relationships",⁶⁷⁰ the "ultimate ethical goal of political relationships."⁶⁷¹

It is common to see the equation expand, for example, ". . . when a number of individuals have a common or collective interest -- when they share a single purpose or objective."⁶⁷²

2. The conception of "interest" as a "goal" where the goal is regarded as the motive is not common in political science. But where it has been used, as by Van Dyke, the results have been both encouraging and discouraging.⁶⁷³

Van Dyke begins by equating interests and values. This is done without comment or justification. Values and interests, he explains, can usually be thought of as goals, and can be classified as prime or instrumental. This, of course, implies the means-end relationship, and both means and ends, Van Dyke contends, can be goals. Van Dyke's advises that an interest conceived as activity, power, or attitude creates problems. It is best to define an interest as "a goal that an actor does or should pursue."⁶⁷⁴ Now it is important to notice that to say of anything that it is an "interest" is to say that it is a "goal", regardless of its role or function in any motivational sequence as a means or an end. To identify the interest, for example, as "the means", is to deny that the end can be an "interest". But Van Dyke is fairly clear about this, and his usage could promote clearer thinking when applied to questions of ultimate goals and instrumental goals.

Van Dyke quotes a number of definitions of "goal" but seems to prefer the following:

[A]n event that an actor plans or seeks to bring

about or prevent or a state of affairs that he plans or seeks to establish, maintain or change. "[S]omething is called a goal" because movements persist towards it and vary in accordance with the changes in it and with conditions that lead to it.⁶⁷⁵

The unfortunate result of Van Dyke's usage is that, on balance, it tends to obscure rather than clarify conceptual problems. Following Maslow, he confidently asserts that "people have motives (goals, values, interests) in a number of such categories, but are rarely conscious of them all."⁶⁷⁶ He approves Maslow's equation of motives, needs, goals, values, interests, and by implication, if he accepts Maslow generally he also approves of Maslow's equation of need, goal, purpose, end, want, value, desire. But the latter point is of little concern. The real issue is that in Maslow's motivational system all basic needs (interests, goals) are unconscious. The force of Maslow's argument is that man will achieve self-actualization only when he is fully conscious of the motives (goals, interests) which move him. It is not a cheery picture. In using Maslow's system, and by his own admission, Van Dyke seems committed to the position that his basic or intrinsic goals (ends, interests, values) are in fact unconsciously held by most individuals. On the other hand, Van Dyke's whole argument is for a rationalist model of postulating basic interests (goals, ends) and carefully and expediently deriving the approximate instrumental interests (means). This suggests a highly conscious exercise which is absurd if one's basic goals (interests) are unconsciously held to begin with.⁶⁷⁷ Van Dyke has unfortunately drawn upon a motivational theory which simply could not support the conclusions he draws from it.

IV. Interest as that which acts as a "means" to any goal.

It is fitting that this usage of "interest" should follow hard on the heels of the Van Dyke usage just reviewed. It is not so much that the similarity is striking. It is rather that what appears to be a similarity could be the source of considerable confusion.

It will be recalled that Van Dyke used "interest" to refer to any goal. Now the goal is said to be an interest regardless of the role which the goal plays in any motivational sequence. An object, event (thing) is an interest if it is a goal, that is, if it is the object of a desire; if it is perceived as a want-satisfier; if it is an event which an actor seeks to bring about, change, or maintain. If an object (event, thing), is seen as a goal because it is perceived as a means to the realization of another goal, it is said to be an "instrumental interest", not because it is a "means" but because it is a goal. Likewise, a long-range ultimate goal is said to be an intrinsic interest not because it is the end of a motivational sequence, but because it has the qualities and characteristics of a goal.

In urging the case that an interest is only a "means", David Easton first denies that it is useful to speak of "interest" as an "end". He notes that "interest" may be used to denote the fundamental value system for an individual or a group, "his basic goals, hopes and aspirations in life."⁶⁷⁸ But to do so is to talk so broadly such as to "destroy any specific analytic significance it may have."⁶⁷⁹ He argues that this meaning ought to be abandoned and that "basic goal" or "fundamental values" ought to be the terms

used to denote this phenomenon. (Why two different terms are required is not made clear). But it is in terms of these fundamental goals that the notion of interest has any meaning at all. By denying "interest" to the end, Easton forces it to fall to the means.

Interests can then be more narrowly defined to refer to instrumental values, those means through which a person or group seeks to implement what may be his or its fundamental goals. In this sense a person may speak of a law or administrative decree or policy as being in his interest. It helps to fulfill his basic goal.⁶⁸⁰

There are quite a number of things to be said about Easton's position. In the first place, his sole emphasis is upon the notion of "means". Now very simply, the notion of a "means" is the role or function one thing plays in relation to another, it helps to bring it about. To say of a thing that it is a means is to say that it is instrumental in obtaining, getting, or bringing about something else. Nothing about the qualities or characteristics of the thing is included when it is called a means, but of course specific qualities or characteristics make certain things better or worse means in relation to certain desired ends.

In Easton's view, anything is an instrumental value not because of any qualities or characteristics which it has, but only because and insofar as it serves as a means in relation to some end (fundamental values, basic goal). An interest is said to be an "instrumental value." So apparently a thing becomes an interest in precisely the same way in which it comes to be an instrumental value, that is, it performs a means function; it is a means to the realization of some desired goal. If policy X helps to bring about goal Y it is

a means, and because it is a means it is an instrumental value, an interest.

There is undeniably some overlap in the senses of "interest" as a "goal" and "interest" as a "means". There are, however, two distinct differences. In the first place, if an interest is whatever serves as a means to the realization of an end, then an unknown object may be an interest -- an unpleasant object, a feared object, a hated object, as well as a loved object or neutral object. In short, certain things will be interests because they are means, things which would hardly be considered at all if interests were only goal objects. On the other hand, objects become goals simply because they are viewed as means to more cherished and highly desired ends. In such cases, the thing is an interest because it is a goal, but it is only a goal because it is a means, however unpleasant the thing may be to the actor.

In the second place, the end is always a goal, a goal in terms of which things derive their role as means. Now a goal can never be an interest in this sense unless it is a means to something else. It must be perceived as a means in order to qualify as an interest. In short, this usage denies the possibility of the end as goal ever becoming an interest unless it ceases to be an end.

Easton's example does not satisfy the requirements of his notion of interest as a means. This is a small point, but worth making as it illustrates how older senses of interest linger on in defiance of new stipulated meanings. Easton believes that a law, administrative decision, or policy will be "in his interest . . . if it helps to fulfill his basic goal." Quite simply, the law, decision, or policy

cannot be "in his interest" as his "interest" is not the goal. It is not "in his interest" as much as it is his interest. It is not "in his instrumental value", it is an instrumental value (in Easton's sense). Easton is using his sense of "interest" to replace and take over the traditional common notion of "in someone's interest" as "in someone's advantage". In his own terms, it doesn't quite make sense.

It is noteworthy that Easton believes that basic goals and fundamental values ought to be called "basic goals" and "fundamental values" respectively. In short, the "end" is never an interest. It is puzzling why the "means" should be called an "interest" rather than simply "an instrumental value" or an "instrumental goal" or simply a "mean". Easton has not thought it necessary to provide any theoretical arguments in defence of his position.

Easton does suggest that his conception of "interest" aids him in distinguishing subjective and objective interests. Now this is really the point of view from which an interest is said to exist. If the subjective point of view is the focus, then "the interest of a person is found in his own interpretation of what is necessary if he is to realize his broader goals." An objective interest is described "as those instrumental needs which others attribute to a person or group according to criteria quite independent of the subjective perceptions of that person or group."⁶⁸¹ His general meaning is plain enough, but he has now replaced values with needs, and in most social science usage, these terms are distinguished. It also seems clear that Easton is still talking about an interest as that "which is necessary

to realize goals" and not as goals themselves. The interests as means are not so much subjective or objective as they are perceived as means by the actor or perceived as means for the actor by others.

Easton introduces an entirely different sense of "interest" in the course of distinguishing "interests" from "demands". He argues that "the expression of an interest in a matter is not identical with the input of a demand."⁶⁸² This involves "interest" as attention and as a general concern about something. Easton has to give up any notion of "interest" in a subjective sense as a disposition, if he is to be consistent with his definition.

Finally, Easton is brought to the point of using "interest" as one species of a general class of individual factors called "wants". He mentions as factors shaping demands, "such ideas and attitudes as expectations, opinions, motivations, ideologies interests and preferences." The entire background of attitudes and ideas out of which demands arise are called wants. "They represent what it is that the members of a system may want as contrasted with demands."⁶⁸³

In the first place, "interest" is given a motivational-dispositional sense which it does not enjoy in his stipulated meaning. In the second place, "interest" is now much more a "goal" than a "means", that is, it is part of "what members of a system may want" and not so much a "means" to get what they want.

So Easton proves something of a disappointment. The message in his book is to be clear and precise in drawing and maintaining conceptual distinctions so that empirical theory may advance. But at the same time he lumbers along in the old ways which he condemns. He is not consistent in

his usage, nor does he realize that all subjective senses of interest are prohibited by his definition. An interest is now without fixed mooring. It is anything which serves as a means to any goal regardless of whether it is liked, wanted, loathed, or even perceived. A person's interests could vary from a stick to an airplane ticket to a dime to a stomach pump to a dead uncle. At the same time, Easton never clarifies questions that arise in regard to whether a means is still an interest if it is not chosen by the individual, even if he knows about it and even if he approves of it himself.

There is another sense in which "interest" is used in relation to "means". This involves something acting as a "means to" or "on behalf of" something else, not too unlike Easton's sense. As an example, R.E. Flathman suggests that "'in the interest of world peace' means simply 'as a means to world peace.'"⁶⁸⁴

V. Interest as the feelings of curiosity and concern which stimulate, accompany, or are the result of, the attention process.

This general usage is set out in considerable detail in the first Chapter on psychology. A variety of senses are included and condensed in this rather general conception of "interest". It includes interest as simply a feeling, interest as a feeling of pleasure identical to the attention process, interest as the hedonic tone of the attention process, interest as the feeling of curiosity, and interest as a disposition characterized by the feeling of concern and worthwhileness which directs the attention process. The

technical senses are difficult to distinguish from the use of the term in ordinary language, included above, as the feeling of one who is concerned, has a personal concern in something such as to fix attention on an object or class of objects.

J.P. Plamenatz notices this sense of the term but discards it because it is thought to bear no special relation to the social sciences. "To take an interest in something is to be curious or concerned about it, but this sense of the word has nothing special to do with the social sciences."⁶⁸⁵ The point, however, is that political scientists have utilized this sense of "interest" extensively. In fact, this sense has been by far the most amenable to empirical methods and, as a consequence, is a most popular term in much of the behavioural literature. The now considerable literature on political participation employs this sense of interest as a major conceptual building block in the development of explanatory theory.⁶⁸⁶

In the bringing together under one general usage of so many fine distinctions, obvious difficulties are going to be encountered. There is no doubt that interest as a feeling of curiosity differs a great deal from interest as an emotionally charged disposition of concern which prompts attention and action. Unfortunately the literature under review fails to make careful distinctions and the extremes tend to turn in towards one another. I will distinguish only two senses very casually here, showing in the course of this section how they tend to blend in a general notion of interest as a disposition directing attention, involving feelings of concern, and tending to motivate conduct. The

two rough senses are: (1) interest as the feeling of curiosity, and (2) interest as concern which includes emotional involvement.

1. Interest as the feeling of curiosity.

Had Plamenatz isolated curiosity alone, there would be little question that it is a sense little employed in political science. S.I. Benn dismisses it quickly as an extreme case; "'showing an interest' may be little more than being curious about something."⁶⁸⁷ R.E. Flathman gives it a much more important role, however, as the extreme subjective side of the relationship between person and substantive which is, in his view, an interest.

At the "subjective" end of the continuum the relationship consists entirely of a psychological or intellectual attitude or curiosity toward or about the substantive.⁶⁸⁸

"Interest" in close association with "attention" is the focus of Adler and Borrow in their investigation of foreign affairs. Those who participated in courses and discussions on world affairs were called the "attentive public" and also went by the label "the interested."⁶⁸⁹

Yet this sense of interest as curiosity relating to attention merges rather suddenly into a major dimension of psychological involvement. Dahl lists it as the first component of involvement and describes interest as "how curious one is to know what is happening."⁶⁹⁰ Coupled with concern, a feeling of how important a person feels a decision is, a very important measure is produced which is strongly associated with activity.

2. Interest as concern which includes emotional involvement.

This slightly stronger sense of interest suggests firmer dispositional roots and a larger dose of the feeling of concern. The best single instance is set out by R.E. Lane.

A related attitude is one of "interest", which may be described as a sense that giving attention to some phenomenon is rewarding but does not necessarily imply a partisan attitude.⁶⁹¹

Now a related state is called "concern" or "caring" and it is said to be a central feature of political emotion. Although this is labeled "concern" in Dahl and in Lane, it is basically the phenomenon set aside by the sense of "interest" which is that of concern about something, such as to attend to, and to be motivated toward, a class of objects. Justification for combining these closely related senses of "interest" in the usage set out here is found in the Dahl-Lane literature. Lane allows that for some purposes it is important to distinguish his notion of "interest" from "concern" but that for the most part they are combined in the overall concept of "involvement". Lane believes that this is satisfactory because "questions of 'interest' and 'concern' tend to select out the same populations and to be related to behaviour in roughly the same way."⁶⁹² The argument here is that Lane's "involvement" is the general usage of "interest" as a concern about something such as to attend to and to be motivated toward it.

Campbell and associates generally concur in Lane's view, and in fact frequently use "interest" and "involvement" synonymously. The degree of interest, for instance, is often employed alone as the measure of political involvement.⁶⁹³ L.W. Milbrand likewise lumps interest and concern into involvement, and seems to equate their influence.

"Persons who are more interested in or concerned about an election are more likely to vote."⁶⁹⁴

Alfred de Grazia is very close to this sense of "interest" in his use of interest as involvement. His view is that involvement with an object accompanies, if it does not precede, the perception of any object. This is equivalent to "the law that interest precedes perception."⁶⁹⁵ This, however, leads de Grazia to certain exaggerated claims. He believes that every action is an "interested action" such that a politics of interest exists by the mere fact that it involves men in action. The kind of concern and involvement suggested in Lane and Dahl's notion of interest is much more intense and is known to be the property of a very small proportion of the American population.

It is important to notice how this general sense of interest has been used in numerous propositions relating to political behaviour. For example, interest in elections is positively related to other aspects of political behaviour, "voting, talking, politics, knowledge, exposure to the media, number and breadth of political opinions, and promptness of electoral decisions."⁶⁹⁶ The decision about whether or not to vote is thought to be mediated through interests at each class level in about the same way. People with the same interest in politics are likely to vote in about the same numbers regardless of their education.

Lane and Sears find that in election situations, "partisanship often follows interest, for an interest tends to 'develop' a person's group loyalties and latent predispositions."⁶⁹⁷ A conclusion of similar magnitude is advanced by Campbell and associates. "Our measure of interest carries

us further than the measure of partisan intensity in finding the conditions of non-voting."⁶⁹⁸

Murray Edelman relates a very similar sense of "interest" to the question of symbolic gratifications in politics. For example, he holds that the interests of organized groups in tangible resources are less easily satisfied than are interests in symbolic reassurance. He contends that success in seeking gratification, rather than yielding satiation "has consistently bred more confident and intensified interest in a larger claim."⁶⁹⁹ He also finds that "the intensity of an interest in a particular political object is lessened," in the degree to which there is action dedicating the state to overt involvement, and ritualistic assertions that it is in fact being attended to.⁷⁰⁰

A rather peculiar sense of "interest" in the general usage outlined, but one which places emphasis on the goal or purpose of the involvement as well as on the feeling of concern of the participants, is that set out by Murray Edelman and Herman Zeigler. Edelman makes it quite clear that the term "group interest" is not the same thing as an organized group.

Neither the CIO nor the Farm Bureau are "interests" but there are "interests", for example, in higher wages, stabilization of wages, higher farm prices. . . . Whoever adheres to any of these interests is a part of the group interest no matter to what organization he does or does not belong.⁷⁰¹

Although Zeigler does not reference Edelman, his contention is almost identical. Some formal organizations may be part of "particular interests" Zeigler argues, "but no formal organization is an interest in itself. There are interests in minimum wages, higher parity for farm products, or fair trade legislation."⁷⁰² He then loses track of his

argument and suggests that an interest is in fact a group, for it has goals and values.

Whoever subscribes to the values or goals of an interest or undertakes activity in support of these goals is part of the group activity no matter to which organization he may belong. ⁷⁰³

CHAPTER VIII

"INTEREST" IN POLITICAL SCIENCE:

CLAIM, STAKE, ADVANTAGE

I. Interest as a social or economic stake in something.

A. The usage outlined.

The common usage which regards an interest as the relation of being objectively concerned in something, by having a right or title, a claim upon, or a share or stake in something, is one of the very oldest usages of the term.⁷⁰⁴ In fact, it is a general usage with about five subsidiary senses; one of which is interest as a pecuniary share, or stake in, or claim upon, anything. It is, roughly, the sense reviewed by Plamenatz where interest is seen as "a right to a share of something."⁷⁰⁵

To speak of a person having "a stake in" something, could mean that he is concerned about his share in something, or, if he has no share in it, he is concerned about how it will affect him. It could also mean that a person has a share or stake in something without being much aware of it or concerned about it. It probably refers most explicitly to a pecuniary share or stake in something, for example, being a part owner of property or a shareholder or bondholder in a commercial or financial undertaking. To have an "interest in X" in the sense of having "a stake in X" would, strictly speaking, mean having money, property, assets of any kind, invested in X so that what happens to X would materially affect the person having the interest.

On the other hand, there seems no reason why a person's stake in something ought to be geared entirely to his material position. A person could have a "stake in" a great many things merely by the fact that they affect him and have to be dealt with, counted on, eliminated or generally taken into account. Because they affect him and bear on his life situation, he has "a stake in" them and in the way in which they develop and impinge on him.⁷⁰⁶ Now the stake may be largely emotional and affective, as in the case of the stockbroker who has a stake in his marriage, being very much in love, and very dependent on his wife. He would be severely deprived if his marriage were to fail. People may have stakes in something in respect to any relationship they enjoy with those things. The stake may be in regard to wealth, status, love, friendship, power and honour, as basic examples. So the kind of stake a person has in something can be subclassified into the kinds of ways in which a person can be related to anything. It may be personal, social, emotional, political, and financial. The thing in which a person has a stake can vary over the whole range of objects to which a person may be related in any of the above senses. A person may have an emotional stake in his marriage, an economic stake in a business, an emotional and financial stake in an aging aunt, a social stake in a club, and a political stake in them all.

The ordinary language use of interest as "a stake in" something seems most often to mean a social and economic stake in something. It is distinguished, in other words, by the kind of stake and not by the object in which the stake is said to exist. The kind of stake reflects the way in which the person is affected by classes of objects. In

this usage, the concern is about one's social and economic position.

Now an interest in this sense refers to a relationship between a person and a class of objects only in respect to the way in which the class of objects affects his social and economic position. A person will usually, though not always, have some subjective awareness of having a stake in something in this sense. Most people are concerned about their social and economic position and thus actively seek to promote, defend, and maintain that position. But a person may have a stake in something without being very concerned about the financial or social gains and losses. For example, the statement "I have an interest in General Mills," may mean "if it prospers I prosper; I have a financial share in it." This does not explicitly say what I feel about my stake in General Mills. Whether I am happy, excited, enthralled, or only vaguely aware of my relationship to General Mills is not explicated by the statement. On the other hand, it is quite possible for a person to have a stake in something without being aware of it. A small boy may have a stake in his grandfather's estate long before he knows about wills, the law, or even about grandfathers. This is to use what is sometimes spoken of as the objective sense of having an interest in something. It means that the interest is an economic stake only, and does not refer to the relationship between the individual and his economic position as he perceives and feels it in a dispositional sense. The concern here is much more with the subjective sense, that is, having, and being aware of having, a social or economic stake in something.

It is the argument here that this notion of interest has been given a more or less technical usage as an alternative to the notion of an interest as an attitude (and as a shared attitude). Those who hold that an interest is an attitude often fail to limit the scope, intensity, and most importantly, the objects, to which the attitudes relate. Thus interest could conceivably be about anything from antiques to polar bear breeding. Some political scientists attempt to counter this generalized notion of interest, by advancing the older sense of interest as a "stake in the community."

B. The British pressure group tradition.

The clearest and most forceful proponent of this view is Samuel E. Finer. His point is that interests are quite different than attitudes and that groups which represent interests ought to be clearly distinguished from groups which represent or promote attitudes.

It is equally obvious that many organizations using "pressure" do not represent any economic or social interest (in the Eighteenth Century sense), but represent an attitude. . . .⁷⁰⁷

Finer uses the term "lobby" to refer to two types of organizations: (a) interest groups, and (b) promotional (or propaganda) groups. Interest groups are primarily concerned with the welfare of their own members, that is, they are self-oriented in representing a particular economic or social interest. Promotional groups are said to exist primarily to advance a cause and the cause is thought to be other-directed.

In his Anonymous Empire, Finer makes his distinction more straightforward. The Federation of British Industries

is, he argues, an interest group, as is the TUC. Promotional and propaganda groups, "such as the Peace Pledge Union or Campaign for the Limitation of Secret Police Powers do not represent 'interests' in the same sense at all. They represent a cause, not a social or economic stake in society."⁷⁰⁸

Now Finer's notion of interest is clear enough. It involves a social or economic stake in society. What is not so clear in his discussion above is that the social or economic stake is held by a group which is also called "an interest". So in Finer's usage we have interests with interests; those having a stake having a stake.

As I see it an "interest" means some economic or social stake in the community, much as we used to talk of "the church interest" or the "landed interest". However some groups don't stand for a strict "interest" in this sense but stand for a cause, such as pacifism or feminism.⁷⁰⁸

The point is that the interest also means the group, the estate, the order in society which has social or economic power because of its ingrained and protected position. Samuel H. Beer speaks of an interest, in the old Whig theory, as broad social groupings which were not confined to particular places. These were estates, ranks, orders, or "to use the term most commonly employed 'interests'."⁷⁰⁹ Austin Ranney notes this sense in his review of the theory of representation. In the Middle Ages, the great estates of the realm were represented, that is, "in modern terminology, the 'estates' were the great interests of the realm."⁷¹⁰ Wilfred Harrison speaks of the 18th century interests as the "landed, commercial, or labouring interests," and explains how the dissenters came to form one of the interests as well. He argues that the balanced constitution was a device to protect the "settled 'liberties' of the

people considered as a set of 'interests' with a 'stake in the country'." ⁷¹¹ Here the strata of society is the interest, as in Finer's usage, while its stake in the country is also an interest in Finer's terms.

So Finer regards the groups which have a social or economic stake (an interest) in society as the interests; and it is these groups alone which represent interests. ⁷¹² The confusion surrounding this view is the following: Does an interest denote a social or economic stake in society or, on the other hand, does it denote those who hold the "stake"? Can a stake only be held by a group? A further deficiency results from Finer's tendency to use interest not only as a group with a social and economic stake in society, but as that which is to the profit, advantage, benefit of an individual or group. The difficulty of interpreting certain of Finer's statements may be evidenced by the following:

If a minister is to espouse the viewpoint of a particular interest, he must defend it not as its interest but as his own considered opinion.

The lobby relies on the civil service to smooth out administrative tangles; hopes to get it to adopt policies in its interests. ⁷¹³

Finer's position is basically this. Only groups with a social or economic stake in society and groups which represent those who have a social or economic stake in society can have interests. Groups which promote causes do not have social or economic stakes nor do they represent those who have a social or economic stake in society. Such groups have no interest regardless of what position in society their members enjoy and regardless of the kinds of feelings of involvement or importance, which they may experience in pro-

moting their cause.

There is no method of knowing what kinds of occupations, what kinds of economic and social relationships, go to make up a stake in anything. To say that the members of a Nuclear Disarmament group do not represent any social or economic stake in society is to take a rather unsympathetic and status quo view. Might not such a group represent a stake in a social and economic order of the future which does not consume resources on nuclear weapons? They may not hold that the existing kinds of social relations are satisfactory and surely they have a social stake in this. If labor unions have a social and economic stake, why might not members of the unions and members of universities and members of businesses have a similar kind of social and economic stake in a new kind of social and economic system, or a perceived stake in the existing system apart from that of their membership groups?

And why a distinction should come down between the social and economic stakes of groups on the one hand, and the ideological and political stakes on the other, is difficult to make out. The TUC coming out in favour of an income and wages policy is to act like an interest group, whereas to come out in favour of unilateral disarmament is to act as a promotional (cause) group. Presumably the members of one group could be now interest, now cause, now interest group. But Finer regards certain groups as interest or cause groups because such group members have a certain occupational and functional basis in society, and without examining issues as they arise.

There is a very strong impression in Finer that what most distinguishes interest groups from promotional (cause)

groups, is that the former are motivated largely by the self-interest of the members, that is, they are "primarily concerned with the welfare of their own members. . .", and "[t]hey only make contact with public bodies where the interest of the members demands this. . . . They are the self-interested lobbies."⁷¹⁴ The cause groups are apparently pursuing policies or issues which are thought to benefit others, regardless of the benefit that it may give them in an emotional, psychological sense to be so active. Self-interest here equals selfish motivational advantage and profit. This may, in the final analysis, be his real criterion for distinguishing interest and cause groups.

The mainstream of British pressure group theory has followed the course sounded by S.E. Finer. Harry Eckstein relies on a kind of Finerian position to distinguish his view of "interest" from both the Truman and Beer schools. Eckstein's is a troubled and halting, almost pointless, foray into the shortcomings and strengths of various theoretical positions in the group literature. He feels that he owes most to Truman and Beer yet he strains to distinguish himself from both. He argues initially that he is not going to enter the definitional quarrel about what constitutes an interest group, but then goes ahead in subsequent paragraphs to do so, possibly trying to win without wanting to appear to be a contestant in the field. Eckstein adds little if anything to what Finer has had to say, and, more significantly, he offers no more compelling theoretical or practical justifications for this view of interest than does Finer. In fact Eckstein never once tells us what he takes an interest to be.

Following Eckstein a certain way into his theoretical jungle may be helpful in illustrating the kind of undertaking it is in trying to pin someone down on the meaning of his basic conceptual tools.

To Eckstein, the genus is "pressure group" and not the "lobby" as Finer had recommended. Now a pressure group is a group which pursues collectively common political aims.⁷¹⁵ A group can become a pressure group if it pursues political purposes -- if it pursues its purposes in the field of politics. Eckstein sets out two kinds of pressure groups. (A) A group which pursues common political aims because of subjective agreements (shared attitudes); most "other oriented", unselfish pressure groups are of this kind. Here, as in Finer, altruism is a basic factor in marking out the cause or attitude group from the interest group. (B) A group may pursue common political aims because of attitudes, usually though not necessarily selfish, which are rooted in common objective characteristics. Now this is the prototype of the interest group. It is selfish as in Finer, but it is also a shared-attitude group as is the "other-oriented" group. The difference is that in the case of the former, the attitudes derive from common objective characteristics. Now Eckstein never tells us what this means, but it becomes clear that it amounts to little more than being a member of an interest group, a group with a social or economic stake in society, an entrenched occupational group.

To Eckstein, an interest group is defined "chiefly by objective characteristics". There is a high probability that political purposes will be pursued collectively, "just because they have objective characteristics in common."⁷¹⁶

Nothing is said of attitudes here, but it is clear that if an interest group is to become a pressure group it somewhere along the way has to develop shared attitudes, and presumably these originate from the common objective characteristics.

Now to distinguish his position on "interests" from Beer's view, Eckstein must distinguish between "interests" and "goals". This follows from his interpretation of Beer, that is, "I can see no reason why we should call all political goals interests (as does Beer)." The closest that Eckstein ever comes to setting out "interests" is the following:

Interests always grow out of objective characteristics while political goals may grow out of interests, but also out of values which are not reflections of objective characteristics.⁷¹⁷

In the first place, the characteristics that define "objective characteristics" are not set out. Presumably they consist of something like occupation and economic position, but this is not clear. In the second place, the distinguishing feature of an interest is not clear. It only "grows out of objective characteristics." Now an interest seems to be cast in opposition to a value. But surely values can grow out of objective characteristics if membership in a trade union, exclusive club, or a drinking fraternity qualifies as an objective characteristic. But Eckstein denies this. Values do not grow out of objective characteristics; by implication, only from subjective characteristics. This is the more puzzling since in his initial position on pressure groups it was stated that both kinds of such groups involve shared attitudes. Now shared attitudes seem to grow out of objective characteristics and it is odd that values should not be able to emerge in the same way.

One thing seems clear from Eckstein's statement. Interests are neither values nor goals. He has set out two bases for group formation and activity. From objective characteristics emerge interests which are somehow related to more or less selfish attitudes and which give rise in turn to political goals. On the other hand, the absence of objective characteristics, presumably the presence of subjective characteristics, yields values which may in turn give rise to political goals. It seems equally clear that interests are not the same thing as attitudes although this must be taken on faith and by implication rather than following clearly from any carefully outlined propositions. In any event, he argues that he can see no reason why "we should speak of interests only when shared attitudes actually exist (as recommended by Truman) without distinguishing the nature and origins of the attitudes."⁷¹⁸ Unfortunately, he stops here and does not elaborate. He has left us with a simple, one suspects all too simple, division between interests and attitudes. "If groups having no 'interest' in common engage in politics, I call them (following Allen Potter) attitude groups."⁷¹⁹

A number of comments seem to be in order. First of all, Eckstein has decided that "political goals may grow out of interests" which, in turn, have grown out of objective characteristics. Something is wrong in the gestation process, for he soon tells us that "the goals they pursue may be 'interests' or 'causes'. . . ."⁷²⁰ Eckstein is simply saying two very different things. Now an interest is a goal.

It is noteworthy that Eckstein attaches some importance to the admittedly "arbitrary" definitions he has engaged in.

They distinguish between things that ought to be distinguished (goals reflecting objective characteristics and goals reflecting purely subjective values) and correspond to the sense in which the term political "interest" is generally used in ordinary speech.⁷²¹

Eckstein believes that he has set apart two classes of goals; those reflecting objective, and those reflecting subjective characteristics. But this is pretty vague for a definition and in fact it is simply silly to think that any definition has been offered. Instead, the reader is told two contradictory things: objective characteristics yield interests which give rise to goals; and interests are a kind of political goal, those which reflect objective characteristics. Too many elements in the statements are unclear or completely undisclosed to seriously believe that anything has been distinguished.

A few final words on Eckstein may serve to set him in his tradition. In commenting on Finer, Eckstein argues that not all politically active groups "try to satisfy their 'interests'". Now it may be that (a) they have no interests or (b) they have them but don't bother trying to satisfy them. I believe he means the former, at least he ought to mean the former, but it is not clear. In any event, he says that there are "'promotional groups' (attitude groups) as well: groups that espouse causes rather than press vested interests."⁷²² He later explains the difference between interest and cause groups.

[T]he difference between groups agitating for their own corporate interests and groups dedicated to social causes, not necessarily arising out of their members' self-interest, interest groups as against 'promotional groups', as S.E. Finer calls them."⁷²³

And promotional groups are groups "seeking to achieve not their own interests but what they conceive to be broader social values."⁷²⁴ Here he falls back, as Finer sometimes seems to do, on the self-interested (personal advantage and welfare) as contrasted to altruistic motives. Also notice here that their own interests and "broader social values" are sought -- as goals.

So at last Eckstein is at least being consistent. His objective characteristics are Finer's interests as strata, the great occupational and functional groupings which have a social and economic stake in society. The interest which comes from the objective characteristics alone is like Finer's "interest" as the social or economic stake in the community, and this stake somehow defines goals or is itself a goal for the group members.

Eckstein does not agree with Finer in using the term "lobby" rather than "pressure group", but in regard to "interest", Eckstein believes that "Finer's exceptions to the old vocabulary are well taken" ⁷²⁵ But it is all the more confusing that, despite his attempt to come into line with Finer, Eckstein: (a) never explicitly sets out or adopts Finer's sense of an "interest", (b) follows the "promotional attitude" -- "interest-group" distinction but allows as Finer does not, that the shared attitudes are basic in both kinds of groups, and (c) seems to be trying to say that political goals may be "interests" or "causes", but does not say how we are to tell the difference.

An almost impossible situation exists in Allen Potter's theoretical chapters. It is apparent that the interest-attitude distinction is being urged, but in the intolerable absence of any definitions whatsoever. The whole thing is

like a confused maze, with the difference that even if you happen to get on to the right track, there is no sense of reward. Potter sets out two classes of groups, "those organizing sectional interests, and those organizing shared attitudes."⁷²⁶ The distinction between interests and causes drawn by Finer, reappears here.

[G]roups organizing sectional interests purport to speak for their sections in "defence" of their interests and groups organizing shared attitudes seek to 'promote' the causes arising from the attitudes of their members.⁷²⁷

There is one immediate problem. Groups may organize "sectional interests" and speak for their section in defence of their "interests". Now "sectional interests" seems to denote a section and its interests -- whatever that means, and the group is said to defend the interests of the section, which could mean their social and economic stake in society. This at least fits the Finerian mold. A section seems to be something like Finer's "interests", his occupational and functional groupings of society which have a "vested interest", a deep social and economic stake in the community. Potter argues that his section is distinguished by physical characteristics, activities, and status. What it amounts to is manufacturing occupations, farming occupations, employers groups, church groups.⁷²⁸ The consumer interest is said to be a section which has lacked articulation.

Now Potter, for the most part, appears to be arguing that only sections have interests in the same sense that Eckstein argues that only objective characteristics give birth to interests, but Potter sometimes admits that the distinction is too thin to make. In a way, he argues, all or-

ganized groups are derived from shared attitudes "since the organization of a section depends on an awareness of a common sectional interest." And in a sense, all organized groups represent sectional interests "insofar as they represent themselves."⁷²⁹ This is very perplexing. Presumably when a shared attitude group is organized to represent itself, it somehow takes on the qualities of a section, for it has an interest to be represented. Most often Potter speaks as though only sections have interests as when he describes how governments assume that each significant section has its organized groups which should be consulted when "the interests of the section are affected."⁷³⁰

Equally disturbing is Potter's classification of promotional groups in terms of the causes they purport to foster. One example is "groups concerned with economic interests and industrial causes." Now here the economic interest is made into a cause. If this is the case, which it certainly seems to be, there is no easy way to distinguish interests from causes. There is also no reason why a cause could not be the interest of a group, just as, apparently, promotion of an economic interest may become a cause. The confusing complexity of Potter is well exemplified in his discussion of the "interested party."

Among the members of a promotional group, an interested party may be defined as a member one of whose particular interests is related to the cause of the group in such a way that it is "in his interest" to belong.⁷³¹

If a "particular interest" is related to a "cause" in such a way that it is "in his interest" to belong, the person is an "interested party". This is pretty vague. But one thing at least, is clear. It is only in "someone's interest"

in the sense of being in his advantage, profit, welfare. It cannot be "in his interest" in the sense of "interest" that Potter seems to be using; but then his lack of definition weakens our case against him. Potter seems to mean that an "interested party" is one who has a stake in something, and, presumably, a social or economic stake.

Interested parties may differ among themselves about what is in their interest. . . . [C]onversely, the furtherance of the interest of the community may be regarded by the interested parties as a way to further their own interests.⁷³²

Potter also speaks of interests as simply groups. "A number of interests expect to achieve representation in one or both of the Houses of Parliament."⁷³³

It is very difficult to see what Potter is really meaning by his use of "interests", "causes", and "sections". The very best that can be said is that it amounts to a small improvement in clarity, if any, over Truman's "shared attitudes."

C. Other uses of interest as a stake in something.

The notion of an interest as a social and economic stake in something is employed by J.R. Lucas. Unfortunately, Lucas is no more able to use this sense alone than were those in the Finer tradition. Lucas explains that having an economic stake in something is one sense of interest, but that stakes of other kinds also qualify as interests. He speaks of the judge who confronts a situation where another has flouted his orders, and asks if he is really disinterested. "He has no pecuniary interest, true. But if his amour propre is involved, is he not really as interested as if he had some financial stake in the outcome?"⁷³⁴

This is a very good question, and one which Finer et. al. could scarcely answer. Lucas rightly believes that the concept of interest is indeterminate and can be expanded until it becomes vacuous. Somehow he thinks that "disinterested interests" can be distinguished from "interested interests". "Although we can distinguish disinterested interests from interested ones, it is too difficult a distinction to draw for us to be able to use in a rule of procedure."⁷³⁵

Now two senses of "interest" are obviously involved in this statement of "disinterested" and "interested" interests. Presumably a "disinterested interest" could include the following disinterested acts as the contrary of interest, where interest denotes a personal, financial or other stake in something. To have an interest is to have such a stake, usually a pecuniary one, and to be disinterested means to have no stake of this kind in the matter in question. The interest which is disinterested could, in Lucas's terms be a stake of a different kind, that is, an emotional stake, a general involvement in something which affects him in an affective manner. Now an "interested interest" is a more unusual case. It should mean that the interested person has a pecuniary stake in something and that the interest is, on the above analogy, something other than a financial one. But if this were so, it would be more straightforward to speak of a person having two different kinds of interests in something.

It is just as probable that Lucas is introducing a very different sense of "interest" altogether. The "disinterested" and "interested" still could refer to his not having, or having, a financial stake in something. The interest could then imply the common sense meaning of an in-

volvement, a concern of any kind. People using ordinary language senses of "interest", (Finer, Potter, and Eckstein) often fail to make the thing sharp or precise enough for the kind of technical theory in which they are purporting to engage. Ordinary language senses usually defy sharp boundaries and distinctions. They are vague and not especially suited for theoretical building blocks.

II. Interest as a claim and as a demand.

A. Interest as a claim.

1. The usage of Plamenatz.

This sense is found in the very general ordinary language usage of interest as "the relation of being objectively concerned in something, by having a right or title, a claim upon, or a share in." It is, to that extent, quite close to the notion of interest as a stake in some thing. For if one has a stake in something, recognized as a moral or legal share in something, then it can usually be claimed, with reasonable expectations that the claim will at least be heard. It is J.P. Plamenatz who has done most to tighten up this common sense usage and give it a definiteness and a precision for rigorous theoretical use. He notes that interest may mean "a claim worthy of consideration; that to have an interest is to have a claim on other persons in respect of something."⁷³⁶ The claim may be moral or legal and it need not be valid; it need only be plausible enough to be worth considering.

Plamenatz first outlined this notion of interest almost a decade before in a seminal article which now commands something close to a following.

Do we mean by "interest" anything more precise than this: the settled and avowed aspirations of a man or group of men which he or they -- or other people interested in them -- believe to be more or less realizable? This is indeed a vague notion. . . . 737

This position is fairly easy to examine. An interest is a settled aspiration, presumably one which has some permanence in a more or less dispositional sense. It is not a fleeting, spur-of-the-moment aspiration. Firstly, then, an aspiration must be settled, enduring, to be an interest. An interest is an aspiration which is avowed, an earnest desire (ambition) which is openly declared, expressed, and admitted. So, secondly, Plamenatz rules out settled aspirations which are not expressed and made public. They are not interests. He believes that an interest in this sense can be held and expressed by an individual or by a group of individuals.

The definition is made less than precise with the introduction of a different sense of "interest", that is, interest as a feeling or concern for a person or thing. This appears in the expression "or other people interested in them."

Plamenatz has it that a condition to be fulfilled before a settled and avowed aspiration can be classified as an interest, is that it be believed to be realizable. Not, apparently, that it be in fact realizable, but that it be believed to be realizable. Those who must think it realizable are either the actor, the individual or group holding the aspiration, or "other people interested in them." This obviously cannot be intended in the sense in which he is defining interest, that is, others with settled and avowed aspirations. This is, incidentally, a sense in which

it is difficult to speak of a person being "interested" at all. It seems clear that Plamenatz introduces a second and undefined sense of interest to help him in defining what is meant by "interest".

The condition of realizability is a weak link in his definition. On the face of it, it is difficult to see why the sheer realizability of a settled and avowed aspiration ought to be a criterion to be satisfied if it is to be called an interest. Presumably, if a person in a very smoothly functioning dictatorship wants freedom, aspires to, and avows freedom, and has done so for some time, it is still not an interest because it is not realizable. (Although it is an interest if the condition is only that it is believed to be realizable). Whereas in the same system, if a person has long aspired to be a soldier and expresses this, and it is quite conceivable that he can be a soldier, then this is an interest.

The other odd thing about the definition is that it opens the possibility that the outsider may play an inordinate, even a commanding, role in deciding which aspirations are realizable. It seems that the actor alone rules on the settled and avowed character of his aspirations and becomes clear about which are so qualified. It is only in regard to their realizability that the "interested" person has a role in deciding which are interests. Consider the case of an individual who has long held and avowed an aspiration which he now believes not to be realizable. He may certainly hold and express it even though he feels it is not now realizable. One concerned about this individual may, on the other hand, be in possession of a different impression of the circumstances and believe that his friend's aspiration is realizable.

Is the aspiration in question an interest? The contrary case is just as puzzling. A man expresses a settled aspiration which he believes is realizable if all conditions are met. The outside "interested" person believes him to be in error concerning its realizability and sets out the justification for this position. The aspirant does not agree and dispute continues. Has this man an interest?

There seems no way of deciding whether an aspiration is in fact an interest short of putting it to the test. It becomes simply an empirical question. If it is realizable in its present form, then it was (is?) an interest. But this leads to more uncertainty. What is to be said if a large portion of his aspiration is met in fact, and that he accepts that portion. Was it an interest? If only a small portion could be realized, and yet he accepts that? And what if a large or a small portion is realizable yet he wants the whole thing to be vouchesafed, is it then an interest? Perhaps fifty plus one per cent of the thing being realizable and the individual deciding to have that much is what is meant by an interest. But then Plamenatz has said only that it must be "believed" to be realizable and so it is not an empirical question in the same sense. That is, the only factual question is to decide whether or not the agent, and/or observer believed the aspiration to be realizable. If they did, then it was an interest, regardless of whether or not it proved to be realizable. The same problem remains, however, about how to decide in the event of a conflict between actor and observer in respect to its realizability. Presumably if their beliefs are in conflict, the aspirations being or not being an interest is simply not capable of solution. Putting it to the test does

not provide an answer to that question.

Plamenatz's basic point is that interests are not the same thing as ordinary wants (desires). To begin with, interests are said to be aspirations, settled, avowed, realizable aspirations and the terms "want" or "desire" are not used by Plamenatz in the definitional context. Plamenatz then sets out to show how interests, although species of want (desire) are very different from ordinary motives. Plamenatz speaks of "interests" as "demands" when he explicates the notion of "class interest". His argument is that conceptions of justice largely determine what a class asks for and insists upon having; in short, what it demands.

Now Plamenatz makes it quite clear that interests are only one class of a general motivational factor called an aspiration. He describes "how aspirations are converted into 'interests'." Most men are said to be dreamers and to desire much more than they can possibly obtain. Plamenatz wonders what it is that changes some aspirations "into claims they are willing to press against other men. It is surely the belief that these claims are just."⁷³⁸ In the above, interests (demands) are now said to be claims as well. It is the actor's common notion of justice, which is employed in determining which aspirations ought to be claimed. It is noteworthy that the conditions of sheer realizability and the judgment of the observer are no longer considered by Plamenatz.

Plamenatz sums up his position on the relation of moral ideas to the creation of interests (demands).

[W]e cannot explain how some of his many aspirations are transformed into the more or less permanent and effective demands that he calls his interests without the intervention of moral ideas.⁷³⁹

To discover the interests of a class, group, or individual, Plamenatz contends, one must examine what in fact they strive for, demand, and most insist on. The data to be considered are men's aspirations which, in their view of moral and legal standards, they feel justified in pressing as demands (claims). The starting point in discovering what their interests are is to see what they aspire to and claim. Finally, Plamenatz warns that interests are a species of basic motives, but must be distinguished from them in a pretty fundamental way.

We must always distinguish between men's desires and needs, on the one hand, and their more or less consistently pressed claims on the other. It is the latter that are their interests. [T]he ambitions and settled preference he calls his interests.⁷⁴⁰

Interests to Plamenatz are a dispositional-motivational factor, an aspiration which is distinguished from other needs and desires by being: (a) settled, (b) declared, (c) believed to be realizable, and (d) justified in the mind of the actor or outsider in view of prevailing notions of justice. To be an interest, a claim must be for only what he believes he deserves, what is his due.

Here is a further fetter on Plamenatz's "interests". They are dependent on prevailing legal and ethical standards for sanction, and if they fail to meet with current notions, they are simply not interests. If a society held that only some interests, say, majority interests, ought to be satisfied, then innovation could be very easily stifled and the minority could be very easily denied. At the same time, holding an interest is a very exacting business in Plamenatz's sense. A person must take thought, he must closely scrutinize his many aspirations, wishes, needs and desires, and

sift out only the most settled. He must tentatively formulate these aspirations as claims or demands. Now he must perceive and evaluate common notions of justice and determine whether his aspiration is justifiable, whether or not it is currently held that he deserves what he would like to ask for and insist upon. He must then decide how realizable his aspirations are in terms of the current situation, and it is suggested that he should also weigh the views of outsiders "interested" in him on the question of realizability. He must then, if these conditions are met, carry his aspirations to activity, and avow his claims, insist on them and persistently press them. He then ~~has~~ an interest. But it surely takes a particular kind of person to have interests.

Now a good part of Plamenatz's argument rests on the assertion that men do in fact act in the manner described above, and that it is because men act in this way that interests become the kind of thing Plamenatz believes they are. If men in fact press a good many desires and needs which are not settled, and with scant concern about whether or not they are justified under prevailing views of morality and law, then his notion of an interest loses its force as a tool for describing much of ongoing behaviour.

A very similar position on "interests" is set out by Plamenatz in Man and Society. It seems that interests become much more "what they want"⁷⁴¹ rather than the "settled and avowed aspiration" of his earlier work. But this is a small point not worth worrying about. Plamenatz again presses his distinction between "desires" and "interests". Apparently as a child acquires notions of justice, it no longer "demands whatever it desires but only what it feels entitled to." The actors conception of what can be justi-

fiably asked for in terms of the prevailing ethical and legal system is still crucial. And so it is that a child comes to have "more or less settled preferences and ambitions. It has what most men (and Marx) understand by interests."⁷⁴² It could be noted that the distinction between morality and expediency is crucial here, that is, the difference between what a child ought to get and what he believes he can obtain. There is little room for expediency in Plamenatz's definition. It should also be remembered that Plamenatz is talking about how people in fact behave. The question of how often, and to what extent, people do resort to moral standards in formulating claims ought to be asked.

This then is Plamenatz's position on interests as a kind or class of aspirations; those justified, settled, avowed, and realizable aspirations which can be called demands (claims). At the same time, Plamenatz sets out another use of interest which will form the focus of the next section. It is mentioned here only to illustrate that even one of such critical rigour and schooling in the use of the term "interest", could falter slightly along the way.

Plamenatz shifts to the general usage of "interests" as that which is in, or to, a person's (group's) profit, advantage, benefit. At the same time, this becomes a simple "means" to the satisfaction of aspirations. In his earlier usage, such aspirations were themselves the interests.

For example, he speaks of Hobbes' belief that man's reason is strong enough to "enable him to discover what is in his enduring interest." He "also supposes they are liable to strong passions which shut their eyes to that interest."⁷⁴³ And in speaking of customs and classes, Plamenatz observes that "customs which were originally in the common interest

may come to be laws which are in the interest only of the rich."⁷⁴⁴

Plamenatz moves almost imperceptibly to the sense of "interest" as a "means" to what one wants. He discloses this in describing what is meant by an individual's "true interests". His example is that someone wants something, and that it is a settled purpose, an ambition, and not a momentary impulse or appetite. Now he says nothing of its justifiability or realizability but he can still say that "his true interest is that he should not have it", that is, "it is not his true interest that it should be satisfied."⁷⁴⁵ Now clearly the distinguishing feature of an interest has moved from what in fact a man claims (given the conditions to be met). Plamenatz believes that in saying "it is not his true interest" is to say something like he will be disappointed if he gets what he wants, he will find he does not like it, or he gets with it things which he dislikes. In other words, the present settled and avowed aspiration is discredited as an interest, not because of anything about it as such, but because of its relation or role in regard to his other wants. The aspiration in question is not his true interest because it is not a means to satisfying deeper and more general aspirations. A thing is an interest if it satisfied these kinds of basic wants. The fact that interests become a purely "means performing thing" is set out clearly.

The interests of a class are merely the interests common to its members, they are whatever satisfies the demands made by its members, or made on their behalf by their acknowledged spokesmen. It's true or objective interests are whatever makes for their enduring satisfaction, whatever satisfies their ambitions without stimulating in them ambitions which cannot be satisfied.⁷⁴⁶

It is fairly clear that the demands and ambitions are now no longer the interests, but whatever satisfies them is the interest. The interest is now either motivationally neutral or it is the object of the demand (aspiration) as a separate and distinct part of the motivational sequence.

2. The usage of Benn.

A position which is very close to the early formulation advanced by Plamenatz is that set out by S.I. Benn. It is Benn who also argues that interests should be sharply distinguished from desires. The basis for the distinction is not so much Plamenatz's settled and avowed conditions as his conditions of "justifiability" and "realizability".

One's interests are not what one aspires to, in one's secret dreams. Anything a farmer puts forward as an interest would probably be something he thought he could reasonably ask for, and which he thought he had a reasonable chance of persuading people he ought to have, if not right away, perhaps, then at some future date, when things were easier and more pressing claims had been met.⁷⁴⁷

To Benn an aspiration (want) is an interest only if it can be reasonably asked for from the actor's viewpoint and if he has a reasonable chance of bringing others to this view. It is a claim, something which is wanted, but also something the actor feels he has a right or title to.

Notice first that Benn comes closer to the ordinary sense of having a right or title, a claim upon, or a share in. This becomes clearer as Benn proceeds. He does argue that a man "would be unlikely to put forward as an interest what he felt himself that he had no claim to."⁷⁴⁸ Now Plamenatz has set out a similar condition, but it is only one of the four which he posits. In Benn, it is much more crucial than that. The standards of morality or justice which bear on

the question of "interests" are all important. Interests are not simply actual wants and aspirations, they are rather wants which correspond to, and are limited by, certain socially accepted standards. Interests to Benn are at the root - wants - but wants which have been converted into claims (demands) by being referred to, and presumably justified in the light of, certain standards. "But once wants are referred to standards, they are already claims, i.e., demands backed by reasons for satisfying them."⁷⁴⁹

Benn stressed what amounts to a more serious departure from Plamenatz than he realizes. To Plamenatz, interests can only be discovered by examining what people strive for, what demands they make, what they insist on. Benn does not believe that interests are that closely geared to actual aspirations. In this respect, it is the standard of justice, fairness, law, whatever, which has the controlling weight in determining an interest in fact, even in the absence of actual aspirations. This means that it is possible to impute interests to an individual, group, or class, simply by deciding what things they could justifiably claim in a particular situation, given the prevailing standards.

[M]ight not the "objective interests" of a class mean what might be reasonably demanded for it in its particular situation irrespective of whether it actually aspires to it itself?⁷⁵⁰

Now in Plamenatz, the aspiration is always the basis for an interest. Benn sometimes appears to hold this. But in the above passage he departs violently from this relation to actual aspiration and allows that interests can be said to exist if observers demand things which a class could justifiably claim. Demands and claims are still interests, but they are no longer the same thing as before, having been di-

forced from the felt aspirations of the persons said to have those interests. Benn illustrates his case with an example of a class of slaves who are apathetic about freedom.

[O]ne might say that it would be better for them, or in their best interests, if they were free, not because this is what they really want, but because slavery is inconsistent with human dignity, or some other general moral standard of that sort.⁷⁵¹

But Benn retracts from the cold objective implications of this view later in admitting that to say that something is in a person's interest is to say that he would want it at some time. Interests are like standards, but they "are still standards which the subject himself, immediately or ultimately, would be anxious to attain."⁷⁵² That the interests themselves emerge as standards is again a departure from Plamenatz. It is, in short, what Benn means by his contention that "interests may have to be understood normatively, and not simply as accounts of actual desires."⁷⁵³ That is to say, the norm (standard) is not, as Plamenatz holds, a condition necessary for, and external to, an interest, but that "in some contexts at least, the norm is part of the meaning of 'interest'."⁷⁵⁴ So rather than holding separate aspirations and ethical and legal standards in terms of which they can or cannot be justified, Benn lumps them together as the interest. An interest becomes "no more than a claim with reasons offered in support of it." Somehow, to Benn, the reasons and the giving of reasons is part of what is meant by an interest and not, as Plamenatz more reasonably maintains, a ground for justifying the pressing of an interest.

3. Other usages.

The basic step taken by Plamenatz and by Benn has been to distinguish ordinary wants (motives) from a particular

class of wants which are said to be interests. A distinction, however difficult to make given the conditions to be met, has been drawn. Benn goes further by building the normative and legal standards into the very notion of an interest, rather than allowing them to be conditions for the emergence of interests from ordinary wants and needs.⁷⁵⁵ A somewhat confused version of both Plamenatz and Benn appears in the work of Charles Fried. He distinguishes between wants as bare demands for satisfaction, and interests which "represent appeals to some existing or proposed scheme of justification, some system for satisfying wants."⁷⁵⁶ But no longer is the interest at base an aspiration (want) which is more or less permanent and which the actor feels justified in formulating and demanding because he feels that it is justified by existing standards. The interest seems to be the standard external to the wanting individual in terms of which claims are evaluated as being justifiable or not.

The concept of "interest" may be further specified as follows: a claim is justified by reference to an interest when the particular deciding agency is obliged or would be well advised to decide the particular case in terms of a rule."⁷⁵⁷

So in Fried's view, interests are no longer claims but have become the standard, the Poundian "social interest". The distinction he draws is that between wants and claims, where claims are evaluated against interests seen as rules or norms.

The failure to see that claims. . . often are more appropriately viewed against a background of interests rather than as wants demanding immediate satisfaction may account for confusions in many areas of the law. . . . [A]nd yet his claims might better be considered in terms of the interests it involves. . . .⁷⁵⁸

What portends to use and further the analysis of Plamenatz and Benn is really nothing of the sort. It is rather a reinterpretation of the Poundian thesis.

B. Interest as a demand.

1. The usage of Lasswell and Kaplan.

The notion of an interest as a demand overlaps, in most important respects, with the notion of an interest as a claim. Very often the two terms are used interchangeably, that is, "claim" and "demand", and this is the case with Plamenatz and Benn. Sometimes "demand" is used to denote the same phenomena others set aside by the terms "interest" and "claims". This is so with H.D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan. An interest is thought to be more than an ordinary desire (expectation) and it is formulated, verbalized, and expressed in a particular form.

[A]n interest is neither a blind desire nor a knowing untinged by valuation. In every interest analysis discloses competent demands and expectations. . . . [A]n interest is a pattern of demands and its supporting expectations. . . .⁷⁵⁹

Unfortunately this sense breaks down in their account of valid and assumed interests. The contention is that in the case of "valid interests" the component expectations are warranted by evidence, and that in the cases of "assumed interests, the expectations are not warranted. Now the statement used to illustrate their point is not well taken. They use the propositions: "a person has an interest in x and that x is to his interest. The latter asserts that in fact x constitutes or will lead to the attainment of the person's values."⁷⁶⁰

In the first place, it seems that both statements may be asserted as facts and that, if challenged, both can be put to the test of disconfirmation. In the second place,

"interest" is used as any means to the realization of a person's values, and not in the earlier stipulated sense of demands and supporting expectations. In the third place, the two statements, "a person has an interest in X", and "X is to his interest", utilize two (or three) different senses of interest. It is not a simple case of a single sense of "interest" being either assumed or valid. To say Y has an interest in X may mean Y has a disposition to attend to X; he is curious about X; or that, more strongly, he is very concerned about X. On the other hand, it may mean that Y has a "stake in" X in the sense of a social and economic stake or share in X. He may have money and status to gain or lose. To say that "X is to his interest", is to use the ordinary language notion of an interest as that which is to one's advantage, profit, benefit. If X is to his interest, it is to his advantage. There is no single "interest" dimension involved here.

2. The usage of Almond.

The general use of "interest" as a demand (claim) is sometimes employed by Gabriel Almond in his theoretical formulations. Possibly the most serious weakness with this work is the splendid ambiguity and vagueness of his terms. It is often impossible and usually difficult to know what he means. For example, "interests" seem to be "demands". He argues that "the demands entering the political system are articulated, aggregated, combined or converted into policies. . . ." ⁷⁶¹ And as two phases of the political conversion function, he notes "(i) the articulation of interests or demands, (ii) the aggregation or combination of interests into policy proposals. . . ." ⁷⁶² There is no distinction drawn here. Likewise, "demands" and "interests" are used

interchangeably in the following:

We need to look at the way in which (1) demands are formulated (interest articulation) (2) demands are combined in the form of alternative courses of action (interest aggregation).⁷⁶³

Now this equation of terms goes on intermittently throughout. We learn that interest articulation is the process by which "individuals and groups make demands upon the political decision makers. . .", and that if groups in a society fail to find open channels "through which to express their interests and needs, these demands are likely to remain unsatisfied."⁷⁶⁴ A fairly clear case of synonymous usage appears in Almond's discussion of interest aggregation.

A political party convention, as it receives the complaints and demands of labour unions and business organizations, and juggles, bargains and compromises these conflicting interests into some form of policy statement is engaging in interest aggregation.⁷⁶⁵

And when Almond tells us that "a manifest interest articulation is an explicit formulation of a claim or a demand," it seems that the terms are synonymous.⁷⁶⁶

Yet judging by other instances of usage and the general context of his account, this can scarcely be the case. That ambiguity akin to chaos results from Almond's usage will be the argument in the balance of this section.

In direct opposition to the equation of "interest" and "demand", Almond sometimes sets them apart. Consider the ambiguity of the following: "Every political system has some way of articulating interests, claims, demands for political action."⁷⁶⁷ One distinguishing feature of the associational interest group is the "orderly procedures for the formulation of interests and demands, and transmission of these demands to other political structures. . . ."⁷⁶⁸ Likewise he speaks variously of "the demand or claim", "demands and claims. . . ."

Very often an interest in Almond's usage seems synonymous with a group. In Anglo-American systems he believes that "most of the 'potential' interests have been organized and possess bureaucracies."⁷⁶⁹ In Asia and into the Middle East, Almond discloses how cliques, informal groupings, powerful families "formed within such non-association interests as religious communities, the large landowners, the business community, and the like."⁷⁷⁰ In another place, Almond tells us that "by non-associational interests we have in mind kinship and lineage groups. . . which articulate interests informally, and intermittently. . . ."⁷⁷¹ This is less than straight forward. At one time Almond spoke of the concern of scholars about "the 'function' of interest in the political process" as if interest were a function or performed a function.⁷⁷² Almond uses the term "interest" as "concern" or "advantage" in its distinguishing role in characterizing an "interest group": "[A] group of individuals who are linked by particular bonds of concern or advantage, and who have some awareness of these bonds."⁷⁷³

There is, finally, a sense of "interest" in Almond whereby "interest" is the basis for the formulation of "demands". Thus "interest" assumes the role of "want", "desire", "aspiration" in Plamenatz and Benn, and "demand" performs the function of "interest". This, of course, is inconsistent with Almond's other senses of "interest". The earliest suggestion of this sense of "interest" in Almond appears in the following:

[T]he job of translating the interests of different segments of the society into political demands, and bringing these demands to bear in the policy-making process was largely performed by the trade-union movements, the agricultural federations, business groups,

trade associations and church groups. . . .⁷⁷⁴

Almond explains that one means by which totalitarian parties aggregate interests is by "the transmission and aggregation of demands and claims through the party structure." A more nebulous sense of an interest base, although he may intend "interest" as group, appears in Almond's description of the French system.

What reaches the legislative process from the interest groups and through the political parties thus are the "now", unaggregated demands of specific interests. . . .⁷⁷⁵

The impression that interest is some kind of basic motivating factor on the basis of which claims (demands) are pressed is reinforced in Almond's account of the interest articulation function. It often appears that what in fact is articulated by interest articulation is not interests, but claims and demands. For one who seriously attempts to formulate rigorous empirical theory, and who is taken seriously by others, this kind of rough and ambiguous use of key explanatory concepts is disappointing.⁷⁷⁶

3. The usage of Easton.

This last use of "interest" as a basis of political demands is the view taken most recently by David Easton. Although interests have often been confused with demands, Easton contends that "conceptually they are quite separate."⁷⁷⁷

A demand is said to be an expression of opinion about whether or not there should be an authoritative allocation with regard to a certain subject matter. An "interest", in Easton's view, is simply an instrumental value, a "means" to any basic goal. On the other hand, interests seem to act as the basis for demands. Easton warns against concluding "that every interest must become incorporated into a demand, but

it seems that many are so incorporated.⁷⁷⁸ He also talks of how, in the case of "objective interests", the very people most affected by interests may not be aware of them and so may not seek "to convert them into demands."⁷⁷⁹ So, somehow interests appear in political discussion in the form of demands. In marking the difference between an interest and a demand, Easton relies on a sense of "interest" which is entirely inconsistent with his definition. Interest as a means to a goal, an instrumental value, rules out the sense of interest as a disposition of concern related to attention.

The expression of an interest in a matter is not identical with the input of a demand. To become a demand, there needs to be voiced a proposal that authoritative action be taken with regard to it.⁷⁸⁰

III. Interest in relation to advantage.

A. The general usage examined.

There is a vague and very general usage of "interest" which is defined by its relation to advantage, profit, good, benefit. More specifically, there are two rather similar yet quite distinguishable uses of interest which stand in some relationship with the notion of advantage.

1. Interest as advantage.

In the first place, a person's interest sometimes means his advantage, his good, his benefit. In this context a person's interest is analagous to the end state or goal of a motivational sequence. A person's interest signifies his advantage, his satisfaction, having what he wants. It is often expressed as "x is in y's interest". X is in (to, for) y's interest if x is in, (to, for) his good, advantage,

profit. This raises a number of questions. What is a person's advantage taken to be? Who decides what a person's advantage is taken to be? The first question gives rise to a number of possibilities. A person's advantage may be to profit materially; it may be to achieve the (or some) ethical good; it may be to enjoy a condition of happiness. The second question is this: is a person's advantage what he wants, or is it what another person believes he ought to want? Both questions are sometimes implied, and great confusion results. This is the confusion that is sometimes expressed in the distinction between an individual's interests and his "real" or "true" interests. This confusion, however, may also result from simply taking a person's interests as generally what he wants, his notions of his advantage, good, profit. This occurs by drawing a distinction between what he wants and what he would want, being the kind of person he is, if he knew himself and his circumstances better. For example, an individual may be set on profiting materially and he may regard this as his advantage. Hence he considers any means to this end as being in his interest. An outsider may hold that he would be far more relaxed and happy if he were to regard modest means and good works as his advantage. The outsider may then argue that this is his real interest and that he ought to pursue it. But there is then a third question. If a person's advantage is to get what he wants, to reach satisfaction, to partake of his good, surely there is immediate and longrange advantage, fleeting and basic advantage. So "x may be in y's interest", if the interest is to gain materially, but x may not be in y's interest in terms of his future gain or possibilities for future gain.

This last question leads to a variety of complications. The notion of immediate and long-range interest is plain enough. Given a sense of advantage as profiting materially, it may be that profiting now in terms of maximizing resources, means losing friends, and making certain definite resource commitments, which will not in fact allow one to profit materially as extensively in the future. So immediate interest may not facilitate long-term interest. But this is simply to admit that human life, plans, and circumstances are not entirely predictable, and that there is no inexorable relationship between certain ends and certain means. To say of this situation that the person has "mistaken his interest" or "does not know his interest" is to talk nonsense. He may know well enough that his interest, as he sees it, is to profit materially. He may mistake the means to do this, he may take unwise risks, and he may misjudge circumstances and others' reactions to him, but his notion of his interest as advantage could be clear and firm.

A rather different kind of issue is raised when a distinction is drawn between a person's basic advantage and his momentary, fleeting, and temporary advantage. This implies a hierarchy of interests as states of being advantaged or profiting, which an individual enjoys. Many people in fact have a variety of areas which concern them greatly. Now it should be noted that to specify one's notion of advantage, profit, good, is, in more technical language, to specify areas of concern and striving, basic goals. To say that some are basic, or that one is basic, is simply to admit that it is more ego-involved, and more salient to the individual. There is more of himself invested in it. The less ego-involved and less salient areas of striving are

what might be termed the fleeting, temporary, momentary, advantage (interests). The issue here is that a person may have a number of interests and that he may correctly or incorrectly, wisely or unwisely, relate them together in terms of enjoying less important ones and still enjoying more basic ones. But again, to overindulge a lesser interest and thus forsake the opportunity of enjoying a more basic interest, is not to "mistake one's interest" or be unaware of one's interest. It is simply to have incorrectly related them, misjudged the implications of them, and mistaken certain circumstances. It does not mean that one's interests have become any less clear than they ever were or could be.

2. Interest as that which promotes one's advantage.

In the second place, a person's interest sometimes means that which is to or for his advantage, profit, good, benefit. In this context a person's interest is that which acts as a means to an end, i.e., the person achieving his good, his advantage, however that is defined. So interest in this sense is simply the role of a "means" to an end. Whatever fulfills this role is an interest. It helps the person get what he wants. It is not the sense implied in "is x in y's interest?"; it is the sense implied in saying "x is y's interest because it helps y get z."

Very often these two senses of interest as advantage are confused. It is easy to see how this could happen. If interest is loosely defined as advantage, it may be taken to be the advantage itself and it may also be seen as whatever contributes to bringing about the advantage.

This section will briefly set out both senses of interest in relation to advantage. It will then examine cer-

tain problems which emerge in using interest in these senses.

B. Interest as a person's advantage (good, profit) as such.

This sense is set out by J. Mark Baldwin: "Interests loosely used for personal advantage or good; as in the phrase 'it is in his interest to do so'."⁷⁸¹ Now in this sense it is crucial to know what things constitute a person's interest as advantage (good). The most common position on this question is to treat advantage as material advantage, economic gain. To be advantaged, to profit, to enjoy one's good, means to profit materially, to have wealth. Now it is important to notice that in using this sense, money is not an interest. It is a means to one's interest which is to profit materially. The interest is the goal (end) not the means. Roy Macridis expresses this sense of interest as well as any.

"Interest" may mean material and economic interest, with every individual or group attempting to maximize in a rational manner material advantages. . . . There is such a thing as the interest of General Motors, the Farm Bureau and perhaps of the consumer.⁷⁸²

In this sense, interest as advantage is more accurately described, however vague the referrent, as a state, as a condition, rather than as a thing; profiting materially rather than making a dollar, living in material comfort rather than making a good deal on a piece of real estate.

Vernon Van Dyke notes that there is a pronounced tendency to attach an economic connotation to the word "interest". This, he holds, is the case with those who see political developments as outcomes of conflicting class interests. They tend to define "class" in terms of economic status and to "define interests in terms of economic advantage. Virtually the same can be said of those who speak

of conflicting sectional interests." He contends that "authors who speak of the 'harmony of interests' are likely to assume that the reference is to a mutuality of economic advantage."⁷⁸³ This general equation of "interest" as "economic" (material) advantage is nowhere as common as in the works of Charles A. Beard.⁷⁸⁴ A rare modern expression of this position is argued by J. Cropsey. "Politics, so far as 'interest' means 'economic interest' (which it does largely, but not exclusively,) is the mutual adjustment of economic positions. . . ."⁷⁸⁵ Samuel Beer states it succinctly enough alongside a rather different sense of the term." The aims of such interests are to be taken as their immediate economic self-interest."⁷⁸⁶ Oliver Garceau's review of the group literature revealed that many group leaders "have developed indispensable skills for negotiating in the group's interest."⁷⁸⁷

Friedrich believes that material and ideal advantages are closely intertwined, and that "the concept of 'interest' serves the purpose of comprehending them in their inter-relationships. Every interest group inclines to view its interest in an 'ideal' as well as 'material perspective'." Friedrich cautions that we should not allow the ideal projection to hide the "'material' advantage which a group standing for that interest seeks to realize."⁷⁸⁸

Other senses of "interest" as advantage abound. Advantage, although usually denoting the economic (material) dimension, has sometimes been taken in the normative sense as the individual's notion of his own good. This has also been employed in speaking of the public interest, as in R.S. Downies' position that anything is a function of government

if "it furthers the public good or the national interest."⁷⁸⁹
 This, of course, is not very commonly used, as interest is more frequently contrasted with morality. Although Downie admits that "the performance of our duties is almost always in our short or long-term interests" he also contends that the main defining feature of moral experience is "the consciousness of a claim that cuts across self-interest. . . ."⁷⁹⁰
 A person's "advantage" has been defined as his life, liberty and property, as is the case with Locke and with J.R. Lucas. Before liberty and property, stand life. "Life is the most central interest, both because it is the pre-condition of every other interest, and because each man's life is what is most peculiarly his own."⁷⁹¹

Interest in the various senses of advantage, performs a useful role in all kinds of contexts. For example, most talk of class interests employs "interest" in the general sense of economic and material advantage. When it is said that there is "rule in the interest of a chosen class,"⁷⁹² this broad sense of advantage is usually implied. Likewise, as previously noted, questions of long-term and short-term interests most often employ this usage. Blackham, like Hume, has it that "men were prone to take short views and to act impulsively, even against their interests."⁷⁹³
 And Hacker believes that "Plato's main interest" was to have wise and public spirited rulers who would not be "tempted to rule in their own interest."⁷⁹⁴ C.B. MacPherson's discussion of Locke's position on the labouring class contains a confusing though illustrative example of this sense of interest.

It was not that the interests of the labouring

class were subordinated to the national interest. The labouring class was not considered to have an interest; the only interest was the ruling class view of the national interest.⁷⁹⁵

Interest is often employed as advantage without a specified meaning being given to advantage. Thus it has been said that going to a good school and eating healthful food are in a child's interest. General advantage, welfare, good, are sometimes intended, as in the sense of a person fulfilling a variety of cultural goals which he may or may not set for himself, but which are generally thought to be good. This broad sense has been selected by C.W. Cassinelli in formulating his view of the public interest.

The word "interest" indicates the evaluational meaning of the standard; it refers to something we should be "interested in", even though we may not be, and it could be replaced by "profit", "welfare", or "benefit".⁷⁹⁶

Now, obviously, two senses of "interest" are used in his statement, but only the notion of profit, benefit, is of importance here. Cassinelli holds that to say of a policy that it is in the public interest, is to judge it "consistent with a political situation that is beneficial to everyone, if not immediately at least in the long run, and whether or not everyone realizes it."⁷⁹⁷

C. Interest as that which is to or for the advantage, good, benefit, or profit of anyone.

1. The usage of Plamenatz.

This use of "interest" has been employed in a rather vague and non-technical sense for centuries.⁷⁹⁸ It is only recently that it has been specified more carefully. The best recent example of more rigorous and thoughtful spe-

cification occurs in the writing of J.P. Plamenatz. It is also in Plamenatz that this sense appears most clearly as denoting the phenomenon which acts as the means in a usually quite general means-end relationship.

An interest may mean. . . (d) whatever is profitable to a person or group, because it gives him or them what he or they want or will find satisfactory. [A] man's interest is whatever is profitable to him, whatever helps him get what he wants or what will satisfy him. In this sense a man may not know his own interest or others may know it better than he does.⁷⁹⁹

Here Plamenatz specifies the means role and the notion of advantage. An interest is whatever helps a man get what he wants. So it is always profitable for a man to get what he wants and this is what is meant by his advantage. An exception is written into the definition, and one which bears on the individual's hierarchy of wants. Plamenatz is saying that a person may have more basic wants which take priority and require satisfaction. It is always profitable (in his advantage) to satisfy these wants even though lesser wants have to be disregarded. Given this provision, those things, events, states, whatever, which act as means to want satisfaction, which is a person's profit (or advantage), are to be regarded as his interests. The distinction here is between the state or condition of want-satisfaction which is the advantage or profit of the individual, and the things which aid in bringing this about. In the last section, the state of being advantaged was regarded as the interest. In this sense it is only the means which are interests, though they are means to his advantage, as in the first sense.

The usually vague notion of "advantage" is given some limits by Plamenatz. It becomes "what a man wants or what

will satisfy him." A man profits or is advantaged if his wants are satisfied. The wants mark and distinguish the notion of advantage which may be operative at a given time and under given circumstances. The wants are not the interests. The interests are the means to want satisfaction.⁸⁰⁰ Interest is not a motive, it is not a disposition, it is not a feeling of concern, curiosity, or pleasure relating to the attention process, it is not an activity nor an attitude, but it is anything which acts as a means to want satisfaction.

Before proceeding to various aspects of this special sense of interest, it would be well to consider a number of difficulties present in the formulation advanced by Plamenatz.⁸⁰¹ By way of clarification, Plamenatz cannot mean by an interest the actual goal object of a motivational sequence. He has told us over and over that there is a distinction between wants and interests. Now if by an interest he intends not what is a means to want satisfaction but the actual goal which gives or brings satisfaction, and is itself a part of the satisfaction, then he has not really distinguished the want from the interest. In fact, in the above, the goal is an integral part of the wanting. To describe the want is to describe the goal, to say that a want exists is to say that a particular goal or class of goals is being sought. Now it seems clear that Plamenatz wants to distinguish his usage from the interest as want position, that is, interest as used in the motivational disposition school. That Plamenatz means by an interest the means to the goal aspect of a want and not something else, seems not an extreme nor fabricated account of his position.

Consider Plamenatz's formulation of an interest:

"whatever is profitable to a man", (which I take to be, whatever is in, to, for, his advantage); that is, "whatever helps him get what he wants or what will satisfy him." There are a number of fairly obvious implications to be drawn. (A) A man may not know his own interest, by which he means, a man may not know "which things" will bring want satisfaction. He knows the end, but is not clear about the means to it. (B) Another may know his interest better than he does. Other people may know what things he wants as well as, or better than, he does. They may know his circumstances and impinging conditions better than he does and hence may know which things available to him could act as means to his want satisfaction.

Consider this proposition: "It can be our interest not to get what we want if our getting it prevents our getting other things we want more or makes us want what we cannot get." There are some implications here that require examination.

(a) He has been less than precise in stating earlier that an interest is "whatever helps him get what he wants or what will satisfy him." What he says now suggests that these may be very different questions. Now an interest is what will help a person get something he wants. If a thing (object, event, whatever) helps him get what he wants it has to be an interest regardless of whether the want is legitimate, basic, or pressing. It can be denied the status of an interest only by introducing his second condition, "or what will satisfy him." If something helps get what he wants but that "getting what he wants" fails to satisfy him, then it is not an interest, if the distinguishing feature of an interest is that which helps satisfy him. But this is a very complicated way to talk. If the two conditions,

what he wants and what satisfies him, are apt to frequently or even occasionally diverge, it would be as well to say that interests relate to wants only if the want satisfaction brings the individual "real" satisfaction, because this is what he is really implying. In short, it would be as well to say that any means to genuine satisfaction is an interest and take the definition away from ordinary wants. It is the more confusing because it is usual to equate what he wants with what will satisfy him.

(b) The statement quoted above, that is, "it can be our interest not to get what we want", is not consistent with his definition to begin with. An interest, Plamenatz argues, is whatever helps him get what he wants or what will satisfy him. It is a purely means function. But in the above statement, Plamenatz suggests that the interest is itself the profiting, the advantage, for it can scarcely be our interest in the sense of a means to what we want, not to get what we want. Plamenatz cannot logically say this, and it is not like him to make this kind of error.

(c) He is arguing here that if getting what we want prevents our getting other things we want more or makes us want what we cannot get, then it is our interest not to get it. This is very confusing. The case rests on our not being satisfied and not at all on the particular wants. To say, "getting what we want", implies that something has been used to get it, in other words, an interest has come into play. It always must do so as long as means are used to satisfy wants. By definition, these things are interests whether the wants add up to general satisfaction or not. In Plamenatz's usage, to want something and to employ a means to get it is to have an interest. To then discover that

the satisfaction of the want hinders or prevents the satisfaction of a more basic want is to say that we miscalculated the hierarchy of our wants and that we did not realize that satisfying the first would have such consequences. It is not possible, given the definition of interests in relation to wants, to say that the thing used in satisfying the want was not an interest because of the consequences. By definition, if the thing led to want satisfaction it was, for that temporal sequence, an interest. To discredit the want is an entirely different question. The same thing has to be said if satisfying a want creates wants in us which cannot in the future be satisfied. The thing used initially is an interest. If the state of wanting which has been intensified and solidified in the process cannot be satisfied because of scarce resources, ethical restrictions, or whatever, the question of the thing or things used to bring initial satisfaction is no longer important. It seems, however, that they may still provide satisfaction. If they could conceivably be used, they are still interests, whether or not they are actually used.

(d) Plamenatz's distinction between immediate and long-term interests is not quite so plausible when it is remembered that his interests are means.

(e) Plamenatz asserts that interests are different than wants but that "'interests' are always related to wants, actual or potential." But he has denied this above. Only the means to satisfy certain basic kinds of wants are interests.

(f) Plamenatz again uses a different sense of interest as advantage. He argues that in giving a man what we think is good for him regardless of what he wants or may come to

want, "we do not promote his interest". This is a cumbersome way to say "we do not promote whatever will help him get what he wants."

2. The usage of Benn.

This sense of "interest" as a means to a person's advantage is argued by S. I. Benn. His other sense of "interest" as concern is not important here except for its role in the quandary which Benn presents as explication. His position is set out as follows:

Such a person could be said to have an interest in promoting other people's interests meaning that he is disposed to occupy himself with what is to their advantage rather than to his own. ⁸⁰²

To begin with, Benn provides no way of distinguishing between these two senses of interest. To have an interest in x could be to have two very different kinds of relationships with x. Secondly, Benn confuses the two senses of interest in relation to advantage which have been distinguished in this section. Benn speaks of promoting other people's interests, which implies, when it is used in this fashion, promoting other people's advantage, welfare, profit. That is, interest is used as advantage. In specifying this notion however, he holds that by the man's "occupying himself with what is to their advantage", an interest is that which is in, to, for, someone's advantage. Here is the common confusion of interest as advantage and interest as a means to someone's advantage. In the third place, Benn holds that such a person, in the above illustration, is 'disinterested, but not uninterested'.⁸⁰³ Now he has an interest as a concern, he is occupied with something, but he is "disinterested" insofar as his concern is not with his own advantage (or what promotes his own advantage) but with the advantage (or what promotes the advantage) of another. So the person in question has a

"disinterested interest" as distinct from a "lack of interest" and from an "interested interest".

The disappointing feature of Benn's article explicating the notion of "interest" is that he very often ends up by confusing the senses himself. On the other hand, never in his own usage nor in his recommendations does he provide any way of knowing which sense of interest is intended. A good example of the confusion is found in Benn's assertion that a person may have an interest in his interests or in other's interests.

We have to distinguish the sense in which a man might be said to "have an interest in" anything which is important to him or for which he has a concern (including perhaps the interests of others), from the sense in which we say he is "concerned for his own interests", which excludes his having a concern for, or interest in, others."⁸⁰⁴

What Benn wants to be able to say with the term "interest" is that it is something about which a group and an individual can be mistaken. In fact, Benn emphasizes "we certainly want to say this sort of thing, and it certainly seems to make sense." This, Benn rightly perceives, is something which one is prevented from saying if interest is taken to be activity in the Bentlian usage. An actor could mistake the outcome of activity, or the correct means to carry out an activity on this latter sense of "interest", but this is not the same thing, Benn holds, as mistaking the interest. The whole point in raising this issue here is to identify the sense of interest employed. Benn switches to interest as the advantage, profit, welfare itself, the end state, the state of being advantaged or profiting rather than "interest" as the means to this advantage.

When we disagree with this group's own views of its interests, we are inclined to say that it has mistaken its "real" interests, i.e., what it supposes its interests are not its interests at all.⁸⁰⁵

Now it is much easier for an individual or a group to mistake the means which will, in the circumstance, lead most efficiently to certain ends, than to mistake what ends it wants. Benn does not say this, and it is not clear whether or not he may mean that the group (individual) is simply mistaken about what it wants. But this comes close to the wanting, and Benn is convinced that there is a profound difference between interests and wants. There is more than a vague impression that Benn has not been as helpful as he had hoped to be in clarifying and delineating senses of "interest".

D. Critique of interest in relation to advantage.

1. The argument of R.E. Flathman.

Flathman's main contention is that the noun "interest" denotes a "two-termed relationship between someone or something . . . and a substantive in which that person or thing has an interest."⁸⁰⁶ It is hard to see how this is any different from any other dispositional noun, like want, demand, advantage, see, hear. Again, as in Plamenatz, in defining the term "interest" he specifies a relationship of a subject "interested" in an object. So we are not much further ahead.

Flathman's position is extremely, though I believe, only superficially, challenging. He posits interests as a relationship between a person and a substantive such that a continuum is established moving from the "subjective" to the "objective". Now the relationship is the concept of interest, but to make any sense at all of his argument, Flathman must alter his meaning of interest as he moves along

the continuum. Thus there is no single dimension under consideration, no standard quantum of interest. In short, it makes no sense to speak of a continuum at all. What Flathman does is to speak of a subjective-objective relationship as a continuum and then isolate various aspects of the relationship and label them with a variety of common, though very different, usages of "interest".

His subjective position is filled by interest as "a psychological or intellectual attitude or curiosity toward or about the substantive."⁸⁰⁷ At the objective end, and this is our major concern here, "the substantive affects the person whether he is aware of the effect or not."⁸⁰⁸ So in no way is it a further extension or diminution of a psychological disposition or curiosity. It is quite a different thing entirely. It is the sense of interest as advantage, although it is not spelled out in those terms by Flathman. In giving an example of what he means, Flathman further confuses his case: "a child has an interest in a diet which produces a certain quantity of protein (or do we say 'it is in the child's interest to have such a diet')." ⁸⁰⁹ Now it seems apparent that the latter is often used, and that it is the sense of interest as "advantage". What Flathman cannot see is that "to have an interest in x" is often to imply that the person has a disposition, concern, feeling about x, and that this part of the relationship is often called the "interest" which is invested in something. Nor can he see that "x is in a person's interest" may or may not imply the existence of the interest in the other sense, and that, regardless, it is a different sense of "interest". Flathman's attempt to relate the supposed subjective and objective senses in the large middle area of the continuum comes

strikingly close to sheer nonsense.

One further observation on Flathman's notion of "interest" is in order. He notes the sense of interest as "that which is to or for the advantage of anyone; good, benefit, profit, advantage." Now here is "interest", then, as a means to one's advantage, a state which is so far undisclosed. The problem is seen in Flathman's subsequent comments on the definition. "On this definition, 'interest in' can be used interchangeably with 'benefited by,' and 'good for' can be substituted for 'in the interest of'."⁸¹⁰

Now how "interest in" can be substituted for "benefited by" is a mystery. There is simply no way in which "interest in", which is usually a profoundly dispositional, affective sense, can be taken to mean advantage. Advantage cannot be used to denote this sense of "interest". Nor, on his own admission, does he want to be committed to the view that "x has an 'interest in y' equals 'y is in x's interest'." If interest can be seriously taken to mean advantage, profit, then surely it is conceivable that cases may arise in which the advantage-promoting thing is not the focus of the actors attention or feeling.

More distressing than anything else is the fact that the definition Flathman presents does not discriminate between interest as a means to one's advantage and interest as constituting the advantage.

2. The argument of W.J. Rees.

Rees recognizes that the concept of interest has a very wide application. He concentrates on the expression "A has an interest in B". Now this may mean two things Rees contends. It may mean that A is interested in B, that is,

"that A has a certain attitude of mind towards B". The expression "A has an interest in B", can also mean "that B is in A's interest; that B is of some advantage or benefit to A, irrespective of A's state of mind about B."⁸¹¹

Now this is incorrectly stated. To say that "A has an interest in B" usually means that A possesses an interest in some dispositional sense or in the sense of having a share or stake in something. In the case of a disposition to attend and to be motivated by B, A would be very conscious of his "interest". In the case of a stake in something, a share in something, A may or may not be conscious of his "interest" but on balance there is a much greater chance that he would be aware of it. But to say that "B is in A's interest", makes B a means to the satisfaction or realization of A's interest as benefit or advantage. This is an entirely different sense of interest and one which is not implied by saying "A has an interest in B."

The second point of importance is that in this initial statement, interest is expressed as general advantage or benefit. What is involved in being benefited or advantaged is not specified but to be advantaged or benefited is said to be a person's interest. Anything which contributes to this state or condition is not an interest, but is said to be in, to, or for, the person's interest. In short, this is the first sense of interest as advantage which has been treated above in this section.

Now Rees proceeds in the next breath to introduce another sense of interest. He characterizes interests as "things" which an individual could have, hold, carry, or ride in. In other words, interests now become the "things"

which may be in a person's interest, or advantage. So he has interest as the things as means, and interest as the general condition of advantage as the end. It is disappointing to see this happen so soon after his opening definition.

The "things" which constitute interests are always either events or processes or continuous states or some characteristics of these. . . . [I]t may be in a man's interest to read, buy or sell a book. . . .⁸¹²

There we have it set out plainly and, unhappily, incorrectly. The things are "interest" yet they are in his "interest".

Rees moves directly to the position of interest as that which is in, to, or for, an individual's advantage, in specifying the relationship between an interest and certain desired states of affairs. The desired human activities are in effect a specification of what it means to be in someone's benefit (advantage) although Rees does not see that this is what he is doing. "In order that an event, process or state may constitute an interest, it must facilitate certain desired human activities."⁸¹³ Rees believes that an interest must facilitate a desired human activity, the advantage specified, "irrespective of A's state of mind about B". Now a desired human activity, in one sense, that of the perspective of the agent, comes very close to a desire. So even though A may dislike, detest, and even fear B, it is in his interest (and it is also his interest, to Rees) if it facilitates certain desired human activities (is of some advantage or benefit to him). But he has just said that A may be to his advantage regardless of his views and feelings about the thing. So in the event that he hated it and plainly did not desire it, it could scarcely, in the context of his motivational complex, facilitate his desires. It would be a very painful thing to have. On the other hand, Rees' position is

sound on this issue if he simply means that an actor need not be aware of B, and need not desire B, in order for B to be the kind of thing (an interest) which could facilitate certain desired human activities.

Rees further specifies the conditions which must be satisfied before a desired activity can give rise to an interest. In the first place, the desired activity must enhance the "ease, property, or chance of survival of the person or persons concerned."⁸¹⁴ This means that one's advantage is a condition of safety, ease and prosperity. To augment and promote this is to be an interest. Things which fulfill mere wants of an individual, in Rees' example, a rope if the individual wants to hang himself, is not an interest. In the second place, the desired activity "is one which is liable to be hindered or frustrated either by other people or by the forces of nature."⁸¹⁵ This condition seems nowhere near as important as the first one. It does allow Rees to eliminate things like fresh air being interests because they are so common and taken for granted, unless of course, someone were trying to stop you from breathing, or the air was becoming contaminated. But Rees is able to say these things only by building a theory of conflict, by arguing that interests pertain only where there are scarce resources, struggles, striving rivalries, and competitions. This leads to strange and even bizarre conclusions: in leisure and plenty a man has no interests; cooperative endeavours involve few interests either as an attitude of mind or as advantage.

Other problems follow because the conditions specified are not compatible. For example, consider the case of the struggling young business executive who takes heavy

doses of sleeping pills so that he may get enough rest to be keen and active to excess. This aids his competitive activity yet at the same time it ruins his health and severely restricts his modest range chances of survival. Under one set of conditions (prosperity), taking sleeping pills is an interest, whereas under the other condition (safety), it is not an interest. There are numerous possible areas where things which increase ease (a new car) decrease prosperity (less investment capital). Things which increase prosperity (a twenty-hour day) may decrease his ease; things which increase his prosperity (untiring work and embezzling) may decrease his chances of survival and ease. Rees does not give us much idea as to how these conditions are to be compromised.

There is also no way to prevent this kind of view of interests as things which are means in facilitating certain desired activities, from becoming utterly petty and hence absurd. Consider the case of old Mrs. Lait who has twelve children and wants to get to the store to buy milk before it is all gone. This ought to satisfy the conditions regarding desired activities. Now she must hurry as the stores will close soon and the late afternoon shoppers and people leaving work often stop to buy milk on the way home. Things which contribute to her endeavours and which are "in her interest" are the following: an extra car, her children being of school age, her grumpy disposition (few stop to chat with her), the sudden rain (which keeps many competitors at home), the location of the store (fairly close), well marked store signs, the old man who falls on the sidewalk and attracts a crowd (keeps competitors away and blocks the avenue to the milk counter), the hot weather (the last quart was sour

and so no one purchased it.)

A further difficulty emerges in Rees' contention that interests do not operate as motivations. In other words, Rees argues that if a person does something because it is in his interest, this lies outside the field of motivational theory.

To state a man's motives for doing something is to explain why he did it, that is, to give his reasons for doing it; to say it was in his interest to do it is to relate the action to another understood range of activities, but this does not explain why he did it. ⁸¹⁶

Rees is on very shaky ground. If x says he did y because he wanted it, this is supposed to be a reason for doing it. Perhaps he wanted y in order to make more money, win friends, or live more completely. But if x says he did y because it was in his interest, Rees believes that no explanation of a motivational nature is being advanced. This seems to be simply false.

Finally, Rees encounters embarrassing difficulties in his classification of interests. The criterion is the kind of activity which generates the interests, and he believes this is exhaustively determined by "the hindrances which beset them." Activities may be hindered by the forces of nature and by the activities of other men. What assists a man in an activity hindered by the forces of nature he calls a "human interest", what assists him in activities hindered by other men he calls a "sectional interest". ⁸¹⁷ Now this seems somewhat peculiar. In the first place, it is questionable if his scheme is exhaustive. Hindrances may be partly by man and partly by nature. In the second place, his naming of interests as "human" and "sectional" is too crude. Anything which assists a man in overcoming a "na-

tural hindrance" is said to be a human interest. This at least suggests that the interest will be human activity. But there is no reason why it could not be a natural force. Consider the case of a dirt farmer in southern Saskatchewan. The hindrances are natural; drought conditions, hot weather, and high winds hinder the activity of farming. Now quite possibly the things which will assist him in overcoming these hindrances will be the natural forces of cool temperatures, rain, and calm weather. But these are human interests by definition.

"Sectional" interests are oddly named. The notion of what goes to make up a section is unexplained. Sectional interests are anything which assist men in their conflicts and rivalries with other men, that is, in overcoming human impediments. Now there is no suggestion as to what the nature of the interests will be, human or non-human. The suspicion is that they will be non-human but that is not at all clear. They could presumably be anything. It could easily be a natural force as well as a human force. In the bombing of Britain in 1941 cloud and smog conditions aided the British in their conflict with the Germans and assisted in overcoming the hindrance. There seems no real basis for the classification, and because it is so loose and indeterminate, it appears to have no useful role to perform.

3. The argument of Brian Barry.

Barry offers the most sophisticated and forcefully argued position on "interest" in relation to advantage. That this position itself is confused and misleading, is never noticed by Barry. Because he argues so well, great gains in useful distinctions and in conceptual clarity seem to follow. That this is illusory because of (a) the manner in

which Barry presents his case on "interest", and because of (b) his limiting and confused formulation of "interest", will be the burden of the present section.

Barry's view of "interests" is set in the context of his more general formulation of the want-regarding principle. In fact his definition of "interest" is specifically designed to fit this larger and more basic theoretical structure. The want-regarding principle is said to take as given the wants people have and concentrate on how a policy will alter the overall amount of want satisfaction or how it will affect the distribution among people of opportunities for satisfying wants.⁸¹⁸ It is this last consideration which is crucial in respect to his definition of "interests". His definition of "interest" hinges on increasing a person's "opportunities to get what he wants."⁸¹⁹ It seems largely because of the demands of his more general principles that Barry draws interest into his account in such a restricted and narrow sense. Barry's model of "interest" is confining and restrictive. It is in believing that it encompasses most of what is ordinarily meant by "interest" that he is most mistaken. Barry develops an almost paranoic fetish about being able to say that "someone has mistaken his interest" such that this particular use in effect becomes the model or standard usage.

He tells us that the concept of interest is to be examined "as it is used in expressions such as 'in so-and-so's interest'."⁸²⁰ And after having used this in his definition, he believes that it covers all cases.

Notice that this is a definition of "in so-and-so's interests". Other uses of "interest" all seem to me either irrelevant or reducible to sentences with this construction.⁸²¹

It is here that Barry is most misleading. That most senses of "interest" can be so far related is simply wrong. That senses of "interest" which cannot be so formulated are irrelevant is an outrageous claim without supporting evidence. It is certainly one way, and an important way, in which the term has been used. But to make it the whole thing by trying to show how all other meaningful senses can be reduced to it comes uncomfortably close to taking the easy way out.

A good example of the restricting nature of his view of "interest" appears in his strictures against J.B.D. Miller. Miller uses interest as "a concern about something." Barry sets out to refute this usage by denying that it is logically sound, by denying that it is widely used, and finally, by urging that it does not say the important things one (he!) wants to say with the term. Now Barry believes that interest as concern allows the following things to be said. One cannot go beyond a person's own inclinations in order to tell him that his interests lie elsewhere. Interests are something of which a person is aware. In short, interest in this sense denotes some kind of subjective disposition.

Barry examines the term "concern" in use and believes that one can be concerned at, concerned about, concerned with, and concerned by something. But then he argues that the noun in so-and-so's concerns can correspond to any of the first three constructions. His point is that as the fourth one does not so correspond, the entire use of concern is misleading. This must be examined in detail.

To begin with, "in so-and-so's concern" does not correspond to "A is concerned at x", "A is concerned about x", "A is concerned with x". X may be a concern to A, that is,

something x is bothered about, involved with, such as an object of affection, attention, concern. The same is suggested by saying A is concerned about, with, and by x. In fact there seems no significant differences among these four statements. To say that A is concerned about x suggests something fairly definite, that is, that A is involved with x in some manner, affective, economic, social; that A cares about x, has a certain feeling about x, and will be motivated towards x in a certain fashion. But to say that "x is in A's concerns" is cumbersome and verges on nonsense. People just do not talk that way. It is not at all clear what it means to be in someone's concerns, although most probably it means that the thing x, promotes A's concerns. In short, by using a model which does not fit the notion of "concern", Barry tries to discredit the notion of "concern". He forces the concept of concern into a model he is soon to use in setting out "interest", and in showing that "concern" does not fit the model, after he has forced it into the model, he concludes that "interest" as "concern" is unsatisfactory. But on his analysis, the only thing which has been shown to be unsatisfactory is the analysis itself.

Barry uses the first three senses of concern to argue that there must be subjective awareness by the agent of the concern. But the fourth sense of concern, that is, "concerned by", Barry makes equivalent to "affected by". He then urges that there need not be awareness by the actor of the concern. He might be affected by a policy of which he had never heard.

This is a strong but misleading position. To begin with, it is unlikely that one would say a person is concerned by x; it would be usual to speak of his being con-

cerned about or with x. But if A is concerned by x it would, given the way concerned is used, suggest A is bothered by, involved with, aroused by x, and not necessarily or even probably, "affected by" x in his objective sense of the term. But Barry then turns around and contends that concern has not really a sense corresponding to "affected by". But then why has he urged that it has? How has he maintained that it is because "concerned by" means "affected by" that no awareness need be involved, when it cannot really be used in this way? This is a troubled way to make a case.

Barry is simply out to discredit "interest" as concern; firstly, because concern usually involves subjective awareness of concerns, hence knowing one's concerns. This Barry wants to eliminate because it does not fit with a person mistaking his interests, and this he dearly wants to be able to say. Secondly, Barry makes Miller's "concern" too strong, or at least much stronger than Miller needed to have intended. He takes concern to be "actual striving", and so maintains that a person cannot have an "interest" and fail to pursue it. He wants to be able to say that a person can have interests and yet not pursue them. But he does violation to Miller again. Miller's "concern" seems not to be "striving", but only "concern". Thirdly, Barry argues that interest as concern is "a completely idiosyncratic definition." So "he (Miller) can hardly claim to have proved much if it turns out that most of the things that people have traditionally said about interests then become false or meaningless."⁸²² This contention is clearly false. Had Barry familiarized himself with the interest literature he could have discovered that interest as concern has been very extensively used over the years.

Before turning to an account of what kinds of things Barry wants to be able to say with the term "interest", it is important to examine one more example of his mode of discounting alien senses of "interest".

Barry takes the expression "in so-and-so's interests" and examines what he takes to be three incorrect explications of that phrase. The first, he argues, "makes 'x is in A's interest' equivalent to 'A wants x'."⁸²³ He gives no examples of anyone making this move. It is too painfully obvious that these are very different senses of "interest". They simply cannot be taken to be saying the same thing. "A wants x" is equivalent to "A has an interest in x", "A is interested in x", where "interest" is used in a subjective, motivational-dispositional sense. It has often been given this meaning. But to use this motivational sense of interest, is to deny its use in a phrase such as 'x is in A's interests.' In this expression x is no longer the goal object, part of the wanting, (the interest); it becomes a means to satisfying A's interests. Now in this expression A's interests might be anything. It probably suggests A's advantage, profit, but this is left unspecified. The main reason Barry advances for discarding "x is in A's interests" as "A wants x" is not that it is incorrect to make this equation, but that it rules out being able to ask "A wants x but is it in his interests?"⁸²⁴ Now it is improper to ask this question given a subjective dispositional notion of "interest" equivalent to a wanting. Presumably a person will be aware of the wanting (interest) and as interest is given no other meaning in his example, it is simply absurd and illogical to ask "but is it in his interests?"

To discredit one sense of a term by arguing that it is not another sense, and without showing why it is important to have the other sense, is really to forfeit the argument. If he uses the same sense of the term in his example, the statement is simply tautological. If "A wants x" is equal to "x is in A's 'interest'," than to say "A wants x but is it in his interests" is to say "x is in A's interests but is it in his interests?" Barry doesn't see that if he is consistent in his sense of "interest" he can say, what he argues one cannot say. He also fails to see that to say it, however, is to talk nonsense. And, finally, he argues that the equivalent statement "rules out" the question, which it clearly does not do, even if another sense of interest is employed. What is important is that he realizes that another sense is being employed. Barry makes an absurd equation of different senses of "interest" and then discards the sense he does not want by showing how it cannot be used to say things which can be said only with a different sense of the term.

His second example of a supposed explication of "x is in A's interests" is "x would be a justifiable claim on the part of A."⁸²⁵ Here again there is no true fit, and his references do not claim that there is. In fact, very few, if any, scholars using the term make this equation. Barry again tries to show how a statement employing a different sense of "interest" shows that "x is a justifiable claim" to be "obviously wrong." And so, he continues, "this rules out asking 'x is in A's interests but would it be justifiable for him to claim it?'"⁸²⁶ Barry holds that this is a sensible question and that the answer could quite conceivably be "no". Hence the failure of this second supposed equa-

tion. It is almost too depressing to again outline the strictures against this method. It is a very bad business indeed.

To begin with, there is no evidence of people saying "x is in A's 'interests'" is equal to "x would be a justifiable claim on the part of A". In the second place, it would be badly confusing two different senses if people were to say this. "X is in A's interests" leaves interest in the vague unspecified sense of advantage with x serving as a means and not as an interest. In the sense of "x as a justifiable claim", x is the interest and is not in any other interest, at least not by definition. Barry makes "what are in your interests" equivalent to "what are your interests". After making the equation to begin with, Barry then discredits one sense of interest by showing how the equation is not in fact valid. This is a rather precarious procedure.

In the second place, "x is in A's interests" as "x would be a justifiable claim on the part of A" rules out asking "x is in A's interests but would it be justifiable for him to claim it?" Now if the question employs the same sense of interest as in the above it is tautological and it makes no sense to ask it. If it employs a different sense of interest, which appears to be the only way Barry can be using it, then it is sensible to ask the question. But it ought to be admitted that a different sense of interest is being used, and it ought to be argued that it is a useful way to use it.

Barry offers a third sense of "interest" and offers objections to it in order to maintain the integrity of his as yet undisclosed sense of interest in the expression "x is in A's interests". It is hardly worth while to repeat

the strictures yet a third time.

Barry outlines the kind of things he wants to say by way of using a certain sense of the concept of interest. To begin with, "we want to say that people can mistake their interests", in fact, this is "item number one of the list of 'things we want to say about interests'."⁸²⁷ Secondly, he wants to be able to distinguish "'disinterested' concern and 'interested' concern." Thirdly, "we find it convenient to distinguish 'interest groups'. . . from 'cause' or 'promotional' groups." (Where the "we" must refer to a small number of British writers on pressure groups notably Finer, Potter, and Eckstein.) Fourthly, he wants to be able to say that something is in one's interest without his pursuing it. And finally, Barry wants to be able to say that a person can realize that something is in his interest, yet nevertheless be knowingly opposed to it.

So it remains to scrutinize Barry's notion of "interest" and see if it lends itself to what he wants to say with it. It is also important to see what his definition excludes. Barry sets out "interest" in the following manner.

A policy, law or institution is in someone's interest if it increases his opportunities to get what he wants -- whatever that may be.⁸²⁸

Firstly, it is this something about an action or policy which makes it in someone's interest, that is, it helps him get what he wants. The action or policy (he uses policy to stand for action, institution, law, policy) is not the interest, for in his definition the interest is presumably to get what one wants, to reach want-satisfaction. Now this is the first sense of interest and advantage explored earlier in this section. It implies that the interest is

the advantage. In an indirect way, Barry specifies what he means by "being advantaged", "profiting". It is simply getting what one wants -- and in fact, he adds, "whatever that may be."

This is crucial. To get whatever he wants is his interest, and everything which supports and promotes this is therefore in his interest. The interest is not simply to profit economically, that is, to get what material things one wants. It is by definition the very general sense of getting everything that one wants, gaining satisfaction whatever the wanting.

On the other hand, "increased opportunities" alone may be what Barry means by an interest. In this case, an interest is simply that which promotes want satisfaction -- a means. The advantage may be getting what one wants or it may be obtaining increased opportunities to get what one wants. It is just not clear. Nor is it easy to see how increased opportunities can stand apart from getting what one wants. And this must be the case if interest is to stand for the opportunities, that is, as the means pure and simple. Barry's use of the expression "x is in A's interest", suggests that he is using interest as the advantage itself. His definition does not discourage this view, but it does open the possibility that interest means the opportunities to be advantaged and not the advantage as such. In short, there may be a tension developing between interest as advantage (end, goal) and interest as a means to some advantage (end, goal).

The first point about Barry's definition is that it does not withstand the strictures which he earlier raised

against three different senses of "interest". This is worth considering briefly, largely because it shows, not that the method is useful which it is not, but because it illustrates his change in criteria in just turning over the page.

Barry equated "x is in A's interest" with "A wants x" and refuted it by showing that it was unable to withstand a sensible question and was thereby ruled out. That is, it was now not possible to ask "A wants x but is it in his interests". He suggested that a different sense of interest was more important.

But if "x is in A's interest" equals "x increases A's opportunities to get what he wants" then it is now impossible, though sensible on his own criterion, to ask, "x increases A's opportunities to get what he wants but is it in his interests?" In fact, given his definition, it is much more sensible to ask it, and he is in a much more embarrassing position in being unable to ask it.

Barry gives examples of his sense of interest by quoting Parsons on Pareto and by quoting Locke. The burden of the argument now, however, is that interests are means. After saying that what increases a man's opportunities to get what he wants is in his interests, he now has it that the means, the things which increase the opportunities, are themselves the interests. His examples are wealth and power from Pareto; "potential means to any ultimate ends", "generalized means to any ultimate ends, or generalized immediate ends of rational action, to which Pareto gives the name 'interests'." And in Locke it is liberty, health, indolence of body, money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like."⁸²⁹ It was noted above that the "things" which are in a person's

interests cannot also be interests, except in a different sense of the term. That he seems to be talking almost exclusively of the means, is evident in his later comments on Parsons.

But Parsons is still right in emphasizing that interests are generalized means to, at any rate, a wide range of ends.⁸³⁰

This, of course, is part of the puzzle. Consider the following: "A person's interests are (roughly) advanced when his opportunities to get what he wants are increased."⁸³¹ The interests may be the opportunities, or they may be getting what he wants. It is hard to see how it can be both, although Barry sometimes seems to use it in that way. The example, however, suggests that means alone are interests. He maintains that the state advances the interests of the public by providing internal law and order and defense. These things are called interests because "they underlie the satisfaction of nearly all more specific wants."⁸³²

One of the clearest examples of what may be a confusion occurs in the following discussion:

Something is in a person's interests if it puts him in a position to satisfy wants. This means that if something directly satisfied a want the concept of "interest" was not relevant to it."⁸³³

Firstly, "x is in A's interests" if x helps satisfy wants by putting him in a position to satisfy wants. A's interests seem to be to have satisfied wants. Secondly, it is clear that if x directly satisfied a want, no interest is involved. So if there is no means to want satisfaction, there is no interest. There is still want satisfaction, so that cannot be what is meant by the interest. The interest must designate the means.

It is usual to regard the use of interest in the expression "something is in a person's interests", as in his advantage, where advantage means profiting, want-satisfaction, enjoying his good, whatever. It appears that Barry means by interests, "opportunities" for satisfying wants. It should be noted that Barry is not so much describing an old usage (which he thinks he is doing), as he is stipulating a new usage.

Barry contends that something, an action or policy, can be in somebody's interest without satisfying any immediate wants.

It is rather to say that it puts him in a better position to satisfy his wants. Policies or actions that will bring me more pay are "in my interest" but once I start spending the money "interest" no longer applies. 834

Here "interest" denotes not only means (policies which provide pay) but means which focus on maximizing economic assets. In fact the money is almost the interest here, especially as "saved money". The point is that a special end is implied, though never exposed, which a means must aid before the means is an "interest".

In this context as means, Barry treats wealth and power, already said to be interests, as assets. He believes this to be useful as it more easily expresses how interests (assets) can be saved or committed, and if committed, how they can be invested, transferred, or consumed. Now all this is by way of explaining how the interests as means to what one wants, can be expressed simply as "opportunities" or, as he puts it, "assets".

Barry believes that there are circumstances under which it would be "rational in a man to wish his possession of these assets to be less than it might be."⁸³⁵ This is the case where the actor takes as his reference group others besides himself and holds that it is better for the group if the disposal of some assets is in the hands of other members of the group. Barry then deviates so markedly from his definition that the argument is worth carefully noting.

But although one could say that under such circumstances the man wants his assets to be reduced, this does not in the least entail that he thinks it is in his interest for them to be reduced.⁸³⁶

In terms of his definition, whatever increases his opportunity to do what he wants is in his interest. His interest is doing or getting what he wants. Here he wants his assets (opportunities to get what he wants) reduced. By definition, it is his interest to get what he wants, and if he wants his assets reduced, it must be in his interests to do so. It doesn't quite make sense, but it is the logical thing to say. Barry's qualification of his initial definition amounts to this. "We must say that, in the phrase 'if it increases his opportunities to get what he wants', wants for others to have their share of assets are not included."⁸³⁷

In short, he argues for a rational egoistic position. He has added a rather confining restriction. Only selfish, that is, narrowly self-regarding wants, can give rise to interests. And secondly, as expressed in the quotation above, the onus falls on wants for others which concern diminution of his assets and presumably those alone. The onus falls on "assets" and not on wants in general. So

now it is not "in his interest" to get whatever he wants. If he wants his assets to be depleted by others sharing them, this is not in his interest. In short, it is not a legitimate want. Only a certain class of wants qualify to be used in conjunction with interests. That is, wants which are selfish and concern the maximization of his resources. Barry is now closing the knot in his restricting definition of "interest".

Barry further qualifies his definition by allowing that a man may, if rational, want to reduce his assets or his opportunities for committing them. Now he will not do so out of any regard for the interests of others, but only because he thinks he may be irrational in the future and it will pay him to take precautions in advance. At the same time, other persons can think their way into his value system, or impute the values of a rational man to him, "and prevent him from doing things he will regret later or making him do things he will be pleased later to have done."⁸³⁸ Again his definition is qualified by delimiting his wants. It is legitimate for an outsider who somehow knows better than he what he will want, to take steps to conserve his assets. He may not want these things done, but it is in his interests to have them done. Only a special class of wants is relevant to interests.

It is misleading for Barry to say that he has qualified his definition. He has moved drastically from his initial view of want satisfaction, whatever the wants, to a position where only selfish, asset maximizing wants are relevant. Barry's focus indirectly comes to settle on assets as material resources, as economic opportunities. By interests he means material interests and the material

interests are things, assets, to get other unspecified things which he wants. The means sense of interest seems to be relevant here. Barry admits that his focus is on material interest in a footnote on Charles A. Beard. Beard is rightly said to focus on "material interest (what I have simply been calling interest)" ⁸³⁹ In an earlier footnote, Barry argues that getting money is always in a person's interests. This may mean that the money is an interest (as a means) although this is not what he says, and it may mean that having money is his interest, that is, profiting materially is his interest. Benn has said that a farmer would not give "a vast sum of money as the answer to the question (what are your interests?)" Now "this is not because getting a large sum of money would not be in his interests, but because it so obviously is. Indeed, I shall suggest that it is a paradigm of something that is in a person's interests." ⁸⁴⁰

On the other hand, if Barry is still using the notion of "in one's interest" as the model, where his interest is getting what he wants, he may be suggesting that getting economic satisfaction, satisfying material wants, is alone implied in his "interest". Why Barry does not admit this directly is not clear.

It remains to comment briefly on what Barry has been able to accomplish with his concept of interest. To begin with, by defining interest as a means, he forfeits the ability to use it in any subjective, dispositional sense. Secondly, it just seems to be the case that he refuses to recognize the tremendous variety of technical and ordinary language uses of the term. The suggestion that this complexity can be adequately presented in the form "x is in

A's interest", is simply mistaken. The specific purposes which Barry wants his concept of interest to serve will be quickly examined.

Barry wants to be able to say that "people can mistake their interests." There is not much doubt that his concept of interest as means, opportunities (assets), and sometimes as advantage, allows this to be said. It can be said because he has removed the subjective dimension from the concept, it is not a dispositional motivational factor. Although it enables Barry to say this, it also eliminates much else that could have been said with the term.

People can mistake their interests (opportunities, assets) just as they can mistake the implication of a general election, the import of a new metaphysical doctrine, or how much gasoline is in their car. But it is just as easy, and certainly as straightforward, to say that a person has misjudged his opportunities, or miscalculated the amount of his assets. The term "interest" in Barry's sense, or in any other, is not crucial to being able to say this kind of thing.

In the second place, Barry wants to be able to "distinguish between 'disinterested' concern and 'interested' concern in a particular matter." This will not work given his definition of interest. The interested or disinterested aspect of the concern clearly suggests a subjective, dispositional variable. It involves another (or other) senses of interest not permitted by his definition: for example, interest as a feeling of pleasure and curiosity attending the attention process; or interest as having a stake in something. Barry could as easily say that there are economic and non-economic concerns (which would fit well with his

notion of interest), or selfish and altruistic concerns. If he is really set on making this kind of distinction, he could talk about "unconcerned" concerns and "concerned" concerns without the need for interests at all.

Thirdly, Barry finds it convenient to distinguish interest groups from cause (promotional) groups. His concept of interest is said to facilitate this, although the details are not provided. An interest group is presumably one which pursues its self-interest, that is, maximizes its assets (opportunities). It is economically self-regarding. The characteristics of cause (promotional) groups are not so clear. Barry believes that the term "interest" has no place where assets (opportunities) are utilized in such a way that assets (opportunities) are not increased. Presumably a cause group is one which foolishly consumes time and money on altruistic causes. Yet it is only in a very restrictive sense of "economic assets" and fairly immediate ones, that Barry's case holds up. A cause group may achieve an outcome which in fact increases the opportunities (assets) of the members as well as reducing the possibilities of nuclear destruction or the senseless killing of foxes. On the other hand, business groups may pressure the government into policy decisions which promote such unforeseen circumstances that the group's opportunities (assets) are actually decreased. And if a cause group is particularly anxious and upset about an undesirable state of affairs (say, the testing of nuclear devices or the distribution of contraceptives), because they are personally afraid of the consequences as well as fearing the consequences for others, then their action is pretty self-interested. But not in Barry's sense of "interest" which has to do largely (if not entirely) with

economic assets (opportunities). Barry may be able to distinguish between interest and cause groups by this concept of interest, but it makes him say so many other things which are not reasonable that the costs seem somewhat excessive. On the other hand, it may be that he has forged a device which is not crucial to the kind of distinction he wants to draw. His distinction could be as easily made by talking broadly of two kinds of pressure groups, those generally self seeking and those generally altruistic. Then both could be said to be interested, but of course in a different sense of the term. It is really not apparent why this distinction is so crucial in making sense out of group activity.

Fourthly, Barry wants to be able to say that "one can recognize something as being in one's interest without pursuing it." It seems that he is able to say this, partly by limiting "in one's interests" to either material advantage or economic opportunities (assets). But this doesn't sit very well with his assumption of rational, egoistic behaviour -- the kind which suits his notion of interest. If something can be in one's interest and yet not be pursued, it is most probably, in Barry's argument, because some principles take priority, and in terms of them, asset-maximizing behaviour is not pursued. This means that he probably loses assets (opportunities) by not acting to maximize them, and such behaviour is scarcely the type to which the term "interest" applies. And to say this generally, is to suggest that it may never be in a man's interests to act on the basis of principles, and this Barry may not be prepared to say.

Finally, Barry wants to say that something can be in my interests "but nevertheless I am against it." This appears to be the same sense as the last one, that is, con-

siderations of a non-interest nature take precedence in the decision. What Barry does not make clear is that such a decision may be based on the prospect of increasing one's opportunities of a non-economic (i.e., non-interest) variety. That is, by not cheating on income-tax returns, a person may increase his opportunities for salvation, a clear conscience, a freer life. What Barry wants to be able to say is that people often consciously act in ways which are not the most economically advantageous. This, however, can be said easily enough without having to rely on the concept of interest at all. By limiting the opportunities to economic ones, Barry very seriously restricts the expression, "x is in A's interest". He departs very significantly from ordinary language usage without giving the impression of having done so.

CHAPTER IX

THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST REVIEWED AND TESTED

Introduction

This Chapter brings together the various usages which have appeared in the literature under review. An attempt is made to synthesize usages and senses of the term "interest" where it is possible to do so without violating what may be significant distinctions. A comment is offered by way of showing how great a role each usage has played across disciplinary borders. Four tests of the usefulness of a concept are then outlined and applied to each major usage.

I. The Usages Reviewed

- A. Interest as a feeling which stimulates, accompanies, or is the result of, the attention process.

The feelings in this case are those of concern, liking, consciousness of worth, pleasure, and curiosity. It is often said to be a feeling which is opposed to indifference, a feeling which stimulates the actor to look at, attend to, investigate, and find out about something. There is no single established feeling component which is generally agreed upon, and those listed above, or some combination, are often said to flow together in making up an interest in this sense. Interest is said to be temporary, shifting from one object to another, general in focus, and accompanying attention, sometimes stimulating it and sometimes following it.

This general usage is created here by a synthesis of a variety of senses of the term, the senses differing slightly

on the nature of the feeling and in the relation of the feeling to attention. This is one of the most widespread usages of the term in the literature of the social sciences. It occurs most frequently in psychology, but is utilized to a considerable extent, and in an often non-technical way, in the other disciplines. It is usually used in such expressions as "taking an interest in something", "finding something interesting", and "listening with great interest".

- B. Interest as a more or less enduring disposition characterized by feelings of concern and involvement, and by cognitive and motivational dimensions.

This usage is very close to usage A in regard to the affective component which is the one which distinguishes it most from other motivational factors. The affective component is said to involve feelings of concern, liking, worthwhileness, pleasure, and involvement. It is the feeling of involvement which distinguishes this usage, on the affective plane, from usage A. Interest in this usage is a disposition, a persistent factor, as distinguished from a more or less temporary display of interest as in usage A. It is also characterized by an emotionally involved relationship with fairly specific classes of objects. It is active concern, a dynamic tendency to seek out objects and do something with them. It is much more than a feeling related to attention. The objects towards which the active involvement relates are usually taken to be fairly central concerns of the individual. There is a very intimate relationship between the disposition and its objects.

This usage appears most often in the literature of psychology and political science, but it has been occasionally

employed in sociology and in jurisprudence. It is usually used in such expressions as "having an interest in something", "discovering an interest in something", "developing an interest in something", and "being interested in something". It is sometimes expressed as "A holds or has such and such interests," that is, labelling the interest relationship by the object.

C. Interest as the basic and general motivational disposition.

This usage treats interest as the term to denote all motivational dispositions and is thus the generic term in those theories. This general usage is the result of a synthesis of a variety of similar positions. It encompasses the usages of interest as a goal, where the goal is synonymous with the general motivational disposition (A. Maslow, V. Van Dyke), and interest as the basic and general motivational disposition (G. Ratzenhofer, A.W. Small, S.H. Beer, R. Pound, L.F. Ward, P. Heck). The formulations by many earlier psychologists, that is, interest as a more or less permanent mental disposition with conative and affective connotations, are not easy to classify because of their generally unspecified characteristics. They may be classified here, as in J.R. Angell and F. Arnold, or possibly under usages B or E, as in the writings of Dewey, Stout, and J.M. Baldwin.

This usage has had fairly widespread interdisciplinary use, most often as an attempt to label the basic motivational factor in terms which would fit the general conceptual framework of the user. There has not been much conscious interdisciplinary exchange, however.

- D. Interest as the primary or secondary motivational disposition in the context of the associative-Learning theory.

This usage involves interest as the term to denote a motivational factor which functions either at the lower level or at the secondary level. The theoretical assumptions hold that the secondary motivational factor is selected, reinforced, and maintained, only so long as it satisfies the primary factor. It is at this point that G.W. Allport's usage (number E) is at variance, as he posits a secondary factor which is more basic and functionally autonomous.

This usage brings together a wide and disparate number of variations, but the basic constitution and function of the disposition is quite similar. It includes the usage of interest as a secondary or acquired drive which constitutes the ego-structure (O.H. Mowrer), interest as a subjective-objective motivational factor (H.P. Fairchild, A.W. Small,) interest as the secondary motivational disposition (E.A. Ross, W.G. Sumner, L.T. Hobhouse S.H. Beer), and interest as the primary motivational factor (A.W. Small, E.S. Redford).

This usage has appeared quite generally across the social science spectrum, but usually without great care concerning the theoretical framework in which the term is related to other motivational concepts. It has most often been used when a motivational factor seemed to be called for, and the term "interest", especially in political science, was handy, popular, and appeared to be well understood.

- E. Interest as an enduring disposition which is the basic controlling, motivating, and directing aspect of the personality system.

This usage is somewhat unique insofar as it lies outside

the usual stimulus-response, associative learning theory, and insofar as it synthesizes motivational and control functions in the same concept. This usage appears most often in the work of G.W. Allport where he distinguishes two classes of motivational dispositions:

1. ego-involved dispositions which select, control, and direct basic patterns of striving, and
2. more lower-order peripheral, segmental motives.

The former are often called interests. Similar usages appear in the writing of Smith, Bruner, and White, in P.B. Rice, and in Newcomb and associates. Largely because of their relative lack of attention to the theoretical context in which a term has meaning, it is difficult to know whether political scientists and sociologists have drawn this kind of distinction. There is a strong impression that they have not. This usage has been localized to the discipline of psychology.

F. Interest as the goal-object of a motivational relationship.

The term "interest" in this case does not denote the entire motivational relationship as such, but only the end stage, the consummatory phase. It is called the goal, objective, and sometimes the purpose. When it is used in this fashion, the dispositional aspect of the relationship is not included, and it would be as well to call the interest the "goal-object" to make this perfectly clear. This usage has not occurred in psychology and to no great extent in sociology or in jurisprudence. It is in political science, notably in the work of such scholars as S.H. Beer, L. Weinstein, C. Hagan, and H. Zeigler, that this usage has been employed.

G. Interest as the object of an attitude.

This usage attempts to purge the term "interest" of its often-times motivational connotations. In this instance, an attitude taken as a state of consciousness, a subjective reaction, stands as the dispositional aspect of the relationship, and an interest is simply the object (goal, objective) of such a disposition. In most respects, this is merely a specification and delimitation of the more general usage of interest as a goal (usage F). It has been very rarely used in any explicit sense, and then only by MacIver and Mannheim in sociology, and by Stanley Rothman in political science.

H. Interest as a shared attitude.

This usage suggests that an interest is an attitude which is shared by a number of people. Insofar as it is an attitude, it falls within one or the other of the general classes of motivational dispositions. This usage has been localized to a very few scholars in political science.

I. Interest as activity.

This usage has appeared in a number of forms but the champion has been A.F. Bentley, and it is his usage which is examined here. To Bentley, the interest is the activity which is the group. It should be noticed that although A.W. Small spoke of interest as a sphere of activity, this was activity encompassing individual interests of a most pronouncedly psychological nature. John Dewey is no closer to Bentley on this, for Dewey's expression of interest as activity contained three other senses of interest, two of which were psychological factors propelling the activity itself. Followers of Bentley, in this respect at least, have been relatively few in number and have been political scientists.

There is an exception outside the Bentlian tradition in Douglas Fryer who sometimes speaks of activity toward a stimulus as an interest. But he more often seems to mean that such reactions are expressions of interest which are directly observable, and this is quite a different matter.

J. Interest as one's advantage.

This very popular usage suggests that something is in, to, or for, someone's interest, if it is in, to, or for, his advantage. Advantage is usually never specified beyond equating it with some undefined notion of good, profit, welfare, or benefit. This usage appears in expressions like "x is in, to, or for A's interest" and not in the expression "x is A's interest if it is in, to, or for his advantage". The latter uses advantage as the end state (the interest in the former), and an interest is whatever acts as an means to that advantage. Interest as advantage signifies a condition, a state of affairs, having what one wants, profiting. To specify advantage (which is rarely done), is to set out areas of concern, desired states of affairs, in a sense, goals.

This very broadly conceived usage has been largely ignored by psychologists. It has received some attention in jurisprudence and has been more frequently employed in sociology. It has been utilized unsparingly by students of politics.

K. Interest as any means which assists a person or a group in getting what he or they want.

This usage most often appears in relation to advantage where advantage is taken to mean one's goal, welfare, benefit, or profit. It is most commonly seen as that which is in, or for the advantage of a person or a group. Most often the condition of being advantaged is not specified, although Brian Barry has done much to rectify this. It is usually

implied, and Barry makes it explicit, that advantage denotes material profiting. More recently, this usage has involved interest as a means to a goal. This is seen in the writing of Vernon Van Dyke and David Easton. Strictly speaking, Van Dyke uses interest as a goal, and something is an interest only if it is a goal, either instrumental or intrinsic. But his use of instrumental goals (interests) as means contributes something to this usage, however much he varies in other respects. Easton speaks of an interest as an instrumental value, but it is the instrumental part which is of concern here.

This usage is quite widely employed in political science and sometimes in an unspecified way in sociology. It has been virtually ignored in psychology and in jurisprudence.

L. Interest as a social or economic stake in something.

This usage sometimes involves the dimension of subjective concern in, or about, something which affects an individual or a group. On other occasions, it suggests a relationship between an individual or a group and something which affects him or them whether they are aware of it or not. To say that "A has an interest x", may mean that A is concerned about how x affects him, or it may mean that it affects him without his awareness. The usage of a stake in something is usually further elaborated as having a right or title, a claim upon, or a share in, something. Plamenatz takes this usage to suggest having a share or a part in something, such as money in a business, or stocks in a company. The kind of stake is not usually expanded to include most major areas of human concern, but usually implies that the share, stake, or title, has to do with economic resources, one's material ad-

vantage, or with one's status position. In jurisprudence, and especially in regard to the law of property, an interest as a claim seems to overlap with the usage of interest as a stake in something. An interest in property specifies possession or ownership, or probable future possession or ownership, of land. With the exception of this use in jurisprudence, the usage is found largely, if not entirely, in the literature of political science.

M. Interest as a claim (demand)

This usage involves the expression of a motivational disposition (want, desire, expectation) as a claim (demand) on other individuals or groups in respect to something. There are two general senses of this usage. On the one hand, as in Pound (and possibly in Almond), any want (desire, aspiration) whatsoever, if expressed, is recognized as a claim. On the other hand, as in Plamenatz, Benn, Fried, and A.L.F. Ross, the range of expressed wants (desires, expectations) which are recognized as claims is severely restricted. The best example of this is Plamenatz' usage. An interest is said to be a settled and avowed aspiration which is believed to be realizable, which the holder can justify in the light of certain moral-legal standards, and which he feels entitled to.

This usage has not been widespread in the social sciences. It has been briefly explicated in a small critical literature in political science, and has been used indiscriminately by Gabriel Almond and Roscoe Pound.

N. Interests as groups united for the defense maintenance, or enhancement of any more or less enduring position or advantage possessed in common.

This usage of interest, usually in the plural, most often

encompasses the usage of interest as whatever is profitable to a person or group -- their advantage, which is seen as a common cause. There are, however, two variations. Interests are sometimes said to be any groups united on the basis of some common cause (advantage) which it is their purpose to defend and maintain. On the other hand, interests are spoken of as the groups effectively controlling a particular enterprise and dominating a field of activity. One or the other, or both, of these senses may be implied in speaking of the vested interests and, for example, the commercial interests. It may be what Finer intends when he speaks of groups with a social and economic stake in society.

II. The Usages Tested

Introduction

The question of what criteria to employ in determining the usefulness of a concept is difficult to answer. But some criteria must be found. The literature of social science, except in a general way, is silent on this important issue. The tests proposed here are rather crude, but they may at least be of some assistance in gauging the strengths and weaknesses of various usages of the concept of interest. The tests to be applied are the following:

1. the clarity and precision of their meaning;
2. their conduciveness to ambiguity;
3. the ability of the concepts to function in hypotheses and laws of explanatory and predictive force; and
4. the embodiment of ordinary language meaning.

A. Clarity of meaning.

This is, generally speaking, the absence of vagueness. As E.E. Eubank puts it, "is the term reasonably precise? Does it convey an exact and clear cut meaning?" ⁸⁴¹ In Brodbeck's view, "a good concept has a reliably identifiable referent (meaning). . . ." ⁸⁴² The questions, then, are when is a concept vague, and what standards can we ask that it fulfill? Vagueness exists when there is difficulty in deciding whether or not something belongs in a designated class, that is, whether or not it counts as an instance of a particular term. Vagueness occurs when various kinds of objects or events seem to fit the criterion and it is a matter of some doubt as to whether or not the term applies. Precise definition of terms counteracts vagueness. In Brodbeck's judgment, "all good concepts are adequately defined . . .", ⁸⁴³ and Van Dyke leaves no doubt that "to be useful, concepts must, of course, be defined." ⁸⁴⁴ The kind of definition required will depend on the kind of term, the particular function it is designed to perform, and the stage of the particular scientific undertaking. The range of choice in definitions is quite large. The two main types of definition relevant to this inquiry are the nominal and the operational. ⁸⁴⁵

There are, of course, those who argue that "meaning in use" is sufficient, that it is too much to ask for a formal definition. But this will not do. Trying to ferret out the meaning of a term through studious analysis of comparative instances of use in assorted contexts can often be misleading and it is almost certain to be uneconomical. The time and skill involved in this kind of detective work can be most usefully reserved for the classics. It seems, then, that a

useful concept ought to be adequately defined. High order theoretical terms can be permitted some lee-way in regard to vagueness, but they are not going to be of much use to us if their meaning is precariously understood.

1. Interest as a feeling which stimulates, accompanies, or is the result of, the attention process.

The term "interest" in this usage is generally well enough understood although it is sometimes difficult to apply in the area of the feelings. The feelings of concern, worthwhileness, pleasure, and liking, appear to be similar and straight forward enough to render the term applicable without too much error, especially when they are seen in relation to attention. Some difficulties are experienced in regard to the feeling of curiosity which is sometimes said to be a more active, conative feeling, as a striving for novelty, and as an active impulse to seek out new sensations, experiences, and knowledge. Vagueness also appears in regard to the extent of its motivational characteristics and its precise relation to attention. The term has been frequently defined, but most often in the earlier psychological literature. It has seldom, if ever, been given an operational definition.

2. Interest as a more or less enduring disposition characterized by feelings of concern and involvement, and by cognitive and motivational dimensions.

This usage has been plagued by considerable vagueness. It has often been used indiscriminately with the usage of interest in relation to attention, with concern as such, with psychological involvement, with basic and general motivational factors, with attitudes, with interest as a stake in something, and with interests as the objects of other motivational factors. In large part this seems to reflect the general vagueness which

accompanies inferred motivational dispositions. On the other hand, when the term has been applied in the light of specific definitions, it appears to have been satisfactorily employed. It has often been defined operationally, more often, one suspects, than it has been clearly defined nominally.

3. Interest as the general and basic motivational disposition.

This usage has the great advantage of much clarity and precision in application as only one class of motivational factors is recognized. The problem is not in distinguishing among kinds of motives, but in knowing a motivational disposition when it has been discovered, a much easier undertaking. The term has been used largely in constructing broad conceptual frameworks and has not usually been operationalized. Nominal definitions, as in the cases of Ratzenhofer, Small Beer, Pound, and Heck, have been vague and sometimes vacuous.

4. Interest as the primary or secondary motivational disposition in the context of the associative-learning theory.

This usage has been unusually vague and difficult to apply, a plight shared by most inferred motivational dispositions when distinctions are required within the general class of motivational factors. Although the term has often been defined (usually nominally), it has been difficult to tell when an instance was located because of the variety of competing terms naming the same general phenomenon.

5. Interest as an enduring disposition which is the basic controlling, motivating, and directing aspect of the personality system.

The term in this usage is not especially easy to apply.

This is primarily because it is so abstract, and because it is one term among many which attempts to denote high order inferred motivational constructs. In being equated with the ego-processes themselves, however, it does take on much more precision. But as the ego-processes are not subject to clear and agreed upon definition, the term "interest" is still somewhat difficult to apply. Definitions have not been crisp and straightforward because so many terms of equal vagueness have been employed in the definition. Operational definitions seem to overlap with those used in applying other terms.

6. Interest as the goal-object of a motivational relationship.

This usage is difficult to apply because the notion of a goal is seldom specified and because a motivational relationship is not easily disembodied and fragmented in this manner. If the notion of a goal were more carefully specified as a) temporally, the idea of a goal, consummatory phase or end state, instigating and directing behaviour, and b) spatially, the goal object as the consummatory end state of a motivational sequence, then it might be clear enough to call the end state alone the goal. Such a specification has rarely been forthcoming in the literature which employs the term in this fashion. It has never been made clear whether interest in this usage is to apply to any goal object of any motivational sequence or only to some. The term has been defined on occasion but never operationalized in practical work, at least not in the literature under review.

7. Interest as the object of an attitude.

This usage is quite easy to apply if an attitude can,

in fact, be identified and discovered. This is the most serious source of vagueness in this usage, the more so when it demands that this kind of distinction be drawn. MacIver's use is a good case in point. He speaks of an attitude as a state of consciousness, a subjective reaction. It is virtually impossible to distinguish an attitude from other subjective dispositions. It has been operationalized in a fashion by MacIver, but it does not prove workable in that he seldom bothers to discuss or locate the attitude component.

8. Interest as a shared attitude.

This term is especially difficult to apply because the expression "shared attitude" is not defined. If it is to be taken as an attitude shared by a number of individuals, then, at least in Truman, it has been nominally defined. Truman never gives it an operational definition nor is he much concerned about its specific components or functions. In this respect, he can indeed be said to follow Bentley. It is no straightforward undertaking to apply the term "attitude", especially when it is not set out in the context of other motivational factors. The term "interest" is made more vague insofar as Truman suggests two rather different senses of the expression "shared attitude".

A point worth emphasizing is that the term "attitude" has been every bit as vague as the term "interest". Shortly before Truman used interest as a shared attitude, and struck on G.W. Allport's 1935 formulation of it as a "mental and neural state of readiness, Anselm Strauss had this to say about attitudes.

[T]here is an amazing diversity of conceptions of what the term denotes. . . . This sprawling concept of attitude serves to focus inquiry upon various

forms of 'inner' psychological behaviour without the necessity of psychologists having to make clear what particular activity they are dealing with at any specific time. 846

Shortly after Truman wrote The Government Process, Smith, Bruner, and White still felt the need to examine "the implicit status of this oddly disembodied concept of attitude." 847

9. Interest as activity.

This usage is magnanimously vague. If there is anything to be said it is that it is vague. In fact, to say that it is vague is to say all that there is to be said about it. Nearly all, in any event. True to his word, Bentley stumbles and soars like the massive intellectual giant that he was, through a variety of expressions and terms as vague as interest. The group, the activity, the process, and the interest are all said to be synonymous. Yet not one of them is set out clearly enough so that the observer could be certain that he had found it, or that it was indeed synonymous with the others. Bentley may have dispelled metaphysics, but he brings us close to pure faith. There is, of course, no fear of finding verbal definitions in Bentley. Dewey does define his terms, at least in his earlier work, but when he does so, interest is defined in four different ways.

10. Interest as one's advantage

This usage has been a household word in political science and has been thought applicable to a glaringly varied array of states of affairs. It is generously vague, usually ill-defined, if at all, and seldom, if ever, operationalized. The terms which have stood to define advantage are usually

not defined as it seems to be assumed that welfare, good, benefit, and profit are plain enough. But, unhappily, this is not the case. It is incredibly difficult to know when an instance of advantage has been sighted. A further problem which tends to accompany this usage turns on who is to decide when an advantageous arrangement or state of affairs exists. The possibilities include the actor, the actor if he knows what he really wants, and observers who claim to know either what he really wants or what he really ought to want. The dimensions of advantage have rarely been specified, that is, whether one's advantage or profiting is in the economic, social, religious, emotional sphere, or whatever. A good rule of thumb is that economic advantage is usually intended. J. Mark Baldwin rightly remarked nearly seventy years ago that this usage was too loosely used to be of any value in a technical sense.

11. Interest as any means which assist a person or a group in getting what he or they want.

This usage has generally been vague in that the state of being advantaged has seldom been set out. But when the end state has been specified, as in the writings of Plamenatz, Barry, Easton, and Van Dyke, the term can be applied without much difficulty. If it is clearly stated what a thing is said to be a means to, the term can at least be applied, regardless of the facts of the matter.

12. Interest as a social or economic stake in something.

This usage is especially vague and difficult to apply. The condition of having a stake is taken to mean a variety of things as divergent as a concern in, a right to, or a title to something. It is also never clear whether the actor is

aware of his stake in something, a possibility which carries some implications in regard to explaining behaviour. This usage most often implies an economic, pecuniary, share or stake in something, rather than encompassing every aspect in which a person or a group has something to be gained or lost. However this is rarely specified. In fact, this usage is rarely defined in any way and seldom appears in anything other than ordinary language formulations.

13. Interest as a claim (demand)

It is sometimes difficult to decide if something belongs to the class of phenomena denoted in this usage. The first difficulty stems from a lack of agreements on what kinds of dispositional factors qualify as claims. The second problem relates to difficulties in determining when the conditions, as in Plamenatz' view, have been successfully met, and a claim appears. This is especially grave in his formulation when the actor and interested outsiders disagree about the justifiability or realizability of a claim. With further specification, however, these problems might be overcome. The greatest example of vagueness occurs in the work of Almond where an interest is sometimes said to be a demand, a claim, a want, and no definition is advanced.

14. Interests as groups

This usually undefined usage is most difficult to apply and is frequently used in a pejorative sense. It is vague insofar as the accompanying terms "cause" and "advantage" are usually never specified. Neither the interest nor the extent to which it is vested are usually explicated, and the level and locus of activity are rarely set out.

B. Conduciveness to Ambiguity

There are two kinds of ambiguity, one of which clearly will not do as a criterion for judging the usefulness of a term. This kind of ambiguity occurs when a term denotes different phenomena, that is, when it has several meanings. The term "interest" could be said to be ambiguous, but a particular usage of the term alone, and that is the consideration here, can scarcely be ambiguous in that sense. But there is a variation of this kind of ambiguity which may be worth watching for. This exists when a number of usages of the term "interest" are employed in the same linguistic expression. Here the context may be of little assistance in determining what is intended. For example, the expressions "A has an interest in x", and "x is in B's interest", can each suggest at least two different meanings of the term.

The second kind of ambiguity seems particularly relevant here. A concept may be regarded as being ambiguous if it is denoted by different terms. This is of some importance in reformulating a concept, for if it can be as adequately denoted by a different term then that usage may be discarded from the term under review. It may be possible to eliminate one or more usages of the term "interest" if other terms are commonly and adequately used to stand for the phenomenon involved.

There is some support in the literature for using conduciveness to ambiguity as one test of a concept's usefulness. It is Brecht who insists that the first requirement for concepts in scientific use is "clarity and unambiguity".⁸⁴⁸ E.E. Eubank uses the absence of ambiguity as one of his four criteria for judging scientific concepts." Is the term perfectly general, that is, always employed in the same sense whenever it is used?"⁸⁴⁹

1. Interest as a feeling which stimulates, accompanies, or is the result of, the attention process.

This concept of interest is sometimes ambiguous as the feeling component is occasionally named by the terms "concern", "curiosity", and "pleasure". But the usage is so basic and generally understood that no other term seems to be able to stand for the type of feeling denoted, especially in its relation to the attention process.

2. Interest as a more or less enduring disposition characterized by feelings of concern and involvement, and by cognitive and motivational dimensions.

This usage can give rise to considerable ambiguity insofar as other terms such as involvement, stake in, concern, and attitude have sometimes been used to denote this general disposition. That it need not be overly conducive to ambiguity seems reasonably clear from its fruitful use in much of the literature on political participation.

The second kind of ambiguity has been much in evidence, that is, when the term "interest" denotes different phenomena but is used in the same linguistic expression. For example, "A has an interest in x" could mean a variety of things. It could suggest a disposition of involvement, a feeling of curiosity accompanying attention, and having an economic stake in something. To say that "A has an interest in the election" could mean 1) A has bet heavily on one outcome, 2) A is a long-time Conservative with a large construction business, 3) A is a strong party identifier with much involvement and concern in the outcome, 4) A sells Liberal party campaign buttons, 5) A is curious and excited by men in conflict, or any combination thereof.

3. Interest as the basic and general motivational disposition.

The most serious shortcoming of this usage is the fact that the phenomenon denoted is labelled by a wide variety of terms. There is no theoretical reason why the term "interest" could not be used, but as it has rarely been employed in this way, its use is conducive to unnecessary ambiguity.

4. Interest as the primary or secondary motivational disposition in the context of the associative-learning theory.

The usefulness of this usage is seriously restricted by its propensity to augment ambiguity. Many different terms have been used to denote primary and secondary motivational factors, and interest has not usually been among them. There is no theoretical reason why the term "interest" cannot be used to denote either type of variable but there seems to be no good practical or theoretical reason why its use in this sense ought to be encouraged.

5. Interest as an enduring disposition which is the basic controlling, motivating, and directing aspect of the personality system.

This usage has been conducive to ambiguity insofar as different terms have been used to describe the same general class of motivational factors. However, the theoretical assumptions of Allport do set it off from similarly denoted phenomena in other theoretical systems. But great care must be exercised in detecting the distinction. On the other hand, Allport has been ambiguous in his use of terms, and often calls this concept "value-scheme", "intentions", "purposes", and "propriate striving".

6. Interest as the goal-object of a motivational relationship.

This usage is conducive to ambiguity in a number of respects. In the first place, various terms are employed to denote the goal-object, for instance, goal, end, purpose, object, and objective. In the second place, the vague notion of a goal allows a variety of other terms to be used in specifying the kind of motivational disposition or an aspect of it. For example, MacIver and Rothman speak of an interest as the object of an attitude.

7. Interest as the object of an attitude.

The rare instances of this usage have been particularly conducive to ambiguity, most often, unfortunately, in the same theory by the same author. It is not so much that the objects of attitudes are differently labelled (although that does occur), but that the term "interest" is employed in a wide variety of other senses. It is difficult to understand, in MacIver's work, how an interest as the object of an attitude alone, can explain the formation and maintenance of associations.

8. Interest as a shared attitude

This concept is quite ambiguous as it is sometimes denoted simply by the term "attitude", a term which is variously used in its own right. More importantly, Truman uses two different senses of a shared attitude; 1) a very generalized tendency to respond to classes of objects in the same way which individuals may hold, and 2) a common response toward what is needed or wanted by a group in a particular situation. This type of shared attitude is held by individuals only as group members, it occurs only in particular kinds of groups, and

it is observable as a claim on other groups in society. These two different senses of a shared attitude go largely unattended in Truman's work and it is difficult to know which is intended in many cases where the expression is used.

9. Interest as activity

This usage inclines to ambiguity. When anything is so vague it is most often ambiguous. The most unsettling feature of this usage, at least in Bentley's hands, is the internal ambiguity. The term "interest" could not seem to stand as activity alone. Other things that he wanted to say with the term were in fact said. For example, he uses interest as activity, group, the manner of stating the value of a group's activity, purpose, a means, curiosity, advantage, and as a feeling in relation to attention. There was nothing narrow-minded about Bentley. A concept is ambiguous if it is denoted by other terms. The third last sentence outlines the terms which are also used to denote the phenomenon in question.

10. Interest as one's advantage

This usage conduces to high degrees of ambiguity as the concept involved is variously termed "goal", "welfare", "profit", "benefit". Without specifying these terms fairly carefully, it is easy to see how the assumed synonymity could break down. To profit materially may not be a person's good in a moral sense of the term. It also conduces to ambiguity in that users of this sense very often want to be able to say that someone is interested in something. And this, of course, is a very different usage.

11. Interest as any means which assist a person or a group in getting what he or they want.

This usage invites ambiguity as the end state, being advantaged, is also often spoken of as an interest. This invokes the possibility of saying that x is an interest if it is a means to an interest, and this is not especially helpful. The condition of being a means to something, on the other hand, is very often not called an interest at all. Not surprisingly, it is most frequently spoken of as a means. In the current language of political science, the term "resource" is often employed to denote such a phenomenon. This usage also conduces to ambiguity in that it seldom allows its employers to say all that they want to say with the term "interest". Easton's abrupt divergence from his definition to speak of interest in a dispositional sense as "an interest in a matter" is a good case in point.

12. Interest as a social or economic stake in something.

This usage is conducive to ambiguity in at least two ways. In the first place, the terms used synonymously with the expression "a stake in", very often appear in their own right and it is difficult to know whether or not precisely the same meaning is attached. If the terms are not synonymous, this ought to be made clear. In the second place, the term "interest" appears in the expression "A has an interest in x", and it is impossible to know whether the interest is a stake (of whatever variety), a feeling accompanying attention, or a more or less enduring disposition of concern and involvement. If a stake in something involves no more than an involved concern about something which greatly affects an individual, then it is very difficult to distinguish from interest in the dispositional sense.

13. Interest as a claim (demand)

Now a concept is said to be ambiguous if it is denoted by different terms. In this case, the terms "claim" and "demand" are most often used without being taken as an interest. In short, interest has seldom been used in this way. Ambiguity also occurs in Plamenatz' definition of the term, where the expression "others interested in him" is used to help define an interest. Almond's work is a model of ambiguity. The terms "interest", "demand", and "claim" are sometimes synonymous and sometimes not. This usage does not seem to facilitate all that the users want to be able to say with the term "interest". Even Plamenatz shifts to several other usages, as do Lasswell and Almond.

14. Interests as groups.

This usage is splendidly ambiguous as the terms "group" and "interest" usually denote fairly distinct kinds of phenomena. It is also ambiguous insofar as two different kinds of groups with differing positions and attributes may be intended. It is a good example of the kind of ordinary language expression which often creeps into descriptive work as a shorthand device.

C. The Ability of the Concept to function in hypotheses and laws of explanatory and predictive force - fruitfulness.

The measure of a concept's fruitfulness, or significance, as Brodbeck calls it, is the most difficult test to apply. A concept is said to be fruitful if it enters into scientific laws. As Arnold Brecht has it, "the scientific usefulness of a concept depends not on analytical reasoning alone but on the truth of 'synthetic' propositions that are meant to reflect reality." ⁸⁵⁰ In Brodbeck's terms, to assert a fact

is to say that a concept has an instance or a number of instances. Connections among individual facts constitute general facts, and generalizations state connections between instances of facts. Now the basic point, in Brodbeck's view, is that only instances that are connected with other instances in this fashion are significant. An example of this type of statement is the following: "if there is an increase in interest in the general election, then more people will vote". Generalizations of this type which connect individual facts, are called laws. The constancy which a law describes is that of "one instance of a concept always being connected with an instance of another... ." ⁸⁵¹ A fact is worth having, and the concepts or concepts embodied in it are thus significant, only under the following conditions, Brodbeck contends.

A concept is significant only if it enters into laws. It is significant, in other words, only if we know something about its referents, know how it is connected with other things. And to know that, in turn, is to know what effects it has, when it occurs, or how it changes. ⁸⁵²

It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to test the fruitfulness of a concept in this sense before it is actually brought into service in empirical inquiries. It is also difficult to judge the fruitfulness of a concept in selected portions of the literature when there exist so many competing concepts and controversies about how useful they have been. In view of these difficulties, this test will be fairly rough and generally applied.

There are two general sub-classes of this kind of scientific fruitfulness. The first concerns a concept's empirical

import, that is, its direct operational validity. This exists when concepts are operationalized and directly enter scientific laws. Now in so doing they also assume a certain amount of theoretical import as well. The second kind of fruitfulness involves very abstract theoretical concepts which are not themselves directly operationalizable, that is, bear no immediate reference to observables, but still enter into explanatory theories. The discovery of this kind of concept, Hempel insists, "requires scientific inventiveness and cannot be replaced by the -- certainly indispensable, but also definitely insufficient -- operationalist or empiricist requirement of empirical import alone." 853

There is another aspect of fruitfulness which cannot be ignored. That is to say, a concept is fruitful if it is suggestive of research, if it guides and directs inquiry to new concepts and relationships. If it has this kind of heuristic quality, it is suggestive of concepts and relationships which can be shown to enter laws, that is, concepts which are fruitful in the first sense of the term. The test for fruitfulness will also employ the criterion of suggestiveness. Now this is an equally difficult notion to call into service. Its application will be rather crude, but, it is hoped, suggestive of how it might be better formulated and managed.

It is also the case that a term can be fruitful only if its meaning is fairly clear, but this was examined under the criterion of clarity of meaning. A term cannot be fruitful if it cannot be used consistently in the way in which it is stipulated. This was entailed, however, in the question of ambiguity.

1. Interest as a feeling which stimulates, accompanies, or is the result of, the attention process.

This usage of the term "interest" was most common in a technical capacity in the work of psychologists of a half-century ago. It entered into a mass of theories, although often in a slightly differing role. These theories, however, were what are now sometimes called conceptual frameworks rather than theoretical explanatory systems. The term was more suggestive than lawful. This sometimes vague concept is usually thought so basic that it seems to enter into an incredible number of descriptive accounts in the social sciences, but usually in a non-technical, and in a very limited role.

2. Interest as a more or less enduring disposition characterized by feelings of concern and involvement, and by cognitive and motivational dimensions.

This usage has been the most fruitful and suggestive of research and theory construction of all the usages of interest under investigation. And it has been so in spite of, and perhaps partly because of, its sometimes vague and ambiguous use. It is this usage which has most often informed the interest-measurement tradition in psychology. Interest has been operationalized as a positive like and as a strong preference for, certain kinds of objects and activities. It is employed in this manner in the work of E.K. Strong Jr., D. Fryer, Kuder, L.W. Ferguson, and in the Vernon-Lindzey-Allport scale, to mention only a few. There has, of course, been some dispute about the various operational definitions and about what the tests actually measured. But generally speaking, it has been very productive.

In political science, the term has been operationalized in much the same way, but the term "interest" itself has been more often employed. There is not much evidence to suggest that this somewhat more direct approach has not been generally successful. R.E. Lane has formulated the law of mediating interests. Interests are said to mediate between sociological pressures and behaviour, and the decision to vote is thought to be mediated through interests at each class level in much the same way. Interest in this sense has been shown to be positively related to voting, talking politics, the amount of political knowledge, exposure to the media, and the number and breadth of opinions held. It is said that political partisanship and participation often follow interest, and that its absence is a crucial factor in accounting for non-voting. This usage has been most fruitful in respect to suggesting and stimulating continuous research and theory.

3. Interest as the basic and general motivational disposition.

The term has been used in this sense almost entirely to specify a concept in a wide-reaching conceptual framework. It has not been given much empirical or theoretical import. As it has not enjoyed widespread and continuous use, and as the variety of competing terms which denote this phenomenon have, it does not appear to have been, or to be, especially fruitful.

4. Interest as the primary or secondary motivational disposition in the context of the associative-learning theory.

As the term "interest has not been widely used in any continuous empirical or theoretical inquiry in this area of

motivational research, it has not been very fruitful. Motivational theory takes a rich variety of forms, and no doubt terms which play a similar role to that occasionally afforded to interest, have been quite fruitful. But the term "interest" has not usually been employed, and has therefore not been suggestive of new factors and relationships.

5. Interest as an enduring disposition which is the basic controlling, motivating, and directing aspect of the personality system.

This usage has formed an integral role in Allport's theory of personality and has, within that context, certain explanatory force. Generally speaking, it has not been widely used in this fashion, as motivational terms go. On the other hand, it has been enormously suggestive of research and critical analysis in the areas of motivation and personality theory. It is employed, or at least a similar usage is employed, in the work of Smith, Bruner, and White, and by Newcomb and associates.

6. Interest as the goal-object of a motivational relationship.

This usage has been employed rather sparingly. When it has appeared, it has done so most often in the discipline of political science, and usually by way of setting out a conceptual framework. It has rarely if ever been operationalized and pressed into service in on-going research. A good deal of the difficulty stems from the fact that writers who employ this usage usually end up by speaking of interest in a variety of other ways, and usually as a motivational disposition. It has not been very suggestive of fruitful research or theoretical reformulation. In short, it has been an easy

term to use to denote an otherwise unspecified phenomenon.

7. Interest as the object of an attitude.

This usage has been employed in theoretical work by a very few scholars but has not proved fruitful largely because of its ambiguous use. MacIver speaks occasionally of interests as the objects of attitudes, but usually only in outlining his conceptual scheme. Interest is used in a variety of ways, sometimes as though it were the attitude itself, often as a subjective, dispositional factor, occasionally as advantage, and not infrequently as a feeling relating to attention. When a term cannot be used in the sense defined, and especially by its creator, it can scarcely be said to be fruitful. MacIver's use of interest, in the sense specified above, has not been suggestive of much further research and seems to have been largely, and quite properly, forgotten.

8. Interest as a shared attitude.

It is very difficult to evaluate the fruitfulness of this usage. There is no question that the usage forms a part of Truman's conceptual framework. That much is clear. But he fails to operationalize the term, it is not used in empirical inquiry, and it forms no part of an empirically interpreted theoretical explanation. On more critical grounds, the fruitfulness of the expression "shared attitude" is vastly limited because it is so ambiguous, and it can never be clearly known which of two senses is intended. This greatly restricts the force of his heuristic propositions concerning shared attitudes, interaction, potential groups, and the pressing of claims. It should also be noticed that the expression "shared attitude" is localized to his introductory chapters

and to several other theoretical pieces, notably his introduction to potential interest groups. Very frequently he uses "shared attitude" as a claim and speaks most often of claims. But then the claim is only an expression of this type of shared-attitude. It sometimes seems that the only reason Truman uses the term "interest" at all is because he wants to address himself to things which were often called "interest groups". Had he elected to call these groups "pressure groups", he might have avoided the problem of interests altogether. In any event, his key terms are claim, group, access, and occasionally, shared attitude. That the term "interest" is not widely employed in his analysis may suggest that it was neither precise in formulation nor useful in the ambiguous roles that it was asked to perform.

A rather different question is the extent to which his usage of interest has been suggestive of further research. This is a complicated issue. Several other scholars in political science have used the term in this way, but they have been very few indeed. More suggestive perhaps, has been the weakness of this usage, for it has stimulated some critical literature. The most suggestive aspect of Truman's The Government Process seems not to have been the theory itself, but the stimulus it gave to others to engage in pressure group research. And this has gone on without his usage of interest.

9. Interest as activity

This usage has entered conceptual frameworks (Bentley's, Hagan's, and Monypenny's) but it has rarely, if ever, been operationalized and utilized in empirical research thus to reappear in theoretical explanatory systems. There is some

reason to suppose that this usage has not been precise enough to be lawful. So many senses of interest are involved that it is sometimes difficult to know which is intended. And by leaving little room for individual activity, it is incapable of entering those kinds of laws. When interest cannot cause behaviour because it is the behaviour, it is of limited power in explaining behaviour. The research tool which Bentley fashioned proved too weighty and blunt for him to wield, and his followers have had to break down by more precise specification, to some degree at least, various aspects of activity. Bentley became much more conventional when it came to talking about groups and governments, and his self-styled disciple, David Truman, outdid him in that. Although the framework has been suggestive of much research and theory in the area of pressure groups, and especially in emphasizing groups in a continuous process, the interest aspect of Bentley's thesis can hardly be said to have been fruitful in the same way.

10. Interest as one's advantage

This usage has not been very fruitful in any systematic way. In respect to entering explanatory laws, it has not much to be said for it. It has never really been used in any thorough-going way in a conceptual framework with empirical intentions. So it has not been suggestive of empirical work and theory. But it has been of very common use in a loosely descriptive sense to denote a state of profiting materially. It is not uncommon to find it playing a major role in talk about class interests. For example, we often read of "rule in the interest of the upper class,"

or that "this policy is in the lower class interest". It is usually intended in speaking of short-term and long-term interests, whether of an individual, group, or class. It is very frequently employed in regard to self-interest. But to say that a usage is fruitful, and to say that it is a handy and often used expression, are two different matters. In this case, the latter seems to sum up the case.

11. Interest as any means which assist a person or a group in getting what he or they want.

This is also a problematic usage to evaluate as it is so old in tradition and yet so recent in specification. It has seldom been set out nominally or operationally. It has seldom, if ever, appeared in conceptual frameworks, and rarely, if ever, has it been employed in actual empirical investigation. It has not yet found a role in explanatory theory. Now Easton has set this usage out in his conceptual framework, but the matter appears to have stopped there. Van Dyke attempts to show how his reformulation allows him to make more sense in deciding whether or not something is in someone's interest by looking at goals and the rational evaluation of means. But in Van Dyke's argument, both means and ends are interests insofar as they are goals. So in the strictest sense, a means is an interest only if it qualifies as a goal. In broad outline, this usage seems to be at least potentially useful. The problem here is that this is often not what people mean by an interest, and both Plamenatz and Easton occasionally revert to using interest in a dispositional sense. The difficulty is in trying to have it both ways. Barry's usage does assist him in formulating his want-regarding principle, but in the pro-

cess he is led into specifying interest in a very restricted sense as economic assets (opportunities). But it could be suggestive of much useful research in this form. This usage allows one to say that a person may have an interest (as a means) without being aware of it, and that he may mistake his interests. To speak of a person having an interest, however, implies a dispositional sense of the term. In this respect, confusion is easily created. It should also be mentioned that this usage, in any specified form, has been localized to the discipline of political science.

12. Interest as a social or economic stake in something.

This usage has rarely been defined, has seldom, if ever, been operationalized in any precise way, and has never formed a part of any empirically interpreted theoretical system. It has been sparingly used in conceptual frameworks, but even then, it has not been clearly formulated. When it has been used, as by Finer explicitly, and by Potter and Eckstein implicitly, it has been taken to mean groups which have a social or economic stake in the community, groups affected in respect to entrenched social or economic advantage. On the other hand, individuals who are "interested" are those who have an economic or pecuniary share in something. This usage has been employed to distinguish between interest as a more or less objective stake or share in something, and interest as a shared attitude. It is difficult to say how fruitful this has been. It has not been widely used, and has in fact been localized to a number of British pressure group studies. It is suggestive of a distinction between two kinds of pressure groups, but

it has never been made out how this is the most important, or even a relatively important, distinction to make. There is no doubt that a basic difference exists between the Confederation of British Industries and the Howard Society, but whether it turns on a rather vague distinction between a cause and an interest is not so certain. This usage has created further difficulties insofar as the stake is sometimes confused with the group holding it, or with a more broadly conceived strata, order, or rank in society. At the same time, users of this usage have experienced grave difficulties in finding it serviceable in order to say what they want with the term "interest". The usage of interest as a disposition has often been employed as well.

13. Interest as a claim (demand).

This usage appears in a fairly wide number of empirical studies and conceptual frameworks. It seems to have entered some laws, especially in research in comparative politics. On the other hand, its employment has been so ambiguous and its formulation so vague in these investigations that the precise characteristics and functions of the concept remain in much doubt. It is indeed difficult to evaluate its fruitfulness in this context. It has simply not been carefully operationalized in this work. It is safe to say, however, that its use in conceptual frameworks initiating inquiry in comparative politics has been very suggestive. The specific role of the general theory and the fruitfulness of the concept of interest, however, are difficult to disentangle. The critical writings of Plamenatz and Benn have been primarily efforts in explication. Their work does seem

to have been fruitful in stimulating some reappraisal of the term "interest", but not in suggesting explicit paths for empirical investigation.

14. Interests as groups

This usage has been neither carefully defined nor operationalized for theoretical work and empirical inquiry. It is not fruitful in the sense of entering laws, nor does it seem to have generated useful research. It is most often a short-hand expression plugged into loosely descriptive investigations.

D. Embodiment of ordinary language meaning.

To what extent, if indeed, at all, scientific terms must embody the ordinary language meanings of those terms, is a much disputed issue and merits some clarification. The case against the embodiment of ordinary language meanings in scientific terms is clearly expressed by Brodbeck. She argues that a scientific term "is unlikely to include all of them [ordinary language meanings] and need not include any." ⁸⁵⁴ This claim seems to be largely based on "the vagueness of ordinary use", a situation which is not thought conducive to scientific progress. She goes on to argue that if I.Q. is a good concept, it is so not because it accords with ordinary usage, but because it can be measured reliably and its relations with other types of behaviour can be known. Hempel advises that as a science develops, its conceptual apparatus has to become more precise in order to enhance the theoretical import of the resulting system. And it is entitled to develop in this way, he suggests, "without being hampered by the consideration of preserving and explicating the prescientific usage of conversational terms taken over

into its vocabulary." ⁸⁵⁵ But this again, it seems, is at least partly because the terms of conversational language are said to "lack determinancy and uniformity."

There are at least two issues here which ought to be identified and discussed. ⁸⁵⁶ The first involves ambiguity, both among scholars and between scholars and the public. The second issue turns on the ability of scholars to communicate in technical language terms with the public in regard to problems conceived by the public in terms of ordinary language.

There is not much doubt that ordinary language usages are often too imprecise for technical purposes and are often ambiguous. They are for these reasons not directly qualified for scientific employment. It can also be allowed that when social scientists take their initial bearings from ordinary language terms, (which Madge tells us is done in the great majority of cases), they cannot be expected to include all the ordinary language meanings. This would be quite impossible given the very frequent occurrence of different meanings associated with a term in the vocabulary of ordinary language. This much can be readily granted. It is likewise not quite fair to discredit an operational definition by arguing that it does not embody what we usually mean by the term if the term is usually ambiguous. But it may very well be a fair comment if there are fairly distinct and generally clear usages of a term and the technical language meaning diverges considerably or fails to specify which meaning comes the closest to being embodied. Very often the ordinary language usages are set out in dictionaries, and

it is surely not too much to ask that a social scientist acquaint himself with these usages in order to identify and to clarify the one (or ones) which inform his technical usage.

Consider Brodbeck's example of intelligence tests. If a social scientist takes the ordinary meaning of intelligence (or one such meaning) as the guiding theoretical concept which is then operationalized by certain measures, then there is every reason that the technical term should be called "intelligence". But it has a responsibility to be an adequate measure of what the theoretical term means, and indirectly, of what intelligence is ordinarily taken to mean. If it does not adequately measure this, then it is not a good indicator and ought to be discarded or reformulated. In the event that it is a good indicator of something else which proves significant, then it should obviously be retained, but under a different label. If an ordinary language concept of intelligence is not used in formulating the guiding theoretical concept which is then operationalized and applied, calling it "intelligence" if it varies considerably from the ordinary meaning of that term can scarcely be justified. That is, unless it is not intended to be used in facing the everyday problems of intelligence as conceived and managed by everyday people. If scientific discourse containing this concept is brought into contact with the concept in ordinary use, ambiguity will probably ensue. It may quite legitimately be said that this is not what is meant by the term. When scientists make so much of their licence to label phenomena by whatever term they choose, another term should be selected. In such cases, the burden is surely on scientists to make the adjustment.

On the other hand, these kinds of tests need not measure what it means in ordinary language to speak of intelligence. But then it would reduce ambiguity if expressions such as "school achievement scales", or "verbal and mathematical skill scores", or whatever, were used to denote the phenomenon in question. The term "intelligence" is not demanded or required of them unless they have set out to measure what that term usually means and the test is adequate. Scientists have a greater responsibility in this area than they have been generally prepared to allow. ⁸⁵⁷

Social scientists may become confused in much the same way, if many are accustomed to employing non-technical usages of a term which has been given a very different technical meaning by some of their colleagues. The term "interest" is much more typical of this kind of possibility.

The issue of communicating with the public has already been touched on. It is simply that if technical terms, and hypotheses and explanations couched in those terms, are to find a market value in ordinary language use and practice, then they must be capable of re-statement in those terms. This is to say that they must embody, to some extent, ordinary language usages. It may be possible to explain and predict human behaviour by means of a theory whose technical terms are not easily and directly re-statable in ordinary language terms. But it might also be capable of contributing little else in a practical sense, and such hypotheses will be capable of an indirect confirmatory test only.

As an example, consider the possibility of a social scientist who advises a workingman, or user of the ordinary

language, that if he phzeuses then he will probably zigfink. In all likelihood this will not make much sense to the workingman or to others like him. If the social scientist cannot interpret his proposition in understandable ordinary language terms, then it is time to ask him to disclose how he reached this formulation and why he happened to elect those particular terms. The social scientist may be able to explain and predict the workingman's behaviour with high predictability, but his theory will not be of much practical use in changing or in directing behaviour, and this is at least part of what many social scientists seem to be set on doing. It will be equally difficult for the social scientist to obtain a reliable test of his hypothesis if the terms cannot be operationalized in the language of ordinary people. The other possibility is to teach the technical language to ordinary people, but this will be difficult if such terms cannot be specified in that language. But it may be possible. If this can be done, then technical terms become part of the ordinary language and take on ordinary language embodiment in the context of their use. In the vast majority of cases, however, the procedure evolves in the opposite direction.

On the other hand, the workingman may reply that he had not realized that if he phzeuses then he would probably zigfink, but now that the social scientist says that he means that if he has a strong interest in politics then he will probably participate in politics, he can now see that there may be something to it and that he can understand well enough what he means. In this case, technical terms could be specified in ordinary language terms, which means that

they have ordinary language embodiment. Communication is facilitated and the workman may rush away to encourage others to develop interests so that they might participate in contriving a better or a worse politics.

Now it seems that social science, for the most part, does commence from the language and problems of ordinary people. After all, scientists speak the common language and, presumably, do much of their thinking in those terms. Science is a more sophisticated variety or continuation of common sense, and ordinary language does make important distinctions in the phenomena of the experiential world and allows explanation to go forward to a considerable extent. Social scientists most often attempt to identify, measure, and relate phenomena which may not usually be conceived in quite that way or which may not usually be related in that fashion, but which at least have meaning for ordinary people. Scientific language has its beginnings in ordinary language, Madge reminds us, and must return to it for clarification.⁸⁵⁸ Kaplan puts the matter fairly succinctly. "Every scientific language, however technical, is learned and used by way of the common language of everyday life; it is that everyday language to which we inevitably return for the clarification of scientific meanings."⁸⁵⁹ And Hempel advises us that one requirement which must be met in any successful explicative reinterpretation is that the reinterpretation allows the inclusion of "at least a large part of what is customarily expressed by means of the term under consideration."⁸⁶⁰ When a large part of what is customarily expressed by means of the term "interest" is taken over from ordinary language, there seems to be good reason for including this

as a test in evaluating the usefulness of the term.

1. Interest as a feeling, which stimulates, accompanies, or is the result of, the attention process.

There is a very firm and long-standing ordinary language basis for this usage. Interest has almost always been spoken of as a feeling of concern. On the other hand, the notion of interest as being specifically related to the attention process did not take on ordinary language connotations until much later. But it is defined lexically as a readiness to attend to, or be stirred by, a certain class of objects, and more directly, as the feeling of curiosity or concern which accompanies or arouses special attention to an object.

2. Interest as a more or less enduring disposition characterized by feelings of concern and involvement, and by cognitive and motivational dimensions.

This usage has a very firm basis in ordinary language. There is not an explicit recognition of a motivational dimension, although this is very often implied. The most common ordinary language usage of interest has been that of a feeling of concern about certain objects which deeply affect an individual such as to cause the individual to be motivated towards them and to do something with them.

3. Interest as the basic and general motivational disposition.

This usage has no direct basis in ordinary language. While concern has been widely employed in ordinary language usage in an implicit motivational sense, it has never been suggested that an interest was the only factor of that nature.

4. Interest as the primary or secondary motivational disposition in the context of the associative-learning theory.

There is no strict basis in ordinary language for the kind of distinction suggested here. Interest is very often seen in a motivational sense as concern, but its relation to other motivational factors has never been specified.

5. Interest as an enduring disposition which is the basic controlling, motivating, and directing aspect of the personality system.

This usage of interest as a high order motivational factor has no direct lexical companion. However it does seem to be based on the ordinary language use of interest as concern, and Allport often speaks of interests as major patterns of striving, one's on-going concerns.

6. Interest as the goal-object of a motivational relationship.

There is some overlap in this case with ordinary language usage. Sometimes interests have been spoken of as something which causes or arouses curiosity or concern, and as the business, course, or principle in which an individual or a group of individuals are interested. But there they are interested in interests, and that is to use two different senses of the term.

7. Interest as the object of an attitude.

Although there is some precedent in ordinary language usage for interests as objects, there is no case reported in most lexical sources of interest as the object of an attitude. This is very much a stipulated usage with little ordinary

language support.

8. Interest as a shared attitude.

There is no clear basis in ordinary language for the usage of interest as a shared attitude. But when the term "claim" is used as an expression of a shared attitude, this term has some ordinary language support. However, this is usually taken as a more recognized kind of claim, and the dispositional base in an attitude is never enunciated.

9. Interest as activity

There is no ordinary language usage which treats interest as activity. There is, however, a usage which regards interest as a business, course, or principle in which an individual or a group of individuals are interested. But then Bentley would want to deny that the group so constituted could be interested in anything, the group itself being the interest.

10. Interest as one's advantage.

This usage enjoys a very firm ordinary language basis. In fact it is usually only employed in this sense. It is most frequently used in the sense of being concerned or affected in respect to advantage, and as regard to one's own profit or advantage, that is, self-interest.

11. Interest as any means which assist a person or a group in getting what he or they want.

This usage has a sound foundation in ordinary language where an interest is often said to be that which is to, or for the advantage, good, benefit, or profit of anyone. The difficulty, however, is that the means is usually associated, at least implicitly, with the state of being advantaged in

a material or economic sense.

12. Interest as a social or economic stake in something.

This usage is firmly rooted in the ordinary language sense of interest as the relation of being objectively concerned in something; having a right or title, a claim upon, or share or stake in something. However, it should be noted that a) the notion of an objective concern is unclear, and b) the variety of synonyms could vary appreciably in meaning.

13. Interest as a claim (demand)

This usage has some footing in the ordinary language usage of interest as the relation of being objectively concerned in something; having a right or title, a claim upon or a share or a stake in something. This is also the common language basis of interest as a stake in an object or event. But it seems to suggest having a claim as a recognized share in, or a right or title to, something, a rather different sense than expressing a claim as a kind of aspiration or want.

14. Interests as groups

This usage embodies two fairly common ordinary language usages, namely, a number of persons who are interested in a business, course, or principle, and the groups effectively controlling an enterprise or dominating a field of activity.

This chapter has reviewed and partially synthesized the major usages of the term "interest" in the social science literature under review. Four tests were constructed and applied. The concluding chapter will initiate a tentative reformulation of the concept of interest.

CONCLUSION

Introduction

In this chapter, the major usages of the term "interest" will be briefly evaluated in the light of the testing, and recommendations will be advanced concerning their future use. In the synthesis and reformulation, an attempt will be made to suggest how communication and research may be improved by discarding and re-naming certain usages. The concepts of interest which it is suggested we retain, will be specified and set in the context of some other terms and expressions which have proved to be a source of confusion. The concluding thoughts will briefly focus on the peculiar status of the concept of interest, a major definitional difficulty, notes on borrowing concepts, and a hasty view of our progress towards a general behavioural theory.

I. The Concept of Interest Evaluated

- A. Interest as a feeling which stimulates, accompanies, or is the result of, the attention process.

This usage of interest as a feeling of concern, liking, consciousness of worth, pleasure, or curiosity, is sometimes vague but rarely appears to conduce to much ambiguity. It has not usually been formulated in a technical usage and so its fruitfulness is quite low. But it is so common in ordinary and in technical language that it can scarcely be done without. It is recommended that this usage be retained in its present form.

- B. Interest as a more or less enduring disposition characterized by feelings of concern and involvement, and by cognitive and motivational dimensions.

This usage includes a pronounced affective component of concern and involvement, a strong motivational basis of striving towards certain objects, and a cognitive dimension which involves beliefs about the characteristics, value, and worthwhileness of the objects. This usage has been rather vaguely formulated and has frequently given rise to ambiguity. When it has been more precisely specified, however, it has been quite capably applied and it has proven to be the most fruitful and most suggestive of further research and theory of any usage under review. It has a fairly clear ordinary language embodiment. This usage has been very often used across disciplinary borders, especially in psychology and in political science. It is strongly recommended that this usage be retained and reformulated to include much that is involved in usage E.

- C. Interest as the basic and general motivational disposition.

This usage of interest as the general motivational factor has been vaguely conceived and has given rise to considerable ambiguity. The phenomena involved **are** denoted by a wide variety of other terms with much greater clarity and status. This usage has been neither common nor fruitful and it has no straightforward embodiment in ordinary language. This usage has largely, and quite properly, gone out of

fashion and there appear to be no good grounds upon which to recommend that it be retained in this form.

- D. Interest as the primary or secondary motivational disposition in the context of the associative-learning theory.

Interest has been infrequently used to denote either the primary or secondary motivational factor in the context of this particular tradition. When it has been employed, it has been vaguely formulated and applied, a circumstance which appears to have augmented ambiguity. It has been neither fruitful nor suggestive, and it enjoys no strict basis in ordinary language. This usage of the term "interest" has gone out of fashion and more commonly accepted terms have taken its place. It is recommended that the term "interest" no longer be used in this sense.

- E. Interest as an enduring disposition which is the basic controlling, motivating, and directing aspect of the personality system.

This usage marks an important divergence in motivational theory from the more usual associative-learning tradition by recognizing basic motivational patterns as strongly ego-involved. The basic components of this disposition include feelings of concern and involvement, high-order patterns of striving, and fairly well informed views about objects which are of central concern to the individual. The components are markedly similar to those specified in usage B. Although this usage has been somewhat vague and

conducive to ambiguity (at least in the context of the associative-learning school), it has been fruitful and very suggestive of critical evaluations and further research. The strong feeling of concern and involvement serve to link the technical usage with a widely held common language usage. It is recommended that this usage be retained and synthesized with usage B. The reformulation will recognize its presence by extending in intensity the dimensions of affect and motivation.

F. Interest as the goal-object of a motivational relationship.

The usage of interest as an end, purpose, objective, or goal has been somewhat vague in formulation, especially in regard to the distinction that is implied in the motivational relationship and in respect to the precise nature of the concept of a goal. It is conducive to a considerable amount of ambiguity insofar as other terms are more often employed to denote the phenomenon in question, most notably the term "goal". This usage has rarely, if ever, been operationalized or formulated in laws of explanatory force, although it has appeared in a number of conceptual frameworks. There has been a marked inability to utilize this usage without resorting to other, and quite different, usages of the term "interest". There is no compelling ordinary language basis for this formulation as its lexical use involves a dispositional sense of interest as well. The

moderate employment of this usage has been generally restricted to the discipline of political science. It is recommended that the term "interest" be dropped and that the phenomenon in question be denoted by the term "goal".

G. Interest as the object of an attitude.

This is a special case of usage F in that it specifies an attitude as the disposition in terms of which a goal is called an interest. This usage is seldom used and relies on a vaguely defined concept of an attitude without offering distinctions within the general class of motivational factors. It has not proved workable in the writings of its major exponents, primarily it seems, because it fails to encompass nearly as much as the authors want to say with the term "interest". It is often not used in the sense in which it has been specified, and it has been neither fruitful nor suggestive of further research. It enjoys no genuine basis in ordinary language. It is strongly recommended that the term "interest" be dropped and that this usage be synthesized with usage F to be named by the term "goal".

H. Interest as a shared attitude.

In this dispositional usage, interest is taken to be an attitude which is shared by a number of people. In Truman's work (and he has been much alone in employing this usage), the term is vague, relatively undefined, and carefully distinguished from neither competing notions of attitude, subjective usages of interest, nor from other moti-

vational factors. Truman employs two usages of shared-attitude, one of which is expressed in the form of claims, and the other of which, as nearly as can be seen, is not. The usage is conducive to ambiguity on a number of fronts. The term "interest" is not an especially fruitful part of a general theory of pressure groups which has been very suggestive of further research and theory. There is no common language basis for this position. In Chapter III it was argued that there are useful ways in which attitudes and interests can be distinguished, although, as with most dispositional factors, there may be blurring at the boundaries. I propose to adhere to these distinctions and to drop the term "interest" from this usage. Thus the terms "attitude" and "interest" can both be retained and can serve to denote different phenomena.

I. Interest as activity

This usage is that utilized by Bentley and a small group of earnest scholars who seek a more general term to denote integrated aspects of activity. This usage has been very vague as activity has not been precise enough in definition to serve as a manipulable research instrument. In point of fact, Bentley and his disciples often break activity up into manageable bits, and a variety of terms, including interest, are used to denote these aspects. This usage conduces to much ambiguity. Interest as activity has not been very fruitful in empirical investigations or in

empirically interpreted explanations. It is almost impossible to speak of individuals having interests, and this seems to be one thing that most scholars want to be able to say. The fruitfulness of this usage lies more in stimulating studies of pressure groups and in emphasizing the flow of activity between group action and the processes of government. It enjoys no common language base and it has not appeared beyond the confines of the discipline of political science. It is recommended that this broad usage be dropped, and that the term "interest" be given a more restricted specification within the general concept of activity.

J. Interest as one's advantage.

Interest as advantage usually signifies a more or less general condition of want satisfaction or profiting. The usage has been vaguely formulated and indiscriminately applied. The terms defining advantage are broad and usually ill-defined. Badly focused quarrels have raged on the questions of who is to decide when an individual's interest is involved, what it is like, or when it is met. The usage conduces to much ambiguity and is usually unable to stand alone in saying all that the authors want to say with the term "interest". It has never been operationalized nor has it entered conceptual frameworks or theoretical explanatory systems. It has been loosely used in a vaguely descriptive way. It has, of course, a very firm ordinary language base,

and is, in fact, most often employed in that kind of generally unspecified sense. Its use has been limited to some political scientists and to a few scholars in sociology. Most often it seems that an individual's advantage is to get what he wants, although an economic sense is often implied. This is basically what is meant by a goal. It is therefore recommended that the term "interest" be dropped from this usage, and that, for technical purposes, the term "advantage" be replaced by the term "goal" in denoting this phenomenon.

K. Interest as any means which assist an individual or a group in getting what he or they want.

This usage sometimes specifies the wanting as one's advantage, usually taken in a material, economic, sense, but most often, the end state is not clarified. The usage has been fairly clear and straightforward in application, especially when the end state is specified. But it does invite ambiguity. A means to a goal is most often denoted by the term "means", and the term "interest" most often denotes something substantive and not simply a means relationship. Further ambiguity results from its user's inability to settle for what can be said with this non-dispositional sense of the term. Its fruitfulness appears to be potentially high but it has so far not been shown to be lawful. The most serious shortcoming, perhaps, is that this is not what most people mean by the term, and other terms denote the

phenomenon quite as well. This usage has a basis in ordinary language as a means to being advantaged, and an economic overtone is implicit. It is recommended that the term "interest" be dropped from this particular usage, and that the phenomenon in question, whatever performs a means function, be labelled by the term "means".

L. Interest as a social or economic stake in something.

This usage is very vague. The concept of a stake in something is usually not specified. Ambiguity is created by this usage as sometimes a subjective relationship of awareness is intended, and at other times it is not. On the other hand, a stake in something very often means a more recognized share in, right or title to, something which is of economic or social significance to an individual or to a group. As it is used in the expression "A has an interest in x", it is most confusing with similar expressions which involve interest as a feeling accompanying attention, or interest as a disposition. This usage has not been fruitful in empirical research and theory, nor has it been suggestive of such work. It has proved difficult for users to say all that they want to say about interests with this usage. It has a strong ordinary language base with the accent on a recognized share in, claim upon, right or title to, something. Its technical use has been limited to a small and generally static corner in political science. It is recommended that the term "interest" be dropped from this usage, and that

when it appears in technical work, it be known by its ordinary language name.

M. Interest as a claim (demand)

This usage involves the expression of a want, or of a certain kind of want, as a claim upon others, or as a demand for something. There is much difficulty in determining whether or not all expressed wants constitute claims, and if only a certain class are recognized, there is difficulty in deciding which ones can be said to meet the conditions. More confusion is created insofar as the term "interest" is sometimes synonymous with a claim (demand) and at other times is not, almost as though it occasionally denoted something quite different. There is no widespread agreement that the term "interest" is best employed in this manner. Although this usage has received considerable use recently in comparative government studies, there is little sound evidence to support the view that it has itself been very fruitful. This usage has some footing in ordinary language although the claim is treated much more as a recognized right or title to, or share in, something. It is only in political science and occasionally in jurisprudence that this usage has appeared. It is recommended that the term "interest" be dropped, and that the term "claim" (demand) be used to denote the expression of an interest in the form of a request or demand for something.

N. Interests as groups

Interest is used here most frequently in the plural, and has been taken to mean "the interests" or "the vested interests" on the one hand, and any group uniting for defense, maintenance, and enhancement, on the other. This widespread usage has been vaguely formulated and variously applied. It is thought to say something quite significant, in a shorthand, as it were, about entrenched groups. But it has rarely, if ever, been operationalized or pressed into service in an unambiguous way. It has not been very fruitful as it has never been shown to distinguish the significant attributes and functions of groups and group relations beyond a common sense and pejorative impression that some groups are more powerful than others. It has a basis in ordinary language use, and has been utilized in political science and in sociology to a considerable extent. It is recommended that the term "interest" be removed from this usage, and that the term "group", or specified subclass thereof, be employed to denote this phenomenon when it is thought necessary to use it in a technical way.

II. The Concept of Interest Reformulated

This discussion proceeds on the assumption that the term "interest" is useful only if it is quite clear and unambiguous, reasonably fruitful, and corresponds to a certain extent with ordinary language usage. It also seems apparent that the term should be retained only if it per-

forms a useful role in theory and in research which is not, or could not be, as capably performed by another. It is certainly the case that the term "interest" is vague and ambiguous in the social science literature examined here. The usefulness of the term would be greatly enhanced if it were more precisely delineated and if certain concepts which it presently labels could be denoted by other terms. This section will examine those usages of "interest" which can be synthesized and denoted by other terms. A tentative reformulation will be advanced so that these terms can perform slightly different roles in the context of the terminology which will be recommended. It should be made clear that the examination will deal only with those terms which usually occur in conjunction with the term "interest".

A. The term "interest" discarded

1. Motivational factors

It has been recommended that the term "interest" be removed from usages C and D, that is, interest as the basic and general motivational disposition, and interest as the primary or secondary motivational disposition in the context of the associative-learning theory. There is little agreement in the social sciences on the specific attributes and functions of basic motivational factors or on the terms by which they are labelled. A motive is said to be a hypothetical, inferred construct which impels behaviour, that is,

an identifiable force which activates and directs activity. There is much to be said for G. W. Allport's distinction between peripheral, segmental motives of a fairly specific focus, and higher order, ego-involved dispositional factors of a more enduring, controlling, and directing nature. I propose to call the general and basic dispositions "wants", and the more enduring, higher-order dispositions "interests". The basic physiological tension systems which suggest basic areas of tension-reduction will be called "drives". Wants are the general level motivational dispositions which develop in this context and which come to be largely social in derivation and in orientation. The motivational dispositions called "interests" will be outlined in the following section.

It should be noted that almost all motivational factors exhibit the same basic components, although in varying degrees. Interests, wants, and attitudes have affective, cognitive, and, of course, motivational components. But this is not to say that useful distinctions cannot generally be made. It is only to suggest that there will be blurring at the analytical borders, and sometimes difficulties in drawing distinctions empirically. But then the objective is to describe and explain behaviour, and distinctions are made so that this can be accomplished. There will be certain areas of doubt, but there is little to be gained by making a fetish of too precise distinctions and unnecessary quarrels. It is most likely that in almost any on-going behaviour, a

variety of motivational factors will be involved.

2. Goals

There seems to be no great distortion in meaning to synthesize usages F, G, and J. These include interest as the goal-object of a motivational relationship, interest as the object of an attitude, and interest as advantage. The term "goal" is commonly used in two main ways in the social science literature under review. A goal is most often defined as the end state or consummatory aspect of a motivational sequence. It is sometimes taken to be the motive itself, but this is much less common. This is not to deny, however, that temporally the idea of a goal is part of the motive, insofar as it assists in instigating and directing behaviour, while the goal itself is the end stage of the sequence. I propose to use the term "goal" in this way, allowing it to stand for a desired state of affairs, the consummatory aspect or object which brings satisfaction to any motivational disposition whether drive, want, attitude, or interest. The goal-objects of wants will probably be more specific and temporary than those associated with interests. In the case of attitudes, goal-objects are not held in the same focusing, directing, absorbing way as is the case with the objects of interests. Interests are not so much characterized as in-built reaction tendencies to respond to classes of objects in more or less regular ways,

although this is one feature of them. They are much more major areas of striving, concern, and ego-involvement, and objects are sought and seized with this kind of concern and involvement. It is largely for the sake of interests, and in the light of central interests, that many goals are perceived and formulated, and in terms of which action is initiated. It is probable that a variety of goals are selected in the light of any one interest.

The term "advantage" usually signifies a satisfying state of affairs, profiting, getting what one wants. The dimensions of advantage may be specified in terms of major areas of wanting, for example, social, economic, religious, aesthetic, and political. The condition of being advantaged is very much like a goal when it is the state of affairs generally sought, and in terms of which means are selected. It could still be said that something is or is not conducive to reaching a goal, that is, something is or is not in one's advantage. It would be as well to do without the term "advantage" in technical talk. But if it must be used, and it is a very popular non-technical term, it would facilitate clarity and communication if it were employed as a synonym for the term "goal". In a more thorough-going reformulation, advantage might be specified as an economic or material goal, for such are the implications often associated with the term. On the other hand, advantage often seems to denote a more enduring and more broadly conceived state of profiting. If

this were selected as the specification, advantage could be taken to mean general goals, or possibly general economic goals. I would recommend, however, that the usually vague term "advantage" be dropped, and that the term "goal" or some sub-classification of goal, be taken to stand in its place in technical usage.

3. Activity

It has been recommended that the term "interest" be dropped in respect to activity. The term "activity" usually denotes action patterns of individuals or groups of individuals. Activity is probably best conceived as a process involving some motivational factor or factors, goals, means, and action, whether covert or overt.

4. Means

The issue here is to decide what to call an object, activity, or event which performs a means (instrumental) function in bringing about, or in assisting in bringing about, a particular end (goal). It has been recommended that the term "interest" no longer be taken to stand for this phenomenon. The term "means" seems neutral enough, and certainly common enough, to be used in this respect. In some instances it may be useful to further specify the objects, activities, or events which act as means. Classification could proceed on the nature of the means, the

characteristics of the goal, or in terms of the kind of relationship involved. Things which act as means are sometimes seen as resources which assist the actor in attaining desired goals. For example, things which act as means in gaining power over others (although some say in influencing the formation of governmental policies, or reconciling conflicts) are sometimes spoken of as political resources.

5. A stake in something.

It has been recommended that the term "interest" no longer be used to denote a social or economic stake in something. I propose that the expression "a stake in" be used to signify a material (economic) share in, claim upon, right or title to, something, whether or not there is awareness by the actor of his relationship to such objects. It seems conducive to much less ambiguity to suggest that the stake be recognized in a moral or in a legal sense. This will help to distinguish such a relationship from one involving an interest in something, or expectations about some desired state of affairs. Having a stake in something comes close to having an investment or a partnership in which one stands to gain or lose. It is the investment of one's economic resources (in Barry's terms, one's assets or opportunities), or the moral or legal recognition of economic resources which may be forthcoming, for example,

a will in which one may have a stake. A person could not be said to have a stake in something, say an election, unless he stood to gain or lose economically by the outcome in a more or less explicitly recognized way.

The expression "stake in" sounds rustic and medieval and not smooth and racy enough for the new terminology of the social sciences. But it does serve to denote an important kind of relationship, and it ought to be retained in this way for technical purposes.

6. Claim

I propose to treat a claim as a particular kind of expression of an interest or other dispositional factor. A claim is something which is explicitly asked for or requested or demanded in terms of an interest (or other dispositional factor) or a number of interests (or other dispositional factors). I will treat only of interests here, although there seems every reason to believe that wants and attitudes could be expressed in the form of claims.

Any given claim may express only an aspect of a general interest, or it may express many interests or different aspects of a variety of interests. The notion that only certain kinds of dispositions can give rise to, or be expressed as, claims, as in Plamenatz, Benn, Fried, Beer and Ross, is rejected. The view taken here is that any interest which is expressed in the form of a request

or a demand for something, is to that extent expressed as a claim. The justifiability of claims can then be determined in regard to whatever standards the judging individual or group usually employs, whether moral, legal, expediency, or some combination of these. Every expression of an interest need not be advanced as a claim. Interests can be expressed by talking or writing about them, arguing, demonstrating, or in other ways acting on them. A claim must take the form of a more or less specific request for something. Groups and political parties are usually good channels for the formation and expression of claims. This view of claims invites investigation to proceed beneath claims to interests, much as Roscoe Pound saw merit in going beneath legal rights to discover what interests they embodied. The position outlined here is similar to Easton's, and it is close to that sometimes argued by Pound. Truman suggests that his second kind of shared-attitudes, those directed toward what a group wants or needs, are observable as claims. But then he appears to allow that only groups can press claims, and that is not the position taken here.

There is another kind of claim which exists in, and is recognized in, a moral-legal context. Wives are said to have certain legal claims on their husbands, and on their husband's estate. A person or a group having such a claim

need not recognize it or be expressing it for it to be said to be a claim. It is, of course, there to be maintained, augmented, and asserted. This kind of claim could be called an established claim as it is established in the context of moral or legal rules.

7. Groups

It is recommended that the term "interest" no longer be retained to denote either a) any group which unites for the defense, maintenance, or enhancement of an enduring position or advantage possessed in common, or b) the groups dominating a particular sphere of activity. It would seem to be more useful to think in terms of a classification of organized groups in which there would be, among others, two sub-classifications to specify and contain these kinds of groups. The first type of group could be seen as a pressure group of the associational variety as outlined by Almond and Powell. The second kind is more nearly an institutional group in the same classification. It is the kind of group which has an economic stake in society, and which pursues broadly conceived political and economic goals to protect and enhance a privileged position. But there seems little reason to think of them as anything other than a kind of pressure group, and the examination of them should proceed on that basis.

9. Attitudes

The usage of interests as a shared attitude does not seem especially useful in D. B. Truman's theory and it has been recommended that it be dropped. I propose to treat an attitude as a more or less enduring organization of emotional, perceptual, and cognitive processes. It is most often characterized as a readiness to respond. As Smith, Bruner, and White see it, an attitude is "a predisposition to experience, to be motivated by, and to act toward, a class of objects in a predictable manner." ¹

The affective component of an attitude is pro or con, positive or negative, favourable or unfavourable and the reaction tendency and cognitive component tend in the same direction. Interests, on the other hand, exhibit an affective dimension of a more involved concern, a feeling of worthwhileness and liking for an object. There is an intimate affective bond between actor and object which is not nearly so pronounced in the case of attitudes. The cognitive components or belief structure of an attitude is also a pro or con bias. It involves evaluative views about objects. The cognitive component of an interest is usually a more informed belief structure and it is much more ego involved. An attitude is more reactive in terms of its motivational components; it is a readiness to respond. Interests are more ego-involved motivational dispositions, more dynamic, and they suggest striving, planning,

and directing. In this formulation, attitudes are more specific, secondary dispositions which are organized around, and in terms of, the ego structure and the dominant interests. Attitudes are said to size up objects and events from "the point of view of one's major interests and going concerns" An attitude "represents a person's way of defining a relationship between the demands of the outside object and the requirements of his own interests." ² The more general and enduring attitudes relate to objects which are central to an individual's on-going interests, and they function in such a manner as to express, enhance, and develop these interests.

B. The term "interest" retained

This section briefly identifies, defines, and distinguishes the two concepts of interest which it is recommended be retained. Several arguments are advanced to justify the view that the term "interest" can be most usefully retained in this way.

1. Interest as a feeling which stimulates, accompanies, or is the result of, the attention process.

This very common usage is employed extensively in the social sciences, and usually in a non-technical sense. It denotes feelings of concern, worth, liking, pleasure, and curiosity which stimulates an individual to attend to,

investigate, and find out about something. This usage is generally well enough understood, although it is sometimes difficult to apply in the area of feelings of curiosity. It has occasionally been used in empirical research but most often it is employed in a non-technical way. This usage has a firm and long standing basis in ordinary language. The term is found in such expressions as "A finds x interesting", or "A is taking an interest in x".

This usage does not involve an enduring disposition to respond to specific classes of objects, although it may be called out quite regularly in respect to certain objects. It is a more general feeling which accompanies, instigates, and sometimes follows, attention. It has no strong motivational basis and no highly organized cognitive component.

The affective aspect of interest in this sense is sometimes difficult to distinguish from that of interest as a disposition. The two concepts of interest often occur together. Although interest as a feeling need not always accompany interest as a disposition, it is difficult to imagine the disposition remaining long if interest as a feeling is not usually present. But interest as a feeling can be called out on many occasions when an interest as a disposition is not present. It may be the case that interest as a feeling develops into interest as a disposition

with the acquisition of stronger feelings of concern, a sense of involvement, a more enduring association with particular objects, beliefs about the objects, and a greater propensity to stimulate action in regard to the objects. Some research findings suggest that there may be grounds for believing that interest as a feeling has been used as the affective component of interest as a disposition. In such cases, its presence seems to predispose people to lower levels of participation. It is because this usage is so close to the dispositional sense in affective characteristics, and acts almost as a component of interest as a disposition, that they can be safely denoted by the same term. Empirical inquiry will have to measure deeper feelings, involvement, and firmer cognitive and motivational characteristics, in order to distinguish the two factors.

There seems to be every reason to retain the term "interest" in this sense. It is enormously common and widely used. There seem to be numerous occasions when no other term can adequately denote the phenomenon in question. It can be set out in the following way.

A has an interest in x if A perceives x, has feelings of worthwhileness, pleasure, concern, liking, and curiosity in regard to x, and willingly gives attention to x.

2. Interest as a more or less enduring disposition characterized by affective, cognitive, and motivational components, and which is a basic controlling, motivating, and directing aspect of the personality system.

a) general characteristics

This usage synthesizes usages B and E as outlined in the previous section. The components of these two dispositions overlap almost entirely. There is a greater degree of involvement, motivational support, and control functions in usage E, but this can be seen as the high point of intensity on the affective and motivational planes. More precise operational measures could locate variations in intensity in these dimensions along a continuous scale. There is, in short, one enduring disposition, and it will be called an interest.

On the affective side, this disposition is characterized by feelings of involvement, concern, worthwhileness, pleasure, and liking. The cognitive dimension involves beliefs about objects and exhibits varying amounts of differentiation and informational support. But it has been shown that interests are usually associated with relatively high amounts of information. The motivational component involves striving, organizing, initiating, and directing. Interests are ego-involved and thus provide the basic control functions of the personality system. They are high

order motivational factors. The objects play an integral role in the dispositional relationship called an interest. There is an intense association between actor and object, a strong involvement, an absorption, as it were, an ego-involved commitment. An interest is a relatively enduring disposition. J. M. Baldwin speaks of the deep-seated life interests; Dewey calls attention to interest as an enduring, dynamic, active concern; J. R. Angell notices that interests have an absorbing characteristic in respect to objects; Newcomb and associates emphasize that interests are stabilizing factors of high centrality to individuals; and Allport and Smith, Bruner, and White, speak of interests as dominant personality factors, the ego-structure itself. But some interests may be held with low intensity, relatively little involvement and concern, and with a diffuse belief structure. Interests come and go, some remain central, others disappear, and others fuse into more enduring factors. It is perhaps too wide a continuum, but precise empirical research should help to clarify this matter.

There have been some difficulties in empirical research in regard to interest as a disposition. Very often interest as a feeling has been measured, and undisclosed amounts of motivational strength and feelings of concern and involvement have been detected. But, by and large, this general usage has good research potential and considerable explanatory power. More precise measurements should

be able to distinguish interest as a feeling from interest as a disposition, as well as placing interest as a disposition on intensity scales with respect to the major dimensions. A rough and tentative outline of some operational definitions may provide some suggestions for more useful formulations.

b) operational procedures

i) the cognitive component

A is likely to have an interest in x if A perceives x in a favourable manner.

A is likely to have an interest in x if A has favourable beliefs about x which have informational support.

A is likely to have an interest in x if A can differentiate aspects of the objects of x, and can distinguish those objects from other objects with a fairly high level of consistency.

ii) the affective component

A is likely to have an interest in x if A feels x is very important, and if A is concerned about outcomes involving x.

A is likely to have an interest in x if A has feelings of concern, worthwhileness, liking, and involvement in x.

iii) the motivational component

A is likely to have an interest in x if A is involved with x, prefers x, talks about x, gathers information about x, participates in activities relating to x, and feels self-involved with x.

c) Some justifications

i) Interest defined in a non-subjective, non-dispositional way, very often proves inadequate. A dispositional sense is often resorted to in defiance of definitions. The writing of Bentley, Easton, MacIver, Rees, Beer, and Finer serve as examples. A good instance is also found in the work of Brian Barry who capably sets out interest as a means. The support that Barry gains for his position from Pareto and Locke is tempered by the fact that they both also use interest in a dispositional sense. There are good grounds, then, for saving a usage which can be consistently and unambiguously employed. Social scientists seem to consistently want to say something like "A has an interest in x", regardless of how many other things they have attempted to say with the term. And it has been argued in a preceding section that these other things can be said well enough without the term "interest".

ii) An argument could be advanced that, on interdisciplinary grounds, a dispositional usage of interest seems called for. This is especially so when it is in fields like psychology that the most fruitful empirical work has been done with the concept, and it is this discipline to which political scientists frequently refer for technical devices and concepts. No other dis-

positional or non-dispositional usage has commanded as much interdisciplinary support.

iii) One major concern in social science is to develop causal theory, explanations with empirical interpretation. So the primary quest is for variables which are causal, that is, factors which enter into fairly regular and predictable associations with other factors. Dispositional variables seem to be of greater potency in this respect than, for example, objects which act as means, goal-objects as such, or particular kinds of claims. It is useful to work with a concept of interest which involves awareness, that is, people know they have them and act on them.

iv) Interest as a disposition has proved to be the most fruitful of all the usages of the term in empirical research and in explanatory theory. Various propositions involving interest were advanced in the preceding chapter. However, it seems in order to briefly review some examples of the concept's fruitfulness. Interest is said to mediate between sociological pressures and behaviour, and the decision to vote is thought to be mediated through interests at each class level in about the same way. Those with intense partisan preferences are most likely to be interested in politics. Members of labour unions who strongly identify with the union have been shown to be more interested and involved in politics

than non-members or weakly identified members. Milbrand reports that "persons who were highly anxious and were absorbed in their personal problems were found to be unlikely to be interested in politics." ³ Interest has been shown to be positively related to voting, talking politics, political knowledge, exposure to the media, and the number and breadth of opinions held.

v) This usage has a very respectable basis in ordinary language. The most common ordinary language usage has been that of interest as a feeling of concern about objects which closely affect an individual, such as to cause the individual to be motivated towards them and to do something with them.

III. What Can Be Said With the Term "Interest"

The discussion in this section focuses on the use of the term "interest" in relation to the terms which were set out in the reformulation. The objective is to illustrate how the usage retained allows a great many things to be said with the term. The second part of this section examines some common and often badly confused expressions which can now be partially clarified in the light of the usage argued for here.

A. Interest as a feeling which stimulates, accompanies, or is the result of, the attention process.

The term "interest", in this sense, retains its general

use as a feeling of concern, worthwhileness, liking, pleasure, and curiosity which stimulates an individual to attend to, investigate, and find out about something. This usage is contained in such expressions as "A is interested in x", "A is taking an interest in x", and "x is interesting".

B. Interest as a more or less enduring disposition characterized by affective, cognitive, and motivational components, which is a basic controlling, motivating, and directing aspect of the personality system.

1. Interest in relation to other terms

The discussion here relates to interest as it can now be used in regard to the terms outlined in the reformulation. It is possible to speak of goals in which an individual feels involved, concerned about, and toward which there is some measure of striving. Interests have goal-objects, but an interest is not a goal. Individuals form attitudes which support and enhance major interests. It may be possible for individuals to hold negative attitudes toward the objects of interest, as an interest in crime or in deviant behaviour. But positive attitudes will most likely be held toward such objects. On the other hand, many attitudes may be held toward objects and events which are only peripheral to one's on-going interests.

But attitudes are not interests. An individual may or may not have an interest in those things in which he has a stake. It is possible to have a stake in something without much of an interest in it, and perhaps without having any interest in it at all. It is also quite possible to have an interest in something without having a stake in it. The interest is not the stake. It is now possible to speak of something as a means to the realization of an interest or the object of an interest, rather than taking the means to be an interest. And there may be many means to an individual's goals in which he has no interest. On the basis of salient interests, individuals may make claims on other individuals and groups. Interests can be expressed as claims and they can be expressed in other ways, but they are not the claims themselves. Members of pressure groups can have interests which may or may not be expressed in claims which the group advances. Group members may not be interested in the economic stake which forms the basis of the activities and claims of an entrenched group. Members of groups may have many interests which are not relevant to either associational or institutional group activities. The groups, however, are not the interests. It is quite possible to speak of an individual wanting certain goals, and often coming to do so because of developing interests. An individual will probably want those things in which he has

an interest, but he could want things in which he had no deep interest. But a want is not an interest.

2. Interest in relation to some confusing expressions.

The focus here is on certain things commonly said with the term "interest", for example, the public interest, subjective and objective interests, group interests, and class interests. This is only a brief and suggestive introduction to some of the ways in which the reformulated usage of interest might serve as an analytical tool in helping to clarify old confusions.

a) Group interest

Members of groups can, and most probably do, hold a variety of interests. Some may be more or less relevant to the major activities of a group, but here group functions and organization would need to be specified. The point is simply that individuals have interests, and in trying to realize them, they very often form groups (for example, associational groups), or attempt to express them through existing group memberships (for example, within the context of institutional groups). Individuals may attempt to so influence the group that claims are formulated and pressed in order to realize their interests or certain aspects of their interests. It is confusing to speak of group interests. Groups make

claims in an attempt to realize the interests of members, a large part of which may relate to the conditions necessary for the existence and strength of the group itself. This view of the situation allows a distinction to be drawn between the often competing, conflicting interests of group members, and the claims which are pressed by the group. Claims are formulated in the light of interests, judgments of circumstances, expediency, legitimacy, elite pressures, and so on. Claims which attempt to gain certain states of affairs (goals) may very well only partly satisfy a range of interests held by individual members. There is a sense in which group members may have an interest in seeing the claims realized, but this is not quite the same thing as usual formulations of a group interest. Very often claims have been taken to be the group interest, sometimes advantage has been implied, and occasionally group interests are spoken of as the stake which groups have in the community. The distinction suggested here between individual interests and group claims may have something to offer by way of a beginning point for re-examination. It may be advisable to drop the expression "interest group" altogether (there is some suspicion that it entered the language with Bentley's formulation of the interest as the group), and speak of varieties of pressure groups. But this is a small matter as long as the character

and functions of interests are recognized.

b) Class interest

This expression is seriously hampered by the vagueness and ambiguity which attends the concept of class. Most often, the interest in this expression has been taken as advantage, with the added suggestion that a class has a certain social or economic stake in certain states of affairs. The advantage, although not usually specified, is most often taken to be material or economic profiting, or a position which leads to, or enhances this. Sometimes power and status are implied. But when interest is no longer conceived as either advantage or a stake in something, the notion of a class interest, in this respect, must be withdrawn. It would, of course, still be possible to speak of a class having a stake in something, and of a class acting to maximize certain goals.

Class interest is sometimes taken in the dispositional sense of interest which is recommended here. But the difficulties with this usage have gone largely unattended, and it has often been confused with the other and now rejected notion of class interest. It is possible to speak of members of a class having a variety of interests. (I believe that Weber tried to treat members of a class individually while relying on the assumption of rational economic self-interest to yield common action patterns).

But in this sense, the expression would have to be "the class interest in x", or "members of the working class have interests of such and such a nature." The issue is the same as that of group interests only on a larger and more disorganized scale. Classes may make claims through spokesmen (and most unlikely by all members), but very often such claims may not embody the salient interests of many members of the class, and many members of the class may have no interests of this nature or in the claims which are going forward. Consciousness of class position and felt involvement in obtaining a better state of affairs, if held by all class members, would constitute a dispositional interest. Marx sometimes spoke of class interest in this way but he geared its existence or possibility to an objective interest in the sense of advantage or general profiting. This second kind of interest was a goal which Marx felt the working class could rightfully claim. But it seems to have turned out that there was no class interest in the dispositional sense of the term. Like the public, members of a class probably have a host of interests in a variety of things, and there is probably no general class interest as such.

c) the public interest

This vague and ambiguous expression has received considerable attention recently, but no precise clarifica-

tion has been forthcoming.⁴ Explications of what is meant by a public have, unfortunately, often been regarded as the manner in which the issue is to be solved, as if the notion of an interest were perfectly clear. It should be added that there is still much dispute as to whether a public denotes all members of a society, those members of society attending to an issue, those members affected by a certain policy or outcome, or all members of society affected by general conditions whether or not they are aware of them and regardless of how they are affected by them.

The term "interest" in this expression is very often taken to mean advantage as profit, good, or welfare. Sometimes a goal is intended, whether or not it is conceived as such. This usage of interest has been extremely vague and ill-defined, with little guidance as to what sphere or dimension of good or welfare is intended, and in which ways it will affect which members of which public. This usage commonly appears in such expressions as "x is in the public interest", and "political parties subvert the public interest". This usage need not imply awareness on the part of the public (however a public is conceived) about the policies or states of affairs which are said to be in, or to constitute, its advantage. This has opened the way for fierce quarrels about what would be the best

state of affairs ideally and practically, as well as what particular means would assist in bringing it about. In discarding the usage of interest as advantage, the quarrel is not affected, but at least it would not continue under the guise of the public interest. This particular issue could be conceived in terms of the public good (equally confusing) or public goals, and more pointed discussion could focus on specified areas of concern, such as the economic, military, social, etc. Inquiry could settle on states of affairs which are being attained and which ought to be attained, as well as on the means that could be, or ought to be employed. But the concept of interest has no integral place in this particular aspect of the controversy.

On the other hand, the public interest has sometimes been taken to mean dispositional interests which members of the public in fact consciously hold. If interest is used in this manner, and it is the usage recommended here, it makes sense to speak of individuals in publics (or in the public) holding interests which denote felt involvements and concern about states of affairs which affect them in common. If this usage is employed, however, it must be shown that individuals in publics have more or less enduring dispositions of the kind earlier specified. It is most unlikely that in publics of any size a commonly con-

ceived and experienced interest will emerge in the dispositional sense. The issue is a broader extension of that touched on in regard to groups and classes. The most probable position to take is that members of a public will have a variety of interests in numerous things, but that there will be serious conflicts among the interests held. If the expression "the public interest" is retained, it should appear in the following form: "the public has expressed an interest in x", (in the unlikely chance that they all have spoken or acted), or "the public interest in x is not great". It might be more clear if the term "public" were dispensed with, and that the group or groups (or indeed, the society) which is (are) said to hold or not to hold a particular interest could be more precisely specified. For example, it might be more useful to say that "the people in Saskatchewan have shown no strong interest in the war in Asia," or that "the residents of Edmonton have shown no great interest in public housing". The existence of an interest, however, must be shown, and it must not be mistaken for the more superficial expression of an opinion.

d) Self-interest.

This expression is enormously vague as neither term is usually clearly specified. I propose to leave the term "self" pretty much alone, and to treat only of the interest.

The term "interest" in this expression has most often denoted advantage, profit, or welfare. Self-interest commonly suggests selfish or personal advantage, motivation primarily in terms of consideration of one's own advantage or welfare. Economic self-interest is a further specification, and although the economic sphere is frequently intended, it seems that various other areas of individual advantage are also encompassed by the term. When the condition of being advantaged or profiting is no longer denoted by the term "interest", the expression "self-interest" can no longer be retained. But as the phenomenon described appears to be an important one, it could be denoted by the expression "personal advantage" (if indeed, the term "advantage" is retained), or simply by the term "selfishness" or "selfish". Rather than saying "A acted in his self-interest", it could as easily be said that "A acted selfishly", or that "A is self-seeking", or that "A is usually selfish". Interests are always ego-involved motivational dispositions held by individuals, and some may be selfishly oriented and others may not.

e) Subjective and objective interests

This much used dichotomy can be formulated in two ways: i) by the position of the individual interpreting the interest, and ii) by the nature of the interest itself.

i) This position is set out by David Easton

and it is fairly commonly held.⁵ Generally speaking, if the point of view about the existence and characteristics of an interest is that of the actor, the interest is said to be subjective, if it is that of an observer attributing it to the actor, it is said to be an objective interest. There are two sub-classes of this usage which turn on whether an interest is seen as a means to a goal or as a goal. A subjective interest exists if an individual relies on his own interpretation of what is necessary or possible as a means to a goal, or on what the goal is or ought to be. An objective interest exists if an observer suggests what are necessary or possible means to the actor's goals, or what those goals really are or really ought to be. When the term "interest" is no longer used to denote either a means or a goal but a subjective disposition, this distinction loses much of its force.

ii) Most often this dichotomy rests on the use of two quite different notions of an interest, that is, interest as a subjective disposition, and interest in the non-dispositional sense as one's advantage or what is in one's advantage, whether the actor is aware of it or not.⁶ This allows the expression of the very confusing phrase, "A is not interested in his (real) (best) interests." The dichotomy makes no sense at all if interests are defined plainly and simply as subjective dispositions. This is what

is recommended here. Interests are subjective and they are therefore not objective (when objective is taken as the converse of subjective). Interests can be expressed and hence objectified, or partly objectified, as claims or other expressions of interests. Interests will also have objects, but an object itself is not an interest. It can be said that an individual may not recognize all the implications of his goals, or that he ought to re-evaluate his goals. And it is quite often reasonable to say that, given his goals, he has not struck upon means which will bring them about, or that more reliable means which he has not noticed are at hand. But it is no longer a question of subjective and objective interests.

IV. Some concluding thoughts

This investigation has attempted to explore a sample of the literature in the social sciences in order to examine the usages and functions of the term "interest". The major usages which have appeared in the disciplines of psychology, sociology, jurisprudence, and political science, were critically examined and reviewed. Tests of usefulness were then formulated and applied and a critical reformulation was provided. It was argued that the term "interest" should be retained in a more carefully specified dispositional sense along with the concept of interest as a feeling in relation to attention. It was recommended that the term

be withdrawn from non-dispositional usages and that the phenomena involved be synthesized and denoted by other terms. Suggestions were then advanced in order to show how the term "interest" might be used in relation to other terms and sometimes ambiguous expressions. It only remains to offer some brief concluding comments.

A. Interest as a utility term

Students of political science and of the social sciences in general, have occasionally been attentive to difficulties of conceptual vagueness and ambiguity. Terms such as "power", "freedom", "democracy", "class", "attitude" and "rights" have sometimes undergone close and protracted examination. The term "interest" has been examined only on rare occasions, and the critical studies have been neither continuous nor thorough. Very often it seems that the term "interest" is treated as though it were a primitive term, a term so basic and well understood that it required no great caution or reflection before it was pressed into service. The term "interest" has been used like an aging utility baseball player. The game cannot proceed without him, but there is always some question about which position he will play in any given contest. When the batting order is shuffled, he always bats last, so much has he been taken for granted. Everyone knows his name but he is traded so often that no one quite knows which

team he is currently with. He never makes the all-star team because he has never been used long enough in one position to display the expertise which commands a following. He is loved by the fans and his name is a household word. But he can never be spoken about with precision because any given position which is mentioned may not be the one in which he is currently performing in the technical play of the game. Managers often call him out when a pinch-hitter or a pinch-runner is necessary and no one else is handy. But he may well enter the record books as the most important, most under-rated, and most little known performer of all time.

Samuel Krislov is at least helpful in summing up this point. "While debate continues as to the exact differentiation of such elusive beings as 'interest' and 'pressure' groups, the basic term 'interest' is accepted as self-defined and ineluctable." ⁷ And after a long and involved examination of "the public interest", Schubert came to realize that "the problem lies rather with the definition of 'interest'". ⁸ But it was scarcely discussed at all. Joseph Dunner, in his Dictionary of Political Science, claims to define and describe important terms and events most often used in writings of political science. ⁹ The term "interest", however, is not included. This seems all the more surprising when Dunner's own definition of

politics employs the term in a less than insignificant way. Politics is said to be "an activity which expresses the wills and interests of individuals in the ordering of their public lives."¹⁰ The term "interest" is listed in neither Polec: Dictionary of Politics and Economics, nor in A Dictionary of Politics.¹¹ Dunner's treatment pretty well epitomizes the dilemma. The term is utilized in a way which is clearly basic to the discipline, but it is not thought necessary to say what it means. That this is not the case has been the argument throughout this inquiry. It is hoped that social scientists in general, and political scientists in particular, can be brought to confront this difficulty. The reformulation of the term "interest" advanced here may provide a focus for the kind of critical attention that the term deserves.

B. Definitions and the use of terms.

It appears to be commonly held by many social scientists that the problem of meaning can be quickly surmounted by resorting to a definition. A nominal definition introduces an alternative term or expression to define the term in question. But it is virtually helpless without some terms and expressions whose meaning is fairly clear. Hempel notes this condition in his view of a nominal definition.

[A] stipulation to the effect that a specified expression, the definiendum, is to be synonymous with a certain other expression, the definiens, whose meaning is already established.¹²

One difficulty frequently confronted in definitions of the term "interest" is that the terms used to define interest are frequently as vague and ambiguous. It is of little assistance to say that an interest is activity, if the term "activity" is not clearly specified. The same thing occurs when interest is taken to be a shared attitude, advantage, a goal, a stake in something, or an aspiration. There is little question that this is an enormous problem, and one which could, conceivably, lead to a long regression of definitions. But at least it serves notice of how careful we must be if our vocabulary is so uncertain and unsettled.

It is time that social scientists genuinely pressed themselves in being as clear and precise as possible in the use and evaluation of terms. The effort and thought involved in performing this exercise are surely as important, if not much more so, than the demonstration that yet another empirical finding has been located, however vaguely conceived. It is probably much easier and much less painful to engage in empirical research, to write up findings, or simply to theorize, by using vague terms in a sometimes ambiguous way. The looser the vocabulary, the easier it is to cut corners and cover possible contradictions and weak spots. The easier it is to say more than a precise use of terms might allow. Some vagueness

is inevitable and possibly desirable, but a decision not to bother carefully examining and specifying terms is neither.

It may be that a strictly adhered to requirement of clarity and unambiguity could lead to a situation where social scientists would have much less to say. There is no compelling evidence that this would be an unmitigated disaster to the progress of the social sciences. In hurrying on to catch our rival and to construct a social science, it might be wise to recall that physical scientists have at least developed a fairly reliable and well-understood vocabulary. If the quest for knowledge is a serious commitment, there seems to be no reason why the utmost frankness could not be exercised in saying what terms mean, in carefully evaluating the utilities and shortcomings of conceptual devices, and in modestly and critically presenting research findings. This is not to suggest, of course, that academics are anything but honest. It is rather to say that the utmost amounts of caution, clarity, and consistency are necessary ingredients of a strongly based and useful social science.

Technical terms are crucial to the development of a reliable and easily communicable language of the social sciences. There should be no mistake about that. But such terms need careful specification, use, and sometimes

ordinary language interpretation. The indiscriminate and light-handed use of often abstract and ill-defined technical terms can easily take on all the unfortunate attributes of a jargon. Social scientists, and political scientists in particular, would probably realize greater scientific advances if they were more sensitive to the value of clear expression and precise interpretation. The writings of J. P. Plamenatz and Charles Hyneman could serve as useful models. Smooth technical talk can be very deceptive, and it often serves to remove discussion too far from the basic facts of the matter. It is often difficult to know what is really being said, and how precisely distinguished and well-grasped the phenomenon really is. It may not be too far in the future, unless the language problem is squarely confronted, that a social scientist sufficiently equipped with an impressive jargon could become almost like a sophisticated salesman with an empty encyclopaedia. This might not be the best line of development for the discipline.

C. Borrowing concepts

With the general lack of attention devoted in the social sciences to continuous critical review and reformulation of concepts, interdisciplinary borrowing can indeed be a hazardous enterprise. It is difficult to be assured that a concept selected, say a particular concept of power,

class, or personality, has passed the tests of usefulness. But there are things that can be watched for and penetrating questions that can be asked. The borrower would be well advised to be cautious of the supposed expertise of others in neighbouring disciplines. No social science discipline can bask in the aura of compelling scientific accomplishments. A concept should be examined carefully and thoughtfully in the context of other theoretical terms and concepts from which it takes its bearings and in the context of which it performs its functions. If it is vague and ambiguously used, an attempt should be made to specify it, and to locate the source of the difficulties. Tests of usefulness should be applied, and if results discourage further use, the search should be taken up again. A concept's status in its native discipline is sometimes a useful index of its usefulness, but it must be remembered that vague concepts are often popular. A concept should then be carefully defined for the undertaking at hand and consistently throughout. If it cannot be used consistently, if some other phenomenon is sometimes denoted by the same term, a reformulation should be undertaken to distinguish and precisely label other aspects of the phenomenon. Political scientists have perhaps been the greatest consumers of concepts developed in other fields. They could do much for their own discipline and for the social sciences as a

whole, if they were to take a strong and insistent lead in demanding carefully formulated concepts and in exposing those which were not.

D. A behavioural theory.

The concept of interest has been used quite frequently across disciplinary borders and it has received a measure of common interdisciplinary use. However, it is difficult to judge whether there has been conscious and critical exchange. Occasionally references suggest that this has been the case, but most often the impression is that use has been similar but not common. Dispositional usages of the term "interest" have been the most interdisciplinary, and especially a general usage of interest as a relatively enduring motivational disposition characterized by feelings of concern and involvement. Interest as a feeling accompanying attention has perhaps been most widespread, but usually in a non-technical sense. Non-dispositional usages have been generally limited to political science and to some corners in sociology. There is some evidence to suggest that the creation of a general behavioural usage is at least possible.

To speak of a general behavioural theory at this point in the development of the social sciences may be premature. The disputes about concepts within any discipline seem to be reflected on a much wider interdisciplinary front. Attempts to formulate such a theory at

this juncture will most probably result in several scholars, or groups of scholars, creating more or less disparate conceptual frameworks. This is not to say that such formulations are injurious. On the contrary, they would most likely be suggestive of useful concepts and relationships. But the problem is more deep-rooted than that, and the remedy more laborious and piece-meal.

A genuine behavioural theory needs to seek its grounding in careful analytical scrutiny of the characteristics, functions, and usefulness of competing concepts. The most useful concepts must be slowly evaluated and advanced from every quarter and painstakingly demonstrated to be basic and useful on a broader field. Individual scholars must develop much greater sensitivity to the need for critical analysis, and much greater awareness of the complex intricacies of our ordinary and technical languages. It is only in this way, it seems, that scholars can be brought to agreement on the formulation and use of conceptual tools. Careful conceptual analysis has not been a prevailing or even a highly respected tradition in the social sciences. But the objective of a behavioural theory, and, indeed, of social science progress, requires this kind of work as a necessary pre-condition. The time for a general behavioural theory is still in the future, and it is not quite so pressing as some suggest.

But the time for rigorous conceptual analysis, testing, and reformulation is at hand, and it is much more urgent than most imagine.

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

- 1 Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (San Francisco, California: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), pp. 18-23.
- 2 Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 11.
- 3 Ibid., p. 11.
- 4 Ibid., p. 11.
- 5 H. D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan; Power and Society: A Framework For Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).
- 6 See the contrasting views of T. D. Weldon The Vocabulary of Politics (London: Penguin Books, 1953) and T. L. Thorson, The Logic of Democracy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962). See also W. K. Frankena's position in Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963); and W. G. Runciman's argument in his Social Science and Political Theory (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1963). Runciman contends that although empirical theory and normative theory are distinct kinds of activities, there are useful functions which each can perform for the other; a more factual basis for recommending, and conceptual analysis for social science research.
- 7 Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959).
- 8 David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 92 ff.
- 9 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965), p. 11.
- 10 Ibid., p. 11.
- 11 Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 64-67.
- 12 Jules H. Masserman, "Conceptualization of Terminology in the Behavioral Sciences," Unfinished Tasks in the Behavioral Sciences, ed. by A. Abrams, H. H. Garner, and J. E. P. Toman (Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Company, 1964), p. 147.

- 13 Robert K. Merton, "The Bearing of Empirical Research on Sociological Theory," in May Brodbeck, ed, Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1968), p. 493; p. 494. See also the comments by Reinhard Bendix and Bennett Berger in "Images of Society and Problems of Concept Formation in Sociology," in Llewellyn Gross, ed, Symposium on Sociological Theory (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1959), p. 92.
- 14 Rollo Handy, Methodology of the Behavioral Sciences: Problems and Controversies (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publishers, 1964), pp. 160, 161; p. 144. See also Rollo Handy and Paul Kurtz, A Current Appraisal of the Behavioral Sciences (Great Barrington, Mass.: Behavioral Research Council, 1964), p. 66.
- 15 Hempel, op. cit., p. 43. See also Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Evidence and Inference in Social Research" in Brodbeck, op. cit., p. 610.
- 16 Melvin H. Marx, "The General Motive of Theory Construction" in Psychological Theory: Contemporary Readings, ed. by Melvin H. Marx (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1951), p. 14.
- 17 Eugene J. Meehan, Explanation in Social Science: A System Paradigm (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 35-36. See also Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 66-67.
- 18 Herbert Feigl, "Operationism and Scientific Method" in Readings in Philosophical Analysis ed. by Herbert Feigl, and Wilfred Sellars, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, inc., 1949), p. 498.
- 19 Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, 2 (1957), 201-218. See also his Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); and Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963).
- 20 I am aware that much of the debate between Dahl and associates and the Miller-Hunter school has been largely polemical in nature. But I have been sufficiently impressed to give the Dahlians the edge over the Hunterites.
- 21 John Plamenatz, "Interests," Political Studies, 11 (1954), p. 1.
- 22 The usage and example are Hempel's, op. cit., p. 10. For discussions of "vagueness" see Handy, op. cit., pp. 157-158; and William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, Methods in Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952), p. 44.

- 23 Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 66-70.
- 24 Ibid., p. 67.
- 25 Ibid., p. 70.
- 26 Meehan, op. cit., p. 37.
- 27 Hempel, op. cit., p. 10.
- 28 John Madge, The Tools of Social Science (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953), p. 39.
- 29 Meehan, op. cit., p. 36.
- 30 Goode and Hatt, op. cit., p. 45.
- 31 Brecht, op. cit., p. 57.
- 32 Goode and Hatt, op. cit., p. 44.
- 33 Handy, op. cit., p. 157. See also Marx, in Marx, op. cit., p. 116.
- 34 Meehan, op. cit., p. 36.
- 35 W. H. Werkmeister, "Theory Construction and the Problem of Objectivity," in Marx, op. cit., p. 486.
- 36 Madge, op. cit., p. 39.
- 37 Goode and Hatt, op. cit., p. 46.
- 38 Hempel, op. cit., p. 10.
- 39 Marx, in Marx, op. cit., p. 117.
- 40 Quoted in Marx, op. cit., p. 117.
- 41 Hempel, op. cit., p. 4.
- 42 Kaplan, op. cit., p. 46. See Meehan, op. cit., p. 36. Concepts are set out, much in Kaplan's terms as "rules that organize or relate perceptions,..." [t]he rules used to organize human perceptions are called concepts. They are human creations not natural entities, and without them man could hardly be said to think". (p. 35)
- 43 Goode and Hatt, op. cit., p. 42.
- 44 Van Dyke, op. cit., p. 62.

- 45 Brodbeck, in Brodbeck, op. cit., p. 7. Brodbeck does not appear to be using the same sense when she argues that "concepts or mental states are the reference of some terms, they do not themselves refer to anything." A concept becomes "the content of a thought" and "terms" are used "to refer to characters of things, either properties or relations." See Brodbeck, "Meaning and Action: in Brodbeck, op. cit., p. 61; p. 60.
- 46 Meehan, op. cit., p. 35.
- 47 Hempel, op. cit., p. 21.
- 48 Goode and Hatt, op. cit., p. 45; p. 41.
- 49 Felix Kaufmann, Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: The Humanities Press, 1958), p. 18.
- 50 Brodbeck, "Meaning and Action," in Brodbeck, op. cit., p. 60.
- 51 Brodbeck, in Brodbeck, op. cit., p. 3.
- 52 Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
- 53 J. B. D. Miller, The Nature of Politics (London: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 39.
- 54 Ibid., p. 44.
- 55 G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960). The introduction is by Almond.
- 56 Samuel Krislov, "What is an Interest? The Rival Answers of Bentley, Pound, and MacIver," The Western Political Quarterly, 16 (1963), 830-843.
- 57 David Hume, The Philosophical Works, ed. by T. D. Green and T. H. Grose (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1964), III. Essay VII, p.125.
- 58 R. M. MacIver, "Interests." Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 8, (1932), pp. 144-148.
- 59 Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation In Western Political Thought (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), p.280.
- 60 Quoted in A. Ranney and W. Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1956), p. 124.

- 61 Sigmund Newmann, "Towards a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Modern Political Parties, Ed. by Sigmund Newmann (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 412.
- 62 Krislov, loc. cit., p. 830.
- 63 S. M. Lipset, "Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups," The European Journal of Sociology, I (1960), p. 20.
- 64 Ibid., p. 27.
- 65 R. T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (2nd and Rev. ed.; London: Mercury Books, 1964), p. 647.
- 66 F. J. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964). The party literature almost without exception seems to rely on an interest base. One exception might be R. Michels, although he clearly assumes class interests. See his Political Parties (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1959).
- 67 Bolingbroke and Calhoun are quoted in Ranney and Kendall op. cit., p. 120, p. 124. M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, trans. by F. Clarke (London: MacMillan, 1902).
- 68 Angus Campbell, et al. The American Voter. An Abridgment (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 57. See generally pp. 55-84. See also R. A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p. 57 and R. E. Lane and D. O. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 96-99.
- 69 R. E. Lane Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 145-146.
- 70 Wolin, op. cit., passim.
- 71 G. W. Allport, "Effect: A Secondary Principle of Learning," The Psychological Review, 53 (1946), p. 340.
- 72 R. B. Cattell, "The Measurement of Interest," Character and Personality, IV (September, 1935-June, 1936), p. 163.
- 73 Roscoe Pound, "Legislation as a Social Function," The American Journal of Sociology, 18 (1912-1913), p. 763.
- 74 Quoted in A. Schäffle's review of Ratzenhofer's Die Soziologische Erkenntnis, translated by Mr. & Mrs. G. A. Ellwood in The American Journal of Sociology, 4 (July 1898-May 1899), p. 528.

- 75 Albion W. Small, General Sociology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1905), p. 443.
- 76 Krislov, loc. cit., p. 831.
- 77 Plamenatz, loc. cit., pp. 1-2, p. 7.
- 78 Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 23.
- 79 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 45.
- 80 Van Dyke, op. cit., p. 48. See his "Values and Interests," The American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 567-576.
- 81 R. A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p. 57.
- 82 D. B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 34.
- 83 S. J. Eldersveld, "American Interest Groups: A Survey of Research and Some Implications for Theory and Method," in Interest Groups on Four Continents, ed. by H. W. Ehrmann (University of Pittsburg Press, 1958), p. 179.
- 84 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Gateway ed.; Chicago: H. Regnery Company, 1962), p. 131.
- 85 S. E. Finer, "Interest Groups and The Political Process in Great Britain," in Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 117. See also Finer's Anonymous Empire (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1958), p. 3.
- 86 Quoted in Krislov, loc. cit., p. 830.
- 87 See S. M. Lipset, loc. cit., passim; D. Brogan, "The American Party System; 1952 Model," Political Studies, 1 (1953), pp. 13-20. See especially J. Madison in the 10th Federalist; and Van Dyke, op. cit., p. 124.
- 88 Quoted in MacIver, loc. cit., p. 146.
- 89 M. H. Moore, "Truth and the Interest Theory of Value", Journal of Philosophy, 32 (1935), p. 545.
- 90 E. K. Strong Jr., "Satisfaction and Interests," American Psychologist, 13, (1958), p. 452.
- 91 This is a fabricated quotation to demonstrate the issue at hand. No one to my knowledge has pushed ambiguity to quite this extent.

- 92 This quotation is fabricated, as the one above, for illustrative purposes only.
- 93 M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert K. White, Opinions and Personality (Science ed.; New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1964), p. 4.
- 94 This is taken primarily from J. A. H. Murray, ed. A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), Volume V, Part II, p. 393. A similar treatment appears in Eric Partridge, Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 187.
- 95 Material in quotation, and much of the other material, is from Murray, op. cit., pp. 393-394, unless otherwise referenced.
- 96 The Century Dictionary: An Encyclopedic Lexicon of the English Language (New York: The Century Co., 1899), p. 3142.
- 97 Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language (Springfield, Mass.: G. C. Merriam Co., Publishers, 1961), p. 1178. This usage does not appear in the earlier dictionaries.
- 98 Ibid., p. 1178.
- 99 Ibid., p. 1178.
- 100 Websters New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language (unabridged second edition, The World Publishing Company, 1957), p. 956. One obvious problem appears in the use of the terms "lexical" and "technical" to denote the two classes of word usage. By and large it is satisfactory, but in the historical context it can be misleading. The lexical usage, number L above, is a case in point. It is in effect a simplified reformulation of what were, and still are, technical senses. So the technical can indeed become common language usage. In the early stages of psychology, the senses in number L were not common and were only slowly becoming technical.

CHAPTER I

- 1 Gordon W. Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 4.
- 2 D. E. Berlyne, "'Interest' as a Psychological Concept," The British Journal of Psychology, 39 (1949), 184-195.
- 3 Felix Arnold, "The Psychology of Interest," The Psychological Review, XIII (July, 1906 - September, 1906), 221-238; 291-315.
- 4 Johann Friedrich Herbart, The Science of Education (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., Publisher, 1895). The translation is by Mr. and Mrs. H. Felkin. This initially appeared in 1806 while Herbart was at Gottingen.
- 5 For this position see Arnold, loc. cit. pp. 222-227; John Mark Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology: Feeling and Will (Revised; New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1894), pp. 147-148; Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1949), pp. 49-54; John Dewey, "Interest as Related to Will," (Second Supplement to the Herbart Yearbook for 1895; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1895), pp. 26-38.
- 6 Wilhelm Ostermann, Interest in Its Relation to Pedagogy (New York: Barnes and Co., 1899), pp. 7-8. Ostermann's psychological conception of interest is close to the common usage of "a feeling that something is of concern to one."
- 7 Ibid., p. 11.
- 8 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
- 9 Arnold, loc. cit., p. 231.
- 10 Berlyne, loc. cit., p. 185.
- 11 Arnold, loc. cit., p. 237.
- 12 G. F. Stout, Analytic Psychology (3rd ed.; London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Ltd., 1909), pp. 224-225.

- 13 There was no common meaning of interest at that time which was encompassed in the psychological concept of hedonic tone, or the feeling accompanying attention.
- 14 Baldwin, op. cit., p. 139. Baldwin incorporates the common usage of "a feeling of concern for, or curiosity about, a person or thing."
- 15 Ibid., p. 142.
- 16 Ibid., p. 139. This incorporates the common usage, "the relation of being concerned with respect of advantage."
- 17 Ibid., p. 144.
- 18 Ibid., p. 145.
- 19 Ibid., p. 146. Much the same distinction is drawn by Alan R. White. He talks about an interest in the occurrent sense, that is, actually taking or showing or feeling an interest, and interest in the dispositional sense of having an enduring interest in something. White does not push his analysis further to the more important distinction between feelings and the characteristics of psychological dispositions. See his "The Notion of Interest," The Philosophical Quarterly, 14 (October, 1964), 319-327; and Attention (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964), Chapter VII.
- 20 James R. Angell, Psychology: An Introductory Study of the Structure and Function of Human Consciousness (4th and Revised; New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1908), p. 421.
- 21 Ibid., p. 421.
- 22 Ibid., p. 425.
- 23 Ibid., p. 425.
- 24 Gordon W. Allport, "The Ego in Contemporary Psychology," in his Personality and Social Encounter: Selected Essays by Gordon W. Allport (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 71-93.
- 25 W. B. Pillsbury, Attention (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1908), p. 55.
- 26 William H. Burnham, "Attention and Interest," The American Journal of Psychology, 19 (1908), 14.

- 27 "Interest as Related to Will," Second Supplement to the Herbart Yearbook for 1895, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1895); Interest and Effort in Education (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Co., The Riverside Press, 1913.)
- 28 Dewey, loc. cit., p. 7.
- 29 Ibid., p. 13.
- 30 Ibid., p. 13.
- 31 Ibid., p. 15.
- 32 Ibid., p. 12.
- 33 Ibid., p. 15.
- 34 Dewey, op. cit., p. 25.
- 35 Ibid., p. 27.
- 36 Berlyne, loc. cit., pp. 184-185.
- 37 William James, The Principles of Psychology, Dover Publications (2 vols. ; London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1950), I, p. 402.
- 38 Ibid., II, p. 344. This trend is reviewed by Douglas Fryer, The Measurement of Interests in Relation to Human Adjustment (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1931), pp. 462-463.
- 39 Dewey, loc. cit., p. 22.
- 40 Ibid., p. 24.
- 41 Dewey, op. cit., p. 60.
- 42 All the quotations to follow in this section are from Felix Arnold, loc. cit. pp. 291-315.
- 43 Ibid., p. 295.
- 44 Ibid., p. 296.
- 45 Ibid., p. 297.
- 46 Ibid., p. 297.
- 47 Ibid., p. 315.

- 48 Ibid., pp. 306-307.
- 49 Ibid., p. 308.
- 50 Berlyne, loc. cit., p. 185.
- 51 R. S. Woodworth, Dynamic Psychology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1918).
- 52 Quoted in Douglas Fryer, "The Objective and Subjective Measurement of Interest: An Acceptance-Rejection Theory," The Journal of Applied Psychology, 14 (1930), 556.
See also Fryer, op. cit., pp. 462-463. Fryer was determined to distinguish between interests and motivation, and between subjective and objective interests.
- 53 William McDougall, Outline of Psychology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923).
- 54 See also the note on McDougall in Berlyne loc. cit., p. 186; and in Charles S. Myers, "Some Present Tendencies of Psychology," The American Journal of Psychology, 36, (1925), 53-65.
- 55 McDougall, op. cit., p. 274, p. 276.
- 56 Raymond B. Cattell, "The Measurement of Interest," Character and Personality, IV (September 1935 June 1936), 163.
- 57 Ibid., p. 157. See especially F. C. Bartlett's Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge University Press, 1932). He uses "interest" in much the same sense as later writers use "general motivational factor". His position will be examined in the following chapter as it relates more specifically to the interest-attitude distinction. A similar and equally all-encompassing view of interests is that advanced by Ralph Barton Perry. Interests are seen as acts, or dispositions to act, and they are characterized by feelings of favour or disfavour. They are, Perry contends, "fundamentally motor or conative." See his, "A Theory of Value Defended," The Journal of Philosophy, 28 (August, 1931), 450. In his earlier work, Perry employs the term "interest" to denote neither the feeling of pleasure or curiosity relating to the attention process, nor to an enduring disposition, embodying motor-affective bias. "Interest" is used much more generally to refer to that which is characteristic of

motor-affective life," that is to say, with instinct, desire, feeling, will, and all their family of states, acts and attitudes." See Perry's General Theory of Value (New York: Longman's, Green and Co., 1926), p. 27. A similar view which substitutes need for interest is argued by Rollo Handy, "A Need Theory of 'Value'," The Philosophical Quarterly, 10 (April, 1960), 156-163. Otis Lee employs Perry's position with the modest change of interest to an active attitude. The characteristics, however, remain the same. See his "Value and Interest," Journal of Philosophy, 42 (March, 1945), 141-161. For a critical discussion of Perry's position see John Laird, The Idea of Value (Cambridge: At the Riverside Press, 1929); Everett W. Hall, What is Value? An Essay in Philosophical Analysis (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1952), especially pp. 67-80; Stephen C. Pepper, The Source of Value (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1958), especially pp. 167-199; and Merrit H. Moore, "Truth and the Interest Theory of Value," Journal of Philosophy, 32 (1935), 545-551.

58 Cattell, loc. cit., p. 165.

59 Ibid., p. 165.

60 Cyril Burt, The Subnormal Mind (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 55. Burt is by no means consistent in his terminology. "Interest" first appears as a generic term to include complexes and sentiments. Examples of his concepts in use suggest that this is not always the case. For example (p. 55) he speaks of "his chief sentiments, interests, and conscious ideas"; and (p. 185) "interests and sentiments play a double part in the causation of delinquency"; and (p. 321) "the various emotions built up into stable interest or sentiments." He appears to use "attitude" as a motive and "complexes" as "repressed or unconscious emotional attitudes." (p. 188). If the usage here is consistent with his initial statement, attitudes would seem to be motives which form complexes which are, in turn, a type of interest. Interests consist of some pattern or organization of attitudes.

61 Edward L. Thorndike, The Psychology of Wants, Interests and Attitudes (New York: D. Appleton - Century Company, Inc., 1935), p. 3.

- 62 Ibid., p. 41. In actual use, Thorndike employs terms as if they were an unnecessary hindrance to his research on learning and the laws of effect. He speaks variously of "wants and interests", "a want or interest", "attitudes, interests, and wants", "an active want or interest or attitude."
- 63 Edward L. Thorndike, The Psychology of Learning, Vol. II Educational Psychology (New York: Teacher's College, 1913); and his Adult Interests (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1935). Thorndike's use of concepts in these works is reviewed by Berlyne, loc. cit., p. 186.
- 64 Edward C. Tolman, "Connectionism: Wants, Interests, and Attitudes," Character and Personality, IV (September, 1935-June, 1936), 253.
- 65 Gordon W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1937).
- 66 D. T. Campbell, "Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Behavioral Dispositions," in Psychology: A Study of a Science, ed. by Sigmund Koch (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., Inc., 1963), p. 95.
- 67 See Campbell's position, in Koch, op. cit., passim. He is not prepared to accept this. Instead, he regards all terms like "attitude", "interest", "motive", "goal", "need", etc. as referring to acquired behavioral dispositions which are all functionally definable in essentially the same way.
- 68 Allport, op. cit., p. 290.
- 69 Edward Spranger, Types of Men: The Psychology and Ethics of Personality, trans. by P. J. W. Pigors (Halle: Karrae, Kriber and Neitschmann, 1928). These are outlined in detail in Allport, op. cit., pp. 228-231. Spranger regards these categories as "directions of striving" or as "value - directions". Allport continues this usage, although he also speaks of them as "master - sentiments" and most frequently as "interests". The development of these categories for test purposes appeared in Philip E. Vernon, and G. W. Allport, "A Test for Personal Values," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 26 (October - December, 1931), 231-248.
- 70 Allport, op. cit., p. 427. He also notes that Thurstone's four major types of occupational interest, that is, interest in science, in language, in people, and in business, might serve equally as well.
- 71 See Gordon W. Allport, "The Functional Autonomy of

Motives," The American Journal of Psychology, 50 (1947), 141-156.

- 72 Gordon W. Allport, "Motivation in Personality: Reply to Peter A. Bertocci," in Understanding Human Motivation ed. by Chalmers L. Stacey and Manfred F. DeMartino (Rev. ed.; Cleveland: Howard Allen, Inc., Publishers, 1963), p. 208. See also Peter A. Bertocci, "A Critique of Gordon W. Allport's Theory of Motivation," in Stacey and DeMartino, op. cit., pp. 174-197. Both articles originally appeared in The American Psychological Review 47 (1940).
- 73 Allport, in Stacey and DeMartino, op. cit., p. 211.
- 74 Ibid., p. 211.
- 75 Berlyne, loc. cit., p. 186. He also argues that in his comprehensive account of the measurement of interest, D. Fryer defines interest only briefly in a footnote. This is simply not the case. The remark says much more about Berlyne's reading of Fryer than it does of Fryer's treatment of interest, which was really quite thorough. This is not the first occasion where it seems evident that Berlyne's review skipped lightly over important areas in the literature.
- 76 Edward K. Strong Jr., Change of Interest With Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1931), p. 9.
- 77 Ibid., p. 9. A useful review of Strong's Vocational Interest Blank (1937) is that of L. E. Ferguson. He argues that the crux of the test is that the subject obtains "an indication of whether or not his own interests, his own likes and dislikes, his own preferences and aversions correspond to or do not correspond to those of successful men and women in the occupations designated." See his Personality Measurement (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 1952), p.31. See also J. P. Guilford, Personality (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 1959), Ch. 9; and Philip E. Vernon, Personality Tests and Assessments (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1957), Ch. IX.
- 78 Fryer, op. cit., passim.
- 79 Ibid., p. 15.
- 80 Ibid., p. 347.

- 81 Ibid., p. 18.
- 82 Ibid., p. 349; p. 347; p. 350. The same view is argued by Fryer loc. cit., pp. 549-556; the view expressed here is somewhat contrary to his earlier position when he spoke of "vocational interest or ambitions", a decidedly more dynamic connotation. See his "Predicting Abilities from Interests," Journal of Applied Psychology, XI (1927), 212-225.
- 83 Ferguson, op. cit., p. 3.
- 84 Guildford, op. cit., p. 222.
- 85 Vernon and Allport, loc. cit., pp. 231-248. See H. Cantril, H. A. Rand, and G. W. Allport, "The Determination of Personal Interests by Psychological and Graphological Methods," Character and Personality, 11 (1933), 134-143. See also the critique of this test advanced by Jan Meloun, "The Study of Values - Test and Graphology," Character and Personality, 11 (1933), 144-151.
- 86 H. Cantril and G. W. Allport, "Recent Application of the Study of Values," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 28 (1933), 259-273.
- 87 Ibid., p. 265; p. 272.

CHAPTER II

- 88 Richard S. Lazarus, Personality and Adjustment (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 52.
- 89 Lazarus, op. cit., p. 45ff.
- 90 Gordon W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937).
- 91 Gordon W. Allport, "The Functional Autonomy of Motives," in Understanding Human Motivation ed. by Chalmers L. Stacey and Manfred F. DeMartino (Rev. ed.; Cleveland: Howard Allen, Inc., Publishers, 1963), p. 171; See also Gordon W. Allport, "Motivation in Personality; Reply to Peter A. Bertocci," in Stacey and DeMartino, op. cit., pp. 197-212.

- 92 This usage has applied since at least 1931. See Philip E. Vernon and Gordon W. Allport, "A Test for Personal Values," The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 26 (1931), 231-248.
- 93 Gordon W. Allport, "The Ego in Contemporary Psychology," in Gordon W. Allport, Personality and Social Encounter: Selected Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 85.
- 94 Ibid., p. 86.
- 95 Gordon W. Allport, "The Psychology of Participation," in Allport, op. cit., p. 186.
- 96 See Gordon W. Allport, "Scientific Models and Human Morals," in Allport, op. cit., pp. 55-68. That little agreement emerged on the usage of motivational concepts is suggested in Allport's later article, "What Units Shall We Employ?" in Allport, op. cit., pp. 111-129. He argues that "as yet investigators have reached little or no agreement, they are not yet able to say 'these are the most useful units to employ'." p. 123.
- 97 Gordon W. Allport, "Geneticism vs. Ego-Structure," in Allport, op. cit., p. 144.
- 98 Gordon W. Allport, "Effect: A Secondary Principle of Learning," The Psychological Review, 53 (1946), 340.
- 99 Gordon W. Allport, "Geneticism vs. Ego-Structure," in Allport, op. cit., p. 138; p. 140.
- 100 When terms are used synonymously in this inquiry the conjunction "or" separates the terms as in "drives or needs". Sometimes parentheses are used as in "drives (needs)". When terms are not being used synonymously the conjunction "and" separates the terms as in "interests and needs".
- 101 Gordon W. Allport, "Effect: A Secondary Principle of Learning," The Psychological Review, 53 (1946), 345-346.
- 102 This particular usage encompasses the senses of "interest" as (1) the quality of the stimulus and (2) as a relation between organism and stimulus which D. E. Berlyne sets out as distinct meanings of the term. See D. E. Berlyne "'Interest' as a Psychological Concept," The British Journal of Psychology, 39 (June, 1949), 184-195. Selective perception in terms of dominant interests could be illustrated by the following. As election

results come in, the political sociologist sees the influence of class, the political psychologist notices the effect of leadership images and voter identification, the international relations expert considers the decisions which the leading party will probably take in the foreign field, the political institutionalist sees the influence of the single member simple majority electoral system, and the political philosopher is not aware that an election is going on.

- 103 Gordon W. Allport, "The Open System in Personality Theory," in Allport, op. cit., p. 41.
- 104 Gordon W. Allport, "The Trend in Motivational Theory," in Allport, op. cit., p. 97. See also Gordon W. Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 29.
- 105 Martin Scheerer, "Cognitive Theory," in Handbook of Social Psychology: Theory and Method, ed. by G. Lindzey (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1954), Vol. I Chapter 3, 121.
- 106 M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert K. White, Opinions and Personality, Science edition (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 30; p. 263.
- 107 Ibid., p. 41.
- 108 Ibid., p. 263.
- 109 Philip B. Rice, "The Ego and the Law of Effect," The Psychological Review, 53 (1946), p. 312.
- 110 O. H. Mowrer, "The Law of Effect and Ego-Psychology," The Psychological Review, 53 (1946), 321-334.
- 111 See the critique of Mowrer's position in G. W. Allport's "Effect: A Secondary Principle of Learning," The Psychological Review, 53 (1946) 338-340. This dispute is reviewed by D. E. Berlyne, loc. cit., pp. 87-88. Berlyne neither draws out nor discusses the distinction between the two forms of motivation so crucial to Allport's position.
- 112 Homer H. Dubs, "The Elementary Units of Behaviour," The Psychological Review, 50 (1943), 479-502.
- 113 Ibid., pp. 486-487.

- 114 Ibid., p. 489.
- 115 Gardner Murphy, Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structures (New York: Harpers, 1947), p. 989.
- 116 Quoted in D. E. Berlyne "Motivational Problems Raised by Exploratory and Epistemic Behaviour", in Psychology: A Study of a Science, ed. by S. Koch (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962), Vol. 5, p. 328.
- 117 Lester D. Crow and Alice Crow, Educational Psychology (New York: American Book Co., 1954), p. 248.
- 118 Quoted in Sister Mary Amatora, "Interests of Pre-Adolescent Boys and Girls," Genetic Psychology Monographs, 61 (1960), 81; A very similar treatment is given by J. P. Guilford in Personality (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959), p. 8; Philip E. Vernon regards personality as an organized system including conscious sentiments and interests, and unconscious mechanisms and complexes. See his Personality Assessment: A Critical Survey (Rev. 3rd ed.; London: Methuen and Company Ltd., 1964), p. 3. A similar distinction is made by Raymond B. Cattell as quoted in Anne Anastasia, Differential Psychology (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1958), p. 351.
- 119 Berlyne, loc. cit., pp. 191-192; See Guilford, op. cit., p. 448. As a factor of "interest" relating to selected overt activities, Guilford includes a "liking for diversion".
- 120 Berlyne, loc. cit., p. 192. He notes Dashiell, Nissen, Bartlett, Hull and Piaget as having demonstrated the existence of this exploratory or curiosity drive. The phenomenon here regarded as "interest" is much like the striving which characterizes cognitive activity, the effort after meaning or "placing need" discussed by Smith, Bruner and White, op. cit., pp. 32-33. This is similar to the desires to know and to understand postulated by A. H. Maslow as the cognitive needs. See his "A Dynamic Theory of Human Motivation," The Psychological Review, 50 (1943), 370-396.
- 121 Berlyne, loc. cit., p. 193.
- 122 Edward K. Strong Jr., "Satisfaction and Interest," American Psychologist, 13 (1958), 452.
- 123 Ibid., pp. 452-453.

- 124 Leonard W. Ferguson, Personality Measurement (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 1952), p. 81.
- 125 Murphy, op. cit., p. 989. This usage is one of long standing in psychological literature.
- 126 Crow and Crow, op. cit., p. 248.
- 127 Rice, loc. cit., p. 316.
- 128 Ibid., p. 316. It may be unfair to distinguish Rice's view from the positions set down in the first sense of this usage. Although his argument is more sophisticated, as befitting a philosopher, he says little more than that interest is the aspect of an act in which the feeling of satisfaction is emphasized.
- 129 Guilford, op. cit., p. 8.
- 130 Ibid., pp. 205-206; p. 432.
- 131 Ibid., p. 447
- 132 See Guilford, op. cit., p. 447; pp. 206ff. His work represents by far the best review of interest studies. See also Ferguson, op. cit., Ch. 2; Philip E. Vernon, Personality Tests and Assessments, (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1957), Ch. 9; Anastasia, op. cit., p. 351; See also Richard S. Uhrbrock, "Interest as an Indication of Ability," Journal of Applied Psychology, 10 (1926), 487-501; Arthur W. Kornhauser, "Results from a Quantitative Questionnaire on Likes and Dislikes Used With a Group of College Freshmen," Journal of Applied Psychology, 11 (1927), pp. 85-94; John B. Marks, "Interests and Group Formations," Human Relations, 12 (1959), 385-390; H. C. Lehman and P. A. Witty, "Vocational Counseling: The Interest Inventory," The American Journal of Psychology, 44 (1932), 801-805; Harry J. Older, "An Objective Test of Vocational Interests," Journal of Applied Psychology, 28 (1944), 99-108, Edward L. Thorndike, "Interests and Abilities," Journal of Applied Psychology, 28 (1944), 43-52; L. E. Tyler, "The Relationship of Interests to Abilities and Reputation Among First Grade Children," Educational and Psychological Measures, 11 (1951), 255-264; R. F. Berdie, "Range of Interests," Journal of Applied Psychology, 29 (1945), 268-281; E. W. Goodenough, "Interest in Persons as an Aspect of Sex Differences in the Early Years," Genetic Psychology Monographs, 55 (1957), 287-323; Sister Mary Amatora loc. cit., pp. 77-113.

- 133 Arthur T. Jersild and Ruth I. Tasch, Children's Interests and What They Suggest for Education (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 1.
- 134 Ibid., p. 2.
- 135 Richard S. Uhrbrock, "The Expressed Interests of Employed Men," The American Journal of Psychology, 57 (1944), 326.
- 136 Sister Mary Amatora, "Free Expression of Adolescents' Interests," Genetic Psychology Monographs, 55 (1957), 182-183.
- 137 A. Q. Saratain and E. G. Waring, "Interest in and Value of College Courses," Journal of Applied Psychology, 28 (1944), 520.
- 138 M. O. Wilson, "Interests of College Students," American Journal of Psychology, 38 (1927), 410.
- 139 S. G. Dimichael, "Interest-Inventory Results During the Counseling Interview," Occupations, 30 (November, 1951), 93-97; L. E. Tyler, "Relationship Between Strong Vocational Interest Scores and Other Attitude and Personality Factors," Journal of Applied Psychology, 29 (1945), 58-67, M. E. Hahn and C. T. Williams, "The Measured Interests of Marine Corps Women Recruits," Journal of Applied Psychology, 29 (1945), 198-211.
- 140 Marks, loc. cit., pp. 385-390.
- 141 Donald E. Super, "Vocational Adjustment: Implementing a Self-Concept," Occupations, 30 (November, 1951), 88-92; E. S. Bordin, "A Theory of Vocational Interests as Dynamic Phenomena," Educational and Psychological Measures, 3 (1943), 49-66.
- 142 Robert E. Lana, "Interest, Media and Order Effects in Persuasive Communications," Journal of Psychology, 56 (1963), 9-13.
- 143 Guilford, op. cit., p. 457.
- 144 Ibid., p. 267; See Ferguson, op. cit., p. 31. He argues that the strong vocational interest test "gives no indication of ability". This conclusion was shared by Douglas Fryer in "Predicting Abilities from Interests," Journal

of Applied Psychology, 11 (1927), 212-225; and by S. G. Dimichael, loc. cit., 93-97. The contrary view was held by R. S. Uhrbrock, "Interests as an Indication of Ability," Journal of Applied Psychology 10 (1926), 487-501; E. L. Thorndike, loc. cit., pp. 43-52, and by Gordon W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1937), p. 201. He argued that "the relationship between ability and interest is always positive, often markedly so. A person likes to do what he can do well".

145 Berlyne, loc. cit., p. 194.

CHAPTER III

- 146 W. H. R. Rivers, Psychology and Politics: And Other Essays (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Truber and Co. Ltd., 1923), p. 16. Rivers was much impressed by Graham Wallas's Human Nature in Politics (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1908).
- 147 Walter Berns, "The Behavioural Sciences and the Study of Political Things: The Case of Christian Bay's The Structure of Freedom," The American Political Science Review, 55 (1961), 550-559.
- 148 Richard S. Lazarus, Personality and Adjustment (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 45-46. See also Gardner Murphy, "Social Motivation," in Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by G. Lindzey (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1954), Vol. II, Ch. 16; pp. 601-633; Gordon Allport gives a more detailed review of this question in "What Units Shall We Employ," in Gordon W. Allport, Personality and Social Encounter: Selected Essays, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 111-129.
- 149 Murphy, in Lindzey, op. cit., pp. 601-633; Lazarus, op. cit., pp. 45ff.
- 150 Lazarus, op. cit., p. 63.
- 151 Ibid., p. 46; See Murphy's review of Murray in Lindzey, op. cit., pp. 608-609.
- 152 Theodore M. Newcomb, Ralph H. Turner, and Philip E. Converse, Social Psychology: The Study of Human Interaction (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), pp. 22-23.

- 153 David Kretch and Richard S. Crutchfield, Theory and Problems of Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 30ff.
- 154 Ibid., p. 41.
- 155 See Murphy's review of Methods of Motive Classification in Lindzey, op. cit., pp. 608-609.
- 156 This trend is outlined in Lazarus, op. cit., p. 67.
- 157 A. H. Maslow, "A Dynamic Theory of Human Motivation," The Psychological Review, 50 (1943), 370-396; See also A. H. Maslow, "Higher and Lower Needs," in Understanding Human Motivation, ed. by Chalmers L. Stacey and Manfred F. DeMartino (Rev. ed.; Cleveland: Howard Allen, Inc., Publishers, 1963), pp. 433-436.
- 158 A. H. Maslow, "Some Basic Propositions for a Growth and Self-Actualization Psychology," in Stacey and DeMartino, op. cit., pp. 111-125.
- 159 Gordon W. Allport, "Geneticism vs. Ego-structure," in Gordon W. Allport, Personality and Social Encounter: Selected Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 137.
- 160 Ibid., pp. 137-151. See also Gordon W. Allport, "The Functional Autonomy of Motives," in Stacey and DeMartino, op. cit., pp. 161-173; and his "Motivation in Personality: Reply to Peter A. Bertocci," in Stacey and DeMartino, op. cit., pp. 197-212. In fact, most of Allport's writings on personality and motivation bear the imprint of this theme.
- 161 Gordon W. Allport, "The Trend in Motivational Theory," in Allport, op. cit., pp. 95-109.
- 162 G. W. Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 47-48.
- 163 O. H. Mowrer, "The Law of Effect and Ego-Psychology," The Psychological Review, 53 (1946), 321-334. It could be noted that R. B. Cattell sets out a very similar usage of "interest" as a secondary drive. Cattell's primary factors are labelled "ergic drive structures" and include sex, gregariousness, exploration, escape, self-assertion, and parental protection, all of which are said to derive from innate organic bases. He

distinguishes this class of motivational units from the "sentiment structures" which include the sentiment to one's vocation, religion, sports, self-reputation, and others. Anastasia suggests that these factors "correspond closely to what others have investigated under the heading of interests". See Anne Anastasia, Differential Psychology (3rd. ed.; New York: the MacMillan Co., Ltd., 1958), p. 351. If this is the case, then "interest" could be used in a more or less generic sense to include all secondary drives or sentiments. A somewhat broader usage was suggested by Cattell himself some years before when he noted that "interest appears as a result of the functioning of any instinct, sentiment, or complex and that the expression "interests" might be used as a generic term to cover all these dispositions". See R. B. Cattell, "The Measurement of Interest," Character and Personality IV (1935-1936), 165. Cattell never chose to free himself from the overbearing influence of William McDougall.

- 164 Homer H. Dubs, "The Elementary Units of Behaviour," The Psychological Review, 50 (1943), 479-502.
- 165 Vernon Van Dyke, "Values and Interests," The American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 567-576.
- 166 A. H. Maslow, "Higher and Lower Needs," in Stacey and DeMartino, op. cit., p. 107.
- 167 J. P. Guilford, Personality (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959).
- 168 Ibid., p. 205.
- 169 Ibid., p. 437.
- 170 Lazarus, op. cit., p. 45.
- 171 See Newcomb, Turner, Converse, op. cit., p. 24; see also Kretch and Crutchfield, op. cit., p. 42.
- 172 Donald T. Campbell, "Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Behavioural Dispositions," in Psychology: A Study of a Science ed. by Sigmund Koch (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), Vol. 6; 135.
- 173 Ibid., p. 136.

- 174 Mowrer, loc. cit., 321-334. Like Campbell, Mowrer suggests that every molar, object-consistent response, is purposive or goal-oriented. This covers, as Campbell points out, the great bulk of the learned responses studied by learning theorists. There is nothing to distinguish goals at this level from goals at a more conscious controlling level, if, indeed, they allow that such higher goals or purposes exist. Their view does not seem to include this distinction.
- 175 A. H. Maslow, "A Dynamic Theory of Human Motivation," in Stacey and DeMartino, op. cit., p. 89.
- 176 A. H. Maslow, "Some Basic Propositions of a Growth and Self Actualization Psychology," in Stacey and DeMartino, op. cit., p. 117.
- 177 A. H. Maslow, "A Dynamic Theory of Human Motivation," in Stacey and DeMartino, op. cit., p. 85.
- 178 Dubs, loc. cit., p. 489.
- 179 Philip B. Rice, "The Ego and the Law of Effect," The Psychological Review, 53 (1946), 316-317.
- 180 Gordon W. Allport, "The Trend in Motivational Theory," in Allport, op. cit., p. 107.
- 181 Gordon W. Allport, "Scientific Models and Human Morals," in Allport, op. cit., p. 61, See also G. W. Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 49ff. Much of D. T. Campbell's argument rests on the notion of "object-consistent responses", clearly a feature only of that level of motivation which Allport classifies as peripheral, deficiency motives. It might be agreed that the "acquired behavioural dispositions" which Campbell deals with have both means and end (goal) connotations. But it is evident that this class of tendencies neither includes, nor pertains to, the type of motivational unit partaking of ego and image involvement which Allport advances.
- 182 Helen Barshay, Empathy: Touchstone of Self-fulfillment (New York: Exposition Press, 1964), p. 14.
- 183 D. E. Berlyne, "'Interest' as a Psychological Concept," The British Journal of Psychology, 39 (June, 1949), 188.
- 184 Philip E. Vernon, Personality Tests and Assessments (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1957), p. 161.

- 185 L. L. Thurstone, "Attitudes Can Be Measured," The American Journal of Sociology 33 (1928), 529-554.
- 186 Gordon W. Allport, "Attitudes," in A Handbook of Social Psychology ed. by C. Murchison (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University Press, 1935), pp. 798-844.
- 187 E. Nelson, "Attitudes: I. Their Nature and Development," The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 21 (1939), 367-399. This is quoted in Muzaffer Sherif and Hadley Cantril, "The Psychology of Attitudes," Part I, The Psychological Review 52 (November 1945), 297.
- 188 Sherif and Cantril, loc. cit., p. 296; and M. Sherif and H. Cantril, "The Psychology of Attitudes," Part II The Psychological Review, 53 (1946), 19.
- 189 Anselm Strauss, "The Concept of Attitude in Social Psychology," The Journal of Psychology, 19 (1945), 329; 335.
- 190 Leonard W. Doob, "The Behaviour of Attitudes," The Psychological Review 54 (1947), 135. It is quite apparent that in the 1940's a considerable amount of critical discussion was focussed on the attitude concept. Illustrations of its ambiguity and attempts at clarification were common in the literature. Yet it was in this atmosphere that D. B. Truman confidently accepted one position or definition of attitude and allowed it to stand for the class of phenomena denoted by the term interest. All this was accomplished without more than a passing reference to the attitude literature, without any suggestion of the confusion surrounding the concept, and without any reference to the interest literature in the field of psychology. See David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 33-44.
- 191 M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert W. White, Opinions and Personality, Science Editions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 7.
- 192 Ibid., p. 4.
- 193 Vernon, op. cit., p.144.
- 194 H. J. Eysenck, "Organization, Nature and Measurement of Attitudes," in The Market Research Society, Attitude Scaling, (London: The Oakwood Press, 1960), p. 10.

- 195 Donald T. Campbell, "Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Behavioural Dispositions," in S. Koch, op. cit., pp. 94-172. The earlier reference is to Campbell's, "The Indirect Assessment of Social Attitudes," The Psychological Bulletin, 47 (1950), 15-38.
- 196 Barshay, op. cit., Chapter 1.
- 197 L. L. Thurstone, "The Measurement of Social Attitudes," in L. L. Thurstone, The Measurement of Values, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 297.
- 198 Ibid., p. 297.
- 199 Gordon W. Allport, "Attitudes," in Murchison, op.cit., quoted in M. Sherif and H. Cantril, loc. cit., Part I, p. 301. This definition is more explicit than his pioneering statement: "An attitude is a disposition to act which is built up by the integration of numerous specific responses of a similar type, but which exists as a general neural "set", and when activated by a specific stimulus results in behaviour that is more obviously a function of the disposition than of the activity stimulus". This appeared in his article, "The Composition of Political Attitudes," The American Journal of Sociology, 35 (1929-1930), 221.
- 200 Gordon W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1937), p. 294.
- 201 It was this aspect of attitude definition and research which especially troubled Strauss, loc. cit., pp. 329-339. The problem involved in inferring attitudes from behaviour and in distinguishing them from other inferred constructs is touched on by John D. Handyside, "A General Introduction to Attitude Scaling Techniques," in the Market Research Society, op. cit., pp. 15-29, and by Cyril Sofer and Isabel Menzies, "Problems and Opportunities in Inferring Attitudes," in the same publication, pp. 35-47. This question provides a large part of the theme in D. T. Campbell's "Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Behavioural Dispositions," in Koch, op. cit., passim.
- 202 Sherif and Cantril, loc. cit., Part I, pp. 301-304.
- 203 Ibid., p. 305.
- 204 Ibid., p. 306.

- 205 Norman Cameron, The Psychology of Behaviour Disorders (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1947), pp. 54-55.
- 206 Doob, loc. cit., pp. 135-155. Also see Isidor Chein's excellent critique of Doob's argument in "Behaviour Theory and the Behaviour of Attitudes: Some Critical Comments," The Psychological Review, 54 (1947), 175-188.
- 207 Eysenck, loc. cit., p. 10.
- 208 Quoted in Barshay, op. cit., p. 13.
- 209 L. L. Thurstone, "Measurement of Values," in Thurstone, op. cit., p. 187.
- 210 Quoted in Barshay, op. cit., p. 13.
- 211 Allen L. Edwards, Techniques of Attitude - Scale Construction, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957), p. 3.
- 212 Leonard W. Ferguson, Personality Measurement (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952), p. 81.
- 213 Guilford, op. cit., p. 223.
- 214 Kretch and Crutchfield, op. cit., pp. 150-152.
- 215 Quoted in Strauss, loc. cit., p. 329.
- 216 L. L. Thurstone, "Attitudes Can Be Measured," The American Journal of Sociology 33 (1928), 531.
- 217 Quoted in Barshay, op. cit., p. 18.
- 218 Smith, Bruner and White, op. cit., p. 33.
- 219 Sofer and Menzies, loc. cit., p. 35.
- 220 William W. Lambert and Wallace E. Lambert, Social Psychology (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 50-51. The formulation offered by John Harding and associates includes a tendency to react, a cognitive aspect, an affective component, and a conative element. See John Harding, Bernard Kunter, Harold Proshansky, and Isidor Chein, "Prejudice and Ethnic Relations," in Gardiner Lindzey, op. cit., p. 1022.
- 221 Newcomb, Turner, and Converse, op. cit., p. 40.

- 222 F. C. Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932).
- 223 Ibid., p. 44; p. 193.
- 224 Ibid., p. 303.
- 225 G. W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1937), pp. 290ff.
- 226 Rice, loc. cit., p. 312.
- 227 Smith, Bruner, White, op. cit., p. 41, pp. 259-261; p. 264.
- 228 Ibid., p. 262.
- 229 Ibid., p. 267.
- 230 Newcomb, Turner, Converse, op. cit., p. 59.
- 231 Ibid., p. 61.
- 232 Ibid., p. 139.
- 233 John Harding et al, "Prejudice and Ethnic Relations," in Lindzey, op. cit., p. 1022.
- 234 Quoted in Sherif and Cantril, loc. cit., Part I, p. 300.
- 235 Norman Squirrell, "Attitude Research," in The Market Research Society, op. cit., pp. 1-9.
- 236 Newcomb, Turner, Converse, op. cit., p. 40.
- 237 Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, The Riverside Press, 1960).
- 238 Albion Woodbury Small, General Sociology: An Exposition of the Main Development in Sociological Theory From Spencer to Ratzenhofer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1905). Chapter 29.
- 239 Floyd N. House, "The Concept 'Social Forces' in American Sociology," American Journal of Sociology, 31 (September, 1925), 145-172; (November 1925), 347-365; (January, 1926), 507-525; (March, 1926), 763-799. See also his The Range of Social Theory: A Survey of the Development,

Literature, Tendencies and Fundamental Problems of the Social Sciences (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929), pp. 561-563.

- 240 Earle Edward Eubank, "The Concepts of Sociology," Social Forces, 5 (March, 1927), 394. This is one of the best argued cases for conceptual clarification that exists in any social science literature. Eubank sets out 276 terms which appear to be widely used in the discipline. He compares 142 key terms as used in 8 basic introductory texts and discovers that only 52 are found in more than one list while only 1 appears in all 8 lists. His complaint is that the lack of agreement among the authors on basic concepts is so great that "a casual reader would be justified in failing to recognize them as dealing with the same subject matter". (p. 395.)
- 241 Ibid., p. 388. Eubank's continued examination of the vocabulary of sociology can be traced in his "The Vocabulary of Sociology," Social Forces, 9 (March, 1931), 305-320; The Concepts of Sociology (New York: 1932); and in his "The Conceptual Approach to Sociology," Chapter III in H. Barnes, H. Becker, and F. B. Becker, Contemporary Social Theory (New York, 1940).
- 242 Emory S. Bogardus, "Tools in Sociology," Sociology and Social Research, 14 (1929-1930), 332-341; Contemporary Sociology (Los Angeles: The University of Southern California Press, 1931); "Concepts in Sociology," Sociology and Social Research, 30 (1945-1946), 217-226; and "Selected Sociological Concepts for Beginning Students in Sociology," Sociology and Social Research, 44 (1959-1960), 200-208. In this last article Bogardus recommends a list of 52 concepts which he regards as basic for junior students of sociology. However, he does so with certain qualifications; "[n]o two sociologists would give exactly the same definitions ..." and "[n]o two sociologists would agree regarding which concepts are standard ones". (p.200). R. M. MacIver and Charles H. Page also express their concern that "different authors define certain of even the most essential terms in different ways". See Society: An Introductory Analysis (New York: Rinehart and Company Inc., 1955), p. 636. They recommend C. Pamunzio's Major Social Institutions (New York: 1939), pp. 523-568, as a useful attempt to standardize sociological terms. H. P. Fairchild's Dictionary of Sociology (Paterson, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1962), is a more recent attempt to perform the same service. In his Preface,

Fairchild maintains that a major problem is created by the fact that so many sociological terms relate to matters of commonplace experience which are set out in ordinary terms and included in most ordinary dictionaries. He insists that scientific accuracy demands that "precise and limited meanings should be assigned to these terms, in order that they be used uniformly alike by specialists, students and amateurs in the field".

- 243 N. S. Timasheff, "The Basic Concepts of Sociology," American Journal of Sociology, 58 (1952-1953), 176-186.
- 244 N. S. Timasheff, Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth (Rev. ed.; New York: Random House, 1957), p. 9. Timasheff cautions that the grounds for continuous empirical research and theoretical integration have not yet been laid. "There exists no set of propositions commonly held by all sociologists, couched in identical or easily convertible terms and allowing them to present the known facts and generalizations as logical derivations of a few principles. On the contrary, the development of sociology has been characterized by the rise of an unusually high number of conflicting theories". (p. 10). Samuel Krislov has argued that "the whole range of sociological theorists -- notably those Martindale calls the conflict theorists -- found the clue to society also in conflict and resolution of interests". See his "What is an Interest? The Rival Answers of Bentley, Pound and MacIver", The Western Political Quarterly, 16 (1963), 831. Krislov's statement goes well beyond the facts. Even in the early stages of sociology, in what Sorokin calls the "psychological school" or Timasheff regards as the "social Darwinists", the exponents of the interest concept, although they numbered some of the great figures of the discipline, were well in the minority. Many orientations such as sociological formalism, social behaviourism, symbolic interactionism, and sociological functionalism, rely on the concept little, if at all. E. E. Eubank includes "interest" as one of the 276 terms which he believes to be of importance to the discipline, but in his review of 8 leading texts, only two, Small's and Dealey's, use "interest" as a major concept. See Eubank, "The Concepts of Sociology," Social Forces, 5 (March, 1927), 394. He also includes "interest" as one of the 1300 terms of a working sociological vocabulary in his "The Vocabulary of Sociology," Social Forces, 9 (March, 1931), 314. On the other hand,

E. S. Bogardus' review of major concepts makes no mention of "interest" either in his "Tools in Sociology," Sociology and Social Research, 14, (1929-1930), 332-341, or in his Contemporary Sociology (1931). In his later study, "Concepts in Sociology," Sociology and Social Research, 30 (1945-1946), 217-226; he notes a list of 60 concepts drawn up by a special committee of the American Sociological Association for introductory students. "Interest" is not included, but it is entered 79th from the top in his own list of 100 terms. By 1960 Bogardus was down to 52 basic concepts and "interest", although not one of them, received mention as an illustration of the concept of social forces. See his "Selected Sociological Concepts for Beginning Students in Sociology," Sociology and Social Research, 44 (1959-1960), 200-208. Timsaheff's major review of basic concepts, loc. cit., p. 184, turns up interest only by the way, as a substitute by MacIver for the concept of value. It is thus very difficult to establish how basic the concept of interest has been in the discipline. It is apparent, however, that it has not been regarded as one of the very chosen few. It is more often introduced in a non-technical sense in one of its many confusing variations.

There is no doubt that Small's pioneering work placed the concept in the sociological spotlight for some years and demonstrated to at least Ellwood, Blackmar and Gillin, Fairchild, Ross, and Vold, that it was worthy of attention and usage. Martindale, op. cit., pp. 189-195, lists several of Small's disciples, but Timasheff, op. cit., p. 65, declares that in spite of Small's personal influence, "his views have neither persisted nor influenced American sociology to any large degree". It seems clear that the concepts of attitude, wish, and value came to serve many of the purposes which interest had performed and, as in psychology, interest fell from favour in sociological theory and research.

245 Gustav Ratzenhofer's chief works in sociology include Wesen und Zweck der Politik (1893), Die Sociologische Erkenntnis (1898), and Soziologie (1907) none of which are available in an English translation.

246 For excellent discussions of Ratzenhofer's classification of interests see Edward A. Ross, "Moot Points in Sociology V. The Social Forces," American Journal of Sociology, 9 (July 1903-May 1904), 537-538; Pitirim Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1928), p. 643; Howard Becker and Harry E. Barnes, Social Thought From Love to Science: A History and Interpretation of Man's Ideas About Life

With His Fellows (2nd. ed.; Washington, D.C.: Harren Press, 1952), Vol. I. pp. 716-718; Timasheff, op. cit., pp. 63-64. Harmon Zeigler offers a sketchy outline on Ratzenhofer in his Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1964), pp. 7-9.

- 247 Quoted in A. Schäffle, A Review of Die Soziologische Erkenntnis by G. Ratzenhofer, translated by Mr. and Mrs. C. A. Ellwood in The American Journal of Sociology, 4 (July 1898 - May 1899), 528-542. Both Timasheff, op. cit., p. 64 and Martindale, op. cit., p. 185, contend that to Ratzenhofer, "interest" is the expression of a need or drive through the awareness of its necessity. However, it is reasonably clear that these more basic needs to Ratzenhofer were also called "interests". Earle E. Eubank's "Errors of Sociology," Social Forces, 16 (December, 1937), 178-201, includes critical comments on Ratzenhofer's position in the context of singularistic theories of social phenomena. See also Emory S. Bogardus, The Development of Social Thought (3rd. ed.; New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1955), p. 386; and John B. Edlefsen, "Albion Woodbury Small: One of the Fathers of American Sociology," Sociology and Social Research, 39 (March-April, 1955), 217-223.
- 248 It was this biological and psychological basis in Ratzenhofer's interest concept which troubled A. F. Bentley. He lamented how Ratzenhofer was not content to take interests as they presented themselves in social group forms, but "felt impelled to swathe them in an exceedingly wearisome and maladroit metaphysics". See A. F. Bentley, The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures (Rev. ed.; Evanston, Illinois: The Principia Press of Illinois, Inc., 1949), p. 476. That Bentley soon forgot this unfortunate side of Ratzenhofer's "interests" appears in his later article entitled "Simmel, Durkheim and Ratzenhofer," American Journal of Sociology, 32 (1926), 250-256. Here Bentley lauds Ratzenhofer for his insight in viewing the group process as activity involving its own energy in the form of social interests, "without entanglement with individual psychological factors taken as direct factors of interpretation."
- 249 For a view of Ratzenhofer's general sociology see his "The Problems of Sociology," American Journal of Sociology, 10 (July, 1904-May 1905), 177-188; Small, op. cit., pp. 183-394; and A. W. Small, "Ratzenhofer's Sociology," American Journal of Sociology, 13 (1907-1908), 433-438.

- 250 Harry E. Barnes, "The Place of Albion Woodbury Small in Modern Sociology," American Journal of Sociology, 32 (July, 1926), 39.
- 251 Small, op. cit., p. 433.
- 252 Ibid., p. 433. This something back of consciousness is entered in the light of Dewey's definition of "interest" as "impulse functioning with reference to self-realization", which Small quotes. Small believes that he is somewhat deeper in the nature of man than that. There is, however, a suggestion in one of Small's earlier articles that something of Dewey did rub off. He contends that "the life of the individual is a process of achieving the self that is potential in the interests...." See his "The Scope of Sociology: IV. The Assumptions of Sociology," American Journal of Sociology, 6 (1900-1901), 202. Small admits that his definition is vague. Timasheff, op. cit., p. 65, holds the same view. He suggests that "the vagueness of this statement is unfortunately fully characteristic of Small's work in general". On the other hand, E. S. Bogardus argues that "he defined 'human interests' with care". See his "Albion W. Small, 1854-1926," Journal of Applied Sociology, 10 (1925-1926), 480. Timasheff appears to be on safer ground.
- 253 This classification, utilizing the term "desire" rather than "interest", first appeared in A. W. Small, and George E. Vincent, An Introduction to the Study of Society (New York: American Book Company, 1894). H. E. Barnes, loc. cit., p. 33, argues that Small's doctrine on interest appeared in comments on Professor Gidding's paper at the New Orleans meeting of the American Sociological Society in 1903. But the position which Small develops in General Sociology (1905) appeared in a long series of articles in The American Journal of Sociology from volume 5 (1899-1900) to volume 10 (1904-1905), with the crux of his argument appearing in Volumes 6 and 8. The commentaries on Small are numerous. He was a great man in the field with more than a great man's share of weaknesses. One of the best critical articles is that of F. N. House, loc. cit., especially 507-512. House treats Small in the context of his contemporaries, many of whom held equally unsteady positions. A good review is contained in Martindale, op. cit., pp. 185-195. Another sound critical review of Small's classification and the incumbent psychological reductionism to which he

was led, is found in Edward Carey Hayes, "The 'Social Forces' Error," American Journal of Sociology, 16 (1910-1911), 613-625, and in his "The Classification of Social Phenomena," Volume 17 of the same journal, at pp. 375-399. See also E. E. Eubank, "Errors of Sociology," Social Forces, 16 (December, 1937), p. 195. Eubank holds that Small's six-fold categories are inadequate but for entirely the wrong reasons. It is his view that the inadequacy of Small's classification is evidenced by the considerable number of other competing classifications and by the lack of general agreement on any of them. Strictly speaking, this says nothing whatever about the weakness of Small's position. The most critical attack on Small and the psychological school of which he is a part, outside of A. F. Bentley's remarks, is contained in Sorokin, op. cit., pp. 643-644.

- 254 Small, op. cit., p. 443; a similar view is found in Louis Wirth's Preface to Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), xxii. He argues that "... those basic impulses which have been generally designated as 'interests' actually are the forces which at the same time generate the ends of our practical activity and focus our intellectual attention."
- 255 Ibid., p. 445. Small often speaks of Sociology as "the science of human interests and their workings under all conditions", (p. 446).
- 256 Lester F. Ward, Dynamic Sociology (New York: Appleton and Co., 1911). A good part of the burden of this pioneering work is Ward's use of the telic concept to combat Spencer's laissez-faire thesis. See also Ward's "The Social Forces Contribution to Social Philosophy, VII" American Journal of Sociology, 2 (1896-1897), 82-95. It is from Ward that Small drew his original notion of the six-fold desires.
- 257 L. F. Ward, Pure Sociology: A Treatise on the Origin and Spontaneous Development of Society (2nd. ed.; New York: The MacMillan Company, 1911), p. 21.
- 258 Ibid., p. 108. In seeking to account for human behaviour and the social structuring of behaviour, Ward, Ratzenhofer, and Small felt compelled to resort to psychology and biology as the only levels of explanation. There were no social units which they thought could be taken as autonomous and self-sufficient. Thus to them the term "social forces" meant the individual motives, in

this case, the interests. It is Krislov's argument that Small and the Chicago school pressed the notion of interests "against similar competing frames of reference such as the 'social forces' notion", and that Ward developed one of these competing frameworks, namely, the "social forces". See Krislow, loc. cit., 831. This is simply a misunderstanding of the social forces concept in general and of the basically similar positions of Ward and Small in particular.

- 259 R. M. MacIver, Community: A Sociological Study (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1917), p. 98 and p. 99. See Krislov, loc. cit., pp. 839-840, for a useful discussion of MacIver's confusion regarding the subjective nature of interests.
- 260 L. T. Hobhouse, Social Development: Its Nature and Conditions (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1924), p. 136. Hobhouse goes beyond the master instinctivist McDougall, who is content to allow "interest" to stand for the feeling of striving which is evoked whenever stimuli call out one or more of the instinctive impulses. In R. B. Cattell's view, interest as a feeling appears only as the effect of the functioning of any instinct, sentiment, or complex. See the discussion in Chapter II above.
- 261 Ibid., p. 173. For a useful review of Hobhouse see J. A. Hobson, and M. Ginsberg, L. T. Hobhouse: His Life and Work (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931), especially pp. 149-158.
- 262 Fairchild, op. cit., p. 161. This is basically the same as his earlier definition in Foundations of Social Life (1927) as quoted in House, op. cit., p. 190. Fairchild defines interest there as "the relation that exists between an individual and an object which he believes will gratify a desire of his.... "This object.... may be a thing or an act".
- 263 This sense is employed by Alfred McClung Lee, "Interest Criteria in Propaganda Analysis," The American Sociological Review, 10 (1945), 282-288. Lee decides that "interest has the sense of objectified desire or purpose, whether realizable or delusory". (p. 282). But he immediately introduces a different sense when he explains that interest relates especially to "economic and political concerns and responsibilities of groups and of society". This is surely a large step from desire plus object. Lee maintains that his usage is similar to MacIver's in "Interests,"

Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 8 (1932), 144-148; to Small's in General Sociology, to Sumner's in Folkways and to Park and Burgess' in Introduction to the Science of Sociology. This is a large and ambiguous claim. MacIver offers three definitions in the article mentioned and explicitly repudiates the Small-Ratzenhofer position. Small advances a number of varied definitions, Sumner is unclear, and Park and Burgess simply quote Small and Bentley on interest without treating the concept in their own work. It is difficult to know quite what Lee has in mind. Little clarification is offered in his later article, "Can the Individual Protect Himself Against Propaganda Not in His Interest," Social Forces, 29 (October, 1950), 56-61. A definition which contains the essentials of Fairchild's attempt is that given by F. Znaniecki, quoted in Bogardus, *op. cit.*, p. 412. Interests are identified as a "combination of objects and attitudes toward them". A rather unspecified usage of the same character appears in T. N. Carver's "The Basis of Social Conflict," American Journal of Sociology, 13 (1907-1908), 632. Carver maintains that "where there is scarcity there will be two men wanting the same thing; where two men want the same thing there will be an antagonism of interests". It is not clear whether interest denotes the want, the thing, or the two in combination. A similar view which Small regards as "psychological" is that advanced by J. Mark Baldwin and is quoted in Small, *op. cit.*, p. 431. Baldwin suggests that a man's interests are simply "the things he wants in life".

- 264 Small, *op. cit.*, p. 196. This is contained in a section which Small entitles "An Interpretation of Ratzenhofer". The consensus among the commentators seems to be that this is a partial translation and interpretation, that it contains Small's Ratzenhofer.
- 265 Small tempers this statement later in his book by suggesting that his term "interest" is not co-ordinate with these "composite interests" but may be approached by means of them. It still remains an extraordinary statement.
- 266 *Ibid.*, p. 432.
- 267 *Ibid.*, p. 434. Small's position is rendered much less credible by the supposed identity between the six-fold desires and the six-fold objective conditions of satisfaction. Certain motivational theories allow that the tension (energy state), the subjective aspect of a

motivational relationship, becomes a motive only with the attachment to some state of affairs (goal) which gives direction and reduces or prolongs the tension. States of tension (anxiety) with neither focus nor direction are simply not motives. There is not usually a goal object set down in the nature of the energy state, what Small regards as the unsatisfied capacity, and in practice, a variety of goals may satisfy a given energy state and one goal may satisfy a variety of energy states. Small's great weakness lies in attributing some identity to the inner state and the objective satisfier well in advance of experience; Health ↔ Health, Wealth ↔ Wealth, etc. He believes that by framing the question in this manner a single definition of interest will include both elements as if they were merely different sides of the same thing. At this point the whole business becomes far-fetched. To begin with, they are not identical. An unsatisfied energy state is not the same thing as an object or an activity which may be an objective condition for achieving satisfaction. And these two elements are aspects of the same relationship only in terms of a specific relationship. A wealth desire may be satisfied by farm labour, driving a taxi, prostitution, owning an oil well, or managing a chain of fertilizer outlets. It is only when a specific desire is related in an enduring way with a particular activity that the relationship could be legitimately termed an interest, or indeed, a drive, motive, or need. By asserting a correspondence between very general unsatisfied capacities and very general potentially satisfying states of affairs, Small is saying much more than that. Small's proposition has the advantage of not being subject to disconfirmation, but in never being wrong, it is difficult to see how he could ever be correct.

- 268 This common usage is set out in R. M. MacIver, "Interests," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 8 (1932), p. 144.
- 269 Small, op. cit., p. 209. The author introduces yet another sense of "interest" in this context. He insists that he is using the term "interest" in the sense of "an interest in buying at the lowest price" and "an interest in catching a train". This turns on the common usage of "interest" as the relation of being concerned in respect of advantage, or generally, the feeling of concern.
- 270 A. F. Bentley is especially critical of Small's subjective and objective senses of "interest". He was so close to

the truth, Bentley implies, and then he blew it all. He interprets Small's sense of "the interest" or "group" as independent objective activity or social facts. This sense is quite acceptable to Bentley. But the use of "interest" as subjective desires is in the rejected category of "soul-stuff". He correctly notes that the subjective interests are inferred because certain classes of social phenomena have been found which require an explanation. Thus Small inferred that there must be classes of motives called "interests" which correspond to the social phenomena and which in fact determine them. This specimen of "billiard-ball" method, Bentley contends, is a "vicious circle which starts with a rough, untested guess and comes out in a rough, untested guess, with nothing but metaphysics in between". See Bentley, op. cit., p. 30. Small was neither high in his praise of Bentley's methodological approach nor grateful for his critical comments. He regards Part I of Bentley's book as "a cumulative exhibit of the author's limitations, and contends that "his theory of social motivation substitutes for the individual billiard balls by which he supposes others to explain social dynamics, group boulders, in which his account leaves no more place for psychic factors, than we can discover in the masses of rock that make up an avalanche". See Small's review of Bentley's The Process of Government in the American Journal of Sociology, 13 (1907-1908), 698-706, at pp. 705-706.

- 271 Small, op. cit., p. 436. And so, he continues, we can go on to speak of the "railroad interest", the "sugar interest", etc., because "everyone knows what the expressions mean". Small believes that he is confirming this distinction in his later argument that "the human individual is a variation of the sixfold interests, i.e., desires (subjective); and second, the conditions of human satisfaction consist of variations of the sixfold interests, i.e. wants (objective)". (p. 445). This last position, however, appears to allow much less room for the terms 'desire' and 'want' to denote independent phenomena.
- 272 A brief critique of the subject-object usage in psychology is contained in Chapter III, above. It is the contention of F. N. House that the hypotheses of Ward and Small "involved no particular attempt to come to terms with whatever the professional psychologists might have to say about the inborn nature of man". See House, loc. cit., p. 357. Ward, Ratzenhofer, and Small, assumed that human nature is everywhere pretty much the same. Class

terms were formulated for common or regular sorts of activities. These were then labelled in terms of universal underlying interests by which men were thought to be motivated. The similarity between "interest" and "instinct" is quite apparent. In the Principles of Psychology (1890), William James had noticed thirty odd human instincts. It was not until McDougall's Social Psychology (1908) that instinct theory was brought with any force to the attention of sociologists. Hobhouse attempts to compromise interests and instincts, but most sociologists who were seeking the basic motive of human action appear to have employed the more fashionable "instinct". The use of "interest" as a basic motive lost more ground in the 1920's when the attitude concept successfully challenged the instinct position.

- 273 Small, op. cit., p. 535. This distinction between motivational levels which Small advances is noted by E. B. Reuter, and C. W. Hart, Introduction to Sociology (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1933), p. 102, and by McQuilkin, DeGrange, The Nature and Elements of Sociology (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 199. J. C. Maxwell comments on how "interest manifests itself as desire when directed on a state of affairs known or believed not to be in existence" See his "Disinterested Desires," Mind, 52 (January, 1943), 43. That Small had little respect for terminological consistency is illustrated by his comment that "interests transform themselves into wants, which are each individual's expression of a generic interest, and they manifest themselves in desire for something". (p. 208). This comes just as the reader was becoming accustomed to the notion of want as the objective condition or satisfying state of affairs. Small's notion of interest as desire encompasses yet another sense of "interest". The sense of "interest" as secondary or derived motivational factor appears in Small's distinction between the pedagogic concept of interest and his own concept. He maintains that the pedagogic emphasis is on a voluntary attitude toward a possible object of attention. Attention and choice are said to be essential elements of interest in the pedagogic sense. His own interests denote affinities latent in the individual which press for satisfaction whether the individual is conscious of them or not. Yet he argues that interests in this subjective, unconscious state pass more and more into the active, objective conscious form, that is "interest in the derived, secondary

sense, involving attention and choice" "We might employ the word "desire" for this development of interest". See Small, op. cit., pp. 434-435. The elements of interest in the pedagogic sense are worked into derived interest as desire.

- 274 Edward A. Ross, Foundations of Sociology (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1905), p. 170. His argument here remains unchanged from the position set down in his "Moot Points in Sociology. V. The Social Forces," American Journal of Sociology, 9 (1903-1904), 526-548, especially pp. 539-548.
- 275 The influence of McDougall's instinct theory triumphs over Ross's previous reliance on Ward's "desires", in E. A. Ross, The Principles of Sociology (New York: The Century Company, 1920), pp. 51-58. Instincts replace desires as the original and basic motivational factors but the position and function of interests remains unchanged. F. N. House, loc. cit., p. 166, erroneously holds that in The Principles, Ross has adopted "an interest concept much like that of Small". In other works, Ross spends much time on the problem of social control which he views as the examination of the manner in which the interests of some and the interests of the many may be balanced and reconciled. See Ross's "Social Control," American Journal of Sociology, 1 (1895-1896), 515-535. The best comments on Ross are contained in Martindale, op. cit., p. 322; Sorokin, op. cit., p. 642 and in Bogardus, op. cit., p. 407.
- 276 W. G. Sumner, Folkways (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1906), p. 33; p. 3. For an elaboration of Sumner's argument see DeGrange, op. cit., p. 203; Martindale, op. cit., p. 189; and especially Timasheff, op. cit., pp. 67-68. Ellwood's position is similar to that held by Ross and Sumner. Ellwood maintains that interest is a derived complex factor compounded out of simple, original elements. He notes that "compounded mainly out of feelings and intellectual elements are beliefs; out of feelings and impulses are desires; out of feelings, impulses, and intellectual elements are interests". This is quoted in House, loc. cit., p. 169. A more explicit statement of the motivational role of "interest" does not appear.
- 277 This is the common usage as outlined in the Introduction of this enquiry.
- 278 James Mark Baldwin, ed., Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (New ed. with corrections; Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), Volume I, p. 562.

- 279 The term "advantage" is employed alone as a synonym for the other terms merely as a device to shorten the expression.
- 280 L. T. Hobhouse, op. cit., p. 147; p. 202.
- 281 John P. Plamenatz, "Interest (Political Science)," in Julius Gould, and William L. Kolb, eds., A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (London: Tavistock Publications, 1964), p. 343.
- 282 Ibid., p. 343.
- 283 The distinction between advantage in the context of a particular want and in the context of general welfare can be demonstrated quite simply by the question "Is X in the interest of Y?" X in Plamenatz's sense of "a means" is illustrated by the following: (a) X is in the interest of Y because it satisfies Y's wanting. It is to Y's advantage. X is therefore an interest. The sense of general welfare may be set out as follows: (b) X is in the interest of Y because it promotes Y's welfare. X is to Y's advantage. X is therefore an interest. X may be an interest in (a) but may not be an interest in (b) in such cases where Y wants X whether realizing or not realizing that X is detrimental to his general welfare, whatever that may be. The dispositional sense of interest is quite distinct from these and simply replaces the term "wanting" with the term "interest". (c) X is in Y's interest if it satisfies the interest (wanting).
- 284 Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), p. 391.
- 285 Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, ed. by A. Livingston (4 vols.; London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1935), III. par. 1477.
- 286 Ibid., III. par. 1499.
- 287 Ibid., III. par. 1526.
- 288 Ibid., IV. par. 2235; par. 2250. A more colorful illustration of this usage appears in Pareto's discussion of "Vital Interests", the new divinity which presides over international affairs. His observation is that "in barbarous ages one people made war on another, sacked its cities, and carried off what loot it could without any great palaver. In our day the same thing is done, but always in the name of 'Vital Interests', and the new way

represents, it is said, a great improvement in civilization" (III. par. 1462).

289 Mannheim, op. cit., p. 55.

290 Ibid., p. 183.

291 R. M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947), p. 130.

292 R. M. MacIver, Society: A Text Book of Sociology (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., Publishers, 1937), p. 29.

293 Ludwig Gumplowicz, The Outlines of Sociology, translated by F. W. Moore, (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1899), p. 137. It is E. A. Ross's opinion that a clash of interests begets opposition in such cases where each party has in prospect an advantage. See his The Principles of Sociology (New York: The Century Co., 1920), p. 158.

294 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, (translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch) p. 108. Weber seems to mean here that ideas about their advantage constitute their interests as they perceive them. He goes on to note how an observer may hold other things to be the interests of farmers.

295 Ibid., p. 109.

296 H. H. Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1961), p. 86. That it is this sense of interest as "that which is to an individual's economic advantage" which underpins Weber's notion of class, is argued in the next chapter.

297 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. by T. Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 109.

298 Pareto, op. cit., III. par. 2009. Sorokin believes that by "interests" Pareto includes honours and esteem as well as material goods. See Sorokin, op. cit., pp. 56-57. In view of Pareto's constant association of interests with economic factors, it seems more accurate to read his statement somewhat differently. He appears to be saying that people are led to acquire material goods because they are useful, provide pleasure, and serve to bestow consideration and honours.

- 299 Ibid., III. par. 2010; par. 2146. F. L. Ward, op. cit., p. 61, believes that it is upon the physical and temporary interests that economists have established their science.
- 300 Weber in Gerth and Mills, op. cit., pp. 103-104.
- 301 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. (London: Collier-MacMillan Limited, 1947), p. 407.
- 302 Ibid., p. 408, p. 410. Talcott Parsons employs this general sense of "interest" in a comment on Durkheim in his The Structure of Social Action (1st. ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 1937), p. 404. Parsons explains that in Durkheim's view there are two motives for obedience to the body of normative rules in any society: 1) moral obligation; and 2) "The motive of 'interest' which, looking upon the rules as essentially conditions of action, acts in terms of the comparative personal advantage of obedience or disobedience."
- 303 In Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 280. For comments on Weber's position on ideas and interests, see Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960), p. 68. Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (Rev. ed.; Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954), p. 28. T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (1st. ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1937), p. 520; pp. 666-668. In their introduction to From Max Weber, p. 62, Gerth and Mills find ambiguity and confusion in Weber's position on interests. Little clarity is purchased by their own interpretation. They note that "Weber refused to conceive of ideas as being 'mere' reflections of psychic or social interest ...". The contention is that Weber was aware of the possible tension between "ideas and interests", between one sphere and another, "or between internal states and external demands." The notion of psychic interests does not quite mesh with the notion of interests as societal demands. The contrast between interests and ideas appears not only in Weber and Mannheim, but is present in Mosca's dichotomy of "ideas and sentiments" and "interests", and in Pareto's dichotomy of "interests" and "derivations".
- 304 In Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 94.

305 Ibid., p. 237.

306 Ibid., p. 105.

307 Mannheim, op. cit., pp. 40-41. His notion of unconscious interests does not seem to agree with his views on the perception of advantage, except insofar as he may imply that interest-bound people protect and promote their situations in life without really becoming aware of what their situations involve. Ideology and Utopia presents one of the most frustrating examples of the undefined and ambiguous use of the term "interest" which is given a crucial role in many major propositions in the book.

308 Ibid., pp. 57-58.

309 Ibid., p. 157. For general comments on Mannheim's use of "interest", see Martindale, op. cit., p. 414; and Bogardus, op. cit., p. 611.

310 Ibid., p. 163.

311 This is very clearly Plamenatz's view although the term "self-interest" is not thought necessary. See Plamenatz, loc. cit., p. 343.

312 In Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 80. The notion of self-interest as the basic motivational factor is found in Gumpolwicz's view of society as group produced conflict. See Gumpolwicz op. cit., pp. 144-145. Every group is said to be incessantly striving to increase its own power and to oppose all other groups on behalf of its own interest. Groups know no standard of conduct but success, "the only motive is self-interest". As Gumpolwicz holds that man's conduct is determined directly by his economic status, it appears that self-interest at the group level refers primarily to economic advantage. A view of self-interest which extends well beyond the economic sphere is that outlined by Gaetano Mosca in The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939), p. 114. Mosca accepts the general maxim that human action is guided by self-interest. Yet he rightly notes that this is somewhat vague. He advances the position that self-interest need not always be expressed materially. He argues that "interest is suited in each individual to the individual's own tastes, and each individual interprets his interests in his own way". He believes that for many people the satisfaction of pride,

personal dignity, vanities, and personal caprices and rancours is more important than the satisfaction of purely material pleasures. But the most common sense that appears in the body of his argument is that of material advantage with ambition and vanity sometimes included. He notes that in every social movement the heroic period characterized by idealism soon gives way to reflection and self-interest. Those involved "must then find something to satisfy ambition, vanity and craving for material pleasures. In a word, along with a center of ideas and sentiments, one must have a center of interests". (p. 188).

- 313 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (London: Collier-MacMillan, Ltd., 1947), pp. 121-122. This position is clear in Weber's definition of want satisfaction; "want satisfaction will be said to take place through a 'market economy' so far as it results from action oriented to advantages in exchange on the basis of self-interest and where co-operation takes place only through the exchange process". (p. 212). The economic sense is apparent when Weber speaks of "the pursuit of selfish interests by the making of money". See Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 57.
- 314 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1947), p. 136. The concept of self-interest in a motivational sense is often discovered in Pareto, op. cit. Among the factors influencing men's opinions, Pareto includes reason, prejudice, superstition, envy, jealousy, but most commonly, "their desires or fears for themselves -- their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest". (I, par. 298).
- 315 Ibid., p. 127.
- 316 Ibid., p. 123. See also H. W. Wright, "Rational Self-Interest and the Social Adjustment," International Journal of Ethics, 30 (July, 1920), 394-403.
- 317 Ibid., p. 136.
- 318 Ibid., p. 136. There is also the suggestion in Weber that self-interested action may not always be rational action. For example, he speaks of the silent waiting of the Quakers as an attempt to subdue the impulsive and irrational, "the passions and subjective interests of the natural man". This is found in the Protestant Ethic, p. 118.

- 319 T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1937), p. 653.
- 320 Pareto, op. cit., III. par. 1498. See Pareto's statement in II. par. 1137, "Not to be overlooked ... is the question of interest in cases where individuals give evidence of pity as means to some personal end. Such would be rational conduct". Talcott Parsons contends that Pareto uses the term interest only in this sense of means or immediate ends to more ultimate ends. Parsons' argument is set down in The Structure of Social Action, p. 262. "It is primarily these two generalized means to any ultimate ends, or generalized immediate ends of rational conduct, to which Pareto gives the name 'interests'...." As such power and wealth appear as means to the system of common ultimate ends".
- 321 Pareto, op. cit., IV. par. 2146. There is some evidence that conduct based on interest is not altogether logical. In the same paragraph Pareto argues that in human organization, thinking has generally played a minor part, sentiment has been dominant. He believes that "a certain number of individuals are clever enough to take advantage of that circumstance to satisfy their own interests, in doing which... they use empirical and to some extent logico-experimental reasoning".
- 322 Karl, Mannheim, Systematic Sociology: An Introduction to the Study of Society, ed. by J. S. Eros and W. A. C. Stewart (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1957), p. 37.
- 323 Ibid., p. 37. Why self-interest must compel an individual to calculate means to achieve ends with the greatest economy of effort is by no means clear. Nor is it apparent why this has to be the case with Pareto and Weber. In Mannheim's view, the rational is merely the procedure of calculation and organization which may accompany self-interest, in which case we have "rational interest". There seem to be no good arguments against self-interest proceeding unaccompanied by calculation and organization, in which case we have simple self-interest. Mannheim seems drawn to the view that all conduct directed by self-interest involves a rational mechanism and thereby leads to rational conduct. There is a missing link in the argument here somewhere. Mannheim appears to have held this position in Ideology and Utopia, but his usage is so confused that it is difficult to be anywhere near certain. He does maintain (p. 35) that in making rational

decisions it is necessary for the individual to free himself from judgements of others and to think issues through "in a rational way from the point of view of his own interests". In the light of his stand that interests are largely unconscious, rational conduct is presumably a deep, soul-searching, and probably rare phenomenon. On the other hand, the impression given in Systematic Sociology is that rational conduct is very common. A similar position is advanced by Robert E. Park and E. W. Burgess in their Introduction to the Science of Sociology (2nd. ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 30. "Men are activated, in short, not merely by interests, in which they are conscious of the end they seek, but also by instincts and sentiments, the source and meaning of which they do not clearly comprehend." This is the only statement on "interest" which they bring forward other than extensive passages quoted from Small and Bentley. The authors seem committed to the view that attitudes are the basic social forces.

- 324 This definition is based on R. M. MacIver's statement in "Interests," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 8 (1932), p. 144. MacIver's remarks are worth quoting in full. "When a number of men unite for the defense, maintenance or enhancement of any more or less enduring position of advantage which they possess alike or in common, the term interest is applied both to the group so united and to the cause which unites them". He notes that the term is often used in the plural, suggesting that similar groups or advantages combine to form coherent complexes as implied in the terms "vested interests", "moneyed-interests", etc. MacIver argues that interest so understood usually has an economic-political character. This sense can be confusing in MacIver's manner of expression as "interest" is said to have two fairly distinct referents, the group so united and the cause which unites them.
- 325 Plamenatz, loc. cit., p. 343. A schema similar to Plamenatz' is outlined by J. A. H. Murray, ed., A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), Vol. 5; Part II, pp. 393-394. Interest is set out as "That which is to or for the advantage of anyone, good, benefit, profit, advantage". Interest is also defined as "A business, cause or principle, in which a number of persons are interested" in the previous sense. This conveys much the same meaning although, it is not identical to, the statements advanced by Plamenatz and MacIver. A rather different sense of "interest" is sometimes used to underlie the concept of group as interest. For example, The Century

Dictionary (New York: The Century Co., 1899), p. 3142, defines interest as "personal possession or right of control, share or participation in ownership; as, to have great interests in a country" [A]nything that is of importance from a commercial or financial point of view; a business, property in general; as, 'the mining interests'. The notion of interest underlying this sense is usually set apart from the notion of interest as advantage. In Murray, op. cit., p. 393, this sense is outlined as "the relation of being objectively concerned in something, by having a right or title to, a claim upon, or a share in". Plamenatz also regards this sense as distinct from the use of interest as advantage or profit which is said to underlie the interest as group concept. Plamenatz divides this usage into three senses: "(a) a claim worthy of consideration, (b) a right to a share of something, (c) a right to take part in an activity". See Plamenatz, loc. cit., p. 343. The Universal Dictionary of the English Language (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1932), p. 615, uses the interest as group sense without specifying the nature of the interest variable except in noting concern surrounding an occupation as the uniting factor. "Interest" ... "Groups of persons engaged in similar occupations; those concerned in the same branch of industry, the agricultural interest; the landed interest". A similarly vague sense is found in Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language (The World Publishing Company, Unabridged, Second Edition, 1957), p. 956. Interest is defined as "A group of people having a common concern in some industry, occupation, cause, etc., as the steel interest."

- 326 Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged; Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merriam Company, Publishers, 1961), p. 1178.
- 327 This is, of course, an attempt to disguise the real identity of the communities in question, a skillful and cunning device which has been perfected and passed down by the more astute and insightful sociologists.
- 328 The notion of "the interests" or "the vested interests" more commonly applies to the fields of industry and commerce. This is implied in the definition offered by Louis Filler in his Dictionary of American Social Reform (New York: Philosophical Library, 1963), p. 390. "The

Interests -- a term invented by David Graham Phillips to describe the financial and industrial forces which made their influence felt in Congress, and thus contributed to 'the treason of the Senate'. As the usage is very common and appears to apply to almost any conceivable field of activity, the example of agriculture may still be useful. That the terms "the interests" or "the vested interests" are often employed to express and to arouse emotions is suggested by Harold H. Punke in "Vested Interests and Civilization", Journal of Philosophy, 42, (1945), 533-538.

- 329 A discussion of the notion of vested interests will follow an account of the simple interest as group concept. The idea of an individual having a vested interest in something can sometimes mean no more than that he has a right or title to, a claim upon, or a share in something which concerns him vitally. An example is given by Plamenatz, loc. cit., pp. 343-344. He contends that "[t]o have an interest in something can also mean to have a share or part in it, as when a man puts money into a business, thus acquiring a right to a share of the profits, or takes part in managing it." A more deeply involved psychological notion of a vested interest is set down by Punke, loc. cit., pp. 533-534. His argument is that a "vested interest" is similar in nature to any interest, and "any interest which demands one's attention is to some extent vested in him". He believes that one is interested in whatever is pleasing to the sense organs but that transient interests often have to be passed over for subsequent and more durable pleasures. Thus it is that an individual "builds up a vested interest in the remote pleasures". Punke finds that the direction of his argument leads deeper into the personality system. The crux of his position appears to be that "one's pattern of vested interests essentially constitutes his system of personal values -- that is his organization of personality". He is more nearly practical in his suggestion that "persons can have vested interests in obsolete manual skills, in antiquated concepts of government, in restrictive superstitions...." Thus railway firemen can be said to have vested interests in the job which railway firemen perform. But Punke may have altered his notion of interest to advantage or profit or welfare to make good this point.
- 330 Fairchild, op. cit., p. 161. The similar but more elaborate definition advanced by MacIver has been noted earlier. The vagueness of common language usage is dis-

cussed by Weber in his examination of "the interests of agriculture". See his The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949), p. 108. His view is that "[c]ollective concepts taken from the language of everyday life have particularly unwholesome effects".

- 331 A. W. Small, "The Scope of Sociology: VIII, The Primary Concepts of Sociology," American Journal of Sociology, 8, (1902-1903), 209.
- 332 A. W. Small, "The Scope of Sociology. IV, The Assumptions of Sociology," American Journal of Sociology, 6 (1900-1901), 64.
- 333 A. W. Small, "The Sociologist's Point of View," American Journal of Sociology, 3 (September, 1897), 154. A more modern version of this kind of struggle is illustrated by Talcott Parsons in Structure and Process in Modern Societies (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), p. 91. An important aspect of what is often called the struggle for power in society, Parsons contends, consists in the competition for authorization and support "among the different organized interests of the society".
- 334 A. W. Small, Adam Smith and Modern Sociology: A Study in the Methodology of the Social Sciences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1907), p. 187.
- 335 A. W. Small, General Sociology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1905), p. 293. It is this large section of Small's book which H. E. Barnes has in mind when he contends that "Small is likely to have a high place in the history of functional political science...." "[I]n the field of political science his General Sociology may safely be called the most profound book published on the subject in this country between Calhoun's Disquisitions on Government and A. F. Bentley's Process of Government, the latter of which was based upon the contributions of Small and Ratzenhofer". Bentley's comments on Ratzenhofer and Small have been noticed earlier although it is not evident that Bentley ever considered Small's work of much value. It could be mentioned that Small's early academic training was in history, economics, and government. He held the chair in History and Political Economy at Colby College for some years and his doctoral thesis received from Johns Hopkins University in 1888 was on the

subject of the Continental Congress. See Barnes, loc. cit., pp. 43-44 and Thomas W. Goodspeed, "Albion Woodbury Small," American Journal of Sociology, 32 (July, 1926), 1-14.

- 336 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1947), p. 249.
- 337 Ibid., p. 340.
- 338 Ibid., p. 396. As an alternative term, Mannheim and Weber sometimes speak of "a constellation of interests".
- 339 MacIver, loc. cit., pp. 144-145.
- 340 R. M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947), p. 52; p. 80; pp. 365-366. An example of this general usage is contained in C. Wright Mills' contention that the doctrine of liberalism as "used by virtually all interests, classes, parties... lacks political, moral and intellectual clarity; this very lack of clarity is exploited by all the interests". Quoted in Irving L. Horowitz, ed., The New Sociology: Essays in Social Science and Social Theory in Honour of C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 153.
- 341 That this expression "vested interests" is vague and variously used is the contention of H. H. Punke, loc. cit. p. 533. He believes that it is most often applied in the economic field and "to efforts of a particular group to hold or extend advantages over others". His attempt to give the term more psychological connotations is not entirely convincing. See n. 92 on pp. 52-53.
- 342 Fairchild, op. cit., p. 161. This is clearly the sense which Talcott Parsons has in mind in his argument that Japanese militarism never rested on aristocratic foundations but has always been based on, and supported by, the masses of the people. This has been so much the case that "the army itself is a popular organ of protest against the 'interests'". See his Essays in Sociological Theory (Revised Edition; Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954), p. 294.
- 343 K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), p. 243. See also G. Mosca, op. cit.,

p. 445. It is Mosca's argument that "every moral force tries, as soon as it can, to acquire cohesion by creating an underpinning of interests vested in its favor".

344 In Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 179; p. 161.

345 T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (Rev. ed.; Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954), p.139; p. 241. See also the definition of "vested interests" offered by Carter V. Good, ed., in The Dictionary of Education (2nd. ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959), p. 295. He defines "vested interest" as "an interest that has become a complete and consummated right because of its distinguished or ancient origin or because of the prestige of its advocates, for example, the interests of the church in education".

346 Max Lerner, "Vested Interests," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1963), Vol. 15, 240.

347 A good example of Lerner's argument is contained in the following: "The vested interests of a rising capitalist class were written into the English common law as they were written into natural rights philosophy, and by the latter part of the 18th century Lord Mansfield declared it an established doctrine that vested rights must be protected". (p. 240). The kinds of vested interests which could be said to be "vested interests" in the group sense would include "the property interests", "the manufacturing interests", "the commercial interests", and "the industrial interests". Lerner indicates that the muckraking era was a phase in the attack on the vested interests, and he notes in particular the denunciation of "the interests" in the western agrarian movement of the 1880's and 1890's. Thorstein Veblen's definition of a vested interest as "a marketable right to get something for nothing", is quoted at page 242. Lewis A. Coser follows Lerner's guidelines in his "Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change," British Journal of Sociology, 8 (1957), 197-207. It is Coser's view that in the modern western world, as in the medieval world, "vested interests exert pressure for the maintenance of established routine" although the social structures of today allow greater room for conflict and hence make more difficult the task of resisting change. (p. 199).

- 348 This is basically the definition advanced in Murray, op. cit., p. 393. The example used there is "in the interests of humanity there is no reason to regret change".
- 349 M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 177.
- 350 In Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 88; p. 218.
- 351 M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (London: Collier-MacMillan Limited, 1947), pp. 263-264.
- 352 Plamenatz notices this sense of the term but argues that it has nothing special to do with the social sciences. See Plamenatz, loc. cit., p. 344. "To take an interest in something is to be curious or concerned about it...." The problem, however, is that social scientists have used this sense along with a confusing variety of other senses.
- 353 A. W. Small, General Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905), p. 435. The pedagogic emphasis is said to be on a voluntary attitude toward a possible object of attention, that is, "attention and choice are essential elements of interest in the pedagogical sense." (p. 434).
- 354 Ward, op. cit., pp. 54-55; p. 108. Ward later contends that the satisfaction of desire is the only end of the individual, "the only one in which he has an interest". (p. 252). Throughout his book Ward uses desire and interest synonymously. He may mean that the satisfaction of desire is the only end in which he has a desire. But it is more likely that he intends interest to denote a feeling of concern.
- 355 Hobhouse, op. cit., p. 135.
- 356 K. Mannheim, Systematic Sociology: An Introduction to the Study of Society (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1957), pp. 36-37. Mannheim's "rational interest" is, if anything, more psychological than his psychological sense.
- 357 Ibid., p. 37. The added emphasis is mine.
- 358 In Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 99. Compare this sense of "interested" with Weber's notion of "interested clients", "private and interested circles". A broader

and more explicitly psychological usage which relies on the notion of concern, is found in Ulysses G. Weatherly, "Habituation Areas and Interest Areas," Journal of Applied Sociology, 10 (1925-1926), 403-409. He outlines physical residences as habituation areas and "the region where the psycho-cultural concerns are located as interest areas. Interest areas are the countries of the mind". (p. 404)

- 359 M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (London: Collier-MacMillan, Ltd., 1947), p. 262.
- 360 M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 59.
- 361 In Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 233.
- 362 Mosca, op. cit., p. 174. Mosca seems totally unaware that he is using two rather distinct senses of the term.
- 363 R. M. MacIver, Community: A Sociological Study (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1917), p. 95. Mannheim's usage in Systematic Sociology has been mentioned earlier. His definitions are, if anything, more naively followed than is the case with MacIver.
- 364 Ibid., p. 96.
- 365 Ibid., p. 96; p. 99. That he must intend the term "interest" as the subjective "objective" of will, is implied in his professed allegiance to Ratzenhofer; "I propose to follow Ratzenhofer in consistently calling these motive forces interests."
- 366 In "Interests", Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 8 (1932), 144-148. Krislov, loc. cit., p. 840 suggests that this distinction is found in MacIver's Society: Its Structure and Change (New York: R. Lang and R. R. Smith, 1931).
- 367 Ibid., p. 147. Krislov, loc. cit., p. 839, very loosely states that "MacIver, following Ratzenhofer, conceives of society as a congeries of conflicting groups and interests working toward consensus". It should be emphasized that this is the case only in Community and it is the case only in regard to MacIver's use of interest as the general subjective motivational factor. There

is no explicit utilization of Ratzenhofer's notion of interest as a group. This comes later when MacIver professes to be using interest as the object of an attitude.

368 Ibid., p. 147.

369 Ibid., p. 147. It has been noticed earlier that MacIver sets this usage out at the outset of the same article.

370 R. M. MacIver, Society: An Introductory Analysis (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1955), p. 20.

371 Ibid., pp. 20-21. It is important to emphasize that MacIver is saying that interests are always objects of attitudes, and that there can be no such thing as an interest without at the same time asserting the existence of an attitude. If this were not the case, there could conceivably be instances where objects (interests) could be the objects of attention alone. This would mean that they may or may not be objects of attitudes at the same time. This would relieve the pressure somewhat by allowing that there could be objects (interests) without them being necessarily objects of attitudes, whereas all objects of attitudes could still be called interests. But MacIver has not intended that this safety-valve be included. His argument is that "every fact of experience involves a relation between the experiencing subject and the experienced object, or, what amounts to the same thing, a relation of attitudes and interests". (p. 27). Therefore, when he maintains that interests can be any object "to which we devote our attention", he either makes attitudes so broad as to encompass almost every state of consciousness, or he makes attention a rather more limited thing, or he simply speaks nonsense. There is much evidence to support the latter.

372 It is difficult to credit the assertion of C. H. Page that "MacIver precisely defines such key concepts as society... attitudes and interests..." "[T]hese and other concepts are utilized throughout his works with unusual consistency". Quoted in Timasheff, op. cit., pp. 252-253. If this is unusual consistency, the usual must be unusually inconsistent.

373 See n. 37 above, p. 70. MacIver's entire argument is burdened with an exceedingly expansive and evasive definition of attitude.

374 R. M. MacIver, Society: An Introductory Analysis (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1955), p. 21.

375 Ibid., p. 28. The emphasis is mine. Here MacIver is forced into the uncomfortable position of saying that the man has an object in an object, which is not an altogether useful way to talk. MacIver argues later that an association is held together "by the twofold interests of its members in it", that is, by like and common interests. (p. 257). The members, of course, cannot have interests in it; they can only have attitudes towards it. And what can he possibly mean when he speaks of "the immediate field of interest"? (p. 258) A good example of this difficulty appears in his discussion of primary groups: "Thus the direct social interest in persons is the distinguishing feature of primary groups, whereas the interest in the impersonal means and ends of living characterize the large-scale associations". (p. 264).

376 MacIver admits as much when he notes that a person may be deceived concerning the conditions of his own welfare. (p. 29) "He may be acting in opposition to his own "best interests" or "real interests", as it is sometimes put." An accompanying confusion appears in MacIver's struggle with motivational problems. As interest becomes a mere object of an attitude, it is presumed that the subjective attitude provides at least the orienting aspect of any motive. One constant theme in Society is that "confusion arises because we do not distinguish adequately between an interest and a motivation". (n.p. 257) Presumably, then, they are quite distinct. But he proposes that "we are all conscious that our external behaviour is an expression of our attitudes and interests", and that the dominant factor which explains our behaviour is regarded as the motive. Sometimes, MacIver advises, stress is laid on the attitude aspect, "sometimes on the interest aspect, as when we say the motive of an act was money or prestige or popularity". (p. 33) He remarks later that "the common interests of groups are potent spurs to conflict, as war also reveals". (p. 56). MacIver seems to be having some difficulty in making up his mind on which way these things are going to go.

377 Ibid., p. 252.

378 In Society: An Introductory Analysis (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1955), R. M. MacIver and Charles H. Page employ the same definitions as in the earlier

text and are no less persistent in avoiding the implications thereof. Interests are still "objective" objects of subjective attitudes without being necessarily material or external facts. The example used to illustrate the correlative nature of attitudes and interests includes a person "interested in" law, religion, and women. The authors maintain that their "interest is focused upon" only certain classes of attitudes, and that "the sociologist's interest is primarily in group phenomena...." They feel confident that "the interest that men show in science, in art, in religion, in tradition, in philosophy, in sport, exemplifies the second form of common interest". (p. 34) They note that "It is inevitable that men should seek after their private interests". And finally, they lament that "we cannot here pursue the interesting theme of the social psychology of leadership". (p. 438).

379 R. M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947), p. 90, p. 91; p. 220; and p. 298.

380 Ibid., p. 421. This return to an earlier theme as well as the marked absence of the attitude-interest distinction is noticed by Krislov, loc. cit., p. 841. His contention that many passages in MacIver are indistinguishable from statements used by David Truman in The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951), is probably correct. But it is difficult to discover what information this remark is expected to disclose. Many passages in MacIver are almost indistinguishable from passages found in virtually any group theorist who employs any or many senses of the term "interest". There is the distinct possibility that Truman was influenced by MacIver's earlier work, especially the "interests" article which Truman quotes on page 34. Although Truman rightly rejects MacIver's use of interest as the object of an attitude, the content and function of his interest as shared attitude is very similar to MacIver's interest as uniting cause or advantage. But this is not what Krislov seems to be saying. In certain cases Krislov's language is scarcely of the variety suitable to the purposes of analysis and clarification which he has set for himself. For example, he remarks of MacIver that a "like" interest "remains a co-incidental coagulation of parallel activities by discreet individuals pursuing individual aims, hedonistic random purpose accidentally duplicating itself in some other entity". (p. 841). This seems an unnecessarily cumbersome and incommodious

annotation or transliteration of MacIver's asseveration which is unpossessed of peremptoriness.

- 381 Several critics argue that MacIver's use of "interest" is simply a synonym for the term "value", and that the phenomena denoted by MacIver's term "interest" are the same as that which others denote by the term "value". This claim bears some examination. There is some evidence that MacIver does use "interest" as an equivalent term for "value". For example, he advises that "we shall speak of like interests when two or more persons severally or distributively pursue a like object or value, each for himself." In MacIver and Page, op. cit., p. 440. It is Timasheff's view that "in MacIver's work the place of value is occupied by 'interest'...." [b]ut the definition is almost identical with that of value in the area of convergence." Timasheff regards the term "value" as particularly vague and points out that it is commonly defined as "that which is desirable (La Piere) or is cherished by the people (Cuber)". See Timasheff, loc. cit., p. 184 and p. 183. It is C. H. Page's contention that MacIver's distinction between objective interests as the objects of subjective attitudes is "conceptually very close to Thomas' distinction between objective values and subjective attitudes." He goes on to argue that both MacIver and Thomas hold that complete definitions of social relationships must include attitudes and interests or values. Page is quoted in Timasheff, op. cit., p. 253. In the same work (n.p. 237), Timasheff maintains that "MacIver's analysis of groups.... is largely based on the types of interests (or values) they promote". There is no doubt that some congruence appears in the phenomenon which Thomas and Znaniecki call "values" and that which MacIver labels "interests". In Thomas and Znaniecki's view a social value is "any datum having an empirical content accessible to the members of some social group, and a meaning with regard to which it is, or may be, an object of activity" "By attitude we understand a process of individual consciousness which determines real or possible activity of the individual in the social world ... "The attitude is thus the individual counterpart of the social value" Quoted in House, loc. cit., pp. 514-515. The authors also maintain that "the social attitude is simply what the persons of a given group are set to do with reference to the given value...." Quoted in House, op. cit., p. 193. Florian Znaniecki proposes that

"the objects of social action are 'values' -- meaningful objects with a partly sensory, partly spiritual character. These values have a positive or negative axiological significance. Most values are organized into cultured systems and constructed and maintained by active tendencies ..." [W]hen not active, a tendency is potential -- it is an attitude". Quoted in Martindale, op. cit., p. 419.

The moral which the critics imply is that one or the other of these terms ought to be adopted to denote this particular phenomenon, that is, "interest" or "value". If the objects of attitudes are labelled either "interests" or "values" then the term not selected may be either dropped or used in a different sense. But this need not be the conclusion at all. In view of the difficulties which MacIver encounters in attempting to have "interest" stand as "object" without any subjective aspects, it seems probable that the term "value" would confront similar difficulties. There is no reason why either term should be employed in this sense. The object of an attitude could be called simply the object of an attitude. If attitude is clearly and precisely defined, this usage could scarcely be improved. Interest has more than enough other uses in denoting such phenomena as feelings, attention, groups, that which is to a person's advantage, and a motivational disposition with its own object.

APTER V

- 382 Albion W. Small, General Sociology: An Exposition of the Main Developments in Sociological Theory from Spencer to Ratzenhofer. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905), p. 209.
- 383 Ibid., pp. 317-318. Ludwig Gumplowicz holds a position which is very similar, given the fact that he regards the individual as of little importance. The group is the actor and the group is motivated by self-interest alone, that is, considerations of economic advantage. Gumplowicz maintains that "the greatest error of individualistic psychology is the supposition that man thinks...." See L. Gumplowicz, The Outlines of Sociology (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1899), p. 156. In E. A. Ross' view, Gumplowicz holds that "the individual unconsciously derives his qualities from his group, and the qualities of his group are determined by the nature of its dominant interests, its special life conditions, and its situation with respect to other groups".

See Edward A. Ross, "Moot Points in Sociology. IV: The Prospects of Group Units", American Journal of Sociology, 9 (1903-1904), 350. The problem of how or why groups come together is eliminated in Gumplowicz' work by the polygenetic thesis. This asserts that in the beginning were countless distinct human groups or swarms, each representing a race or a society. Groups are said to have common needs and common interests (concerns) in satisfying them. In his practical talk, interest becomes some condition which is to the advantage (usually economic) of the group members to obtain and defend. In one of the most honest and soul-searching retractions in social science literature, Gumplowicz explains how it was that he gave up the polygenetic thesis on the promptings of a noted geologist, Lester Frank Ward. See his "An Austrian Appreciation of Lester F. Ward," American Journal of Sociology, 10 (1904-1905), 643ff.

384 Ibid., p. 252. Ratzenhofer does not seem to have been troubled by any sense of wrong-doing in moving directly from individual interests as innate and derived motives to group interests in much the same sense. It is E. A. Ross' contention that the primary element to Ratzenhofer is "a definite cluster of persons conscious of a joint interest and facing other groups as a unit". See E. A. Ross, Foundations of Sociology (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1905), p. 283. The group, Ratzenhofer is said to believe, is like a living body, "its course being determined by the unifying interests of the members" and by their feelings and ideas regarding the forces in their environment. A. F. Bentley's critique of Ratzenhofer in the Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures (New Edition; Evanston, Illinois: The Principia Press of Illinois, Inc., 1949), p. 477, emphasizes this point. Ratzenhofer is said to have given each group its own personality and individuality, its own will and spiritual unity based on the notion of interest as a basic biological motivating factor. Bentley complains that Ratzenhofer sets up group personalities or group interests independent from, but of the same character as, individual interests, and attaches ideas and instincts to these group unities.

385 Small, op. cit., p. 499.

386 Ibid., pp. 494-495.

387 Small was not taken in by assertions of "group mind", "collective consciousness", and "herd instinct" which

were becoming fashionable in his day. On some occasions he even strikes out at Ward's quasi-mystical conception of the "social forces", by arguing that whatever they are taken to be, they must be generated by individual activity.

388 Small, op. cit., p. 495.

389 Ibid., p. 499. The primacy of "group" over "interest" gains as Small goes on. He argues that people always live in groups and that the same person is likely to belong to many groups. Whatever social problem confronts us, Small advises, the first question to ask is always this: "To what groups do these persons belong? What are the interests of these groups? What sort of means do the group use to promote their interests? How strong are these groups, as compared with groups that have conflicting interests?" (p. 497). This is indeed a very promising series of questions to ask, if the notion of "interest" could be straightened out.

390 See Small's definition, op. cit., p. 445.

391 It should be noticed that the only way in which Small is able to circumvent the embarrassing depth and unconscious nature of his "unsatisfied capacities" is to use "desire" as "derived interest" which involves attention and choice. A safeguard exists insofar as the desires may not reflect the real nature of the more basic unsatisfied capacities. Only on the basis of desire can group formation come about in this more conscious sense.

392 Small, op. cit., p. 445.

393 See the discussion in Chapter IV, above, especially n.267. E.A. Ross appears to be bound up in a similar difficulty and it is not at all clear that the transformation from individual interest to group interest is ever accomplished. Instead of the six unrealized conditions postulated by Small, Ross employs the four classes of goods, Wealth, Government, Religion and Knowledge. In respect to these vague goods, elementary desires give off impulses which run together to form the economic, political, religious, and intellectual interests. Interests then mediate between desires and these four conditions in an attempt to satisfy desires. Little more is known about how this is accomplished. It is clear that interests in this sense are the basis upon which individuals join groups and it can only be presumed that

groups attempt to realize states of affairs under one or another of these four categories which will in turn satisfy desires of group members. In answer to the question, "how do groups emerge and what do they do?", Ross has this answer. "Will not those of kindred interests find one another out, band together, and organize themselves, the more effectively to assert their claims against similarly organized bands supporting rival claims?" See his Foundations of Sociology (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1905), p. 273. Besides the large functional groups outlined by the organicists, Ross notes local or regional groups, likeness groups, and interest groups. Local or regional groups are "united by certain special persons about a common interest, in order to support it and advance it even at the expense of other interests." (p. 274) There is no explicit statement in Ross concerning the nature of a "group interest". His position is near enough in essentials to that advanced by Small to warrant the assumption that an answer to Small's dilemma may prove satisfactory for Ross's unrecognized difficulty.

- 394 Small, op. cit., p. 209; pp. 312-313. This is not to say that there is no evidence in Small to support alternative interpretations. The argument is that, on balance, this is the most plausible interpretation.
- 395 Small's position is more rigid than modern investigators who uncover a vast number of different motives for joining any particular group. Small seems to have been led to this single interest determinant of group formation by the broad nature of his interest categories and by his assumption that the inner interest (desire) exactly corresponds to an external interest (want).
- 396 Small, op. cit., p. 261.
- 397 Ibid., p. 305. It seems fairly clear from the arguments of Small and Ross, that the notion of groups pressing claims is not original with D. B. Truman.
- 398 Ibid., p. 385. "Interest" in this statement appears to refer to a group.
- 399 Ibid., p. 315. He also notes that "men struggle primarily to assert their selfish interests". (p. 309).

- 400 Ibid., pp. 314-315. In fact, Small contends, "the reality or fiction of general interests comes into use, to justify the preferment of certain claims, assumed to be those of the public, over others, classified as those of individuals".
- 401 That Small moved progressively from interest as the key concept in sociology to the group concept is suggested by E. C. Hayes in "Masters of Social Science: Albion Woodbury Small," Social Forces, 4 (June, 1926), 676. He maintains that in Small's later book Origins of Sociology, the group replaces interest as the major methodological tool in sociology. A discussion of the importance of the group concept in Small's general work is contained in Maurice H. Krout, "The Development of Small's Sociological Theory," Journal of Applied Sociology, 11 (1926-1927) 203-215; Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1960), pp. 189-195; and especially Harry E. Barnes, "The Place of Albion Woodbury Small in Modern Sociology," American Journal of Sociology, 32 (July, 1926), 15-44. In fact, shortly after his General Sociology appeared, Small seems to have been prepared to relinquish his interest concept and all that it entailed in an attempt to forge some agreement among sociologists on conceptual usage. His statement in "Points of Agreement Among Sociologists," American Journal of Sociology, 11 (1905-1906), 633-649, is particularly striking. Small contends that "indulging my own preference among psychological terms, I would resolve every sentient act into three essential elements: attention, valuation, and volition". (p. 643) The notion of interest does not appear. By the time his The Meaning of Social Science, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910), appeared, he seems to have settled on the term "purpose" as a replacement for "interest". He maintains that "human experience is evolution of purposes in men". (p. 88). His statement on the subject matter of the social sciences is well thought out. The reality which social scientists are encouraged to examine is basically the following: men paying attention to different objects; men finding other men the most difficult objects of attention; men forming valuations in regard to different objects of attention; men adopting purposes in line with the valuations; men seeking means to realize these purposes; men applying these means; men becoming changed personalities in the process and going through the process again and again. This carefully reasoned

statement is probably as good as any that can be found in the early literature. It may even have much to commend it in our own vastly more sophisticated phase of social science. Small proved to be one of the staunchest advocates of an integrated social science in a period when disciplinary borders assumed many of the characteristics of an armed barricade. His caricature and kindly advice is worth quoting in full.

"Without essential perversion, the story of the social sciences in the United States during the past generation might be told under the figure of a pack of mongrels foraging for their keep and each snarling at each whenever one found a consumable bite. All the needed reduction of exaggeration in the analogy might be effected by the substitute that until recently the typical American social scientist has acted as though he feared that the supply of truth in the world is not enough to go around, and that his share of it might run short if anybody else went in search of it along any but his own beaten paths. The social scientists have manifested a maximum of short-diametered clannishness each toward his own kind, and a minimum of magnanimity toward everybody else. The result has been stunted and shrivelled social scientists and social science". Small's Review, American Journal of Sociology, 31 (July, 1925), 89.

- 402 In H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1961), p. 86. This compilation of Weber's work is edited and translated by Gerth and Mills.
- 403 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1947), p. 410.
- 404 R. M. MacIver, "Interests," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 8 (1932), 144. It is Talcott Parsons' view that government always becomes the major focus of the struggle for power in society "almost regardless of the particular content of the interest or 'cause' which any group promotes". See his Essays in Sociological Theory (Rev.ed.; Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954), p. 168.
- 405 This usage appears most clearly in MacIver's Society: A Textbook of Sociology (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., Publishers, 1937), pp. 20-22.
- 406 Ibid., p. 27. MacIver seems to have only two classes of attitudes in mind, the associative and the dissociative.

The classification is based on whether "they imply tendencies to promote or deter social relations between those who have the attitudes and towards whom they are directed." (p. 22)

- 407 Ibid., p. 30; p. 255. Samuel Krislov maintains that MacIver confuses two senses of common interest, "the indivisible nature of the benefits" and "the sense of the common". See S. Krislov, "What is an interest? The Rival Answers of Bentley, Pound and MacIver", The Western Political Quarterly, 16 (1963), p. 842. This may be the case, but it is by no means as clear a confusion as others which exist in MacIver's work and which Krislov has chosen to neglect. In fact on this particular point MacIver suggests that the interest (object) is indivisible in its benefits because it simply cannot be achieved by individuals acting alone, and because they cannot act alone, some sense of the common must pervade their activities. Krislov's entire discussion of MacIver seems characterized by this unfortunate tendency to come down on precisely the wrong points.
- 408 Ibid., p. 252. It is MacIver's view that "associations come into being as means or modes of attaining interests. An association is likely to be formed wherever people recognize a like, complementary, or common interest sufficiently enduring and sufficiently distinct to be capable of more effective promotion through collective action, provided that differences outside the field of this interest are not so strong as to prevent the partial agreement involved in its formation." (p. 252) Interests are clearly things or states of affairs which people desire, pursue, and promote. The reasons for acting and associating as well as the specific attitudes which facilitate or impede this process, in a word, the entire subjective aspect of the process, is implied but never appears. Interest as object alone just cannot do the job. The disappointing aspect of MacIver's method is that he shows flashes of recognizing this very requirement. In discussing the role of leadership in creating associations, he notes that leaders "seek to accentuate the advantage of organization and seek to establish attitudes in the potential members favorable to its formation". (p. 253) Unfortunately, such instances are infrequent and seldom fully developed.
- 409 Ibid., p. 252. MacIver sometimes implies an alternative usage of interest in order to make good his argument. The sense of "interest" as a dispositional, subjective ele-

ment occasionally appears to be included, as in the following: "In order to organize an interest, it must first be presented in a certain detachment from others, and then, in its organized form, it must be brought into harmony with the complex of interests of the members". (p. 253) He urges that we may fail to appreciate the significance of an association "unless we realize that it is held together by the twofold interest of its members in it, by the subtly interwoven bonds of like and common interest". (p. 257) In a footnote on the same page, MacIver speaks of the group as constituting the interest as well as suggesting that individuals entertain an interest in the group. "The group as a whole remains a common interest no matter what motives we may discover in the minds of those who entertain it."

410 This Small may have found in Ratzenhofer or in Gumplowicz. Gumplowicz distinguishes classes primarily on an occupational basis. The interest of any calling is said to clearly distinguish its members from all others. There is much of Marx in Gumplowicz' views on class conflict and on economic determinism. Gumplowicz asserts that social progress is always produced by economic causes, that "a man's behaviour is determined immediately by his economic status ..." and that "[m]an's material need is the prime motive of his conduct". See Gumplowicz, op. cit., p. 163; p. 123. It is his view that "class interest" denotes those states of affairs which are to the economic advantage of any class. The motive for class conflict is found in the quest for personal advantage and the spur of self-interest. Class conflict is said to be inevitable and incessant with the state as a tool in the struggle. Thus "the interests of the traders will be permanently opposed to the interests of the other classes ..." and "[t]he ruling classes through their parliaments exercise the legislative power and are able by legal institutions to further their own interests at the cost of others". (pp. 140-1; p. 145).

411 A. W. Small, General Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905), p. 252. The typical interests in a state are said to include the following class interests: "(1) extraction, (2) artisanship, (3) manufacture, (4) wage labour, (5) trade, (6) professional and personal service, (7) parasitism, (8) pseudo-classes; a) capital, b) massed capital, c) massed industry, d) massed agriculture". Small notes that the pseudo-classes are those which are not active as productive factors but still claim a portion of the product of industry. (p. 269).

- 412 Ibid., pp. 260-261.
- 413 Small is obviously unsatisfied with the class distinctions implied by the terms "labour" and "capital". He finds them so vague that a gigantic no-man's-land exists between them. He contends that "in this zone are people who in the main fall under the one description, while their decisive interests group them with the class indicated by the other description". Thus the interests and sympathies of certain small proprietors place them in the proletariat class while many of the poorer professionals are committed by their "bread and butter interests" to solidarity with the capitalist class. In this discussion, "interest" seems to denote advantageous economic conditions. See Small's "The Church and Class Conflicts," American Journal of Sociology, 24 (March, 1919), 483.
- 414 Ibid., pp. 487-488.
- 415 A. W. Small, Adam Smith and Modern Sociology: A Study in the Methodology of the Social Sciences (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1907), pp. 152-153.
- 416 Weber, in Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 181; p. 183. The economic interest underlying class is contrasted to social honour which is said to underlie status. The "status situation" involves those "components of the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honour". (p. 186) The market, on the other hand, is dominated by "functional interests", and it knows nothing of honour. "Without regard for persons" is the watchword of the market and generally "of all pursuits of naked economic interests". (p. 215) Weber observes that "[a]ll groups having interests in the status order" react sharply against the pretensions of pure economic acquisition. (p. 192) It should be remembered that, to Weber, not all interests were of an economic character. The interests in the status order could be interests of prestige, ideal interests, power interests, and possibly religious interests.
- 417 Weber later concludes that classes are "groups of people who, from the standpoint of specific interests, have the same economic positions. Ownership of material goods or of definite skills constitute the class situation". Ibid., p. 405.

- 418 Weber contends that "in a market economy the interest in the maximization of income is necessarily the ultimate driving force of all economic activity". See his The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1947), p. 320.
- 419 Ibid., p. 121; p. 122.
- 420 In Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 183. Pareto stands in basic agreement with Weber in respect to the primarily economic basis of class groupings. Although Pareto makes no attempt to define what he means by "class interest", he implies throughout that it consists of those conditions which a class promotes and defends because those conditions are the basis of the economic position of its members. Pareto also notes that the two kinds of capitalists, those who live on interest from property, and those who live on enterprise, often have different interests. In fact there is sometimes a greater conflict between the interests of capitalists than there is conflict between the interests of capitalists and proletarians. Classes, especially the rentiers, may be misled by sentiment to such an extent that they may act against their own interests. This involves the distinction drawn earlier between perceived economic advantage and general position or welfare. See Pareto, op. cit., IV.; pars. 2187, 2231, 2235, and 2250.
- 421 The ultimate unit in Weber's sociological analysis is the individual and the understanding which the individual has of his own actions. There is therefore a decided tendency to avoid attributing objective meanings to individual action or to collective action.
- 422 Weber warns that the Marxian notions of class and class interest are misleading, and especially the assertion that "the individual may lie in error concerning his interest but that the class is 'infallible' about its interests". See Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 185. Karl Mannheim seems to believe that the creation of a consciousness in a class of "the general interest of the class" is possible, but slow to emerge, and intermittent. He argues that this "tendency to unite along the lines of class interest is one of the great tendencies in our modern society", which competes with tendencies to unite along cultural, religious or national lines. See his Systematic Sociology (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1957), p. 145. His notion of interest is that of personal advantage, and presumably class interest is the pursuit of common advantage by individuals in the same class. The expression "class interest" is used frequently in his Ideology and Utopia but in nothing other than a taken-for-granted sense.

- 423 Later Weber appears to give away any ground that he may have gained with only the notion of mass action to save him. He maintains that an important and simple fact for the understanding of historical events is that "men in the same class situation regularly react in mass actions to such tangible situations as economic ones in the direction of those interests that are most adequate to their average numbers". In Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 184. This implies that members of a class will regularly act "similarly" but not with "feelings of belonging together" in the pursuit of personal economic advantage. The results may be the same as those flowing from communal action but they will be attained not by the class acting as a whole, but by individuals acting within the class.
- 424 In his Community: A Sociological Study (London: Mac-Millan and Co. Ltd., 1917), p. 107, MacIver does imply that by "interests" in the class context he means objects of the will. However, the objects of the will are stretched beyond recognition in the process. He defines class as "a group held together by a complex of interests, but itself is constituted as a portion and not the whole of any community". A class may be named by the predominant interest around which the members cluster. Thus a governing class is named by the predominant political interest, and a leisured class, a working class, and an agricultural class are said to be similarly named. It is also argued that a group must have a complex of common interests to constitute a class. This usage is easier to appreciate in this particular work by virtue of the fact that "interest" still retains subjective characteristics.
- 425 R. M. MacIver, and Charles H. Page, Society: An Introductory Analysis (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1955), pp. 348-349.
- 426 Ibid., p. 361.
- 427 R. M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York: The Mac-Millan Company, 1947), p. 216. MacIver does not seem to allow for the possibility that the right, that is, the upper classes, may not always correspond to the dominant classes.
- 428 Ibid., p. 217.
- 429 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, Mercury Books (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1963), p. 220.

- 430 Ibid., p. 229. Lipset does admit that there is much more to it than this. Left voting is said to be an indication that three basic needs are not being provided for: 1) the need for security of income; 2) the need for satisfying work; and 3) the need for social status -- recognition of personal worth. But it makes more sense to regard these as individual needs than as class interests.
- 431 R. Alford, Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964). The assumption that the concept of class interest is clear enough is widely shared. It is found in T. B. Bottomore's contention that as the administrative elite is only one section of the dominant class in society, its political neutrality and independent power is modified and curtailed by the "interests and aims of the class which it represents". This is found in Irving L. Horowitz, ed., The New Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 365. T. H. Marshall speaks of the existence of class conflict "when a common interest unites adjacent social levels in opposition to more distant social levels". But he remains silent on the nature of such interests. Quoted in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, ed., Class, Status, and Power (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), p. 84. Richard Centers implies that class interests are of the same species as attitudes and values but fails to clarify his position. He argues that "a person's status and role with respect to the economic processes of society imposes upon him certain attitudes, values and interests relating to his role and status in the political and economic sphere", and that "the status and role of the individual in relation to the means of production and exchange of goods and services gives rise in him to a consciousness of membership in some social class which shares those attitudes, values and interests". See his The Psychology of Social Classes (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961), pp. 28-29. Milton M. Gordon comments on Center's position in Social Class in American Sociology (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1958), pp. 194-195.
- 432 Alford, op. cit., p. 11.
- 433 Ibid., p. 37. Throughout this intuitively insightful work, political parties are spoken of as "instruments of various class interests", and as "representatives of specific sets of class interests". This makes the reader yearn all the more to know what these sorts of things are.

On occasion Alford speaks of class as either synonymous with interest or at least that interests are something which only classes can have. He notices that as governments face problems of increasingly national dimensions, politics becomes increasingly based on competition among large organizations with national social bases; "competition with an 'Interest' or 'class' content". (p. 58) His meaning here is not straightforward as he also speaks occasionally of interest groups. In remarking that Britain is so highly polarized around social classes, he ventures the opinion that "where politics is so decisively based upon 'interest' cleavages", the addition of value cleavages would probably render the political system unstable. (p. 171).

CHAPTER VI

- 434 Quoted in Herbert Morris, "Dean Pound's Jurisprudence," Stanford Law Review, 13 (December, 1960), 185.
- 435 Quoted in Edwin W. Patterson, "Roscoe Pound on Jurisprudence," Columbia Law Review, 60 (December, 1960), 1124.
- 436 H. L. A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals," Harvard Law Review, 71 (February, 1958), 593.
- 437 See Edwin W. Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law (1st. ed.; Brooklyn: The Foundation Press Inc., 1953), p. 509. Pound astonished and astounded the American legal profession with his denunciation of American law and procedure in his appearance before the American Bar Association in 1906. He advocated the study of the social effects produced by legal doctrines and legal institutions. Pound went on to champion this cause. Professor W. Friedmann believes that "the programme and conclusions of American sociological jurisprudence have been most fully elaborated by Roscoe Pound". See his Legal Theory (4th. ed.; Toronto: The Carswell Company Limited, 1960), p. 293.
- 438 Professor K. N. Llewellyn contends that Pound has contributed more than anyone, with the possible exception of John Dewey, to making legal thought in the United States "result-minded, cause-minded, and process-minded." See his Review of Pound's Jurisprudence in The University of Chicago Law Review, 28 (Autumn, 1960), 179.

- 439 Pound sets out his position in "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," Harvard Law Review, 25 (December, 1911), 140-168. Useful as a background to his argument here is the earlier article of the same title in The Harvard Law Review, 24 (June, 1911), 591-619.
- 440 Ibid., p. 143. Pound holds that Jhering's greatest contribution was his insistence on the examination of the interests secured by a legal system rather than upon the "conceptual apparatus" by which it secures them. See Pound's "Jurisprudence" in Harry E. Barnes, ed., The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1925), Chapter 9; p. 453. The social utilitarian philosophy of Jhering is, in Patterson's judgment, the connecting link between Bentham's individualistic utilitarianism and "two important philosophic movements of the present century; the 'jurisprudence of interests' in Germany and the sociological jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound in the United States". In Patterson, op. cit., p. 459. The insight that interests exist beneath legal rights set Jhering on the quest for purpose in the law. He came to believe that all conduct is governed by purpose, that is, by practical motives. He arrived at the view that every legal rule owes its origin to a purpose, and that in the final analysis, ethics, morality, and law, all play a part in the realization of the social purpose, establishing the conditions of social life. Jhering's position is set out in his Law as a Means to an End, (Boston: The Boston Book Company, 1913). This is a translation by Isaac Husik of the first volume of Jhering's Der Zweck Im Recht, published in 1877. The best interpretation of Jhering's influence on Pound appears in Patterson, op. cit., pp. 459-463; Friedmann, op. cit., pp. 278-280, and in William L. Grossman, "The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound," Yale Law Review, 44 (February, 1935), 605-618.
- 441 R. Pound, "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," Harvard Law Review, 25 (December, 1911), 143.
- 442 R. Pound, "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," Harvard Law Review, 25 (April, 1912), 512-513.
- 443 R. Pound, "Social Problems and the Courts," The American Journal of Sociology, 18 (1912-1913), 340. The immediate tasks at hand include, in Pound's opinion; 1) a definition of social justice to replace the individualistic

conception, 2) a definition of social interests and an examination of how far they are served by securing individual interests which the law presently recognizes, and 3) an enquiry into the means of securing social interests by methods different than those worked out to secure individual interests. (p. 341). In his "Juristic Problems of National Progress," The American Journal of Sociology, 21, (1915-1916), 26, Pound recommends that legal history be rewritten "in terms of the ever widening recognition and securing of social interests."

444 R. Pound, "Legislation as a Social Function," The American Journal of Sociology, 18 (1912-1913), 763.

445 Several critics trace a connecting link between Bentham and Jhering's definitions of "interest" and that employed by Pound. In a broad sense, the common element is the notion of an interest as a motive. However, Bentham regarded "interest" as basic and undefinable, and Jhering's position is so confused that any assertion of direct influence must be tempered. Bentham seems to mean by "interest" something very much like utility. Utility is defined as "the property or tendency of a thing to prevent some evil or to procure some good". Good is pleasure and evil is pain. Bentham believes that "that which is conformable to the utility or interest of an individual is what tends to augment the total sum of his happiness. That which is conformable to the utility or interest of a community is what tends to augment the total sum of happiness of the individuals that compose it". This is quoted in Friedmann, op. cit., p. 268. It is Friedmann's view that Jhering follows Bentham in describing interest as the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Jhering argues that "nature also can win man for her purposes only by setting in motion the lever of his own interest within him...." "[T]his interest she has given him in the form of pleasure and pain". In Jhering, op. cit., pp. 26-27. Jhering never quite succeeds in distinguishing between interest and purpose. Friedmann's interpretation offers little assistance. He understands Jhering to be saying that "[i]ndividual interest is made part of a social purpose by connecting one's own purpose with other people's interests. By converging interests for the same purpose co-operation is brought about". In Friedmann, op. cit., p. 278. Jhering sometimes suggests that objective purpose is of the nature of a shared cause or objective or concern, whereas subjective purpose constitutes an

interest. He argues that commercial relationships are based on the connecting of an individual's purpose with another person's interest. In such co-operative action no one may view the purpose as such, "but everyone has his own interest in view, a subjective purpose which is quite different from the objective one". In Jhering, op. cit., p. 28. The motivational character of an interest is fairly explicit. He maintains that "being interested in a purpose, or briefly interested, is an indispensable condition for every action -- action without interest is just as much an absurdity as action without a purpose; it is a psychological impossibility". (p. 33). Patterson believes that Pound's "interest" combines Jhering's notion of a legal right as a legally protected interest with James' conception of a claim or demand as the source of ethical obligation. See Patterson, op. cit., p. 519.

- 446 R. Pound, "Legislation as a Social Function," The American Journal of Sociology, 18 (1912-1913), 763.
- 447 R. Pound, "Interests of Personality," Harvard Law Review, 28 (February, 1915), 343-4; 355.
- 448 R. Pound, "Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations," Michigan Law Review, 14 (January, 1916), 177-196.
- 449 R. Pound, "A Theory of Social Interests," 15 Proceedings of The American Sociological Society, 16 (1921), 29-30. This definition is retained in his "Jurisprudence," in Barnes, op. cit., p. 453.
- 450 R. Pound, Social Control Through Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), pp. 66-67. Of the early sociologists, Pound seems to have followed most closely the work of E. A. Ross.
- 451 R. Pound, "A Survey of Social Interests," Harvard Law Review 57 (October, 1943), pp. 1-39. In his "A Survey of Public Interests," Harvard Law Review, 58 (September, 1945), 909-929, Pound uses interest as a claim or demand only. (p. 909). In his "Individual Interests of Substance -- Promised Advantage," Harvard Law Review, 59 (November, 1945), 1-42, Pound resorts to his initial usage and an interest is simply a claim. But Pound does not seem to be saying that a claim or demand is different from a want or a desire. That he might profitably have made this distinction is urged later in this chapter.

- 452 R. Pound, The Ideal Element in Law (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1958), p. 87.
- 453 R. Pound, Jurisprudence, (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1959), Vol. III, Parts 4 and 5; p. 7; pp. 15-16. When Pound's claim that interests are the subject matter of law is compared with Small's assertion that interests are the subject matter of sociology, and Pareto's contention that interests are the subject matter of economics, the importance of discovering what interests are thought to involve becomes more apparent. In terms of Pound's definition quoted above, Herbert Morris is not clear as to why law must do something about interests. He does not believe that this necessarily follows from his definition, but is rather an empirical view tacked on. The problem raised is that some interests, for example those in personality, have only recently been recognized by law and in a very limited way. Morris does not agree that recognition of all Pound's interests is essential to the existence of organized societies. Unfortunately, Morris does not elaborate further. See Morris, loc. cit., p. 190.
- 454 In his "A Theory of Social Interests," Pound notes that there is between lists of instincts "an obvious relation between what we call interests." (p. 31) Apparently the same kind of phenomena is denoted. Pound rejects instinct theory because sociologists are not yet ready to treat social forces as instincts and because psychologists have reached no agreement on these fundamental tendencies. It is noteworthy and puzzling that Pound does not examine the social science literature on "interest" as a source of guidance in his own formulation. This is all the more surprising in that his early work contains references to Albion Small's General Sociology.
- 455 Julius Stone, The Province and Function of Law (Sydney, N.S.W.: Associated General Publications, P. T. Y., Ltd., 1946), p. 488. Samuel Krislov endorses this interpretation in his "What is an Interest? The Rival Answers of Bentley, Pound, and MacIver," The Western Political Quarterly, 16 (1963), 836-837.
- 456 An equally broad psychologically oriented definition is advanced by Alf Ross in On Law and Justice (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1958) p. 358. Ross holds that the wider sense of "interest" covers every state of consciousness which involves an attitude. In this sense "we are 'interested' in everything towards which we experience a positive or negative attitude". The narrower

sense of interest is only slightly less inclusive. This sense is involved when it is said that an action "springs from a person's 'interests'". In this case, "interest then designates a particular class of attitudes. . . ., [a]ttitudes based on needs". To Ross, "interested" human action is conduct motivated by need. Interest therefore denotes a secondary or derived motivational factor of considerable generality.

- 457 This is the decided opinion of Herbert Morris, loc. cit., pp. 190ff. Morris concludes that in Pound's view, any difference between these terms is taken to be irrelevant. His contention is that this is not at all obvious, and that matters so crucial to Pound's position should not be left in doubt. William Grossman notes the dilemma occasioned by the apparent interchangeability of terms and confesses that he does not understand what Pound really means by "interest". See Grossman, loc. cit., p. 609.
- 458 J. Stone, "The Golden Age of Pound," The Sydney Law Review, 4 (March, 1962), 20. Stone notes Pound's use of a variety of synonymous terms almost three decades earlier but expresses no reservations. See his "A Critique of Pound's Theory of Justice," Iowa Law Review, 20 (March, 1935), 537.
- 459 Stone argues somewhat differently. He believes that in Pound's theory nothing can be done about demands that are not articulated. This is true but it misses the point. Had Pound envisaged cases in which many desires were not claimed, he may have been much more clear on what he intended interests to denote. See "The Golden Age of Pound," Sydney Law Review, 4 (March, 1962), 20.
- 460 P. Lepaulle, "The Function of Comparative Law: With a Critique of Sociological Jurisprudence," Harvard Law Review, 35 (May, 1922), 843.
- 461 But here again, Pound is not altogether straightforward. For example, in setting out the four types of interest in the domestic relation which the law is called upon to secure, Pound mentions the interests of parents as "demands which the individual may make growing out of the parental relations." The three remaining types of interest are characterized by the same expression, "may make". See his "Individual Interests in the Domestic

Relations," Michigan Law Review, 14 (January, 1916), 181. However, it may be that Pound has examined many cases and finds that these are the four types of claims that have been made and in all probability will be made again. He does not seem to be saying "demands which the individual ought to make", a very different kind of assertion.

462 J. Stone, "The Golden Age of Pound," Sydney Law Review, 4 (March, 1962), 20.

463 Ibid., pp. 20-21.

464 At the beginning of most of his discussions of "interests" Pound sets out what he calls the "jural postulates" of society. These are the fundamental principles concerning human conduct which are expressions of what men in society want their law to be. It is not clear just how the jural postulates work into Pound's theory of interests. Stone believes that Pound uses them as working hypotheses in order to account for the de facto human claims asserted within a given society. Stone suggests that "using the jural postulates ... as working hypotheses, he draws upon organized inventory of the interests which, assuming the jural postulates to be sound, may claim recognition and enforcements by law in a given society". See Stone's "A Critique of Pound's Theory of Justice," Iowa Law Review, 20 (March, 1935), 537-538. It seems that the postulates are to be used not only to indicate and predict which claims will be asserted, but that they are also to be employed in deciding which interests ought to be recognized. These predictive and evaluative roles are not especially compatible. Apparently Josef Kohler acted as Pound's source in respect to the jural postulates. Several examples are set out in Patterson's "Roscoe Pound on Jurisprudence," Columbia Law Review, 60 (December, 1960), 1129. These include the following: "In civilized society men must be able to assume that others will commit no intentional aggression upon them," and "Everyone is entitled to assume that at least a standard human life will be assured to him; not merely equal opportunities of providing or attaining it, but immediate material satisfaction."

465 See Morris, loc. cit., p. 191.

466 R. Pound, "Jurisprudence", in Barnes, op. cit., p. 411; and Social Control Through Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), pp. 68-69. Pound never mentions other more technical uses of interest employed in legal writing.

For an alternative use of the term in a somewhat vague and ill-defined sense, see F. H. Lawson, Introduction to the Law of Property (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958). The more technical sense of "interest" as employed in the law of property seems to turn on the sense of interest as advantage, although the nature of the advantage is set in fairly precisely defined limits. Most often it is advantage through possession, or the possibility of future possession, of property. For example, if property is held in trust for beneficiaries, the trustees are said to have the legal estate and the beneficiaries the "equitable interest". This means that "the beneficiaries have the 'beneficial ownership', which implies that they can enjoy the use and possession of it and draw an income from it". (p. 10) Equitable interest comes close to what is popularly regarded as ownership. This seems to be the case with "concurrent interests" which denote two kinds of ownership (p. 64) In the discussion of successive enjoyment of property, "interest in the property" is used in relation to those who hold the property and those to whom it will be granted. An interest seems to be a recognized claim, whether of a present, future, or contingent nature, to the possession of property. A long and complicated argument relates to "estates vested in interest" (perhaps the source of the common expression "vested interest"), "future interests", and "contingent interests". (pp. 68ff.).

- 467 Alf Ross more successfully distinguishes between interest as advantage and interest as a claim. However, in so doing, he also limits interest to a certain kind of claim. See Ross, op. cit., p. 279. He argues that if by A's interest in something is meant the existence of something which would be advantageous and satisfactory to A in the light of A's basic desires, needs and inclinations; then there would be no limit to anyone's interest. A person would be interested in anything advantageous to him. This is not the conception of interest used in moral-legal deliberations, Ross continues. It is his view that the concept of interest is itself legally qualified, that is, "it does not embrace all imaginable desires or claims, but only those that are justified". The concept interest presupposes the existence of a legal order which distinguishes between interest claims which are justified and those which are not. This legal order is said to be natural law manifested in a set of natural rights. A justified claim is one which "arises out of a natural right".

468 Pound, "Jurisprudence" in Barnes, op. cit., p. 471.

469 Julius Stone never defines interest in his own right and it is fairly certain that he uses Pound's formulation without serious reservations. In his collaboration with Sidney P. Simpson in Cases and Readings on Law and Society (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1948), Pound's definition is the one which informs the investigation (See Book I, n.p. 105; and Book II, n.p. 743). Edwin Patterson, another former student of Pound, uses the master's outline as well. George Paton is basically in the same mold although he does place more emphasis on the objective side of interest. The human will, Paton reasons, "desires certain ends, and interests are but objects of human desire. An interest is a claim or want of an individual or a group which that individual or group wishes to satisfy." See George W. Paton, A Text Book of Jurisprudence ed. by D. P. Derham, (3rd. ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 254. Paton's general acceptance of Pound's framework is indicated in his "Pound and Contemporary Juristic Theory," The Canadian Bar Review, 22 (June and July, 1944), 479-491. Edgar Bodenheimer relies on Pound's definition in his Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 110-111; pp. 262-264. Bertha Wilson relies on Pound's notion of interest in her "A Choice of Values," The Canadian Bar Journal, 4 (November, 1961), 448-457. W. F. Bowker uses "interest" and "claim" interchangeably but there is no explicit reference indicating that this is derived from Pound. See his "Basic Rights and Freedoms: What Are They?" The Canadian Bar Review, 37 (March, 1959), 43-65. The view advanced by John Chipman Gray is very similar to Pound's with somewhat more emphasis on the object of desire. He contends that "by the interests of a man is meant the things which he may desire. I shall not attempt to enumerate or classify the objects of human desire". See his The Nature and Sources of the Law (2nd.ed.; Boston: Beacon Press, 1921), p. 18. The most elaborate definition brought forward in the jurisprudence literature under review is that of A. Kocourek in "The Nature of Interests and Their Classification," The American Journal of Sociology, 23 (1917-1918), 360. After arguing that it does not seem possible in a modern society to construct a unified and consistent concept of interest, Kocourek offers the following: "In a positive sense an interest may be defined as an (1) intelligent (2) continuing (3) will, (4) accompanied by power to affect the interests of others, (5) directed toward an end (6) which may point to the advantage of the subject of the interest or of others. In a word, the subject of

an interest is an intelligent dynamic center; and the interest is the force and direction of this power." In Kocourek's definition, "interest" denotes a specific but highly qualified relationship involving a distinct subject and object. But like the definition of Roscoe Pound and Albion Small, it is difficult to conceive of any types of human action which do not involve "interest" as the motive force and object desired.

A rather different approach which utilizes a "policy-science" orientation and focuses primarily on the term "value" (although used in much the same sense as Pound's "interest"), is that pioneered by H. D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal. Some impressions of this kind of framework can be gained from Lasswell and McDougal's "Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest," Yale Law Review, 52 (March, 1943), 203-295; K. N. Llewellyn's review, "McDougal and Lasswell Plan for Legal Education," Columbia Law Review, 43 (May, 1943), 476-485; See also M. S. McDougal's "The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Community," Yale Law Journal, 56 (September, 1947), 1345-1355; and Richard Arens and H. D. Lasswell, The Defense of Public Order: The Emerging Field of Sanction Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

470 R. Pound, "Legislation as a Social Function," The American Journal of Sociology, 18 (1912-1913), 763. This three-fold classification appears in almost all Pound's works quoted in this chapter. The concern here is to set down different formulations in order to gain some insight into the criteria used as the basis of the classification. It is quite evident that the outline of this classification originates with Jhering who sets out a scheme which includes individual property, state property, and public right. Patterson argues that this "inchoate scheme" suggested to Pound a means of classifying interests but that it is vastly inferior to Pound's finished product. See Patterson, op. cit., pp. 462-463; and Friedmann, op. cit., p. 280. After setting out Pound's classification in a naive and skeleton fashion, Krislov wrongly argues that Pound's distinctions "tend to follow von Jhering's fairly closely, though Pound was equally influenced by William James' ethical doctrines". In Krislov, loc. cit., p. 836. James' ethical doctrine has absolutely no bearing on Pound's classification.

471 R. Pound, "A Theory of Social Interests," 15 Proceedings of the American Sociological Society, 16 (1921), 29-30.

472 R. Pound, "A Survey of Social Interests," Harvard Law

Review 57 (October, 1943), 2. (The added emphasis is mine.)

473 R. Pound, Jurisprudence (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1959), Volume III, Part 4, pp. 23-24. (The added emphasis is mine.)

474 R. Pound, in his review of Julius Stone's The Province and Function of Law, in the Harvard Law Review, 61 (1947-1948), 724-737.

475 Ibid., p. 735.

476 This seems to be the sense gathered by Stone in "A Critique of Pound's Theory of Justice," Iowa Law Review, 20 (March, 1935), 539, and in his The Province and Function of Law, (Sydney, N.S.W.: Associated General Publications, P.T. Y., Ltd., 1946), p. 491.

477 R. Pound, "A Theory of Social Interests," 15 Proceedings of the American Sociological Society, 16 (1921), 32-33.

478 Patterson is particularly insistent that by concentrating on the judicial process alone, and the judicial process as screened by judges and legislators, Pound may have neglected many desires or claims asserted in society. This point is of considerable importance as Pound's definition of "interest" includes almost every conceivable desire or claim which is asserted in society. Pound's method opens a great gulf between interests (the subject matter of law) and the interests actually classified, as only a limited portion of the range of desires or claims has been surveyed. See Patterson's "Pound's Theory of Social Interests" in Paul Sayre, ed., Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies: Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), chapter 23, p. 559; p. 563. On Pound's method, see also Patterson, op. cit., p. 519, pp. 525-526; Morris, loc. cit., p. 192; Paton, op. cit., p. 123-125; Krislov, loc. cit., p. 538; and Stone, "The Golden Age of Pound," The Sydney Law Review, 4 (March, 1962), 9.

479 Detailed examinations of individual interests appear in: "Interests of Personality," Harvard Law Review, 28 (February, 1915), 343-365; 445-456; "Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations," Michigan Law Review, 14 (January, 1916), 177-196; and in "Individual Interests of Substance - Promised Advantage," Harvard Law Review, 59 (November, 1945), 1-42. A very well integrated treatment is contained in his Jurisprudence (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1959), Volume III, Part 4, pp. 25-235.

- 480 R. Pound, "A Theory of Social Interest," 15 Proceedings of the American Sociological Society, 16 (1921), 17. The "ought to" is disturbing here, as interests are said to be what is in fact desired, claimed, etc.
- 481 R. Pound, Jurisprudence, (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1959), Volume III, p. 270.
- 482 This list is basically from Pound's 1921 formulation, "A Theory of Social Interests." In his "Survey of Social Interests" in 1943, Pound adds the interest in the security of economic institutions to this category. His outline in Jurisprudence, (1959), offers no changes.
- 483 In his survey of social interests in 1943, Pound adds the social interest of individual opportunity. This is the claim that all individuals have fair or reasonable political, physical, cultural, social, and economic opportunities.
- 484 That Pound sometimes speaks as though the state or society has and asserts claims is unmistakable. That he does not intend to say this is the opinion of Stone, op. cit., p. 490. Patterson is not clear. Krislov, loc. cit., p. 837, has it both ways by arguing that Pound reifies concepts and that he successfully evades the temptation.
- 485 R. Pound, "A Survey of Public Interests," Harvard Law Review, 58 (September, 1945), 909.
- 486 Ibid., p. 909. A very similar account is given in his Jurisprudence (1959), Volume III, pp. 235-268.
- 487 In believing that social and individual interests are interchangeable, that is, the same claim viewed from a different aspect, Stone is led to discard Pound's category of public interests because they do not meet this criterion. In Stone's view, only social and individual interests are interchangeable. The public interests are said to be only one species "the political" of the genus "social". While all public interests can be seen as "social" and hence as "individual" interests, the reverse is not the case. Individual or social interests are not always convertible into public interests. On the other hand, if Pound does not mean that individual and social interests are interchangeable (and Pound uses the expression "assumed under" and not

"interchangeable"), Stone's argument comes to nought. In any event, Stone believes that Pound's public interests are in fact social interests and consequently the public interest category is dropped from Stone's own classification. See Stone, op. cit., pp. 490-492. Paton follows Stone's lead and constructs two categories of interest, the private and the social, although he also holds that "logically no exact division can be drawn at all between social and private interests". See Paton, op. cit., p. 128. In Friedmann, op. cit., pp. 293-295, it is noted that Stone has "convincingly shown" that the public interest category is redundant. Kocourek does not appear to have considered public interests, at least not in Pound's sense. Kocourek's classification includes two main classes of interests, positive and negative. Under positive interests are two large groups, egoistic and altruistic interests, and somewhere under these headings appear individual and social interests. In Kocourek, loc. cit., pp. 359-368. Gray holds that interests defy enumeration and classification as they include all those things which a person may desire. See Gray, op. cit., p. 18.

488 R. Pound, "A Survey of Public Interests," Harvard Law Review 58 (September, 1945), 926.

489 Ibid., pp. 927-928. Pound demonstrates that the public interest in safeguarding social interests is of a supervisory nature. They include the superintendence and administration of charities and charitable trusts, the prevention of encroachment upon, or appropriation and misuse of, natural advantages open to the whole community; holding public officers to their duties, supervising corporations, protecting dependents and defectives, and granting and regulating franchises or power to exercise some public employment. Pound believes that the state (or the agents of the state) are directly charged with the responsibility of maintaining the political order. This can be accomplished to a great extent through the regulation and securing of the social interests which are presumably pressed by waves of popular demand.

490 In Jurisprudence (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1959), Vol. III, pp. 328-329. The same contention appears in his An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1922), pp. 97-99.

- 491 Ibid., pp. 333-334. Pound quotes the passage from James which has provided one of his basic principles. (p. 15). "Must not the guiding idea for ethical philosophy (since all demands conjointly cannot be satisfied in this poor world) be simply to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can?" Pound flatly rules out the quest for an ultimate, absolute measure of values which can command universal respect. But, he insists, life has to go on. Law is a practical matter and experience must be relied upon in securing conflicting and overlapping claims. The method seems to be experience, trial and error, the testing of reason, and further experience. See especially his argument in The Ideal Element in Law (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1958), pp. 93-94. That practical experience and awareness of shifting popular demands are the most basic criteria in balancing interests is the contention of Justice Benjamin N. Cardoza. See his The Paradoxes of Legal Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), especially pp. 72-75. A good example of Cardoza's argument is quoted in W. Friedmann's, Law in a Changing Society (London: Stevens and Sons Limited, 1959), pp. 25-26. Cardoza explains that "If you ask how he is to know when one interest outweighs another, I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study, and reflection; in brief, from life itself. Here, indeed is the point of contact between the legislator's work and his."
- 492 In "A Survey of Social Interests," Harvard Law Review, 57 (October, 1943), 2-3.
- 493 See Patterson on "Pound's Theory of Social Interests," in Sayre, op. cit., p. 561. Much the same argument is contained in Patterson, op. cit., pp. 518-527. It is noteworthy that Patterson does not raise the question of the social interests in his article, "Roscoe Pound on Jurisprudence," Columbia Law Review, 60 (December, 1960), 1124-1132. This is all the more surprising in the face of the unanswered strictures raised against his earlier interpretation by Julius Stone.
- 494 R. Pound, "Social Problems and the Courts," The American Journal of Sociology, 18 (1912-1913), 340.
- 495 In "Interests of Personality," Harvard Law Review, 28 (February, 1915), 349.

- 496 Ibid., p. 349.
- 497 In The Spirit of the Common Law (Francetown, New Hampshire: Marshall Jones Company, 1921), p. 197. Pound also uses the notion of an individual interest being "coincident with" a social interest. See his Social Control Through Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), p. 69.
- 498 "The Golden Age of Pound," The Sydney Law Review, 4 (March, 1962), 15; 17. The bulk of his unswerving attack on Patterson is contained in his Review of Patterson's Jurisprudence in the Northwestern University Law Review, 50 (March-April, 1955), 130-138.
- 499 It will be recalled that it is on this ground that Stone rejects Pound's public interests.
- 500 R. Pound, Jurisprudence (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1959), Volume III, pp. 23-24.
- 501 R. Pound, "A Theory of Social Interests," 15 Proceedings of the American Sociological Society, 16 (1921), 32-33.
- 502 In "The Golden Age of Pound," The Sydney Law Review, 4 (March, 1962), 16; 18.
- 503 It is not even certain that Stone believes a classification is necessary, although he implies that he is using one. He argues that "the words 'social' or 'individual' are to be discounted or (which is the same thing) neutralized before the moment of judgement". (Ibid., p. 17). If these are the same thing, and if "neutralized" is to read "discounted", then Stone is saying that a claim is only and always a claim. There seems no need to classify them. But this is a far cry from what Pound apparently has in mind.
- 504 Unfortunately Pound never discusses the points at issue in his theory nor does he integrate and evaluate other theoretical work on "interests" going on in the field of jurisprudence. This stricture is best argued by K. N. Llewellyn in his review of Pound's Jurisprudence in the University of Chicago Law Review, 28 (Autumn, 1960), 174-182.
- 505 In Studies in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1958), p. 149. He contends that "[c]lassification of interests or values

have not won acceptance by lawyers nor has their usefulness in scientific research been exemplified". He believes that lawyers think primarily in terms of causes of action and the actual events which brought on intervention by officials. Thus the focus is on specific harms and the reasons for their precise formulations. He suggests that "interests or values are derivative and they are apt to be expressed in generalizations which are too vague for intensive research". In an embarrassingly obscure statement, Krislov appears to take the opposite position although little supporting evidence is offered. He claims that "[h]is [Pound's] approach to the 'balancing of interests' by osmosis and direct influence has become a standard jural technique". See Krislov, loc. cit., p. 836.

- 506 See especially K. N. Llewellyn's contention that Pound's notion of balancing interests provides "no indication of how to tell an interest when you see one". This is from Llewellyn's Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), n. p. 7. He believes that neither the definition nor the classification is adequate: "[T]o be sure, we do not know what interests are. Hence, behind substantive rights ... we now have interests (which we need not check against anything at all, and about whose presence, extent, nature, and importance, whether the interests be taken absolutely or taken relatively one to another, no two of us seem to be able to agree). The scientific advance should be obvious. Complete subjectivity has been achieved" (p. 14). Llewellyn advocates an approach which concentrates on observable behaviour and which attempts to use words which describe and adequately reflect that behaviour. He insists that in the study of interests the existence and nature of the groupings of behaviour claimed to be significant has seldom been demonstrated. The most usual current approach, he insists, "tends instead to set up the broadest of formulae about interests and to attribute them to situations in majestic unconcern for the specific facts". (p. 18). The elusive and all-inconclusive nature of Pound's social interests is noted by Friedmann in Legal Theory (4th ed.; Toronto: The Carswell Company Ltd., 1960), pp. 294-295.

- 507 This criticism is voiced by those critics who find no solution in Pound's practical and pragmatic proposals and who believe that some explicit principles for evaluation are required. This case is best argued by Morris,

loc. cit., pp. 191-192; and by Grossman, loc. cit., pp. 609-610. Stone raises this issue in his "A Critique of Pound's Theory of Justice," Iowa Law Review, 20 (March, 1935), 544-545. Lepaulle believes that Pound is left with no alternatives but to harmonize claims in terms of satisfying the greatest number asserted with the least possible friction. This is a dangerous doctrine in Lepaulle's view, as he believes that in many historical periods decadence and decay have been occasioned by the fact that most societal claims combined to further the destruction of the societies. He also argues that because the satisfaction of many claims in the individual's life does not lead to happiness, there is no reason why a claim ought to be satisfied simply because it is a claim. See Lepaulle, loc. cit., pp. 844-846. Paton does not believe that the weighing of interests on the basis of numbers pressing meets well with most theories of law which contain some notion of what men ought to do. He refuses to admit that the law is a mere reflection of the actual behaviour of a community, an account of what the majority actually does. See Paton, op. cit., p. 125. At least one critic, Edgar Bodenheimer, believes that Pound's method is the best one available in the absence of agreed upon standards of value. See Bodenheimer, op. cit., p. 263.

Several critics argue that although Pound fails to articulate standards of value to be used in the weighing process, nevertheless his own theory is riddled with implicit value premises. See especially Morris, loc. cit., p. 192; Lepaulle, loc. cit., p. 844; Paton, op. cit., pp. 120-121; and Friedmann's Legal Theory, p. 296. This by no means exhausts the criticisms which have been focused on Pound's theory of interests. They are legion and cannot be brought forward here. By way of conclusion it could be noted that however lacking Pound's theory may be on various points, most critics regard his endeavour as of immense value. Patterson believes that Pound's theory has done much to end the chaotic and episodic character of discussions of public policies. See Patterson, op. cit., p. 523. Friedmann argues that Pound's classification "greatly helps to make inarticulate premises articulate, to make the legislator as well as the teacher and practitioner of law conscious of the principles and values involved in any particular case". In Friedmann's Legal Theory (4th ed., Toronto: The Carswell Company Limited, 1960), p. 296.

- 508 Thomas A. Cowan, "Group Interests," Virginia Law Review, 44 (1958), 331. Cowan's earlier article precipitated his present concern. See his "The Impact of Social Security on the Philosophy of Law: The Protection of Interests Based on Group Membership," Rutgers Law Review,

11 (Summer, 1957), 688-701. In this enquiry Cowan comes equipped with Pound's notion of interest as a claim or demand or desire. In the examination of social security claims, Cowan discovers that they do not qualify as social interests in that they are not demanded in the name of the whole social group. In fact these interests usually represent claims against the whole social group. But unlike individual interests, they are not claimed for the benefit of individuals as such, but for individuals as members of a social group. (Cowan does not seem to realize that this statement might require some elaboration). As the interest can be classified as neither individual nor social, (the public category is never mentioned), Cowan decides that they must be group interests almost as if it were the only remaining alternative.

- 509 Pound does speak of groups having interests but he refuses to distinguish this from the notion of an interest itself. An interest is something which may be claimed by a group as well as by an individual. He defines an interest as "a claim, a want, a demand of a human being or group of human beings which the human being or group of human beings seek to satisfy and of which social engineering in civilized society must therefore take account". In his "A Theory of Social Interests," 15 Proceedings of the American Sociological Society, 16 (1921), 29-30. F. N. House is badly confused by Pound's language and in his interpretation of Pound he speaks of "social or group interests", and "public or group interests". See his The Range of Social Theory (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1929), p. 466. Pound's notion of group is not distinguished from individuals as the claimants of interests, and "group" nowhere enters his classification. If Pound's index consists of "on whose behalf" an interest is claimed, he may feel that as individuals compose groups, claims on behalf of groups are really claims on behalf of individuals. Pound implies that the age of group interests is long passed. He argues that the first interests to be recognized are always group interests and that it is only with increasing economic development that "individual interests gradually arise out of these and come to be recognized". He notes that up to the end of the 18th century the entire course of legal development had been to disentangle individual interests from group interests and to protect and secure these individual interests by legal rights. See his "Interests of Per-

- sonality," Harvard Law Review, 28 (February, 1915), 348. Kocourek, in loc. cit., pp. 359-360, argues that "the starting point in juridical interests is not with the individual but with the group".
- 510 In "Group Interests," Virginia Law Review, 44 (1958), 332. In all fairness, Cowan does urge a re-examination of the concepts of interest and group interest in his concluding remarks (p. 346).
- 511 Ibid., p. 332.
- 512 "A Symposium on Group Interests and the Law," Rutgers Law Review, 13 (Spring, 1959), 429-602.
- 513 In the very odd case, some calls go out for conceptual clarification. See Reed Dickerson's remarks, pp. 497-499. He recommends that the term "social" be used to designate the concept "public interest" in its broadest sense and that we regard "all specific, shared interests as 'group interests' even where they are shared by everyone". (p. 501). His example is that the interest in wholesome food should be viewed as a group interest rather than as a social interest. It is hard to believe that clarification lies in this direction.
- 514 Ibid., p. 439.
- 515 Krislov, loc. cit., p. 839. On some occasions, various senses of "interest" are combined in the same assertion. In noting the power position of certain social and economic groups, J. C. Chommie laments that there is no theory which can "harness this power in the interests of the social and individual interests...." (p. 485).
- 516 For an interpretation of this school, see Patterson, op. cit., p. 539; pp. 463-464; Bodenheimer, op. cit., pp. 107-108; and Friedmann, Legal Theory, (4th ed.; Toronto: The Carswell Co., Ltd., 1960), p. 285; pp. 289-293. The movement was primarily German-based and was led by Ehrlich, Kantarowicz, and Philipp Heck. The French counterpart was pioneered by Francois Geny. A very useful edition and translation of various contributions to this literature is M. Magdalena Schoch's edition, compiled as The Jurisprudence of Interests (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, The Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy Series, Volume II, 1948). An impression of this book and of the work of the move-

ment in general is found in Arthur von Mehren's review of the Jurisprudence of Interests in the Harvard Law Review, 63 (November, 1949), 370-373.

- 517 Quoted in Schoch, op. cit., p. 35. Jhering is recognized as the founder of the teleological school and consequently of the "Jurisprudence of Interests". But Jhering's emphasis on purpose is not considered adequate. This needs to be supplemented, Heck explains, with an analysis of underlying interests, or what is the same thing, "the theory of conflicts". The task is therefore to examine the conflict of interests which underlies each rule of law.
- 518 Heck clarifies this issue, in Schoch, op. cit., p. 123: "But the Jurisprudence of Interests is not a theory of substantive values. We do not dream of dictating to the legal community which interests it must protect in preference to others. We want to serve all interests which the legal community holds worthy of protection at a given time, ideal interests as well as material ones". There is a hint of Max Weber here, and in fact, Weber's works are occasionally referenced throughout. Hermann Isay takes issue with the statement by Heck just quoted. He believes that in not providing a theory of substantive values, no method has been presented for establishing the content of legal rules. Isay contends that "by telling the legislator or judge that he must adjust those interests, we have told him nothing whatever about the content of the rules which is to be the legal norm". (Ibid., p. 317). Strikingly similar complaints are raised against Pound's scheme for balancing interests.
- 519 Quoted in Friedmann, op. cit., p. 290.
- 520 Hermann Isay finds the concept not only colourless but almost devoid of content. He believes that the concept is useless in that it "comprises everything that affects human beings either as individuals or as a community...." "Oertmann" has justly remarked that in this way the concept is being inflated to such a proportion that it becomes useless". In Schoch, op. cit., p. 316.
- 521 Ibid., p. 88.
- 522 Ibid., p. 130. It is surprising that the interest concept advanced by this school has been neither examined nor criticized by any of the legal scholars who have reviewed this literature. Krislov mentions the work

of this school in a two-sentence footnote. Although his concern is to delineate, illustrate, and evaluate usages of "interest", he fails to examine the concept employed in this literature. His vacuous assertion that "applications of the interest approach in its native Europe, which indicate both the relevance for political science and divergence from such focus ... are to be found in the Jurisprudence of Interests ..." is not especially helpful. See Krislov, loc. cit., p. 839.

CHAPTER VII

- 523 Charles B. Hagan, "The Group in a Political Science," in Approaches to the Study of Politics, ed. by Roland Young (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1958), p. 39.
- 524 Frank J. Sorauf, "The Conceptual Muddle," in The Public Interest, ed. by C. J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 1962), p. 183. The first systematic attempt at conceptual clarification was that of Sir George Cornewall Lewis in his Remarks on the Use and Abuse of Some Political Terms (New ed.; Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1898). The term "interest" is explored at page 128.
- 525 Ibid., p. 190.
- 526 Quoted in Sorauf, loc. cit., p. 184.
- 527 J. Srzednicki, "Basic Political Concepts," The Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (July, 1963), 229. See also Margaret Macdonald, "The Language of Political Theory," in Essays on Logic and Language, ed. by A. Flew (London: Basil Blackwell, 1951), pp. 167-186.
- 528 Hagan, loc. cit., p. 39.
- 529 Samuel J. Eldersveld, "American Interest Groups: A Survey of Research and Some Implications for Theory and Method," in Interest Groups on Four Continents, ed. by Henry W. Ehrmann (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), p. 179.
- 530 Myron Q. Hale, "The Cosmology of Arthur F. Bentley," The American Political Science Review, 54 (1960), 959.
- 531 S. I. Benn, "'Interests' in Politics," New series, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 60 (1960), 124.

- 532 John Plamenatz, "Interests," Political Studies, 2 (1954), 3.
- 533 R. E. Flathman, The Public Interest: An Essay Concerning the Normative Discourse of Politics. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 15.
- 534 Vernon Van Dyke, "Values and Interests," The American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 567.
- 535 J. R. Lucas, The Principles of Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 131-132.
- 536 Samuel Krislov, "What is an Interest? The Rival Answers of Bentley, Pound, and MacIver," The Western Political Quarterly, 16 (1963), 830-831.
- 537 Roy C. Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis," The Journal of Politics, 23 (February, 1961), 27; 28-29.
- 538 Donald C. Blaisdell, "Pressure Groups, Foreign Policies, and International Politics," The Annals, 319 (September, 1958), 150.
- 539 Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 8.
- 540 Frank J. Sorauf, "The Public Interest Reconsidered," The Journal of Politics, 19 (1957), 635.
- 541 Glendon A. Schubert Jr., "'The Public Interest' in Administrative Decision-Making: Theorem, Theosophy, or Theory," The American Political Science Review, LI (June, 1957), 343.
- 542 John Dewey, "Interest as Related to Will," in The Second Supplement to the Herbart Year Book for 1895, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1895), p. 15.
- 543 Quoted in A. F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Evanston, Illinois: The Principia Press, 1949), p. 31. See also A. W. Small's "The Scope of Sociology," The American Journal of Sociology, 8 (July, 1902 - May 1903), 208. Small may have had much more influence on Bentley than the latter was prepared to allow. For example, Small briskly asserts that "we need not trouble ourselves very much about nice metaphysical distinctions between the aspects of interest, because we have mainly

to do with interests in the same sense in which the man of affairs uses the term." That is to say, "the railroad interest, the canal interests, etc...." See Small's General Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905), p. 436.

- 544 See Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 148. Bentley's definition is regarded as unusual and it is thought to be inadequate as "it is not ordinarily considered enough to identify the word with activity." On the other hand, when Bentley departs from his stipulated usage, which is frequent, he becomes very traditional indeed.
- 545 See: William T. Bluhm, Theories of the Political System, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 337; p. 350; Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 122; Leo Weinstein, "The Group Approach: Arthur F. Bentley" in Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics ed. by Herbert J. Storing (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 1962), pp. 164-165; pp. 191-197; pp. 173-174; Myron Q. Hale, "The Cosmology of Arthur F. Bentley," The American Political Science Review 54 (1960), 959; Richard W. Taylor, "Arthur F. Bentley's Political Science," The Western Political Quarterly, V (1952), 216, 224-5; R. E. Dowling, "Pressure Group Theory: Its Methodological Range," The American Political Science Review 54, (1960), 945; Charles B. Hagan, in Young, op. cit., p. 42; Krislov, loc. cit., p. 832.
- 546 Famous is Bentley's chiding stricture, "Who likes may snip verbal definitions in his old age, when his world has gone crackly and dry." See Bentley, op. cit., p. 199. A good critique of Bentley's refusal to define and to carefully conceptualize is found in Krislov, loc. cit., p. 832; and in S. J. Eldersveld, in Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 179. Eldersveld contends that there is much conceptual confusion in the interest group literature and that the problem was initially precipitated by Bentley. He agrees that Bentley "had no interest in combining conceptual differentiation with an exercise in taxonomy."

Peter H. Odegard is troubled by Bentley's lack of clear definitions of terms, especially the key notion of an interest. See his "A Group Basis of Politics: A New Name for an Ancient Myth," The Western Political Quarterly XI (1958), 694. On the other hand, R. T. Gol-embiewski defends Bentley's neglect of definitions as

reflecting his opposition to utopian theory where definition is taken to be the starting point. See his "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes on Analysis and Development," The American Political Science Review, 54 (1960), p. 966.

547 Bentley, op. cit., p. 196.

548 See Bentley, "Simmel, Durkheim, and Ratzenhofer," The American Journal of Sociology, 32 (1926), 250-256. A superficial but useful review of the background and influences on Bentley is contained in Harmon Zeigler's Interest Groups in American Society, (Engelwood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp 6-13.

549 See especially Bentley's devastating criticism of A. W. Small, in Bentley, op. cit., pp 31ff.

550 Bentley, op. cit., p.179.

551 This is especially the focus of Small's criticism of Bentley in his review of Bentley's The Process of Government, The American Journal of Sociology, 13 (July 1907 - May 1908), p. 706. Small holds that Bentley substitutes for the "individual billiard balls" explanation of social dynamics the "group boulder" approach, which leaves no place at all for psychic factors.

552 Bentley, op. cit., p. 211.

553 Ibid., p. 444. W. J. M. MacKenzie detects a certain amount of fog surrounding Bentley's equations which he takes to include "(group = intelligent felt activity = interests = pressures = inertia = process). See his "Pressure Groups: The 'Conceptual Framework'," Political Studies, 3 (1955), 250.

554 The analysis of Bentley on groups directly follows Weinstein, loc. cit., pp. 191-192. W. J. M. MacKenzie sees three rather different definitions of "group" in Bentley's work. The same point is made, however, that Bentley blurs the senses and switches frequently and unannouncedly among the senses. See MacKenzie, loc. cit., 250. R. E. Dowling insists that one of the greatest single weaknesses in Bentley is his failure to provide any means for directly identifying groups. See Dowling, loc. cit., pp. 947-8.

- 555 Not only can individuals not have interests, but, if Bentley is serious about his equation of terms, neither can groups have interests. Mancur Olson Jr. believes that in Bentley's system the individual has no place, "whereas group interests were everything, individual interests were nothing." The idea of an individual interest is simply fiction. See Olson's The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 119. The burden of Peter H. Odegard's entire critique can be summed up in his statement, "there is little or no room in this theory for the individual." See Odegard, loc. cit., p. 692. Professor W. J. M. MacKenzie's unusually acute analysis of Bentley and the group tradition breaks down at this point. MacKenzie is of the view that "individuals are held together in groups by interests." Now clearly the interest is the group in Bentley's explicit statement on the question. MacKenzie suggests that individuals have interests and that it is because of these interests that groups emerge. A strict reading of Bentley would have to hold that both these positions cannot be correct. Charles Hagan contends that his view of interest as activity does leave room for the individual. In fact, "The individual is his activity, and his acts are representative of an interest." See Hagan, loc. cit., p. 45.
- 556 The Bentlian definition of interest is defective, Van Dyke suggests, because it "rejects the view that anyone other than the actor has a basis for identifying the actor's interests". See his "Values and Interests," The American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 575. The same complaint is also raised by S. I. Benn, loc. cit., p. 125 and by Myron Q. Hale, loc. cit., p. 959. Hale's contention is that Bentley's group interest is its course of behaviour and that he allows no standard of judgement outside the universe of overt behaviour.
- 557 See Hagan, loc. cit., p. 46. Hagan contends that the question of a group acting contrary to its interest is quite absurd. The point however, is that those who raise this kind of question almost invariably use the sense of "interest" as that which is to an individual or group's advantage: Hagan seems correct in arguing that if interest is defined as activity (quite apart from any question of mistaken consequences), the question has no bearing at all in a Bentlian analysis.

558 See Dowling, loc. cit., p. 946.

559 In Crick, op. cit., p. 129.

560 Bentley, op. cit., p. 271.

561 See Hale, loc. cit., p. 959.

562 Ibid., p. 959.

563 Weinstein, loc. cit., pp. 151ff., Bentley's famous prophecy about the description and the groups and the complete science is found at pages 208-209 of The Process of Government.

564 Bentley, op. cit., p. 213; p. 215.

565 Ibid., p. 211; p. 271.

566 See Weinstein, loc. cit., p. 165; Bentley, op. cit., p. 14.

567 Bentley, op. cit., p. 213.

568 Ibid., p. 213.

569 See Weinstein, loc. cit., p. 197. Krislov maintains that somehow interest is deduced from activity, but exactly how this is brought about, he cannot explain. See Krislov, loc. cit., pp. 832-833.

570 Weinstein, loc. cit., p. 216. He is too straightforward in his criticism here, although his critique of Bentley is by far the best in the literature. Weinstein seems to argue that Bentley weaves this sense of interest into his account of the group process unwillingly, and at other times he seems to be saying that Bentley does not do so nearly enough. He may just be saying that Bentley needs the additional sense although it is inconsistent with his own definition. Part of the difficulty may stem from Weinstein's own conviction that interest as "goal" or "purpose" is the best way to use the term. He argues "the interest is a goal toward which other activities are directed. We may be able to understand why a group acts the way it does by understanding its interest; we would be returned to unintelligible movement of the kind Bentley called chaos if we attempted to see activity and interest as identical."

- 571 Bentley, op. cit., p. 211.
- 572 Ibid., p. 205.
- 573 Ibid., p. 211.
- 574 Ibid., p. 215.
- 575 Ibid., p. 215.
- 576 Ibid., p. 292.
- 577 Ibid., pp. 293-294.
- 578 Ibid., p. 216.
- 579 Ibid., p. 222.
- 580 Ibid., p. 425.
- 581 Ibid., p. 426.
- 582 Ibid., p. 424.
- 583 Ibid., p. 211.
- 584 Ibid., p. 258.
- 585 Ibid., p. 214; p. 215.
- 586 Ibid., p. 373. It is this example which Weinstein uses in drawing out the same point. See Weinstein, loc. cit., pp. 208-212. He argues that "Bentley's use of 'group' or 'interest' does not remain stable for the length of a single example." And that in the specific case mentioned, 'interest' now means not the Republican party as a group, "it means a goal or purpose, of the Republican party." Weinstein regrets that Bentley appears to shift from "groups or interests as formal organisations" ... "to interests as purposes or reasons . . . without attention to the different meanings that the word 'interest' serves." (p. 216). That interest is sometimes used as "purpose" and as "objective" is noted by Phillip Monypenny, in his "Political Science and the Study of Groups: Notes to Guide a Research Project," The Western Political Quarterly, 7 (June, 1954), p. 192; p. 196. In another place, Monypenny relates how "direct observation of the interests or political purposes which

were actively contending at a given time apparently appealed the most to Bentley." This is found in his introduction to R. H. Mahood's Pressure Groups in American Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 4. Peter Odegard believes that on occasion "interest" to Bentley "means some common goal or purpose" loc. cit., p. 694; in an article read and blessed by A. F. Bentley himself, R. W. Taylor urges that in Bentley, "Interest is nothing else than group activity looked at from the point of view of the objective of activity." This is a milder form of expression, but it amounts to pretty much the same thing. See Taylor, loc. cit., p. 216. W. J. M. MacKenzie, who seems not to take Bentley seriously at all about "interest" as "activity", believes that rather than interests, "various other words, such as 'wants' or 'needs' or 'wishes' or even 'purposes' would serve him equally well." In MacKenzie, loc. cit., p. 249.

587 Bentley, op. cit., p. 368.

588 Ibid., p. 441.

589 Ibid., p. 444.

590 Ibid., p. 444. Weinstein seizes on Bentley's very infrequent references to "self-interest" to advance the position that a naive view of "self-interest" underlies most of his formulations. What Weinstein does not raise is how Bentley can speak of "self-interest" at all, given his position on "interests" and on "individuals". Weinstein argues that Bentley often "identifies interest with greed." See Weinstein, loc. cit., p. 223.

591 For further reports on Bentley's move back to subjectivism, animism, and various brands of Witchcraft, see Pitirim Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1928), esp. n.p. 28; n.p. 62; p. 644; n.p. 647.

592 Benn, loc. cit., p. 125. Brian Barry raises this most forcefully in his Political Argument (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 179. He argues that it is important to have a sense of interest which "enables one to see how people can 'mistake their interests'".

593 Bentley, op. cit., p. 226.

- 594 See Weinstein, loc. cit., p. 190.
- 595 Bentley, op. cit., p. 210.
- 596 Ibid., p. 264.
- 597 Ibid., p. 467.
- 598 Ibid., p. 216.
- 599 Ibid., p. 212.
- 600 Ibid., p. 229.
- 601 This ordinary language usage is frequently drawn in, especially when the author is attempting to avoid explicit dispositional senses of the term.
- 602 Ibid., p. 336. The notion that a view of economic interest underlies Bentley's group process (i.e. in the "lower lying groups"), is argued in Hale, loc. cit., p. 959; in Weinstein, loc. cit., pp. 166-167; and in Bluhm, op. cit., p. 350.
- 603 Bentley, op. cit., p. 384.
- 604 Ibid., p. 271.
- 605 Ibid., pp. 293-294.
- 606 The Process of Government was received badly from the very beginning. J. W. Garner's review was squeezed into a few sentences and said nothing at all about the book, other than that it might be worth examining by sociologists. See his Review in the American Political Science Review, 11 (1907-1908), 457. Small's review was longer and less kindly. The first part of this book he held was "much to do about nothing; 172 pages consumed with a cumulative exhibit of the author's limitations". See American Journal of Sociology, 13 (July 1907 - May 1908), 698-706. For comments on the difficulties Bentley's adherents experienced in working even partly within his framework, see W. J. M. MacKenzie, loc. cit., passim; Weinstein, loc. cit., pp. 156-157; Dowling, loc. cit., p. 951. For views on the operational failure of 'interest' as 'activity', see the critique in Roy Macridis, "Interest Groups in Corporative Analysis", The Journal of Political Science, 23 (February, 1961), pp. 26ff; and Joseph La Palombara, "The Utility and

Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations," The Journal of Political Science, 22 (February, 1960), 31ff.

- 607 Bertram M. Gross, Review of A. F. Bentley; The Process of Government, in The American Political Science Review, XLIV (September, 1950), 742.
- 608 Phillip Monypenny, "Political Science and the Study of Groups: Notes to Guide a Research Project," The Western Political Quarterly, VII (June, 1954), 183-201; and Charles B. Hagan, "The Group in a Political Science," in Young, op. cit., pp. 38-51. A related usage appears in Phillip Jacob and J. V. Toscano, eds. The Integration of Political Communities (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964), p. 29. Functional interests are viewed as the crucial foundation for integration. "Such interests might also be defined as actions for which they expect a substantial reward as a result of their efforts." Interest as "action" also implies, in this example, some material advantage. Charles E. Merriam in his New Aspects of Politics (2nd. ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), speaks of political interests most often as motives. On one occasion he does equate "interest" with "activity". He asks "what are the factors that create political interests or activity, or tend to destroy or modify it?" (p. 92).
- 609 Hagan, loc. cit., p. 45.
- 610 The issue is set out in much the same fashion by Avery Leiserson in Administrative Regulation: A study of the Representation and Interests (Chicago Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1942). The term "interest" is restricted to the activities of economic groups. He argues that "interest cannot be separated from group activity, and they may be combined in a working definition of 'group interest' as that activity or behavior whereby individuals, through their group organizations, seek to establish and perpetuate the conditions favorable to the existence of the distinctive group practices". (p. 6). But only a few pages along, Leiserson argues that as a working definition of 'group interest' "an appropriate concept might be found in those purposes common to individuals which have been embodied or objectified in collective rules and practices of established group organizations." (p. 17). So in the last

analysis, "interest" is the "group activity" but it is also, and more specifically, the common purposes of group members.

The purer form of "interest" as activity is used by Jack W. Peltason. He provides this definition. "An interest consists of all kinds of activity of all kinds of people, some of whom may be public officials, in conflict with an opposed array of activities". Quoted in V. Van Dyke, "Values and Interests," The American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 575.

611 Hagan, loc. cit., p. 46.

612 Monypenny, loc. cit., p. 188.

613 Ibid., p. 192. Roy Macridis objects to this equation of "interest" as "purpose". He believes that for the Bentley school, "interest" may mean "an activity for the accomplishment of any given purpose". Macridis, loc. cit., p. 27. Macridis argues that his sense of "interest" is too broad and sweeping for operational purposes, as well as being of "dubious philosophic validity". Macridis attacks those who view interest as "being synonymous with human activity or purpose". That is to say, Macridis believes that the terms "purpose" and "interest" denote quite different phenomenon. However, he seems prepared to allow that "human activity" and "purpose" are synonymous. On balance, then, Macridis is not particularly helpful.

614 Monypenny, loc. cit., p. 196.

615 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interest and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964).

616 Ibid., p. 24. S. Krislov contends that "Truman postulates the congruity of the interest, the group, and the activity" and identifies this with "shared attitudes". In Krislov, "What is an Interest? The Rival Answers of Bentley, Pound, and MacIver," The Western Political Quarterly, 16 (1963), 834. In asserting this supposed synonymous usage, Krislov is simply in error. Not only are the group (interaction) and the interest distinct, but there is a species of group, the unorganized or potential group, which is not even interaction.

- 617 This distinction which Truman draws very early on in his discussion is not picked up for examination by any of his critics.
- 618 Truman, op. cit., p. 33.
- 619 Ibid., p. 34.
- 620 Ibid., p. 511. For their standard comments on Truman's use of "interest" as "shared attitude" see William T. Bluhm, Theories of the Political System (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 337; p. 354; and W. J. M. MacKenzie, "Pressure Groups: The Conceptual Framework," Political Studies, 3 (1955), 253. Those who believe that interest is usefully conceived as shared attitude vary from the flirting non-acceptance of V. O. Key, Jr. in Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed., New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964), pp. 103-104; and the similar position of Abraham Holtzman in Interest Groups and Lobbying (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966;), pp. 11f., to the more dedicated use of Harmon Zeigler in Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 22; pp. 25-26; and the uncritical acceptance by Austin Ranney, The Governing of Men (Rev. ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966), pp. 366ff.
- 621 Truman, op. cit., p. 33.
- 622 Ibid., p. 33.
- 623 Ibid., p. 33.
- 624 Truman, op. cit., p. 512. The quarrel about whether Truman allows for individual interests as well as for group interests, or whether there can be group interests without at the same time being individual interests, has not been especially protracted or bitter. This is largely because most criticism seems to assume that Truman leaves no place at all for the individual or for individual interests. For the popular side of the story, see Stanley Rothman's excellent article, "Systematic Political Theory: Observations on the Group Approach," The American Political Science Review, 54 (March, 1966), esp. p. 17; and Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press, 1965), p. 124; the view that Truman brings the individual back to political science, though not necessarily "individual interests" is argued by Zeigler, op. cit., p. 13. It is not clear in Truman whether interests are only, or primarily, shared attitudes. At times it seems that an interest may be just an attitude, not necessarily shared. For example, "Each of these interests (attitudes) may be wide or narrow, general or detailed." Truman, op. cit., p. 512.

625 Truman, op. cit., p. 64.

626 Ibid., p. 505.

627 Ibid., p. 505.

628 For pointed discussion of this question, though lacking in generosity to Truman, see Rothman, loc. cit., pp. 18-23; and Leo Weinstein, "The Group Approach: Arthur F. Bentley," in Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, ed. by H. J. Storing (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962), p. 519. Zeigler seems to be attempting to dissolve the problem in Truman's favour. but it is a largely unsubstantial effort. See Zeigler, op. cit., p. 15.

629 Truman, op. cit., p. 33; p. 43; p. 505.

630 Ibid., p. 34; p. 35; p. 48; p. 505; p. 114.

631 Ibid., p. 51.

632 Ibid., p. 138.

633 Ibid., p. 22.

634 Ibid., p. 22.

635 Ibid., p. 505.

636 Ibid., p. 511.

637 Ibid., p. 37.

638 Ibid., p. 38. Both Stanley Rothman and Mancur Olson Jr. believe that the real Truman lies in certain hidden assumptions which colour the work without ever coming

to light. Olson argues that "self-interested economic groups always play the largest role ..."; in Olson, op. cit., pp. 125-126. Rothman believes that Truman takes over the utilitarian self interested rationality with the difference that it is played out by groups and not by individuals. See Rothman, loc. cit., p. 27.

639 Truman, op. cit., p. 50.

640 Ibid., p. 512.

641 Ibid., p. 51.

642 Roy C. Macridis, "Interest Groups on Comparative Analysis", The Journal of Politics, 23 (February, 1961), 28.

643 Vernon Van Dyke, "Values and Interests," The American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 575-576. Stanley Rothman notes that the implicit view in Truman is one in which individual's "goals and aspirations as they define them, constitute their interests." See Rothman, loc. cit., p.27.

644 Stanley Rothman, alone among the critics, strikes a blow at the difficulties involved in using "shared attitudes" to stand for interests. However, Rothman does so for the wrong reasons. He argues that a large part of Truman's confusion arises from "the identification of interests with attitudes or values, ... "[i]f they are attitudes it becomes difficult to discuss the changes in the attitudes of group members as to what constitutes their interests," See Rothman, loc. cit., n.p. 23. Now this is no difficulty. It is a logical impossibility. By "interest" Truman means the attitude. All one could discuss then, would be the changes in the attitudes of group members as to the character, objects, intensity and direction of their attitudes. Rothman is here utilizing his own view of interests (from MacIver) as "ends or goals about which people have attitudes."

645 That Truman's legacy is much more a practical account of the development and activities of pressure groups in American society than a clearly conceptualized and much followed notion of interest, is the impression given in Avery Leiserson's review of Truman's The Governmental Process in The American Political Science Review, XLV (December, 1951), 1192-1193.

- 646 MacKenzie, loc. cit., pp. 254-255.
- 647 Several highly respected critics have urged that Truman fails to provide useful operational definitions not only in regard to interests, but also in regard to potential groups. See Macridis, loc. cit., p. 29; Olson, op. cit., p. 128; S. Eldersveld, "American Interest Groups: A Survey of Research and Some Implications for Theory and Method," in Interest Groups on Four Continents, ed. by W. H. Ehrmann (University of Pittsburg Press, 1958), p. 179. Eldersveld's discussion of Truman's conceptual problems is generally extremely helpful.
- 648 Oliver Garceau, "Interest Group Theory in Political Research," The Annals, 319 (September, 1958), 106.
- 649 Ibid., p. 109.
- 650 Jean Meynaud, quoted by Henry W. Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 236.
- 651 Jovan Djordjevik, "Interest Groups and the Political System in Yugoslavia" in Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 208.
- 652 John Dickinson, quoted in Frank J. Sorauf, "The Public Interest Reconsidered," The Journal of Politics, 19 (1957), n.p. 635.
- 653 Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 63.
- 654 Ibid., p. 64.
- 655 S. H. Beer and A. B. Ulam, eds., Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems of Europe (2nd. ed.; New York: Random House, 1962), p. 52.
- 656 Ibid., p. 28.
- 657 Ibid., p. 52.
- 658 Ibid., p. 58.
- 659 Ibid., p. 53. Beer is more explicit in his account of how a judge or a civil servant is not entirely neutral in "his interests and goals". (p. 60).

- 660 Ibid., p. 53.
- 661 Ibid., p. 54.
- 662 Ibid., p. 56.
- 663 Quoted by Emmette S. Redford in "The Never Ending Search For the Public Interest," a Bobbs-Merrill Reprint from his Ideals and Practices in Public Administration (University of Alabama Press, 1958), p. 112.
- 664 S. H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain," The American Political Science Review, 50 (March, 1956), n.p. 17. For a similar use of "interest" as a motivational factor which is part of the personality system, see C. E. Merriam, New Aspects of Politics, (2nd. ed.; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931), p. 92. A wider usage, although in the same general mold, is set out by J. Roland Pennock in "The One and the Many: A Note on the Concept" in The Public Interest ed. by C. J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, Nomos V, 1962), p. 180. Pennock believes that "private interests must be conceived as including the individual enjoyments, satisfactions, fulfillments, and so on that only come in and through society".
- 665 Ibid., n.p. 17.
- 666 Beer, loc. cit., n.p. 23.
- 667 Stanley Rothman, "Systematic Political Theory: Observation on the Group Approach," The American Political Science Review, LIV (March, 1960), n.23.
- 668 Leo Weinstein, "The Group Approach: Arthur F. Bentley," in Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, ed. by H. J. Storing (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962), p. 195.
- 669 Harmon Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 22.
- 670 C. W. Cassinelli, "Comments on Frank J. Sorauf's 'The Public Interest Reconsidered'," The Journal of Politics, 20 (August, 1958), 553.
- 671 C. W. Cassinelli, "Some Reflections on the Concept of the Public Interest," Ethics, 69 (October, 1958), 48.

- 672 The quotation is in Mancur Olson, Jr. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 7. For extensive use of interests as purpose (objective), see P. Monypenny's, "Political Sciences and the Study of Groups: Notes to Guide a Research Project," The Western Political Quarterly, VII (June, 1964), 192; and his Introduction in H.R. Mahood's Pressure Groups in American Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 4. For the use of interest as a goal (objective), see R. E. Dowling, "Pressure Group Theory: Its Methodological Range," The American Political Science Review, 54 (1960), 953; S. J. Eldersveld, "American Interest Groups: A Survey of Research and Some Implications for Theory and Method," in Interest Groups on Four Continents, ed. by H. W. Ehrmann, (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), p. 182; Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 152; and S.H. Beer, "Group Representation in Britain and the United States," The Annals, 319 (September 1958), p. 133.
- 673 V. Van Dyke, "Values and Interests," The American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 567-576. See his Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 130; p. 148. Van Dyke associates "interest" more with means and ends than with goals, that is, he sets the basis for the argument which appeared in the 1962 article. A similar sense is argued in the "public interest" literature by Frank J. Sorauf. He holds that the public interest can be seen as a consciously desired political goal for which individuals and groups are willing to engage in political struggle," and that all interests are selfish in the sense that they are the personal self-centered goals of those who held them." See his "The Public Interest Reconsidered," The Journal of Politics 19 (1957), 624; 635.
- 674 Van Dyke, loc. cit., p. 576.
- 675 Ibid., p. 568; p. 570.
- 676 Ibid., p. 569.
- 677 Felix E. Oppenheim believes that his usage is faulty primarily because it is a poor way to describe human behaviour. It is his contention that people do not

first postulate basic goals and then derive suitable means. He also believes that goals are too vague to admit of much articulate disagreement. He suggests that the disagreement which Van Dyke admits about means may be more normative and less factual than he allows. See Oppenheim, "Instrumental Values and Ultimate Goals," The American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 975-976.

- 678 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 45.
- 679 Ibid., p. 45.
- 680 Ibid., p. 45.
- 681 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
- 682 Ibid., p. 47.
- 683 Ibid., p. 47.
- 684 R. E. Flathman, The Public Interest: An Essay Concerning the Normative Discourse of Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 16.
- 685 J. P. Plamenatz, "Interest (Political Science)," in A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, ed. by J. Gould and W. L. Kolb (London: Tavistock Publications, 1964), p. 344.
- 686 That this sense of "interest" has received considerable use in sociology was argued in Chapter IV above. This use was quite common in the work of Max Weber, A. W. Small, Frank L. Ward, L. T. Hobhouse, and Karl Mannheim.
- 687 S. I. Benn, "'Interests' in Politics," in New Series Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LX (1960), 124.
- 688 Flathman, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
- 689 Kenneth P. Adler and Davis Borrow, "Interest and Influence in Foreign Affairs," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 20 (Spring, 1956), 91. Bernard C. Hennessy uses the same sense where interest is given top priority in his discussion of internal and external attention variables. See Hennessy's Public Opinion (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1966), p. 346.

- 690 Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963), p. 57.
- 691 Robert E. Lane, Political Life: Why and How People Get Involved in Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 133-134. This sense is repeated in R. E. Lane and D. O. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 96.
- 692 Lane, op. cit., pp. 133-134. Lane and Sears use "concern" in the traditional sense of "interest as concern in respect to advantage". "Concern", they contend, "implies that there is some value at stake in a situation, some gain in a preferred outcome; it is future oriented," See Lane and Sears, op. cit., p. 96. This, along with their notion of interest as a disposition related to attention, makes up the ingredients of the general usage presented here.
- 693 Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter: An Abridgement (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 64, p. 84. The authors combine "interest" and "concern" as the two dimensions constituting political involvement. (Neither term, incidentally, is clearly set out). They concur in Lane's view that the two variables tend to select out the same population and tend to be related to behaviour in the same way. (p. 57).
- 694 Lester W. Milbrand, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), p. 51. Harmon Zeigler supports this sense of interest by strongly approving Lane's position. He also notes that "our interest in government affairs will be more intense when we have a personal stake in resolution of the issue." See Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 38.
- 695 Alfred de Grazia, "Nature and Prospects of Political Interest Groups," The Annals, 319 (September, 1958), p. 115.
- 696 Lane, op. cit., p. 143.
- 697 Lane and Sears, op. cit., p. 97. The kinds of questions used to tap the "interest" dimension suggest either the

low point, or the zenith in sophistication. They usually involve no more than "I am interested in politics" -- agree, disagree, etc. (See W. A. Glaser, "Doctors and Politics," The American Journal of Sociology, LXVI (November, 1960), 235; or "Are you very much interested, somewhat interested or not much interested in following the campaign," (See Lane and Sears, op. cit., p. 96.)

- 698 Campbell, et al., op. cit., p. 57. Up to date propositions relating interest to political participations are found in Milbrand, op. cit., pp. 40-53.
- 699 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 155. See his "Symbols and Political Quiescence," The American Political Science Review, 54 (1960), 695-704.
- 700 Edelman, op. cit., p. 164.
- 701 Murray Edelman, "Governmental Organization and Public Policy," Public Administration Review, 12 (Autumn, 1952), 276.
- 702 Zeigler, op. cit., p. 29.
- 703 Ibid., p. 29.

CHAPTER VIII

- 704 J. A. H. Murray, ed., A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), Vol. V, Part II, p. 393.
- 705 J. P. Plamenatz, "Interest (Political Science)" in A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, ed. by J. Gould and W. L. Kolb (London: Tavistock Publications, 1964), p. 343. See also Richard E. Flathman, The Public Interest: An Essay Concerning the Normative Discourse of Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 1; p. 15.
- 706 For example, P. E. Jacob and J. V. Toscano recognize that "these functional interests are by no means limited to economic stakes...." See The Integration of Political Communities (New York: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1964), p. 31. See also J. R. Lucas, The Principles of Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p.131.

- 707 S. E. Finer, "Interest Groups and the Political Process in Great Britain," in H. W. Ehrmann, Interest Groups on Four Continents (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), p. 177. Finer is by no means alone in promoting this usage. The general tenor of British pressure group studies takes this course, as we should see in regard to Eckstein and Potter. Other examples abound. Philip E. Jacob focusses not on the common interests but on the influence of particular interests in the decision-making process. That is, "we want to know not whether a large number of people have this same stake in a given type of endeavor but what interest groups are politically dominant." Jacob and Toscano, op. cit., p. 30. This seems to be the sense implied by Schattschneider, in his proposition that "economic groups universally tend to be active in promoting their interests in politics," in E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressure and the Tariff (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1963), p. 104. R. B. Dishman sets out no firm position on what it means to talk about "the public interest". However, as an example, he speaks of "the public's stake in uninterrupted service or production" in his "The Public Interest in Emergency Labor Disputes," The American Political Science Review, XLV (December, 1951), 1105. The problem of distinguishing this sense of having a social or economic stake in something, and having a general concern about and involvement in something, is severe. Murray Edelman appears to use both senses, but there is no way of knowing for certain. He argues that political quiescence is a function of (i) "lack of interest" -- stemming from indifference or futility, or (ii) "the satisfaction of whatever interest the quiescent group may have in the policy question." See his "Symbols and Political Quiescence," The American Political Science Review, 54 (1960), 695. Now it is probable that in the second case he means by "interesting policy question" more than attention and concerns, something like a financial stake. But this is not the kind of thing we ought to be guessing about.
- 708 S. E. Finer, Anonymous Empire: A Study of the Lobby in Great Britain (London: The Pall Mall Press Limited, 1958), p. 3. See also S. E. Finer, "Interest Groups and the Political Process in Great Britain," in Interest Groups on Four Continents, ed. by H. W. Ehrmann (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), p. 233.
- 709 S. H. Beer, "The Representation of Interests in British Government," The American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 617.

- 710 A. Ranney, The Governing of Men (New ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1966), p. 260.
- 711 Wilfred Harrison, Conflict and Compromise: History of British Political Thought, 1593-1900. (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 117; p. 122.
- 712 Finer, op. cit., p. 14. As an example of "interests" or "groups", Finer advises us that "the fifth set of interests may be styled civic groups". (*Italics mine*).
- 713 Ibid., p. 101.
- 714 Ibid., p. 95. See also Finer in Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 117.
- 715 Harry Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical Association (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960), p. 9.
- 716 Ibid., p. 9.
- 717 Ibid., p. 10. Of course Beer does not maintain this always, nor even most of the time.
- 718 Ibid., p. 10.
- 719 Ibid., p. 9.
- 720 Ibid., p. 11.
- 721 Ibid., p. 10.
- 722 Ibid., p. 10.
- 723 Ibid., p. 35.
- 724 Ibid., p. 26.
- 725 Ibid., p. 10.
- 726 Allen Potter, Organized Groups in British National Politics, (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1961), p. 25.
- 727 Ibid., p. 119.
- 728 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
- 729 Ibid., p. 26.
- 730 Ibid., p. 31.

- 731 Ibid., p. 134.
- 732 Ibid., p. 136.
- 733 Ibid., p. 273.
- 734 J. R. Lucas, The Principles of Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 131.
- 735 Ibid., p. 132.
- 736 John Plamenatz, "Interest (Political Science)," in A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, ed. by J. Gould and W. L. Kolb (London: Tavistock Publications, 1964), p. 343.
- 737 John Plamenatz, "Interest," Political Studies, 2 (1954), 1-2.
- 738 Ibid., p. 4.
- 739 Ibid., p. 4.
- 740 Ibid., p. 7.
- 741 John Plamenatz, Man and Society: A Critical Examination of Some Important Social and Political Theories From Machiavelli to Marx (2 vols.; London: Longmans, Green and Company Limited, 1963), II, p. 311.
- 742 Ibid., II, p. 312-313.
- 743 Ibid., I, p. 136.
- 744 Ibid., II, p. 288.
- 745 Ibid., II, p. 316.
- 746 Ibid., II, p. 318.
- 747 S. I. Benn, "'Interests' in Politics," New Series, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LX (1960), p. 127. Later Benn argues that "the distinction between 'interests' as wants and as claims sheds light on the socialist ideal of fraternity in a producer's cooperative economy." (p. 132).
- 748 Ibid., p. 127.

- 749 Ibid., p. 127-128.
- 750 Ibid., p. 128.
- 751 Ibid., p. 129.
- 752 Ibid., p. 130.
- 753 Ibid., p. 129.
- 754 Ibid., p. 128.
- 755 A similar view is that of A. L. F. Ross. He urges that "the concept of interest itself is legally qualified. It does not embrace all imaginable desires or claims, but only those that are justified. And that means.... that the concept of interests presupposes the existence of a legal order, and that the weighing of interests cannot be the principle from which the law is derived." See his On Law and Justice (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1958), p. 279. Ross, it might be noted, discards the use of "interest" as advantage on the ground that such a usage is much too broad and vague.
- 756 Charles Fried, "Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Courts Balancing Test," Harvard Law Review, 76 (1962-1963), 756-757.
- 757 Ibid., n.p. 756. There are much more than mere echoes of Pound here.
- 758 Ibid., p. 771.
- 759 H. D. Lasswell, and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 23. Lasswell reiterates this in regard to common interests. In terms of the perspectives of the participants, Lasswell contends, "common interest refers to shared demands about value effects (alpha), supported by expectations regarding conditioning factors (beta)." See his contribution to The Public Interest, ed. by C. J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 1962), p. 64.
- 760 Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 24.
- 761 Gabriel Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics, (1965), pp. 194-195. This aspect

of the Almond model is taken up by J. E. Hodgetts. The equation goes as follows: "regional interests would be treated as demand inputs." See his "Regional Interests and Policy in a Federal Structure," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 32 (February, 1966), p. 3.

- 762 Gabriel A. Almond and G. B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, and Company, 1966), p. 29.
- 763 Ibid., p. 73.
- 764 Ibid., pp. 73-74.
- 765 Ibid., p. 98.
- 766 Gabriel A. Almond, and J. S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 34; see also Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 86.
- 767 Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 34.
- 768 Ibid., p. 34.
- 769 Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," The Journal of Politics, 18 (August, 1956), 391-409.
- 770 Gabriel A. Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," The American Political Science Review, 52 (1958), 275.
- 771 Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 33.
- 772 Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," p. 273.
- 773 Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 75.
- 774 Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," p. 273.
- 775 Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 40.
- 776 For a brief critique of the Almond approach see Roy C. Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis," The Journal of Politics, 23 (February, 1961), 31.

- 777 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1965), p. 45. The term "interest" does not appear in Easton's "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, IX, (April, 1957), 383-400, although "demand" is frequently used. Likewise, D. E. Apter finds no use for the term in the theoretical framework which he recommends in "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," The American Journal of Sociology LXIV (November 1958), 221-237.
- 778 Easton, op. cit., p. 46.
- 779 Ibid., p. 46.
- 780 Ibid., p. 47.
- 781 James Mark Baldwin, ed., Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (New ed., Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), Vol. 1, p. 562.
- 782 Roy C. Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis," The Journal of Politics, 23 (February, 1961), 27; 28.
- 783 Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 124.
- 784 For an example, see Beard's The Economic Basis of Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), passim.
- 785 Joseph Cropsey, "On the Relation of Political Science and Economics," The American Political Science Review, 54 (March, 1960), 3.
- 786 Samuel H. Beer, "The Representation of Interests in British Government: Historical Background," The American Political Science Review, LI (September, 1957), 628.
- 787 Oliver Garceau, "Interest Group Theory in Political Research," The Annals 319 (September, 1958), 109.
- 788 Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), pp 511-512.
- 789 R. S. Downie, Government Action and Morality: Some Principles and Concepts of Liberal Democracy (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1964), p. 62.
- 790 Ibid., p. 19; p. 29.
- 791 J. R. Lucas, The Principles of Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 195.

- 792 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 191.
- 793 H. J. Blackham, Political Discipline in a Free Society (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1961), p. 23.
- 794 Andrew Hacker, Political Theory: Philosophy, Ideology, Science (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1961), p. 34.
- 795 C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 228.
- 796 C. W. Cassinelli, "The Public Interest in Political Ethics," in The Public Interest, ed. by C. J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 1962), p. 46.
- 797 Ibid., p. 46.
- 798 In J. A. H. Murray, ed., A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), Vol. 5, Part II, p. 393. This usage is explored by R. E. Flathman in The Public Interest: An Essay Concerning the Normative Discourse of Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 22ff.
- 799 J. Plamenatz, "Interests (Political Science)," in A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, ed. by J. Gould and W. L. Kolb (London: Tavistock Publications, 1964), p. 343.
- 800 A similar view is taken by W. J. Rees. He holds that it is a mistake to identify interests with wants. "Interests presuppose wants but wants do not necessitate interest." See his "The Public Interest," The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 38 (1964), p. 20.
- 801 The notion of "interest" as "means" is argued by Plamenatz in his Man and Society (2 vols.; London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1963), II. pp. 315-318. He speaks of the interest of a class as "whatever satisfies the demand made by its members." (p. 318). And in regard to professions, Plamenatz contends that it is necessary to distinguish between "its true interest in the sense of what makes for its efficiency, and its true interest in the sense of what makes for its efficiency, and its true interest in the sense of what makes for the enduring happiness

of its members." (n.p. 218). A similar usage, though only briefly and perhaps unwittingly employed, appears in H. D. Lasswell, and A. Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 24. See also J. Plamenatz "Interests (Political Science)," in Gould and Kolb, op. cit., p. 343.

802 S. I. Benn, "Interest's in Politics," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, LX (1960), p. 124. C. W. Cassinelli takes a very similar position. He believes that individual interests may be conceived as "those things which are good for certain individuals, in terms of some standard not set by the individuals themselves, but which are not good for all individuals." So interests are means to an individual's good, and means which exist quite apart from their own recognition and evaluation of them as means, Cassinelli argues for a use of "interest" in a non-dispositional sense, that is, for a notion of an interest which is not possessed by an individual and by a public. See his "Some Reflections on the Concepts of the Public Interests," Ethics, 69 (1958), 56.

803 Benn, loc. cit., p. 124.

804 Ibid., p. 124.

805 Ibid., p. 126.

806 R. E. Flathman, op. cit., p. 15.

807 Ibid., pp. 16-17.

808 Ibid., pp. 16-17.

809 Ibid., pp. 16-17.

810 Ibid., p. 22.

811 W. J. Rees, loc. cit., p. 19.

812 Ibid., p. 19.

813 Ibid., p. 19.

814 Ibid., p. 20.

815 Ibid., p. 20.

- 816 Ibid., p. 20.
- 817 Ibid., p. 23.
- 818 Brian Barry, Political Argument (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 38.
- 819 Ibid., p. 216.
- 820 Ibid., p. 174.
- 821 B. Barry, "The Public Interest," The Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volume, 38 (1964), 4.
- 822 Ibid., p. 3.
- 823 Barry, op. cit., p. 175.
- 824 Ibid., p. 175.
- 825 Ibid., n.p. 175. This Barry allows, is the notion advanced by J. Plamenatz and S. I. Benn.
- 826 Ibid., p. 175.
- 827 Barry, loc. cit., pp. 3-4; p. 5.
- 828 Ibid., p. 4. His definition reappears in his "The Use and Abuse of the 'Public Interest'," in The Public Interest, ed. by C. J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 195 and in Political Argument, p. 176.
- 829 Barry, op. cit., p. 175. Locke, of course, uses many different senses of interest. This could be embarrassing to Barry, and for that reason, it is all the more important to ask why this particular sense has been selected. For example, Locke uses "interest" as a disposition (or as advantage) in the following comment on the law of nature . . . "they who through passion or interest shall miscite or missapply it." In John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, J. W. Gough, ed., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), p. 69. Interest is an end or goal in his view of the function of law as "the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest." (p. 29). Interest is an out and out motive in the following: "reason is easier to be understood than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men, following a contrary and hidden interest put into words. . . ." (p. 81).
- 830 Ibid., p. 183.
- 831 Ibid., p. 216.
- 832 Ibid., p. 216.
- 833 Ibid., n.p. 208.

834 Ibid., p. 176.

835 Ibid., p. 176.

836 Ibid., p. 176.

837 Ibid., p. 177.

838 Ibid., n.p. 187.

839 Ibid., n.p. 175. Some of the clearest and most revealing statements seem to be found in Barry's footnotes.

840 Ibid., n.p. 175.

CHAPTER IX

841 E.E. Eubank, "The Concepts of Sociology," Social Forces, 5 (March, 1927), 388.

842 May Brodbeck, ed., Readings in The Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1968), p. 90.

843 Ibid., p. 6.

844 Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 65.

845 Nominal definitions play a key role in the formulation of scientific theories. The function of this kind of definition is to define a new expression, a concept. It singles out a concept and gives it a special name. The formal characteristics of a nominal definition are clearly set out by Hempel.

[A] convention which merely introduces an alternative - and usually abbreviatory notation for a given linguistic expression, in the manner of the stipulation. . . [a] stipulation to the effect that a specified expression, the definiendum, is to be synonymous with a certain other expression, the definiens, whose meaning is already established.

See Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 2. The notion of a nominal definition is similarly set out in Van Dyke, op. cit., p. 66; and by Abraham Kaplan in The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology For Behavioural Science (San Francisco, California: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 72. A. Brecht's brief discussion of definitions is quite useful. See his Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 510-512. For detailed comments on contextual and conditional definitions, see Hempel, op. cit., p. 4; Brodbeck, op. cit., p. 4; and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

Operationism can be roughly but conveniently classified into two major varieties; narrow operationism and broad operationism. The thesis of narrow operationism is best argued by its founder P. W. Bridgeman. "[I]n general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations. . . . [concepts] are undefined and meaningless in regions as yet untouched by experiment." Bridgeman is quoted in William P. McEwen, The Problem of Social-Scientific Knowledge (Totowa, N.J.: The Bedminster Press, 1963), p. 92. McEwen's entire discussion is clear and well-argued, and could be most profitably read in conjunction with Gideon Sjoberg's "Operationalism and Social Research," in Symposium on Sociological Theory, ed. by Llewellyn Gross (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1959), pp. 603-627. The adherents of the more rigid position are neither as plentiful nor persuasive as in the somewhat crude empirical phase of a few decades ago. The basic idea of operationism is fairly straight forward. The terms and concepts used must be framed in terms of operations which can be reduced to easily replicable physical manipulations. The criterion for the application of a term, for example, "length," would consist in specifying appropriate rules and procedures for the measurement of length. Length is simply what the procedures measure. In this view of the matter, in McEwen's summation "a thing is defined by the operations required to construct or observe it," or as Goode and Hatt observe, a concept is defined "by describing the operations which observe, measure, and record a given phenomenon." See McEwen, op. cit., p. 92; and William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, Methods in Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952), p. 53. Several well-argued cases for this position are found in Melvin H. Marx, ed., Psychological Theory: Contemporary Readings (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1951). See especially the article by S. S. Stevens, "Psychology and the Science of Science," pp. 21-54; and Edward C. Tolman's "The Intervening Variable," pp. 87-102. The extreme formulation of narrow operationism argues that operations and theoretical definitions (if they are allowed at all) should be associated on a one to one basis. If the operations were changed, the concept changed. The view held by broad operationism is that there are two different kinds of definitions, theoretical and operational ones, and that they are two ways of defining the same concept. The point is to have the latter

formulated initially in terms of the former and, in the light of research experience, to have the former modified in the light of the latter. This procedure, and the difficulties encountered in its application, are capably outlined by Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 8-11. See also the discussion by H. Morgenau quoted in McEwen, op. cit., p. 127. Morgenau insists that "every scientific quantity must be defined in two ways: operationally and constitutively. . . . [U]nless the vital interplay between these two procedures leading to concept formation is clearly recognized, we shall not understand why science is the progressing, self-correcting enterprise which in fact it is. Without operational definitions it fails to be applicable. The union of both makes it a going concern." So broad operationism is also concerned about operations which allow precise measurement, but it does so with accompanying theoretical concerns. In the view of Melvin Marx, operationism is a "formal attempt to stimulate critical evaluation of the relationship between logical constructs and their supporting empirical evidence." in Marx, op. cit., p. 13. See also the account advanced by Gustav Bergmann and Kenneth W. Spence, "Operationism and Theory Construction," in Marx, op. cit., pp. 54-66; and in Hempel, op. cit., p. 39. For one of the best practical guides, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Evidence and Inference in Social Research," in Brodbeck, op. cit., pp. 608-634.

- 846 Anselm Strauss, "The Concept of Attitude in Social Psychology," The Journal of Psychology, 19 (1945), 329; 335.
- 847 M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert W. White, Opinions and Personality, Science Editions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 7.
- 848 Brecht, op. cit., p. 58.
- 849 Eubank, loc. cit., 388.
- 850 Brecht, op. cit., p. 58.
- 851 Brodbeck, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
- 852 Ibid., p. 8. There is a surprising agreement in the literature on the broad question of the significance of a scientific concept. Brodbeck and Brecht are at one on this point. Kenneth Spence means by significance, "the extent to which a concept or variable aids or enters into the formulation of laws. Significant concepts in

science are those which are discovered to have functional relations with other concepts." See his "The Emphasis on Basic Functions," in Marx, op. cit., p. 177. To Feigl, a concept is scientifically worthwhile if it assists in prediction, and, possibly, in control. See his excellent article, "Operationism and Scientific Method" in Herbert Feigl and Wilfred Sellars, eds. Readings in Philosophical Analysis (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949), p. 504.

853 Hempel, op. cit., p. 47.

854 Brodbeck, op. cit., p. 5.

855 Hempel, op. cit., p. 49.

856 There is a much deeper and more complex issue involved which goes directly to the crux of the nature of explanation in the social sciences. It is simply mentioned here in passing. The question is whether or not social science language must embody ordinary language meanings to be able to adequately explain behaviour which goes forward in terms of meanings expressed and understood in ordinary language. Brodbeck appears to think not. Kaplan, however, argues that the data for behavioural science are not sheer movements but "actions - that is, acts performed in a perspective which gives them meaning or purpose." He suggests a distinction between "act meaning," the meaning an act has to the actor, and "action meaning," the meaning an act has to scientists. The scientist is advised to begin with "act meanings" and to then search for meanings of the interpreted acts. See Kaplan, op. cit., p. 32. Alfred Schutz is even more insistent that a theory purporting to explain social reality "must develop particular devices foreign to the natural sciences in order to agree with the common sense experience of the social world." Social science constructs at the second level must, he argues, include reference to the subjective meaning of an action for the actor. See his "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," in Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader, ed. by Maurice Matanson (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 241-242.

857 See Rollo Handy, Methodology of The Behavioral Sciences: Problems and Controversies (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, Publishers, 1964), pp. 144 ff.

858 John Madge, The Tools of Social Science (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953), p. 38.

859 Kaplan, op. cit., p. 45. See also Hempel, op. cit., p. 1.

860 Hempel, op. cit., p. 11.

CONCLUSION

- 1 M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert W. White, Opinions and Personality, Science Editions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 33.
- 2 Ibid., p. 261; See also pp. 262-265.
- 3 Lester W. Milbrand, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965), p. 53. See generally p. 39 ff.
- 4 The literature on "the public interest" has become larger in quantity and somewhat more rigorous in recent years. The following is but a brief account of some of the principal contributions. Richard E. Flathman, The Public Interest: An Essay Concerning the Normative Discourse of Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966); Brian Barry, Political Argument (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965). Carl J. Friedrich, ed. The Public Interest (New York: Atherton Press, 1962). Brian Barry, "The Public Interest", Supplementary Volume, The Aristotelian Society, 38 (1964), 1-18; See W. J. Rees, "The Public Interest", in the same journal and number, pp. 19-38; Frank J. Sorauf, "The Public Interest Reconsidered," The Journal of Politics, 19 (1957), 616-639; C. W. Cassinelli, "Comments on Frank J. Sorauf's 'The Public Interest Reconsidered,'" The Journal of Politics, 20 (August, 1958), 553-556; C. W. Cassinelli, "Some Reflections on the Concept of the Public Interest," Ethics, 69 (October, 1958), 48-61; William D. Zarecor, "The Public Interest and Political Theory," Ethics, LXIX (July, 1959), 277-280; Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest: A critique of the Theory of A Political Concept (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960).
- 5 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965), pp. 45-47.
- 6 Flathman, op. cit., p. 14-31.
- 7 Samuel Krislov, "What is An Interest? The Rival Answers of Bentley, Pound, and MacIver," the Western Political Quarterly, 16 (1963), 830.
- 8 Glendon A. Schubert Jr., "'The Public Interest' in Administrative Decision-Making: Theorem, Theosophy, or Theory," American Political Science Review, LI (June, 1957), 343.
- 9 Joseph Dunner, ed., Dictionary of Political Science (New York: Philosophical Library, 1964).

- 10 Ibid., p. 418.
- 11 Harry Bock, Horst Cirullies, and Gunter Marquand, Polec: Dictionary of Politics and Economics (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1964); Florence Elliott and Michael Summerskill, eds., A Dictionary of Politics. (3rd ed.; London: Penguin Books, 1961).
- 12 Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 2.

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